VI.

NAVAL AVIATION.

The aeroplane idea is so old that we find it in Greek mythology, and it is consequently of unknown antiquity. Hundreds of years before Christ there were hoary old legends of Dædalus and Icarus, who made wings for themselves and flew. Icarus flew too high, the sun melted his wings, with the result that there happened to him what happens about once a week to aviators to-day, he fell and died. Contemporary with these legends, are legends of floating rocks which spurted out fire--stories which sounded inestimably silly till steamships came along. We may imagine prophets able to look ahead[39] and to invest their day with visions of the future. Equally we can discard prophets and imagine a civilisation long since dead which knew all about flying and steamers, and survives in legends only.

[Illustration:

_Photo_] [“_Topical._”

BRITISH NAVY SEAPLANE.]

The latter alternative is really the more reasonable of the two. While imagination can do a very great deal and exaggerate to any extent, it must have a base to work on. It is easier to believe in some long gone and extinct civilisation which destroyed itself in the air, than to believe that pure imagination accounts for the flying stories of long ago. Africa is full of traces of vast cities older than any history, telling of past civilisations of which nothing is or ever will be known. Also there is practically no known age in which anything but the motive power stood between aeroplane theories and their realisation.

In support of the theory that men flew before to-day there is the following:--Somewhere about the year 1100, that is to say, back in the reign of King Stephen, a French historian relates the appearance of “as it were, a ship, in the air over London.” It anchored, and the citizens of London got hold of the anchor. The airship sent a man down to free it, and the citizens of London caught him and drowned him in the river. The rest of the aviators then cut the rope and sailed away.

This incident is mentioned so baldly and casually and so much mixed up with ordinary petty chat of the era (chat which proves to have been quite true), that it takes far more faith to accept it as “pure lies” than to accept it as fact more or less.

These legends cannot be disregarded lightly. They one and all give priority to the aeroplane--the “heavier than air” vehicle. Once in a way the “lighter than air” idea got a casual look in; but it was not till the end of the eighteenth century that it got into the regions of practical politics with the French Montgolfiers. But there were people who invented elementary aeroplanes long before Montgolfier.

From the end of the eighteenth century until to-day the Montgolfier idea of “lighter than air” has got little further. The shape has altered; instead of hot air, hydrogen gas is now employed; and by means of motors the balloon no longer drifts before the wind. But progress is terribly slow. That it is so, is a very important thing to recognise, as slow development is by no means a reason for ignoring an invention. Sometimes it is quite the opposite.

It will probably be a good many years before it is definitely settled whether the “heavier than air” or “lighter than air” principle is the better for Naval purposes, though there are not wanting enthusiasts who decry the “lighter than air” machines altogether.

This is probably a grave mistake, brought about by the fact that practical balloons existed long before practical aeroplanes, and dirigibles made flights before ever aeroplanes rose off the earth. Yet the dirigible is in a far more elementary stage than the aeroplane is. Not only is the aeroplane a much older idea in the theoretical direction, but, being very much smaller, it on that account has very possibly developed more quickly.

The world has been building ships for thousands of years, yet it has only recently developed _Tigers_ and _Olympics_, and both are still developing and likely to do so for some time to come. Row-boats, however, arrived at perfection a good thousand years ago. That is to say, there has been no alteration or improvement in them at all commensurate with the alterations that have taken place in big ships during the same period.

[Illustration:

_Photo_] [_Sport & General._

HOISTING A NAVAL SEAPLANE ON BOARD THE _HIBERNIA_.]

Something of the same sort is quite possible with aeroplanes. It is already comparatively easy to forecast their eventual form without much danger of being proved a false prophet later on. We may safely say that they will become capable of much higher speeds than at present; also (which is perhaps more important) _slower_ speeds; and that all existing troubles with stability will eventually be overcome. But experiments made with birds indicate that the run which an aeroplane has to take before it can rise occurs in much the same proportion with birds; and so there are few, if any, practical men who now expect to see future aeroplanes capable of rising vertically from the ground, or hovering in the air except under such conditions as any bird can hover without inconvenience.

The possibilities of the dirigible, on the other hand, no man can foresee. The gasbag that can be brought to the ground by a single bullet hole in it, is a very different thing from the possibility of airships of the future, which may be a mile or two long, divided into innumerable compartments, filled with non-explosive gas such as is sure to be discovered sooner or later. Two miles seems an extraordinary length to-day, but a ship ten miles long would only be something like the ratio of the early dirigible to the future ones compared to the ratio Dreadnoughts bear to the first ships built by men.

On the water, bulk is limited by the depth and size of harbours, but in the vast regions of the air there are practically no limitations whatever, and there is virtually nothing to limit size, save the building of land docks on open plains into which airships could descend for purposes of repair and so forth. Consequently those who hastily assume from a few accidents that the “lighter than air” craft has no future are probably making a mistake; at any rate, so far as naval work is concerned. Certain definite uses are apparent even now to those who think and ignore commercial rivalries.

It has been wisely laid down that aeroplanes for naval purposes must be capable of rising from and descending on the water. The Curtiss was the first successful hydro-aeroplane, but since then floats have been fitted to various other types with equal success. It is doubtful whether naval aeroplanes will ever be carried on shipboard like boats, although this is by no means impossible. It will, however, be more convenient for a variety of reasons to use them like submarines with their own special depot ships.

The main naval use of aeroplanes at the outbreak of war was for scouting purposes. How near they would be able to approach a hostile fleet was a question not likely to be solved until the day of battle. The question of their being hit is secondary to the question of their being upset, owing to tremendous concussions of heavy gun fire. The idea of aeroplanes dropping bombs down the funnels of warships can be dismissed as the entirely fanciful dreams of people who know nothing whatever about aeroplanes or the mathematical problems involved. Judging by recent events, dropping bombs anywhere upon a moving ship is nearly or entirely impossible, except at ranges where the aviator would at once be brought down by rifle fire.

A far more likely and useful service would be the destruction of enemy aeroplanes. For this purpose a special gun, firing a species of chain shot, has already been suggested, and the naval aeroplane of the future was always certain to carry a gun of some kind. The off-chance of doing a certain amount of damage to a hostile ship by dropping a bomb upon it, is nothing compared to the importance of destroying the enemy’s aeroplanes. This last seems likely to be all-important as time goes on.

The duties of naval airships will be of a different nature. Already a point kept in view in their design is ability to “keep the air” for a considerable period, and with what are in these days “large airships” of the Zeppelin type (to which the ill-fated Naval Airship No. 1 _Mayfly_ belonged) there seems no reason why an airship should not be kept in the air for three or four days already.

The fuel problem is not very difficult, because a great deal can already be done without the use of the engines, or with only partial use of them. It is also more than probable that with a view to further economy some kind of sails, combined with sea-anchors, will be evolved, whereby the ship might become able to sail in the air nearly as well as the old three-deckers, or, at any rate, as well as the masted ironclads, sailed in the water. The difficulty of “keeping the air” is the inevitable leakage of gas, but as leakage nowadays is infinitesimally less than it once was, the assumption is that as the years go on it will eventually be reduced to almost a minus quantity. Gales will be met by “bulk” and efficient anchors, on the principle that the gale which swamps a fishing-boat or blows over a haystack has no effect on a Dreadnought or a cathedral.

Ability to keep the air will enable all Fleets to be accompanied by airships, which would detect mines and perhaps submarines, and with their ability to adapt their speeds at will, the presumption is that they would be able to destroy submarines by bombs.

A further and very important duty would be the detection of torpedo attacks at night. Experiments carried out in Austria some few years ago with a captive balloon proved conclusively that except in cases of thick fog any vessels in motion are easily detected at a distance of ten or twelve miles. It is not merely the tell-tale flames in the funnels which betray attacking vessels; their wakes are always clearly visible, and as a general rule the vessels themselves, no matter how dark the night.

Bomb-dropping from an airship must be a more serious matter than from aeroplanes, as so much more in the way of explosives could be carried. The chance of being hit, however, would probably be so much greater that it was (when war broke out) unlikely that any airships would be risked for such purposes. Nor is it very probable that naval airships will for some time to come attack each other, if they can possibly avoid it, the reason being that for a good many years they will be comparatively few in number, and the attack would have, in most cases, to be delivered in the presence of a fleet, which would make the attack, to say the least of it, very hazardous.

Eventually, of course, aerial Dreadnoughts fighting each other are probable enough; but “the Trafalgar of the air” is unlikely to be witnessed within the lifetime of most or any of us now living. Nor is it likely that aerial Dreadnoughts will replace Dreadnoughts of the water, although as years go on they may cause profound modifications in design in order to allow of mounting guns for vertical fire.

We are in the presence of the introduction of a “new arm.” But between what a “new arm” can actually accomplish, and what enthusiastic inventors say it will do, there is always an enormous gap. Inventors, when they come to prophesying, are usually one of two things--asses, or prodigious asses! France--once the second Naval Power in Europe--became of little or no account because it took the submarine at the enthusiastic inventor’s face value, and neglected the present and immediate future.

The present stage of aerial progress in the British Navy is briefly to be summarised as follows:--

1. A big Zeppelin type naval airship was built in 1909–1911. It proved a total failure.

2. In 1911 four naval officers were appointed to learn aeroplane work. Subsequently a few others were appointed. Others, again, qualified privately. In 1912, the Royal Flying Corps was established--both naval and military aviators becoming “wings” of the same body--an excellent principle, but one necessarily experimental so far as practical work was concerned.

3. In practice it proved a failure; so the Naval Air Service was formed into a branch by itself. Four small army airships were handed over to it--craft too small to be of any value except for instructional purposes.

At the outbreak of war there were two effective dirigibles--one of French type of Astra-Torres design, the other a Parseval purchased in Germany. Neither of these ships is in any way comparable to the German Zeppelins in dimensions or endurance. A number of other dirigibles of varying sizes were on order, but it is inadvisable to publish any

## particulars on this subject. The designs for these were foreign, but

the construction was British.

In the matter of aeroplanes a number of special naval stations were established and supplied with seaplanes and landplanes of various types, while strenuous efforts were made towards the training of a large number of efficient pilots. The building of an aeroplane is a matter of only a few weeks, whereas the training of a really efficient pilot is a matter of a year or thereabouts.

VII

AUXILIARY NAVIES.

No account of the British battle fleet would be complete without reference to the various auxiliary navies. Though none of them possesses any very serious fighting value, yet all possess potentialities for the future which can with difficulty be computed.

The auxiliary navies may be divided into two main sections--(1) those which are direct branches of the British Navy, and (2) those which belong to the semi-independent colonies.

Of the former, the principal is the Royal Indian Marine, which consists of a number of armed troopships. Of these the chief are the _Northbrook_, launched at Clydebank in 1907, 5,820 tons, 16 knot speed, and an armament of six 4-inch and six 3-pounders. The _Dufferin_, which was launched in 1904, is of 7,457 tons, has a speed of 19 knots, and an armament of eight 4-inch and eight 3-pounders. The _Hardinge_, launched 1900, is of 6,520 tons, 18 knots speed, and carries six 4.7-inch guns as well as six 3-pounders and 4 Maxims.

There are three older troopships, the _Minto_ (1893), the _Elphinstone_ (1887), and the _Dalhousie_ (1886). These are supplemented by ten small steamers and nine small mining vessels.

The germ of this fleet was created in the early seventies when the breastwork monitors _Abyssinia_ and _Magdala_ were sent out for the defence of Indian harbours. These were small predecessors of the _Devastation_, very similar to the home coast-defence monitors of the _Cyclops_ class, and carried four 18-ton muzzle-loading guns.

About the year 1888 some new torpedo boats (Nos. 100–106) were lent for the Indian Marine service. These, with their names and numbers, were as follows:--_Baluch_ (100), _Ghurka_ (101), _Kahren_ (102), _Pathan_ (103), _Maharatta_ (104), _Sikh_ (105), and _Rajput_ (106). The two earliest numbers were built by Thornycroft, and were of 92 tons; the others were built by White, of Cowes, and were of 95 tons displacement.

In the years 1890–91 two torpedo gunboats, _Plassy_ and _Assaye_, of the _Sharpshooter_ class, were launched at Elswick for the Indian Marine, in which they remained until withdrawn in the early years of the present century.

On a similar footing to the Royal Indian Marine are the flotillas, mostly consisting of river gunboats, maintained in North and South Nigeria and in Central Africa, and the gunboats on the Nile under the Egyptian Government.

The Colonial Navies are on a different standing. First place in their formation belongs to Australia. The monitor _Cerberus_, practically a sister of the _Abyssinia_ and _Magdala_ already mentioned, was launched at Jarrow in 1868 for Victoria. This vessel (which still exists as a drill ship) is of 3,480 tons, armed with four 18-ton muzzle-loaders, and protected with an 8-inch belt.

In 1884 Australia’s local defence was re-inforced with four gunboats as follows:--The _Protector_, of 920 tons, carrying one 8-inch and five 6-inch guns, for South Australia. She, as well as the others, was built at Elswick. For Western Australia a similar vessel of 530 tons, named the _Victoria_, was built, armed with one 18-ton muzzle-loader. The _Gayundah_ and _Paluma_, also of the same type, carrying one old 8-inch and one 6-inch, were built for Queensland. Their displacement is 360 tons each.

From that time onward the Australian Navy occasionally sent a few officers and men for training in the British Navy.

Towards the end of the eighties interest began to be taken in Australian naval defence, and five cruisers and two torpedo gunboats were ordered for local Australian service while borne on the Royal Navy List. Of these vessels the five cruisers were the _Katoomba_ (ex _Pandora_), _Mildura_ (ex _Pelorus_), _Ringarooma_ (ex _Psyche_), _Tauranga_ (ex _Phœnix_), and the _Wallaroo_ (ex _Persian_), all 2,575 vessels of the old _Pallas_ class, of which at the time of writing the _Philomel_ still exists. These ships had a designed speed of 16.5 knots, a protective deck, and an armament of eight 4.7-inch and some smaller guns.

The torpedo gunboat _Boomerang_ (ex _Whiting_) and _Karrakatta_ (ex _Wizard_) belonged to the _Sharpshooter_ class, and were lent under the same conditions as the cruisers.

In the course of time all of them wore out and were eventually recalled.

Coincident with this the Australians commenced to have a revived interest in Imperial defence, and in the year 1905–6 Australia and New Zealand contributed £240,000 to Imperial naval defence, and a project was put forward for the building of eight destroyers and four torpedo gunboats for Colonial Defence purposes.

A few years later this project took a more definite shape, and about the year 1910 the battle-cruiser _Australia_, a sister of the _Indefatigable_, was ordered. As part of the same programme, three protected cruisers of the _Dartmouth_ type, the _Melbourne_, _Sydney_, and _Brisbane_, were also ordered. Previously to this, three destroyers of the _Paramatta_ type had been commenced, and in 1911 three more were ordered, thus forming a nucleus of a serious Australian Navy.[40]

New Zealand’s interest in the Imperial Navy may be said to have commenced about the year 1900. It eventuated in paying for the battleship _New Zealand_[41] of the _King Edward_ class, which was laid down in September, 1903. An old gunboat of the _Magpie_ class was purchased, re-christened the _Amokoura_, and used for training purposes, while to replace some old torpedo boats, which had been sent to New Zealand about the same time as similar boats went to Australia, three destroyers of the _Paramatta_ type were ordered. Finally, an offer from the New Zealand Premier to supplement the Dreadnought efficiency of the British Navy culminated in the battle-cruiser _New Zealand_, which was offered to be provided about the same time or a little before Australia offered a similar vessel.[42]

[Illustration: BATTLE CRUISER “NEW ZEALAND” ON THE STOCKS--1912.]

The Dominion of Canada has always maintained a certain number of small vessels for Customs duties or fishery protection, also for service on the Great Lakes. In 1909 the question of a Canadian Navy became insistent, and two old British cruisers--the _Niobe_ of the _Diadem_ class and the _Rainbow_ of the _Apollo_ class--were purchased as training ships for the Canadian Navy. A project was also brought forward for the creation of Canadian dockyards and building therein four second-class cruisers of the _Dartmouth_ class and six destroyers, though up to the time of writing none of these ships have materialised, and the Canadian Navy is still very much a project in the air.

Newfoundland has a naval reserve, trained over many years in the drill-ship, which is ex H.M.S. _Calypso_.

The whole subject of Colonial Navies is somewhat involved, owing to the question as to how far they should be under the orders of and part of the British Navy, liable to be used when and where required for Imperial needs, and how far they should be regarded as merely for local defence. It has been argued from one point of view that Colonial Navies

## acting on their own responsibility might create undesirable Imperial

complications--as for instance, Australia with Japan, or Canada with the United States. On the other hand it is argued that it would not be possible to arouse Colonial enthusiasm for a Colonial fleet which was not always on the spot, despite any strategical grounds that might exist for its being elsewhere. New Zealand, in May, 1912, negatived this by presenting her battle-cruiser to the Imperial Navy for use where most needed, but generally speaking Colonials think first of local defence.

These two divergent points of view, which are certainly extremely delicate, may be said to be still _subjudice_, but in the year 1911 the following agreement, which is of the nature of a very judicious compromise, was drawn up:--

1. The naval services and forces of the Dominions of Canada and Australia will be exclusively under the control of their respective Governments.

2. The training and discipline of the naval forces of the Dominions will be generally uniform with the training and discipline of the fleet of the United Kingdom, and by arrangement, officers and men of the said forces will be interchangeable with those under the control of the British Admiralty.

3. The ships of each Dominion naval force will hoist at the stern the white ensign as the symbol of the authority of the Crown, and at the jack-staff the distinctive flag of the Dominion.

4. The Canadian and Australian Governments will have their own naval stations as agreed upon and from time to time. The limits of the stations are described in Schedule A (Canada) and Schedule B (Australia).

5. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring to send ships to a part of the British Empire outside of their own respective stations, they will notify the British Admiralty.

6. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring to send ships to a foreign port, they will obtain the concurrence of the Imperial Government, in order that the necessary arrangements with the Foreign Office may be made, as in the case of ships of the British Fleet, in such time and manner as is usual between the British Admiralty and the Foreign Office.

7. While ships of the Dominions are at a foreign port a report of their proceedings will be forwarded by the officer in command to the Commander-in-Chief on the station or to the British Admiralty. The officer in command of a Dominion ship so long as he remains in the foreign port will obey any instructions he may receive from the Government of the United Kingdom as to the conduct of any international matters that may arise, the Dominion Government being informed.

8. The commanding officer of a Dominion ship having to put into a foreign port without previous arrangement on account of stress of weather, damage, or any unforeseen emergency, will report his arrival and reason for calling to the Commander-in-Chief of the station or to the Admiralty, and will obey, so long as he remains in the foreign port, any instructions he may receive from the Government of the United Kingdom as to his relations with the authorities, the Dominion Government being informed.

9. When a ship of the British Admiralty meets a ship of the Dominions, the senior officer will have the right to command in matters of ceremony or international intercourse, or where united action is agreed upon, but will have no power to direct the movements of ships of the other service unless the ships are ordered to co-operate by mutual arrangement.

10. In foreign ports the senior officer will take command, but not so as to interfere with the orders that the junior may have received from his Government.

11. When a court-martial has to be ordered by a Dominion and a sufficient number of officers are not available in the Dominion service at the time, the British Admiralty, if requested, will make the necessary arrangements to enable a court to be formed. Provision will be made by order of his Majesty in Council and by the Dominion Governments respectively to define the conditions under which officers of the different services are to sit on joint courts-martial.

12. The British Admiralty undertakes to lend to the Dominions during the period of development of their services, under conditions to be agreed upon, such flag officers and other officers and men as may be needed. In their selection preference will be given to officers and men coming from, or connected with, the Dominions, but they should all be volunteers for the service.

13. The service of officers of the British Fleet in the Dominion naval forces or of officers of those forces in the British Fleet will count in all respects for promotion, pay, retirement, etc., as service in their respective forces.

14. In order to determine all questions of seniority that may arise, the names of all officers will be shown in the Navy List, and their seniority determined by the date of their commissions, whichever is the earlier, in the British, Canadian, or Australian services.

15. It is desirable in the interests of efficiency and co-operation that arrangements should be made from time to time between the British Admiralty and the Dominion for the ships of the Dominions to take part in fleet exercises or for any other joint training considered necessary under the Senior Naval Officer. While so employed the ships will be under the command of that officer, who would not, however, interfere in the internal economy of ships of another service further than is absolutely necessary.

16. In time of war, when the naval service of a Dominion or any part thereof has been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government by the Dominion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of the British Fleet, and will remain under the control of the British Admiralty during the continuance of the war.

17. The Dominions having applied to their naval forces the King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions and the Naval Discipline Act, the British Admiralty and Dominion Governments will communicate to each other any changes which they propose to make in these Regulations or that Act.

The Schedules A and B defined the stations of Canadian and Australian ships respectively. These stations cover the territorial and contiguous waters in each case. The agreement generally seems framed in an exceedingly able and statesmanlike spirit, designed so far as may be to avoid any possible friction or misunderstanding in the future, and in preparation for the day when the Imperial British Fleet shall be something very much more than a dream or just a fancy.

This chapter merely records the birth of something the end of which none can foretell. It may be the first hint of a great world-wide English-speaking confederation: it may be the swan song of the British Empire. But it is probably one or the other in full measure.