CHAPTER VII

HERAT AND THE WESTERN BORDER

The inception of the policy by which our relations with Afghanistan are controlled at the present time is due to the reflective intuition of Alexander Burnes[11] who, in 1831, when attached to the Teheran Mission under Sir John Macdonald, felt the necessity of combating the growing influence of Russia in Afghanistan. Circumstances, emanating from the presence of the Russian Mission under Prince Menzikoff at Teheran in 1826, disclosed the policy of Russia towards Persia and Afghanistan to be following two channels: the one, real, immediate and acquisitive; the other, remote, artificial and aiming at intimidation. The influence of these two methods of approach was inimical alike to Persia and Afghanistan, as also to the interests of India; to their existence may be traced the causes of the Russo-Persian War. The results of this campaign with Russia, in which the Shah was engaged from 1826 to 1828, left Persia smarting under its loss of prestige, broken up into a number of petty principalities and ready to attempt armed incursions across the frontier by way of restoring its good name. Khiva and then Herat in turn were considered, selection finally falling upon Herat as the object of attack. The expedition was begun; but owing to the death of Abbas Mirza, the father of the Prince Royal Mahomed Mirza who conducted the expedition, it was withdrawn and for the time being further action was deferred. In the meantime, affairs in Persia had attracted the attention of India; and, as the weakness of the Persian state increased, Russian diplomacy became more active. Distinguished by a marked hostility to England, the policy of Russia aimed at stirring up the tribes of Afghanistan. With this end in view Russian advice counselled Mahomed Mirza Shah to resume the operations against Herat at the same time that a Russian Mission was despatched to Kabul. The intimate association with the affairs of Persia and Afghanistan, which distinguished the position of Russia at this date, is interesting since it reveals how closely our Afghan and our Persian policies were interwoven, the one re-acting on the other with sympathetic consequence. There is, also, equal evidence of the influence exercised over India by the machinations of Russian diplomacy.

The existence of Russian influence at Kabul and behind the Herat expedition of 1837-38 synchronised with the formal enunciation of the policy by which, since 1838 down to 1906, our relations with Afghanistan have been governed. Indeed, no sooner was the Persian expedition of 1837-38 launched against Herat than the Government of India awoke to the urgency of the situation. Lord Auckland, embodying in more concrete shape the spirit of the idea put forward by Alexander Burnes in 1831, proclaimed upon November 8, 1838, the necessity of establishing a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our north-west frontier. A treaty of alliance was made with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shujah and an expedition, ostensibly prepared for the relief of Herat but not without the intention of checking the growing influence of Russia in Persia and Afghanistan, crossed the Indus under the leadership of General Keane. Kandahar was occupied and Kabul entered in 1839, when Shah Shujah was proclaimed. Unfortunately, owing to one of those singular mistakes of judgment which, by their very frequency, confirm the impression that our success in Asia is more by good fortune than good management, Kabul was evacuated in the winter of 1841-42 and the beneficial possibilities of the occupation of Kabul dissipated in a disgraceful and signally disastrous retirement.

In respect of Herat, Persian designs upon the fortress were by no means crushed by the effect of the campaign--the first Afghan War of 1838-1842. Within ten years--in 1851--disturbances, arising out of the death of the Khan of Herat, caused the new ruler to throw himself once more upon the support of Persia. This situation gave rise to the Anglo-Persian Convention January 1853, by which the independence of Herat and its continuation in Afghan hands was assured. This step, although indicating the importance which the Government of India attached to Herat and giving direct confirmation to the pronouncement of Lord Auckland in 1838, was not sufficient to secure immunity to the Herat Khanate from Persian interference. Three years later--March 1856--the Government of Persia, taking advantage of a rupture of relations with Great Britain which had occurred in the previous December, despatched a force to Herat. The occupation of the city which followed was short-lived, an _émeute_ occurring in which the Persian flag was replaced by that of the British. Within a few months the espousers of the English cause, receiving no encouragement from the Imperial Government, hauled down their flag and Herat passed once more into Persian hands. Surrendered to Persia on October 25, 1856, it was evacuated finally and restored to Afghanistan July 27, 1857, under pressure of the expeditionary column which disembarked at Karachi in the Persian Gulf on December 4, 1856.

This war, concluded by a treaty of peace signed in Paris March 4, 1857, marks an important epoch in our history with Afghanistan. It denoted the resumption of relations which had been in abeyance since 1842, preparing the way for that treaty of alliance which was signed at Peshawar with Dost Mahommed on January 27, 1857. By this engagement the assistance of the Afghans, in return for a monthly subsidy during the continuation of the war of 1856, was secured against the Persians. As events proved no such help was required. Although hostilities ceased within six weeks of the date of the agreement the monthly subsidy, beginning in the autumn of 1856, was continued until September 30, 1858, the accidence of the Indian mutiny dictating the prudence of preserving friendly relations with Kabul until the very disquieting influences, which were then at work, had been allayed. Relations with Afghanistan continued until 1863 to follow a course more or less overshadowed by the growing importance of Russian intrigue in Central Asia.

While our activities in Persia and Afghanistan demonstrated merely political expansion, a change of quite another order was beginning to define the position of Russia in Central Asia. From this it became evident that a severe test would be imposed upon our trans-border policy. By successive stages, Russian aggrandisement had subjugated the several States which were lying between her territories and the frontiers of Afghanistan when the principles of our policy in regard to that country were announced in 1838. One by one the Turcoman tribes were conquered until, by the capture of Samarkand in 1868 and the submission of the Amir of Bokhara, Russia gained direct approach to the waters of the Oxus, with the right to furnish its bank with armed posts. The moment was rapidly arriving against which all the energies of Indo-Afghan policy in the past should have been directed. In the interval, before the Russian domination of Central Asia was complete, the aim of British policy to bring about a strong Afghanistan had seemed upon the point of realisation when, in 1863, Dost Mahommed died.

None could foresee the developments of the future. The activity of the Russians in Central Asia boded no good; and with the death of Dost Mahommed it was recognised that the resulting situation contained a challenge to the principles of the policy by which, in years gone by, we had proposed to guarantee the inviolability of Afghan territory. Indeed, an attitude of non-intervention was no longer politic; but, instead of seizing the opportunity presented by the death of Dost Mahommed and occupying the territories of Afghanistan for ourselves, we hesitated. Yet, if the passing visit of a Russian mission to Kabul in 1838 had been accounted sufficient warranty for the invasion of Afghanistan, how much more the massing of Russian forces upon its northern and north-western frontiers should have propelled us to a renewed display of energy in 1863. Unfortunately for ourselves, the logic of our position was destroyed irretrievably by the train of hostile circumstance which our supineness had set in motion. Whilst our politicians debated Russia had acted; and Shir Ali, Khan of Herat and son of Dost Mahommed, spurred by Russian promises and intrigues, began a movement against Azim, Khan of Kabul. Varying fortunes distinguished the efforts of the rival factions between 1863-1868; but at length, in 1868, Shir Ali prevailed and he became recognised as _de facto_ ruler of Afghanistan. For the moment the situation showed improvement, as Shir Ali veered from Russia to India. Practical assistance, in the shape of money and materials of war, was at once accorded him by the Government of India, between whose supreme chief, Lord Mayo, and himself as the ruler of Afghanistan a conference was arranged at Umballa in March of 1869. The outcome of this meeting, not by any means so definite as the interests of a trans-border policy demanded, was held to be sufficient to dispel the feelings of alarm which the prolonged military activities of Russia in the Trans-Caspian region had aroused. None the less, while the Russians were occupied with the conquest of Khiva and Shir Ali had been disappointed at the aloofness of the Indian Government, four momentous years 1869-1873 were passing. Their close revealed only the further and more complete estrangement of the Amir of Kabul through the amazing ineptitude with which the advisers of the Indian Government dealt with his difficulties. Bitter, indifferent, and relying upon the Russian promises of assistance of 1872, Shir Ali became openly defiant, repudiating all suggestions for any formal treaty of alliance, 1876-1877. At the same time, 1877, he flatly declined to admit to Kabul any British officers as the accredited representatives of the Government of India, although in 1878 he himself received a Russian mission there. With the failure of our own attempt (1878) to force a mission upon him, the Second Afghan War, 1878-1880, began.

[Illustration: GANDAMAK BRIDGE, WHERE THE FAMOUS TREATY WAS SIGNED]

Kandahar was occupied by Sir Donald Stewart, January 8, 1879; and, while a second force moved into position against the capital, a third under Sir Frederick Roberts marched against Paiwar Kotal. Shir Ali, flying before these operations, died at Mazar-i-Sharif in February 1879, the first chapter of the second war closing with the installation of his son Yakub Khan on the Kabul throne and the despatch of the Cavagnari mission to Kabul. The treaty of Gandamak, May 26, 1879, had barely put the seal upon certain rights, which might have led ultimately to the definite establishment of British authority in Afghanistan, when, in the following September, the sudden massacre of the entire mission occurred. The second phase of the Afghan War of 1878-1880 opened with the operations of Sir Frederick Roberts. Defeating the Afghans at Charasia, he entered Kabul in October causing the overthrow of Yakub Khan and paving the way for the eventual recognition of the late Amir Abdur Rahman as Amir of Kabul. Throughout this occupation of Kabul the temper of the surrounding tribes became slowly inflamed until, in December 1879, a rebellion against the British was proclaimed. The tribes rising, the forces in Kabul were placed in jeopardy by the interruption of communications with India. Action by Sir Donald Stewart, who had come up with forces from Kandahar, stemmed the torrent, the situation growing more complex when Abdur Rahman, who had retired across the Oxus on his defeat by Shir Ali in the war for succession, 1863-1868, reappeared in March of 1880 to establish himself in north-western Afghanistan. Both the Government of India and the bulk of the population welcomed his return, and withdrawing the territories of the Kandahar province from his rule he was recognised as Amir of Afghanistan with certain reservations in respect of foreign policy and dealings with Russia. Unfortunately the disasters which hitherto had followed British intervention in Afghanistan were to continue; in July 1880, but a few months after the proclamation of Abdur Rahman as the new Amir, the news of the defeat at Maiwand of General Burrows was received. Ayub Khan, Khan of Herat and youngest son of Shir Ali, marching upon Kandahar and defeating the British force sent to check his advance, had succeeded in investing the city. Sir Frederick Roberts was now once more to come upon the scene. Taking 10,000 men from Sir Donald Stewart’s garrison at Kabul he set out to the relief of Kandahar, accomplishing by a series of forced efforts an extraordinarily rapid march of 313 miles and, on September 1, 1880, routing Ayub Khan’s army. A little later, in 1881, British troops once again retired to India from Afghanistan; but a sudden attack by Ayub Khan’s adherents in July, 1881, secured the re-capture of Kandahar, Ayub Khan remaining there until, on September 22, he was totally vanquished by Abdur Rahman, losing all his possessions and retreating to Persia, from where subsequently he surrendered to the Government of India.

[Illustration: PLAN OF HERAT]

[Illustration: A STREET SHRINE.]

During this long pre-occupation with Afghan affairs Russia had made considerable improvement in her own position in Central Asia, where but little more than the final touches remained to be given. These appeared with the seizure of Merv in 1884 and the completion of the Central Asian railway between Krasnovodsk and Samarkand 1800-1888. The slow, yet faltering, steps with which Russia had maintained her advance towards Afghanistan, in contradiction of all treaties, in abuse of all frontiers and in contempt of our own inaction, at last forced home upon the British Government the fruits of its own miscalculations. In 1884 along the Afghan north-western frontier as also in 1896 on the Pamirs, Boundary Commissions were assembled to meet the exigencies of the situation. The former of these took the field under the leadership of Sir Peter Lumsden, with whom were associated Colonel Sir West Ridgeway and numerous officers attached for political, survey, military, geological and medical duties, including Major E. L. Durand, Major C. E. Yate, Major T. H. Holdich, Captain St. George Gore, Captain Peacocke, Captain the Honourable M. C. Talbot, Captain Maitland, and Lieutenant A. C. Yate. The Pamirs Mission was under the presidency of Major-General M. G. Gerard, with whom were Colonel T. H. Holdich, Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Wahab, Captain E. F. H. McSwiney, and Surgeon-Captain A. W. Alcock. Russia was represented by Major-General Povalo Shveikovski, Colonel Galkin, Captain Krutorogin, Lieutenant Orakolow, Monsieur Panafidine, and Doctor Welman.[12]

The province of Herat extends from near the sources of the Hari Rud on the east to the Persian frontier on the west, and from the Russian southern boundary to the northern limits of Seistan. The area is 300 miles from east to west and 200 miles from north to south. North, south and west there are tracts of unproductive country, presenting facilities for development only over restricted surfaces. In the east the upper reaches of the Hari Rud valley stretch away to the mountain regions of the Koh-i-Baba. It has been estimated that the valley of the Hari Rud is capable of furnishing supplies for an army of occupation which should not exceed 150,000 men. It is this fact, coupled with the value of its position as the converging point of roads from the Caspian, Merv, Meshed, Bokhara, and from India through Kandahar, which has invested Herat with the title of The Key of India. The Hari Rud oasis presents a wonderful appearance of fertility; near the city groves of pistachia and mulberry trees, blackberry bushes, wild roses and innumerable settlements abound. The Hari Rud, flowing in a single channel 100 to 140 feet in width which diminishes as the summer wanes, has been the means of converting into a smiling paradise the surrounding wilderness. Flood-water in this river lasts from the close of January until the end of March, when fords are dangerous to cross. The subsidence of flood-water in April makes it more readily passable, the average depth of the fords then measuring 4 feet. Later, when the warmer weather appears, the permanent channel breaks up into long lakes, fed by springs and underground continuations of supplementary streams. The northern extremity of the river, which waters the Tejend oasis and the Sarakhs region, preserves in the main the characteristics of the upper stream. The undulating country between the Hari Rud and the Murghab, extending from the northern slopes of the Paropamisus to the edge of the Kara Kum, is called Badghis. At one time this district included the oasis of Yulatan and, even now, it embraces Pendjeh. Across it, along the banks of the Murghab and through the valley of the Kushk, runs the direct road from Merv to Herat. From the levels of valleys within Russian jurisdiction, which are about 2000 feet above sea-level, the road rises throughout a distance of 35 miles until it pierces the Paropamisus range by the Ardewan pass, 4700 feet above sea-level. From these mountains, it descends across the broken slopes of the Koh-i-Mulla Khwaja until it meets at last the alluvial flats of the Hari Rud plain, wherein the city of Herat stands, 2600 feet above sea-level.

The city of Herat, built entirely of mud with certain outworks lying beyond its walls, stands in a hollow. It forms a quadrangle 1600 yards by 1500 yards. On the western, southern and eastern faces the wall is a straight line, the only projecting points being the gateways and the bastions. On the northern face, the line is broken by the old Ark or citadel, which stands back about 200 yards from the main wall and is situated upon a high, artificial mound, which is 250 feet in width and between 50 and 60 feet in height. Above this the walls of the city rise an additional 30 feet. There are five gates--the Kutabchak near the north-east angle of the wall and the Malik gate at the re-entering angle formed by the wall of the Ark and the continuation of the north wall. The other gates are on the western, southern and eastern faces, the names respectively being the Irak, Kandahar and Kushk. Four streets, running from the centre of each face, meet at the Charsu, a domed square covered with beams and matting in the heart of the city. A wide, road encircles the walls on the inside, although its upkeep has been sadly neglected. The defences of the city are contained by the wall which stands above the mound. On its outer slope there were at one time two parallel trenches, covered by low parapets; but the trenches, like the moat at the foot of the mound, are now choked up. There are 25 bastions on each wall. The gates, defended by works differing from one another in shape, are of irregular design. They resemble redans, with sides of unequal length and project about 200 feet beyond the main wall. The defences of the gateways are of a lower profile than those of the main works. At the apex of the projection a small rectangular traverse screens the postern.

The northern wall is irregular. Near its centre, thrown back about 200 yards from the main wall and standing on a mound of its own, is the position of the old citadel. A “return” in the wall, leading down on this work from the eastern portion of the north face, terminates on the counterscarp of its ditch. The western face, retired about 100 yards behind the eastern face, connects with the north-west angle of the citadel by a slight bend. There are two gateways on this front, the one about 200 yards to the westward of the north-east angle and the other in the main wall. This latter is unprovided with the irregular projecting work attached to the others.

The wall of the fort is about 14 feet thick at the base, 9 feet thick at the top and 18 feet high, exclusive of the parapet. The parapet is 2½ feet thick at the base, 9 inches at the crest and 7½ feet in height. It is loop-holed and crowned with the ruins of small battlements which, like so much attaching to Herat, have been permitted to crumble away. In several places the walls have broken down, the repairs subsequently effected adding to the general insecurity of what has remained rather than improving the original breaches. The width of the pathway behind the parapet is 6 feet; but there are many gaps, and continuity of communication is preserved only by the severe physical exertion of flying leaps. Their condition renders them ill-adapted to the employment of artillery, while the ramps leading up to this pathway are barely broad enough to admit the passage of a single man.

At one time this wall was flanked by small exterior towers, placed at intervals of 100 feet. They varied in size and are now so generally in ruin that it is difficult to estimate their dimensions. In their original state they were probably from 40 to 60 feet in diameter, the larger towers being 30 feet in width and projecting 25 feet. In contrast with the containing wall of the city the wall of the fort possesses an outward inclination, equal perhaps to one-seventh of its height. The slope of the towers is generally greater; many of them are splayed at the base to accommodate their foundations to the sloping surface upon which they rest. The whole work appears originally to have been constructed of sun-dried brick, backed with layers of moist earth. Some of the towers have foundations and facings of rough stone or burnt brick, laid in mud. The wall itself is a very old one; stone, brick and earth have been used indiscriminately, so that it now presents a patchwork appearance.

[Illustration: THE IRAK GATE]

The interior slope of the mound, upon which the walls stand, is steep and from the base of the wall drops perpendicularly into the town. No attention whatever appears to have been paid to this part of the fortifications. The inhabitants of the city have been for several generations in the habit of removing earth from it for the construction or repair of their dwellings. At one time, too, houses were erected close to the foot of the rampart and also upon it, the slope being excavated to admit of the walls being erected against it. A partial collapse of the mound has followed, the fallen masses of earth serving as a convenient resting-place for the dead.

The old citadel is a brick structure 150 yards long from east to west and 50 yards wide. It occupies an elevation of its own, and, when erected, stood nearly in the centre of the north face of the city. It was flanked by several towers, differing greatly in size; those at the angles were the largest, while those on the north-east angle were the most imposing. The interior, in part occupied by Feramorz Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, is divided into three courts. The inhabited portion is a lofty building, supported by four bastions along its face, with the entrance gate facing the main street to the Charsu. It fills a space 110 yards in length by 60 yards in breadth. The Ark, from its massive appearance, is very dignified, but it is not calculated to withstand protracted defence if the town itself were captured. Its walls, thickly built but of inferior masonry, are exposed from base to parapet, and a few shells dropped behind them would create great havoc.

The Ark-i-nao, or new citadel, serves as a parade-ground for the garrison. Weak both in plan and profile, it is constructed in advance of the mound, but 80 feet below it and upon a level with the country. It consists of 4 straight walls 300 yards in length. The face is flanked by 5 semi-circular towers, each possessing a diameter of 30 feet. The walls are 13 feet thick at the base and 8 feet at the top, crowned on their outer edge by a parapet 6 feet high and 1½ feet thick. There was once a ditch 30 feet in width and 15 feet in depth at a distance of 60 feet from its base, but it is now a general receptacle for the refuse of the city.

[Illustration: HERAT CITADEL]

Within recent years the fortifications of Herat have undergone radical alteration. At one time, prior to the Pendjeh crisis, the city could not be said to possess an esplanade nor any free field of fire. Detached buildings, even small villages, surrounded it, while cultivation extended close to the walls; and where agriculture ended the cemeteries of the city began. Mosques, tombs and reservoirs stood opposite the gateways, some of them lying within 100 yards of the walls. Vast mounds of earth were also close at hand. Many of these defects were removed[13] under the guidance of the British officers who were assisting in the demarcation of the Russo-Afghan boundary in 1884-87; in 1903-04, under the supervision of Feramorz Khan, additional improvements were made and a number of mountain and field batteries installed.

In general the Herati is not a fighting man and cares little for military appearances. Indeed, if choice were left to the Heratis they would sooner surrender at once to the Russians than run the risk of future disturbances. The garrison is not generally drawn from the locality and seldom includes many Herati, Hazara or Taimani recruits. Commanded by Feramorz Khan, it is composed mainly of regiments from Kandahar and Kabul, whose men lounge through the streets in unkempt undress or clad in dirty linen and to whom belongs such little martial spirit as may be detected in the city. In this direction nothing can be more marked than the difference between the Herati and the Afghan soldier. The former, a peasant pure and simple, is unversed in military science, while it is a rare sight to see the soldiers without an extraordinary number and variety of weapons attached to their persons. Each carries, as a rule, two pistols, a sword, rifle and many knives, their swagger and overbearing disposition causing them to be hated by the wretched population. The position of the city to-day as between Russia and India is rather that of a woman whose wares are put up to the highest bidder. It is not particularly partial to the rule of the Amir, to the overtures of Russia or to the influence of India. One might say that it were indifferent alike to each of these three interested parties and that it is merely a question of price which will determine its surrender. It must be confessed that the fortress occupies an unfortunate position. Whatever the garrison might attempt in support of the huge earthworks which the place boasts, there is no doubt that the sympathies of the population--if the history of the past goes for anything--would be given to any who contrived to evict the Afghans; and, as all reports concur in alluding to the lavish manner in which Russian roubles have circulated in the province, the statement may be hazarded that, under certain contingencies, the tribes on the north-western border of Afghanistan would declare for the Russians. Upon this aspect of the situation various changes introduced by the Amir into the administration of Herat province, and concerning equally all posts along the banks of the Oxus and the western border, have direct bearing. Although there is practically no intercourse between the Afghan and Russian posts on either bank of the Amu Daria, indeed the ferry station at Chushka Guzar is constantly sniped from the Afghan bank by Pathan pickets, there has been an insidious growth of association between the Herat officials and the Russians. Quite lately the Kazi Saad-ud-Din, Governor of Herat, was recalled, the Shahgassi Mahomed Sarwar Khan taking his place, while a warning was administered to the commander-in-chief. There is no doubt that these officials accepted complimentary gifts from the Russian officials at Merv, and the transference of the one and the rebuke of the other may check the propensity of the native to find in the efficacious application of the Russian rouble a panacea for all evils. In respect of the soldiers themselves, orders have been issued from Kabul that all detachments on frontier duty are to be relieved monthly. Obviously Herat is too close to the Russian border not to have been intimidated by the spectacle of Russia’s strength in Central Asia. A similar state of things might not be expected to prevail in Kabul and Kandahar. Kabul is too much under the personal sway of the Amir to express any active interest in Russia or India, while Kandahar has been associated too closely with the reverses which British arms have experienced in Afghanistan to have over much respect for the greatness of Hindustan. Russia is really the supreme and dominating factor in Afghanistan, not only along the northern, eastern and western frontiers, but throughout the kingdom.

[Illustration: KITCHEN IN NATIVE HOUSE]

Herat is a dirty town. The small lanes, crooked and narrow which branch from the main thoroughfares, are roofed and their gloom offers safe harbourage for the perpetration of every possible offence. The breadth of the streets is only 12 feet, but in their narrowest parts even this space is reduced. Pools of stagnant water left by the rains, piles of refuse thrown from the houses, together with dead cats, dogs and the excrement of human beings, mingle their effluvia in these low tunnels. Much of the city has been abandoned and various travellers, in reporting their experiences, agree that the bazaars are of a very inferior order. On either side of the streets there are spacious serais where the merchants have their depôts. The western face of the city is the least populated, the buildings in this quarter being a mass of ruins. The houses are constructed usually in the form of hollow squares. They are commonly of one storey, built of brick and mud, with very thick walls. The roofs are vaulted and composed, equally with the walls, of mud; the entrances are low and winding. These houses are quite incombustible. The larger establishments have stable and servants’ courts attached to them, and every courtyard has, in its centre, a well or small reservoir for the reception of water. All the houses are more or less capable of resisting men armed with rifles, and a determined garrison might, by barricading the streets leading to the ramparts and loopholing the adjacent houses, protract the defence of the place for some time after the walls had been gained by the enemy. There are several spacious caravansaries in the town, all of which open upon the street leading from the Kandahar Gate to the citadel and would serve, in emergency, for the accommodation of troops. At the time of Connolly there were:

Houses 4000 Shops 1200 Baths 20 Colleges 6 Caravansaries 17

Although the city has been almost entirely destroyed since his day, his estimate is of some value for purposes of comparison.

[Illustration: HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS]

The principal building in Herat is the Masjid-i-Jama, which comprises an area of 800 yards square. It was built at the end of the fifteenth century, in the reign of Shah Husein by his relative Prince Shibali. When perfect it was 465 feet long and 275 feet wide; it had 408 cupolas, 130 windows, 444 pillars, 6 entrances and was adorned in the most magnificent manner with gilding, carving, precious mosaic and other elaborate and costly embellishments. It stands in the north-east quarter of the city, about 300 yards from the east walls.

The palace of Chahar Bagh is situated to the west of the Masjid-i-Jama and was originally the winter residence of the chiefs of Herat. It is now the residence of the Governor of the city, but has been considerably enlarged and improved. A fine garden has been laid out with flower-beds and a fountain. It is enclosed on either side.

The inhabitants of Herat, who are mostly Shiah Mahommedans, comprise Afghans, Hazaras, Jamshidis and Tiamanis, with 700 Hindus and some 400 families of Jews. Its population has always been subject to constant fluctuation. When Christie visited it in 1809 the population stood at 100,000 souls. Connolly considers these figures too high, reducing them himself to 45,000. According to Ferrier, again, prior to the siege of 1838 the number of inhabitants was, at least, 70,000; when the siege was raised these numbers had dwindled to between 6000 to 7000, a total which, he considered, had increased in 1845 to 22,000. As under the severe but secure rule of Jan Mahommed life was safe, it is probable that before the investment of 1857 it again approached Connolly’s total. Its siege and capture by Dost Mahommed in 1863 must have once more reduced its numbers; when Vambéry visited it two months afterwards he was met by a scene of utter desolation and devastation, from which, according to the estimate of A. C. Yate[14] in 1885, the city had never recovered. Citing the previous census, which gave the population at 1700 families, the latter returned it at 10,000. The existing number is now a little less than 18,000 people, exclusive of the garrison, which in peace numbers five regiments of regular infantry, twenty squadrons of cavalry, one battalion of sappers and eight batteries.

[Illustration: A CARAVANSARY COMPOUND]

The city has declined considerably from its quondam opulence. There is scarcely any trade and the houses are deserted. It is, nevertheless, famous for its fruit and its breed of horses; but the Heratis have endured too many of “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” to be able to withstand adversity and bad seasons. Wars and sieges, pestilence and famine have had their effect; and the scene, which Vambéry described so brightly, is now sombre and melancholy. No longer is Herat the great central market between India and Persia. It still receives a certain amount of merchandise from Kabul, such as shawls, indigo, sugar, chintz, muslin, bafta, kincob, hides and leather. These are exported to Meshed, Yezd, Teheran, Baghdad and Kirman, and exchanged for tea, sugar-candy, china-ware, broadcloth, chintz, silk, copper, pepper, dates, shawls, numnahs, carpets and all kinds of spices. Silk is obtainable in the vicinity of Herat, and lambs’ fleeces and sheep-skins are made up locally into caps and cloaks. There are, too, a number of native craftsmen who work in silk and metals, leather, iron and wood; but there are few opportunities for their skill and no money with which to pay for it. The carpets of Herat, once so famed for softness and for the brilliance and permanence of their colours, are no longer in demand. At one time they were made in all sizes, ranging in price from 10 to 1000 rupees; but their day is gone. Indeed, in its present impoverished state, the city is eloquent only of a bygone grandeur. Everything is decayed and decrepit.

[Illustration: RELIGIOUS FESTIVAL ON THE PERSO-AFGHAN BORDER]

In relation to future developments in the military position along the western frontier Herat, the immediate objective of Russia, has been for many years the pivot of our trans-border policy. Lying within 80 miles of Kushkinski Post, itself only eighteen hours by train from Merv, it would not be long after the outbreak of hostilities that a Russian force would be before its walls. The passage of reinforcements from Merv, in support of such detached or independent flying column, would be divided between Kushkinski Post and Tanur Sangi, which, when considered from Merv, the main depôt of supplies in Trans-Caspia, rank practically as ultimate bases, with an immediate base at Pendjeh. The position of Herat would be no worse than Maimana, Balkh, Kunduz and Andkhui, upon which an equally rapid concentration would be made. At such a time the forts established at Kala Khum, Chushka Guzar, Kelif and Termes--where, by order of Kuropatkin, a strong work has been placed to cover the debouchure opposite Patta Hissar of the road from Takht-a-pul, the central cantonment of Northern Afghanistan--would be sufficient to repel attack if the Afghans were rash enough to cross. Again, between the Oxus and the chain of main bases established along the Central Asian railway--Askhabad, Merv, Samarkand, Khokand and Margelan, with Tashkent as the great centre of arterial distribution--there would be a line of auxiliary depôts, such as Sharisabz and Hissar and no doubt possessing by the time war occurred railway communication with the Central Asian system on the one hand and the Oxus on the other, to serve as intermediate bases of supply to the ultimate frontier and fighting zone.

In the situation along the extreme eastern frontier, the Badakshan-Wakhan region, the same preponderating strength and advantage of position would be detected in the Russian dispositions. The existence of the several elevated areas composing the Pamirs and acting as a containing rampart to the Russian left flank renders the Russian sphere between Kala Khum and Langar Kisht sufficiently impervious to serious attack. As a precaution against sporadic forays from the Afghan posts on the opposite bank a number of permanent forts, usually included within the Pamir military district, would be available.

On the right bank, between the upper waters of the Oxus and Charog, there is the post of Langar Kisht where the Russians maintain one company of thirty men with a maxim gun. Charog itself, which is opposite Kala Bar Panja, is the principal post of the Russians in the region of the Pamirs. Here the strength of the garrison varies according to the season of the year. During the winter months the muster is fifty Cossacks with four officers and a maxim detachment. Two maxims and a single mountain gun have been mounted on the ramparts covering the river. Charog is connected with Fort Murghabi by a road along the Alichur Pamir and the banks of the Ghund Daria; built of clay, wood and stone, it possesses earthworks of an enduring character. Additional accommodation is in course of construction, as it is intended to establish quarters there for one battalion of troops. The winter strength of the Russian force in the Pamirs is 500 men; this will be raised to 1000 men so soon as the requisite barracks have been erected at Charog and Fort Murghabi. The probable disposition of the force will put 300 men into each of the three forts at Tashkurgan, Charog and Murghabi, the remaining 100 being detailed by companies to the smaller posts of Langar Kisht, Aktash and Kizil Rabat. At Kala Wanj there was an establishment of 300 levies from the native army of the Amir of Bokhara, a further detachment from the same establishment and similar in strength, being in garrison at Kala Wamar. At Kala-Khum, occupied by 1000 men, there was one native regiment. Along the reach of the Middle Oxus the same arrangement held good, native troops being distributed among all ferry and customs posts, constituting a useful supplement to the Russian troops in the riverine areas. Hitherto the employment of the Bokharan levies for garrison and frontier duty in Darwaz, Shignan and Roshan has been quite a feature of the Russian disposition along the Oxus. Drilled by Russian instructors and armed with modern weapons these territorial troops are regarded by the Russians as the equal of the Afghan soldiery. In war, they would be expected to relieve the regular forces of a multitude of fatigues and thus leave the energies and numbers of the Russian command unimpaired by that slow process of attrition by which, in the main, the fighting strength of an army becomes so quickly exhausted. Quite lately these posts have been taken over by the regular forces, the native troops being withdrawn for service in the Khanate. It has been always unlikely that, in the event of hostilities, the Russians would permit levies to take the field against the Afghan forces.

[Illustration: AFGHAN POST AT KALA PANJA _Photo, Olufsen_]

On the left bank of the stream the Afghan authorities maintain posts at Kala Panja, which is opposite Langar Kisht, Kala Bar Panja, which confronts Charog, and Ishkashim. No works of special importance have been constructed to observe Kala Wamar and Kala Wanj, the work at Kala Bar Panja being the central Afghan position on the Upper Oxus. As a fort it compares not unfavourably with the Russian one at Charog; in point of size it is larger than the original Russian structure there. It is in the form of a square; the walls, constructed of clay and stone, are 200 yards in length, about 12 inches thick and 15 to 20 feet in height. It has capacity for about 1000 men and, along one wall, provision for a small force of cavalry.

Possession of these works did not quite equalise the situation and within the last few months many changes have taken place in the Eastern, Northern and Western commands, the raising of 20,000 recruits having been sanctioned by the Amir for the Eastern and Western divisions at the request of the commanding officers. Leading chiefs bringing 1000 men to the colours were to receive the rank of regimental commanders; those who raised 100 men would become company officers. It was further promised that the pay of these new regiments would be issued monthly. The strengthening process has been also applied to the Home or Central command, 10,000 men having been raised in the Shinwari district and sworn in by the Governor of Jelalabad; while enlistment among the Sufi tribal levies has been started for the Kabul garrison. Further, the Governors of Maimana and Faizabad were instructed to entrench their cities, to throw up the necessary watch towers and to place all approaches in a condition of defence. Two new forts were located on the Oxus at Kala Panja and Ishkashim in Wakhan, a third at Boharac and a fourth at Faizabad.

These fresh works possess nominal accommodation for 1000 men, although there is ample space for double or even treble this number. Built in the form of a square, the walls are 6 feet thick at the top and 18 feet at the base. Artillery emplacements have been prepared in the watch towers at each corner and a shooting-gallery runs round the defences a few feet below their parapet. Quarters have been placed along three walls, each wall taking twenty houses, the fourth wall holding the stable, transport and commissariat arrangements. Pathan regiments from Faizabad were detailed to these positions and also to the support of the Badakshan-Wakhan border; new regiments, fashioned from the reinforcements which had been despatched to Faizabad, taking their place. The normal strength of the Eastern command is represented by seven regiments of Pathan infantry, four squadrons of cavalry and five batteries.

Similarly there has been much activity in the Northern command, the Governor of Afghan Turkestan, Sirdar Ghulam Ali Khan a son of Abdur Rahman, having completed his development of the scheme of defences at Dehdadi which the late Amir created. That stronghold has now been incorporated with Takht-a-Pul, which lies between Mazar-i-Sharif and Balkh and where an important fortified cantonment has been established, possessing a permanent strength of several thousand men. Habib Ullah has full confidence in his brother Ghulam Ali Khan and, in view of the delays which occur in the passage of supplies from the Kabul arsenals to the Herat and Turkestan garrisons, the Amir has sanctioned a proposal to construct in Herat and Takht-a-Pul, small-arms ordnance works, tanning-yards and boot factories, so that these two important commands may be independent of Kabul for these elemental accessories to their efficiency. Powers of control over these projects have been invested in Ghulam Ali Khan, who has appointed an assistant to the Herat branch of the undertaking.

[Illustration: A WATER-SELLER.]

[11] “England and Russia in the East.” Rawlinson.

[12] This study of Anglo-Afghan relations is continued in Chapters xvi. and xvii.

[13] “The Indian Borderland.” Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich.

[14] “England and Russia.” A. C. Yate, 1886.

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