CHAPTER IX

SEISTAN AND THE McMAHON MISSION

Westwards of the Kandahar district is the region of Seistan, to which unusual political interest attaches. Roughly speaking, it is divided between Persia and Afghanistan, the Helmund river demarcating the mutual spheres of interest and occupation. Geographically, it belongs to the watershed of Afghanistan. Its extensive areas, situated along the borders of Afghanistan, Persia and Baluchistan, are drained by the Hamun lake, which also receives the waters of the Helmund, Farah, Khash and Harud rivers. The area of this depression, which is broken up into three subsidiary basins--those of the Farah, the Helmund and the Zirreh,--is 125,000 square miles. The first of these consists of the two-fold lagoon formed by the Harud and Farah rivers flowing from the north, and by the Helmund and the Khash or Kushk Rud flowing from the south and east respectively. These are connected by a thick reed-bed called the Naizar, which, according to the amount of water that the lakes contain, is either a marsh or a cane-brake. In flood-time these waters, ordinarily distinct, unite to pour over the Naizar into the second great depression, known by the generic title of Hamun Lake. In times of abnormal flood the Hamun will itself overflow. On such occasions the water, draining southwards through the Sarshela ravine, inundates the third depression, which is known as the Gaud-i-Zirreh. The Hamun Lake, like the Gaud-i-Zirreh, is one of those seasonable phenomena which are invariably met in regions where the water system is irregular. At certain periods quite dry, at others it possesses a measurement of 100 miles in length, 15 miles in breadth, with a mean depth of 4 feet and a maximum of 10 feet. The waters of the Hamun are sweet. Fish are very plentiful, providing food for an aboriginal colony which frequents the lake. It is, also, the haunt of many varieties of wild geese, duck and other water-fowl.

[Illustration: CAMEL BAZAAR, NASRATABAD]

It is better, before proceeding to study further the value of Seistan, to describe exactly of what Seistan consists. Sir Frederic Goldsmid, for purposes of more accurate definition of the region, divided its areas into two parts: Seistan Proper and Outer Seistan. In this he may be said to have given Seistan Proper[20] to Persia and Outer Seistan[21] to Afghanistan. The former lies between the Naizar on the north and the main lateral canal, which waters the lands around Sekuha and the neighbouring villages on the south. It extends along the old bed of the Helmund, from a mile above the dam at Kohak, to its mouth on the east, and to the fringe of the Hamun and the Kuh-i-Khwajah on the west. The population numbers 45,000, of whom 10,000 were nomads of mixed descent. Of the larger total, 20,000 are returned as Seistanis and 15,000 as Persian-speaking settlers, the average number of persons to the square mile being roughly 15--figures which are eight times in excess of the proportional result found elsewhere in Persia. Outer Seistan comprises the country stretching along the right bank of the Helmund, from its lake mouth on the north to Rudbar in the south. The inhabitants are Seistanis, Baluchi nomads and Afghans, together with a certain proportion of Sanjuranis and Joktis--the term Seistani applying

## particularly to that portion of the inhabitants possessing permanent

settlements, irrespective of descent and nationality. The combined areas of the Seistan basin aggregate some 7006 square miles and the joint population is returned at 205,000, or 34 to the square mile.

It is the Helmund river, the chief tributary to the Hamun, that has been the greatest obstacle to the successful demarcation of the Seistan region. Hitherto the boundary defining the respective limits of the two States has been the one arranged in 1872 by the Goldsmid Award. Under that instrument a line was drawn from Siah-koh to where the then main bed of the Helmund river entered the Naizar swamp. The frontier then proceeded to Kohak. From this point it followed a south-westerly direction to Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah, thus leaving the two banks of the Helmund below Kohak to Afghanistan. Since then the Helmund has changed its course, and in that portion of the frontier which was affected by the vagaries of the stream, considerable confusion arose, while local Perso-Afghan relations became very much inflamed. The question as between the two races depended upon the future division of the new bed of the Helmund, the point of dispute dealing specifically with the divergence of the main stream from the channel which was selected as the frontier line by the Mission of 1872. The Afghans, who were the principal gainers by the alteration of the course of the river, claimed that the new bed formed the frontier: the Persians, on the other hand, endeavoured to maintain the strict interpretation of the old agreement.

[Illustration: LAKESIDE DWELLERS]

Unfortunately Seistan possessed interest for others than those who were dependent upon the course of the Helmund, and Russia had already secured the Shah’s assent to the appointment of a Russian consul at Nasratabad. As soon as the dispute promised local unpleasantness between Persia and Afghanistan, and political difficulties for Great Britain with Teheran, this individual, M. Miller, interfered. Exclaiming against the presumption of the Afghans, he offered to provide a force to resist their so-called aggression. Happily, before matters had reached the crisis which would have made Russian interference possible, the Shah, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Paris, requested the British Government to arbitrate on the question of the Helmund waters and, at the same time, to establish a permanent boundary line in place of the vague provisions made by the Goldsmid Mission.

In agreeable accord with this request, the Imperial Government at the end of 1902 appointed as British Commissioner, Major McMahon, who had already demarcated the whole of the southern boundary of Afghanistan--a distance of 800 miles. It so happened that his new duties commenced at Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah, the point at which his former work finished. The mission consisted of eleven British officers, numerous survey and irrigation experts, an escort of 200 native infantry, 60 cavalry, with a large supply of transport, including the 58th Camel Corps--in all a total of 1500 men, 200 horses and 2200 camels. As the base was at Quetta, 500 miles across an almost waterless desert, whence all stores except grain and fodder and a few local commodities had to be imported, the task of feeding the mission can be well appreciated. Starting from Quetta, the mission proceeded through Afghan territory to Khwaja-ali on the Helmund and then followed the river, with the object of commencing work in the middle of the boundary.[22] This march of 500 miles over uninhabited waterless country occupied five weeks. The temperature was very low, with the thermometer at 4 degrees above zero; and frightful blizzards were encountered. During this period three men were frozen to death and a number of animals lost. On reaching Seistan, Colonel McMahon was met by the Afghan Commissioner and by two Persian Commissioners, each with a large escort. The Amir, who was known personally to the British Commissioner, kindly despatched from Kandahar for his private protection a force of 100 cavalry and 200 infantry.

[Illustration: 1 2 THE NATIVE STAFF ATTACHED TO THE MISSION 1. Mir Shumsha Khan Bahadur, first Native Commissioner. 2. Kazi Khan.]

Political difficulties for the Mission commenced at the very outset. Attempting to cross into Persian Seistan it was refused admission by the Persians, who had been thoroughly frightened by Russian misrepresentation as to its object. The cool assertion was made that no boundary was in dispute, and that any attempt to pass into Persian territory would be met by force. For a whole month the Mission contented itself with travelling along the Afghan side of the Helmund, collecting information in regard to the frontier line. Throughout this time there was no meeting with the Persian officials. Further work at last necessitated an entry into Persian territory. Notwithstanding Persia’s protests and her objection to the erection of a bridge for the purpose of crossing the Helmund, the Mission crossed, receiving the customary compliments and being welcomed with bands and guards of honour.

The actual work of demarcation was very difficult. South of the Helmund for 90 miles the line lay through an arid desert where water was brought from long distances. North of this section the boundary traversed country liable to inundation in which pillars of a massive permanent nature had to be erected, while the last 20 miles of the frontier ran up the waterless, glacial slopes of the Siah-koh. By the decision agreed upon the old bed of the Helmund was retained as the new frontier, the present boundary being so fixed that it continues irrespective of further changes in the course of the river. This arrangement reconstitutes the 1872 line. Considerable delay marked its acceptance both in Kabul and Teheran, the findings being delivered in April 1904. Demarcation work, proceeding in accordance with McMahon’s report, was not completed until the close of 1904, by which time Persian objections to the decision upon the boundary had been overcome, the first part of the work of the Mission being settled absolutely when the final adhesion of the two Governments to the verdict of the Mission was notified in September 1904. The appropriation of the Helmund waters between Persia and Afghanistan was the second part of the business of the Mission. The difficulties of the question were increased by Russian exertions to thwart a satisfactory solution. Nevertheless, after most scrupulous pains and exhaustive inquiries into existing rights and practice, the Commissioners’ award upon partition of the waters was handed, in May 1905, to the Persian and Afghan representatives for communication to their respective Governments. The Amir of Afghanistan at once accepted the judgment of Colonel McMahon, while the people on the spot also warmly espoused the settlement. But Persia, inspired by the laboured concoctions of the Russian officials in Teheran, refused to ratify the protocol and, after great delay, confirmed her dissatisfaction at the distribution of the waters by direct representations to the British Minister at Teheran. Unhappily on February 26, 1906, in spite of previous official intimations from the Foreign Office that Persia had acquiesced in the results of the Mission, the Shah’s Government formally notified Sir Edward Grey of its inability to accept and consequent rejection of the decision in respect of the McMahon division of the waters of the Helmund. In a similar manner, it may be remembered, Persia appealed against the decision of the Goldsmid Mission with the result that its original terms were confirmed. No genuine objection exists in this instance.

[Illustration: 2 1 3 OFFICERS OF THE MCMAHON MISSION 1. Colonel Sir A. H. McMahon, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. 2. Captain Ramsay, Personal Assistant to Colonel McMahon. 3. Captain Bell, C.I. Horse, Commanding Camel Corps.]

It is perhaps to be regretted that the most prominent result revealed by the McMahon Mission was the pronounced antagonism of the Germans and Russians to British interests in Persia. From the very beginning and with deliberate intent, M. Miller wrongly described the intentions and aims of the Mission, his ingenious fabrications ultimately finding sympathetic shelter in the columns of the German Press. Germany’s share in the persecution with which the Mission was followed has passed unnoticed in this country. But at a moment when stupid people are encouraging others of greater foolishness to commit the British Government to very undesirable rapprochements with Berlin, it is as well to reflect upon the real character of the niceties which underlie German policy where Anglo-German interests are concerned. Unfortunately, it is not always realised in Great Britain how much weight a venal Press can give to the indefatigable inventions of scurrilous, political gossipers. It may be, therefore, necessary to say that not a particle of truth attaches to the many statements about the McMahon Mission which appeared abroad in print. Ingenuous as the mendacity and duplicity of M. Miller may be, it is incomprehensible that any diplomatic official would circulate, without specific orders, such lies and travesties of fact as were current in Seistan during the sojourn of the Mission there. Whatever may appear to have been the gist of M. Miller’s instructions from the Russian Minister in Teheran, it is to be admitted that he acted up to the fullest limit of his opportunities. Happily the malicious untruths and slanders, which became so prominent a feature of the Russo-German press campaign, have recoiled upon the Russian policy; and, while the arch purveyor of the trash has been removed, Russian prestige itself has temporarily fallen very low.

With the disappearance of M. Miller from the scene in Seistan, the emissaries of the Russian authorities went further afield. Articles, breathing the engaging candour of a regular crusade, appeared in the Press of St. Petersburg and Berlin, lengthy extracts being received in Teheran itself through the kindly offices of the Official Telegraph Agency in St. Petersburg. The organ of the Russian authorities in Central Asia--_The Russian Trans-Caspian Gazette_, published at Askhabad--was perhaps the most industrious agent in circulating grotesque details of the wrongs inflicted upon the poor Seistanis by the brutal decisions of the British Mission. In respect of these statements it happens that the share in the Hamun lake, allotted originally by the Goldsmid Convention, remains absolutely unaltered. The remark that Persian Seistan was in danger of becoming a desert because Persia had been mulcted in two-thirds of its water supply is a lying absurdity, divulged by M. Miller or the Russian Minister in Teheran for no other purpose than to sow distrust of Great Britain in the Persian mind and throughout Europe. Again, the touching descriptions of the homeless Seistanis dispossessed of their lands through the heartless insistence of the British Commissioner, which only needed to appear in the _Russian Trans-Caspian Gazette_ to be commented upon by German newsmongers with characteristic insolence, are conspicuously false insomuch that neither Persian nor Afghan villages were removed, nor any single individual evicted. The statement, too, that the McMahon Mission had laid out upon Persian soil an extensive fortified camp, within battlemented mud walls is equally untrue. This “extensive fortified camp” consisted of the mud-huts used by the Mission; the walls were the mud-walls of the tennis-court, while “the armed guard,” left in charge of these “fortifications,” resolved itself into one of three watchmen, who had been given the custody of certain property pending orders as to its removal. In this direction it is of interest to know that upon the day following the departure of the Mission an attempt by the Russians to occupy the camp was prevented only by the presence of these men.

Full inquiries into the pernicious activity which distinguished the Russian officials of course should be made by the British Government. There is no doubt that M. Miller abused the privileges attaching to his diplomatic position in proclaiming that the British Mission would not be permitted by the Russians to enter Persia; and when, as the representative of Russia in Seistan, he went the length of arranging riots against the British Consul on his Majesty’s birthday, he committed a serious offence against a friendly country. At such an affront Sir Arthur Hardinge, our Minister in Teheran, might well have intervened; but, in spite of the mob demonstrating before the British Consulate and demanding the expulsion of the Consul and the withdrawal of the Mission, it was left to the Mission itself to secure its own protection. This was not impossible; eventually the ringleaders of the movement, which included the majority of the Russian agents in Seistan, were apprehended and summarily flogged. There could have been no objection if the stronger action, which the circumstances warranted, had been more directly applied.

[Illustration: BALUCHISTAN CAMEL CORPS]

While the course of the Imperial Government in respect of Afghanistan cannot be defined with certainty, there is an equal lack of decision in respect of our policy towards Persia. The condition of our affairs in Mid-Asia, Persia and Afghanistan, which our lamentable lack of foresight has precipitated, is altogether disastrous; our difficulties increasing precisely as the integrity of Persia and the dependence of Afghanistan disappear. In consequence of the serious defects in our policy, coupled with most inadequate representation at Teheran, Great Britain has been almost completely ousted from north-east Persia. The success of the Boundary Mission in Seistan cannot be regarded as introducing any permanent factor in nor effecting any radical alteration of the situation. In view of the significant hold over Persia which Russia possesses and since Russian movement in Khorassan in the future cannot but affect Seistan, the present occasion is one where a firm stand against Russian pretensions undoubtedly should be made.

The trials of the mission in Seistan were of a distinctly unpleasant order. During the winter 1904-05 the jackals with which the district abounds, for some unknown cause went mad, attacking men and animals. Four members of the Mission were bitten, one of whom died of hydrophobia. The disease also spread to the wolves, who played great havoc. One wild night, March 25, 1905, during a blizzard blowing at a velocity of 88 miles an hour, two mad wolves raided the lines of the Camel Corps and worried seventy-eight camels and one horse. Forty-eight of the camels and the horse died of hydrophobia. On another occasion a horde of these creatures tried unsuccessfully to rush the main camp. The Seistanis themselves were so overcome by terror that they actually killed off all but a few of their dogs on whom they depend for safety and security at night.

[Illustration: 1 2 3 BALUCHI CHIEFS WHO ACCOMPANIED COLONEL MCMAHON 1. Jalal Khan. 2. Bungle Khan of Zhob. 3. Merab Khan, son of Chief of the Buchtie tribe.]

One of the most tragic experiences was the death of an Indian surveyor while on duty in the waterless Dasht-i-Margo. He ventured too far from water and, owing to the intense heat, was unable either to move forward or to retrace his steps. He and seven of his followers paid the penalty with their lives. This incident was marked by the heroism of one of his men who, seeing the surveyor die, determined to rescue the map, to secure which so many lives had been given. He cut it off from the board of the plane table and, knowing that he could not long retain consciousness, wound it under his waistcloth round his body. Then he blindly started northward in the hope of reaching water. The four men who commenced this journey with him collapsed, he himself remembers no more than regaining consciousness at night-time lying by a pool in the Krash river. Here he was found by a wandering Afghan, who carried him on his back to a native village where, after receiving careful attention, his life was saved. The bodies of his unfortunate companions were subsequently discovered in a completely mummified condition.

Seistan resembles other parts of Central Asia and almost every centre of importance in Afghanistan, insomuch that its existence depends upon irrigation. The canals which branch off from the Helmund, bearing the waters of that river throughout the heart of the country, date back to a period which itself is long prior to either Persian or Afghan conquest. The systems in vogue to-day are hardly an improvement upon those earlier waterworks; there is no doubt that the region might be made the centre of an exceptionally fertile oasis if there were any enduring qualities in the local government, security for trade or opening for agricultural activity. Life in Seistan does not entail elaborate preparations. Provisions are cheap; and sheep and oxen are abundant. Rice comes from Herat, vegetables are scarce, while wheat and barley may be purchased in large quantities.

The feature of Seistan is the Helmund. Indeed, this region is as dependent upon the Helmund as Egypt is upon the Nile, and in recent years agricultural conditions have much improved. The gross revenue is now 100,000 kharwars of grain, with an additional 7100 tomans as the value of other products. Of this latter return the Amir of Seistan takes one-fifth, 1420 tomans; with levies upon forage and firewood from each village and the proceeds from the sales of permits to collect taxes on cows and sheep, the cash revenue amounts to 14,095 tomans. The tax on cows is 2½ krans per 100 cows, and the impost on sheep 1 kran for 20 sheep. There is no levy on ploughing bullocks. Of the 100,000 kharwars of grain the Amir receives 30,000 kharwars at the value of 5 tomans per kharwar. The net receipts are, therefore, 164,095, of which the Persian Government require 2600 tomans in cash and 24,012 kharwars in grain, of which 9812 kharwars are remitted in allowances to officials, priests and troops.[23] In place of the payment in grain, too, the Persian Government usually accepts a cash equivalent at the rate of 7 krans per kharwar, 9940 tomans, the aggregate cash payment contributed by Seistan to Teheran amounting to 12,540 tomans, or £2500.

The prices ruling in the Nasratabad Bazar are:[24]

Wheat, 25 krans, or about 10s., per kharwar of 649 lbs. Barley, 20 krans, or about 8s., per kharwar of 649 lbs. Bhusa, 4 krans per kharwar of 649 lbs. Firewood (tamarisk), 4 krans per kharwar of 649 lbs. Bread, 1 kran per 2 mans or 13 lbs. Ghee, 4 krans per 1 man or 6½ lbs. Milk, 1 kran per 2 mans or 13 lbs. Sugar, 6½ krans per 1 man or 6½ lbs. Fowls, 2 or 3 for a kran. Eggs, 40 for a kran.

The capital of Seistan is divided into two sections--northern and southern; although so long the centre of local government, it reflects at first a somewhat cheerless and dilapidated appearance. The absence of roads about the city and the generally neglected condition of Husseinabad, the southern town, set up a feeling of disappointment in those who see the place for the first time. Beyond these two towns have sprung up in the last few years the neat buildings of the British Consulate, which may be said to constitute a third part of the capital, with Captain Macpherson in charge of Anglo-Indian interests. Separated from the rest of the city by a broad stretch of level ground, some acres in extent, it occupies an admirable site and has the advantage of room for extension, should it, at any time, be thought advisable to embark upon enlargement. Between two rows of buildings is a wide space, more nearly a square than a street, at the end of which the Union Jack flies. Behind the main block on the south side of the square is a mosque. The principal premises cover a space of about 150 yards by 70 yards, the whole site consisting roughly of about 13 acres. Alongside the consulate stand the imposing premises of the British bank, a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia, comprising several excellent houses and a well-kept garden.

Husseinabad is little more than a collection of small-domed mud-houses, built, irrespective of ground plan, wheresoever fancy dictated and placed in the middle of a vast plain. Here and there a windmill of curious shape--usually stationary in the winter months, but wanting only the fierce blasts of the _Bad-i-sad-o-bist roz_ or wind of 120 days, which blows unceasingly in the summer months, to rouse it to a state of wild activity--stands conspicuously among the surrounding houses. Beyond this the residences of the Russian Consul and the Chief Mullah are the only other objects likely to attract attention. The former, no longer the largest house in the town, is also badly situated, being enclosed on three sides by houses and on the fourth by a graveyard, which stretches from the Consulate to the walls of Nasratabad. The Russian Consulate itself, a rectangular building enclosing two courtyards opening into one another, has been, in reality, converted from native houses. It rejoices in an upper storey; a cluster of domes--each room possessing a separate dome--forms the roof, above which stands a sorry-looking flagstaff.

[Illustration: GATES OF NASRATABAD]

Nasratabad, the northern town, though in itself insignificant, is by far the more imposing half. It is surrounded by walls 30 feet in height, about 350 yards in length from north to south and 400 yards from east to west, with buttresses at intervals of about 40 yards. An additional rectangular enclosure projecting from the north-east corner contains the arc or citadel, in which is situated the palace of the Amir. In the centre of the southern wall, supported on either side by buttresses, stands one of the two gateways of the city. From here the central street traverses the length of the city, terminating in a similar gateway in the centre of the north wall. Running all round is a protected way which is loopholed; there is also a deep ditch, sometimes filled with water. The place possesses from fifty to one hundred shops; with one exception they are insignificant and mainly occupied by soldiers who, during their term of service in Seistan, devote themselves to trade and are scarcely ever taken away from the fort. The open spaces in the city have been cultivated, and little patches of grain may occasionally be seen. As is always the case with Persian towns donkeys are everywhere to the fore.

[Illustration: THE WALLS OF NASRATABAD]

Nasratabad is garrisoned by two Kain regiments,[25] one of which is disbanded at home, while the other supplies shopkeepers to the capital in the intervals of military duties. The nominal strength is 1000, but less than 800 men are mobilised. They are armed with the useless jezail, although at Birjand there is a store of Werndl rifles; they are supposed to receive a new uniform every second year. Service is for life and is hereditary in the families supplying the soldiers. Their pay is twenty krans--twelve shillings--and 7½ mans of wheat yearly; on service in Seistan they are given rations. As may be supposed, they do not constitute a formidable body of fighting men. In addition to the infantry there are 20 gunners hailing from Tabriz, who hold a position of which they take the fullest advantage. They carry on the business of moneylenders, charging 500 per cent. as a minimum!

It has long been recognised in Seistan that, while Indian commerce can achieve no compensating return in the markets of Khorassan against the trade of Russia and a dam of prohibitory tariffs blocks any little trickle from India entering Central Asia, something might be gained by concentrating attention upon Seistan itself. Accordingly, when in 1896 the laying-out of a route between Nushki and Nasratabad was begun and the construction of a railway between Quetta and Nushki was mooted, two important steps in the right direction were indicated. The distance from Quetta to Nasratabad along the route which was adopted is 565 miles. The five stages out of Quetta down to Nushki, a distance of 93 miles, pass through mountainous country. The road descends 2564 feet from the Quetta plateau to the great tableland which stretches away to Seistan at a height of 3000 feet. Across it lies the track, fairly level and admirably adapted for the passage of caravans. The hills tower in rough fantastic forms along the road to Nushki, and in crossing from valley to valley vistas of the mountain scenery of Baluchistan open out in constant succession. The altitude of the country above the sea and the dry bracing atmosphere create, in winter, a pleasant feeling of exhilaration. The heat in summer is intense, but the temperature varies between the extremes of heat and cold.

[Illustration: BAZAAR SCENE, NASRATABAD]

The hills are the great feature of Quetta. To the east, within a mile or two of the bazaar, the Mardar range rises to a height of 11,000 feet, forming a splendid background to the cantonment. To the north, west and south the plain stretches out to the foot of the Zarghim, Tuckatoo and Chiltan hills. Bare and rugged are their slopes, for the juniper groves are tucked away in clefts on the hill-sides. Chill and forbidding are their summits, save at sunset when they flush scarlet as sin; then deepening gradually to purple pale to amethyst as twilight falls. As the night darkens, too, the fires of the charcoal-burners in the juniper valleys flash out, and the lowing of cattle from a distant bazaar reverberates in the still air. The atmosphere is very clear and distances are most deceptive. Dust-storms are frequent and the tiny dust-devil may be seen across the plain twirling rapidly in the radiant sunlight. Near Quetta there are a few mud-walled villages. They contain mostly a mixed population, the Baluchis proper being nomads and living in black blanket-tents. Even of these there are very few except at harvest time, when beside every threshing-floor, dotted amongst the golden mounds of _bhusa_, are ragged shelters. Each tent is composed simply of a couple of coarse goats’-hair blankets stretched, one to the windward and one overhead, across some forked sticks. Inside swarm a mass of men, women and children. The women wear long-sleeved, red cotton shirts reaching to the ankles, full cotton trousers and _chaddas_ of indigo blue cotton. They do not appear to veil themselves among their own people; upon the approach of the white man a corner of the _chadda_ is caught quickly across the mouth. The _chadda_ falls straight down from the crown of the head to the heels and the frayed, soil-worn tail is left to drag among the dust heaps. The long black tresses of the women are thickly plaited and ornamented with blue beads and white cowries. Sometimes a mass of coins is worn like a fringe over the forehead. Their shirts are finely worked in green and gold on the hems, at the sleeves, neck, skirt and down the opening at the throat with the Russian cross stitch.

The Baluchi is a wild-looking man with long, black, well-oiled locks, which he keeps hanging in heavy curls round his neck and shoulders. He wears flowing cotton trousers, a cotton shirt, a waistcoat and a variety of coats according to his means. His apparel is of the dirtiest and his bare feet are thrust into heavy ammunition boots with never a lace in them. In spite of certain defects in his attire, he is a very dignified-looking man and a born leader--of camels! Moreover, he does not set too high value upon his womenfolk; labour is divided, and in ploughing his wife and a camel are usually harnessed together. The price of a spouse is calculated in so many goats, sheep, donkeys or camels.

From Quetta a good driving road runs as far as Samungli, 8 miles distant, where there is a small caravansary. From this point a _kutcha_ road bears off south-west circling round the northern foot of Chiltan in the valley of Girdi Tallao, near the middle of which is the next halting-place. Here there is a caravansary built in the Persian fashion--a square courtyard with leans-to for cattle and camel-men and in one corner quarters, consisting of a mud _rez-de-chaussée_ and a wooden _chappar khaneh_, for travellers of a better class.

From Girdi Tallao the road proceeds to Tilleri through a cultivated valley, always bordered by the bare hills. At Tilleri there is another rest-house built on the same pattern, but possessing the luxury of windows in the lower storey. After leaving Tilleri the road is level for the first few miles as far as the Sherinab stream. It then rises gradually for the ascent of the Barak pass, where there is a litter of rubble and stones and the ground is very much broken. Beyond the pass, in the vicinity of Murad Khan Killah, the valley spreads out to a level plain with sandy, well-cultivated soil--for Baluchistan. Up to this point in this stage there is not a vestige of a tree nor yet a camel-thorn bush; even the water is brackish. Moreover signs of agricultural activity do not continue. Soon after leaving Murad Khan the route lies across stony, uneven ground until the Kishingi valley is reached. Here the soil is once more sandy; camel-thorn abounds, and in spring there is the glow of crimson tulips. Beyond Kishingi, the road descends into the Nushki plain by a long, steep pass.

It has not been possible for Nushki to avoid the prosperity which follows in the train of the caravan. At the present moment it is an

## active but unfortunate settlement. Built at the foot of the hills which

bound it on the north and only 2 or 3 miles from the range separating it from Kishingi, the winds from the west, sweeping along the plain to the hills and then eddying back again carrying clouds of dust, catch Nushki both ways. Although very seriously exposed and lying on the edge of the desert which stretches away westwards to the Helmund, there are evidences in the country around of attempts at agriculture. Irrigation is practised and the trickle of water from the Kaisar stream has been augmented by the careful sinking of wells, until the present state of Nushki is in near relation with that which seems to have existed many generations ago. On the top of a low spur of hills which runs south across the valley, where was once a Baluchi fort, now stands an ugly mud-coloured, flat-roofed bungalow, the traveller’s rest-house. The hill on which it is built is very stony and absolutely bare of vegetation. On its southern aspect is a pebbly water-course into which the water, after running close to the bazaar and supplying two cattle-fords, dribbles scantily. The water-course is a favourite place for the disposal of dead camels and donkeys; while the unwholesome little river, the germ-bearer of many maladies, serves to turn three rather primitive waterwheels for the grinding of wheat and barley. In the clay soil along the edges of the stream myriads of tiny mauve irises grow during spring, with here and there scarlet and yellow tulips.

The bazaar is somewhat uninteresting, for it has been built by a British officer in uncompromisingly straight lines. Of course it is all made of mud; the roofs are flat and there are no balconies or verandahs because wood is scarce. So also there are no white Hindu temples and shady peepul trees, no domed mosques and stately-arched gateways, no strings of chillies strung across the shop fronts crimsoning in the sun. There is no touch of colour anywhere; even the people seem to be clad in dirty white or dusty indigo-blue.

A wide street leads through the centre of the bazaar, and upon it are set two rows of one-storey mud-shops. Nearly all belong to Hindu bunnias from Shikarpur. Their effects are chiefly sacks of grain and Manchester cotton goods, a few native-made long overcoats, waistcoats broidered with gold or silver thread and the peaked Afghan kullah or semi-conical cap, worn in the centre of the puggaree. At the end of this thoroughfare are the police lines, post office and some attempts at a military cantonment in which the local levy is quartered. The population is liable to fluctuation. Three years ago there were 250 people and rather more than 200 houses, of which 120 were shops; but any estimate to-day would need to be much greater, as the numbers of the population have doubled. This increase is due primarily to the growing popularity of the Nushki-Seistan route and an influx of people who were concerned in the construction of the Quetta-Nushki railway. The completion of this work, which was opened to traffic on November 15, 1905, when a tri-weekly service was initiated, will probably cause the abandonment of the present position which Nushki occupies. The soil there has been infected by epidemics of cholera, and enteric is endemic among the villagers.

The actual terminus of the line has been placed 10 miles further on in the open valley, where there is both water and a better situation. There is little doubt that ultimately the preference of the caravans and the merchants will be given to the spot where the station premises are already located.

Work upon the railway began in the summer of 1902, when the difficulties which it presented were not formidable. The cost of construction has been but little more than half a million sterling. The line, which is 83 miles in length, branches off from the North-Western railway to Quetta above the Bolan pass, 3 miles from Shezand station and 12 miles short of Quetta itself, at a height of 5864 feet. The stations constructed on the line are very well appointed, far better than those upon the Bolan or Humai systems. They reflect the greatest credit on the engineers. They are as follows:

1. Nishpa East. 2. Nishpa West. 3. Tiri Walikhan. 4. Dhinger. 5. Sheikh Wazil. 6. Khurd Barak. 7. Kardagap. 8. Galangur Kotal. 9. Kishingi. 10. Nushki.

In general, Mr. Woodside may be congratulated upon the successful termination of his labours. Certain features in the construction are novel and create a somewhat daring precedent, as bridges have been built only over the large streams. Across the smaller streams the line runs, so that in heavy storms it may be washed away and the service dislocated. The experiment may prove troublesome, and it will be interesting to see how the system answers; with small traffic it may be a success. For a long time there will be little traffic beyond the Mastang district, although there is likely to be a large trade from there during the hot weather. The investigations of the engineers have proved that in all the valleys water is everywhere within practicable distance, under 150 feet generally. Where there was desolation before, and where it was not believed possible to find water, plentiful springs have been tapped.

Splendid work has been done by two young engineers, fresh from Scotland, Mr. Slee and Mr. Young. In two years or less these young men have learned the languages generally spoken by the workmen, and in dealing with the tribesmen, who numbered some thousands, they have had neither difficulty nor opposition. Their lives cannot be said to have been lonely. Day and night they were busy, orders or instructions being incessantly solicited, while their words were law in settling the disputes that so frequently arose between the tribesmen.

With the advent of the railway to Nushki, that place now becomes the starting-point of the great Indo-Perso overland caravan route. Prior to 1896, the existence of certain questions of a political nature prevented any definite steps being taken towards the construction of a trade-way between Seistan and Nushki. The Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman, whose fiscal policy was well calculated to stifle trade, was in occupation of the Chageh district, through which lay the direct route from Nushki to Seistan. It was eminently desirable that a change should be effected in the ownership of this district. In accordance with the Agreement of 1893, drawn up between Sir Mortimer Durand and Abdur Rahman, the Chageh district was assigned to the British sphere. In the following years, 1894-6, a Boundary Commission under Captain McMahon occupied itself in demarcating the frontier of Afghanistan south of the Helmund and up to Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah; in 1895, by agreement with the Shah, a second Commission under Colonel Holdich proceeded to define the Perso-Baluch frontier between Kohak and Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah--a distance of 300 miles. So soon as these two missions had completed their labours, Captain Webb Ware was appointed the Assistant Political Officer and was placed in charge of the stretch of country which had accrued to the Government of India as the result of the demarcation, Major Trench proceeding to Seistan. Captain Webb Ware at once set himself to work upon plans for the creation of a trade route between Seistan and Nushki, the good fortune which had attended his earlier efforts being carried a stage further in 1900, when the interests of the Khan of Kelat in the Nushki district were bought out at a perpetual quit-rent of 9000 rupees per annum. Success has been pronounced; and both the character and complexion of this barren region have been transformed. No more difficult country could have been found for development. In the days before the road was started the region was the home of roving parties of Baluchi and Afghan ruffians who periodically sallied forth to plunder passing caravans. Further, heat, the absence of water and the dangers of the journey to India over long desert stretches, militated against its adoption. Only at rare intervals did a caravan attempt the venture.

These defects are now, in the main, surmounted, and an excellent trade route is established between Nushki and Nasratabad, the marches being divided into twenty-one stages. Between Nushki and Robat a _kutcha_ road, varying in breadth between 10 feet and 20 feet, is laid out. Dâk bungalows have also been established at regularly appointed stations and[26] telegraphic communication exists. Around the several bungalows there are now tiny settlements where itinerant traders exist on the proceeds of their business with the caravans. Marauding bands have ceased to worry, as their leaders have been made responsible for the safe custody of travellers between the different stages. At each post there is a small levy-guard and quarters for the camel-dâk, which carries the mail between India and Seistan in nine and a half days. Although it is impossible to avoid the heat, the water difficulty is no longer insuperable. Wells have been sunk and, since the abolition of all tolls and duties on the route--which wise precaution was made an essential preliminary to the inauguration of the service--an increasing stream of camels passes to and fro, between India and Khorassan.

_Value of Imports and Exports by the Nushki-Seistan route for the years 1896-1905._

_Year._ _Rupees._ March 1, 1896, to March 1, 1897 1½ lakhs. ” 1897 ” 1898 5 ” ” 1898 ” 1899 7 ” ” 1899 ” 1900 12 ” ” 1900 ” 1901 15 ” ” 1901 ” 1902 20 ” ” 1902 ” 1903 18 ” ” 1903 ” 1904 18 ” ” 1904 ” 1905 24 ”

_List of Marches between Nushki rail head and Nasratabad._

1. [27]Nushki to Mull 25 2. [27]Mull to Padag 30 3. Padag to Yadgar Chah 24 4. Yadgar Chah to Dalbandin 31 5. [27]Dalbandin to Jujaki 30 6. Jujaki to Meroi 21 7. [27]Meroi to Chah Sandan 21 8. Chah Sandan to Tratoh 24 9. Tratoh to Kundi 22 10. Kundi to Mashki Chah 22 11. [27]Mashki Chah to Ware Chah 26 12. Ware Chah to Makak Karez 23 13. Makak Karez to Sainduk 11 14. [27]Sainduk to Kirtaka 17 15. Kirtaka to Chah Mohammed Reza 17 16. Chah Mohammed Reza to Killa Robat 28 17. [27]Killa Robat to Hormak 17 18. Hormak to Nowad Chah 24 19. Nowad Chah to Girdi Thana 7 20. Girdi Thana to Asak Chah 22 21. Asak Chah to Sayed Khan’s _khel_ 10 22. Sayed Khan’s _khel_ to Nasratabad 20 Quetta to Nushki 93 ---- Total 565

The road follows two sides of a triangle, skirting the whole of Southern Afghanistan before entering Persia at Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah. The distance from Nushki to Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah and thence direct to Meshed is just 1000 miles. To aid traders using this route a rebate of seven-eighths of the Indian Customs duty is allowed. As the sea is free to Bunder Abbas, this concession should be increased so that the starting-points of the caravans--_i.e._, Nushki and Bunder Abbas--might be on a footing of equality. “Drawbacks” of 33 per cent. are granted by the North-Western railway on all goods sent by it and destined for Persia. Additional facilities have also been arranged for the trade using this new route; in order to avoid the difficulty of having to go 150 miles out of their way to Nasratabad for Customs examination, hitherto experienced by merchants proceeding by the Nushki route to Khorassan, a first-class Customs Bureau has been established at Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah. This enables _kafilas_ to proceed direct to Kain and Khorassan _viâ_ the Palankoh route and to avoid the detour through Seistan. Furthermore, a British Consular Agent has been deputed to Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah, one of whose principal duties it will be to watch the interests of British traders using the route and to assist them in their dealings with the Customs authorities. As regards traffic, since the opening of the Quetta-Nushki railway a considerable flow of trade has set in from the Helmund direction _viâ_ Chageh, as caravans for Herat and Afghan traders naturally prefer to follow the Helmund to a point north-west of Chageh and then to turn southwards. A stretch of desert still has to be crossed; but it is less in extent than that between Nushki and the Persian frontier at Robat.

In order to encourage traders a revised schedule of rates for the hire of camels along the Nushki-Seistan-Meshed route has been issued by the Government of India. By these changes the hire for single camels carrying 400 pounds has been reduced from 57 rs. 8 a. for the single journey to 55 rs.; for the double journey from 100 to 95 rs., the time having been decreased from 105 to 85 days: this latter is a distinct advance. The charge per kharwar has been reduced from 370 krans to 359 krans 11 shahis, or 89 rs. 6 a. This concession does not yet equal the average rate of hire from Bunder Abbas to Meshed, which is 300 krans per kharwar. Goods must be packed in gunny bags, boxes or leather cases, no package weighing more than 2½ maunds. Special rates are quoted for wood-work and iron materials. The periods allowed for the journey are:

Quetta to Seistan 45 days. Seistan to Meshed 40 ” Nushki to Seistan 38 ”

Contractors will be held responsible for all loss and damage to goods in transit obviously due to the neglect of the camel-men. They will be at liberty to refuse goods for delivery if they are not properly packed and secured. Loss through raids will be considered beyond the contractors’ responsibility. Ten days’ notice must be given for any number of camels required up to 40, 25 days for over 50 and up to 300, 50 days above 300 but not exceeding 1000. Express camels can be hired at higher rates, the journey from Quetta to Seistan being then made in 30 days.

The evident success of the new route has been the more remarkable because M. Naus, the head of the Belgian administration that conducts the Persian Customs, has devised special means to check the expansion of Indian trade, two Customs officers being appointed to Nasratabad to deal with it. To give zest to their existence these men imposed many novel regulations upon caravans.[28] The camel-men are fined for the non-observance of arbitrary rules which are purposely varied so that confusion may be created; the men are thrown into prison, the animals seized and the goods confiscated. In addition, the Customs barrier in Seistan is reinforced by a plague cordon between Seistan and Khorassan against caravans from India, in spite of the fact that the period of any possible incubation has expired long before a caravan from Quetta can reach Seistan, and that the limits of time, within which quarantine is permissible, have been laid down by the decision of the Venice Sanitary Congress. The headquarters of this latest pest are at Turbat-i-Haidari and Karez. Meanwhile the Russian and Belgian authorities encourage the circulation of alarmist rumours about the mortality from Indian plague in Seistan, the doctor at the Russian legation in Teheran recently having spread a statement that 99 per cent. of deaths from plague had occurred in the Naizar district of Seistan. While these reports are very greatly exaggerated in respect of Indian plague, an epidemic of this disease nevertheless ravaged Seistan during the spring of 1906. At Nasratabad the population was reduced through it from 2500 to rather more than 300. The efforts of Dr. Kelly, the medical officer attached to the British Consulate in Nasratabad, however, did much to arrest it, over 500 inoculations having been made and an excellent impression created by the recovery of a man who had been seized after being inoculated by him. None-the-less, its existence prepares the way for more vigorous precautions against Indian caravans, the measures of the plague officials being directed against the development of Indian commercial relations with Northern Persia and Northern Afghanistan in the hope that Persian and Afghan merchants may frequent the Meshed emporium. At the present moment these preventive measures have achieved conspicuous success, and Russian commercial

## activity has entirely subjugated Khorassan province. No headway appears

to be possible for British trade; while the rapid growth of Russian commercial influence, under this system of pernicious assistance, threatens to reduce Seistan to the position of a commercial base from which the markets of India can be attacked by articles of Russian manufacture. A precisely similar state of things prevails at Meshed in respect of Afghanistan.

[Illustration: DÂK BUNGALOW ON THE NUSHKI ROUTE]

It is of value to compare the Nushki-Seistan route to Meshed with others, viz., the Bunder Abbas-Narmashir-Neh-Turbat route; the Bunder Abbas-Yezd-Turbat route; the Bushire-Yezd-Turbat route; the Basra-Baghdad-Kermanshah-Teheran route; and the Trebizond-Tabriz-Teheran route.

2. The Bunder Abbas-Narmashir-Neh-Turbat route.--The distance is about 900 miles and the time taken to traverse it is from 80 to 120 days. The cost of transport is about £5 per 650 lbs. It is needless to say that owing to Bunder Abbas being in direct communication with London, goods reach it at a cheaper rate and more quickly than _viâ_ Nushki, which is not as yet a commercial centre of any great importance. At Bunder Abbas, too, there is a large and old-established colony of British Indian merchants, in addition to the agents of more than one British firm. This route, moreover, possesses certain inherent attractions. The Customs examination takes place at the point of landing, before the caravan journey commences; while goods destined for export are only examined at Bunder Abbas. Further, there are alternative markets at Bam and Kerman, and alternative routes _viâ_ those centres. Supplies also are cheaper and not so scanty; and the grazing is better. At the same time, the Nushki route is quite secure as far as the British frontier and comparatively safe in Persian territory. No route in Southern Persia is ever permanently safe.

3. The Bunder Abbas-Yezd-Turbat route.--An alternative route from Bunder Abbas of less importance, but still the second largest artery of trade from the south as regards Khorassan, runs _viâ_ Yezd, to which centre much trade is attracted by the presence of a large number of merchants and the prospect of choice of markets. Several Khorassan merchants, indeed, make their purchases in Yezd; although every year the tendency is to go further afield and establish direct relations elsewhere. The smaller merchants from lack of capital continue to depend upon the credit afforded them by the wealthier members of the fraternity and are thus tied to the home mart.

4. The Bushire-Yezd-Turbat route.--Bushire is 932 miles distant from Meshed and a certain quantity of goods reaches Khorassan from that port, perhaps to the extent of 4 per cent. of its total imports. As a rule, the trade is not direct, but applies to that class of traffic which is done by merchants who do business solely with Yezd.

5. The Basra-Baghdad-Kermanshah-Teheran route.--The distance from Baghdad is over 1000 miles. The time taken is about four to five months, the cost being about £8 10_s._ per 650 lbs. Goods in transit by this route pay a penalty of 1 per cent. to the Turkish Customs. Owing to the lack of water-carriage on the Tigris there is frequently much delay at Basra before goods are forwarded; and, as everything breaks bulk at Basra and again at Baghdad, the route is bound to be expensive. It is preferred for heavy articles such as pianos and machinery.

[Illustration: INFANTRY WITH THE PERSIAN COMMISSIONER]

This route, as far as Khorassan is concerned, is chiefly used for the importation of British, Austro-Hungarian and German manufactures, such as cloth, gold and silver thread and lace. These goods, as a rule, are destined primarily for Teheran; but, when conditions are more promising at Meshed, they are forwarded for sale to that market. Yet another aspect of this route is that Baghdad, owing to its proximity to Kerbela, is a great pilgrim centre. Consequently, merchants not infrequently combine a little profit with a pilgrimage. The figures for 1904-1905 on this route are £14,491 as against £20,800 in 1903-1904.

6. The Trebizond-Tabriz-Teheran route.--Trebizond is the most westerly port of entry with which the trade of Khorassan and the commercial centres of Meshed and Seistan is concerned. The distance to Meshed is some 1400 miles and the time taken is seldom less than five months. The cost is about £12 per 650 lbs. This route exists owing to the fact that goods using it pay no Customs in Turkey; but it is a terribly long and expensive journey to Khorassan, while the strict application of the new Persian Customs rules is reacting unfavourably on its prosperity. The advent of the Russian rail-head within a few miles of Tabriz will also press it very hard. At the same time certain classes of goods, not affected by Russian competition, will continue to use this route. The total for the year 1904-1905 was returned at £17,770, as against £21,780 for 1903-1904.

To summarise: Route No. 1 is an artificial route called into being on account of the fiscal barriers erected around Afghanistan, otherwise the Kandahar-Herat route is shorter and cheaper. Routes 2 and 3 are the most natural, but receive little assistance from the Persian Government in the suppression of brigandage or in other ways. Their desert nature also constitutes a grave disadvantage. These routes are the main arteries of commerce from the south. Routes 5 and 6 are not primarily intended to serve Khorassan, but occasionally the market is more promising at Meshed than Teheran.

A table of these trade routes is appended:

_Table of Routes, Freights, etc., to Meshed._

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Average Distance Cost of Length Route. in miles Carriage of Nature of Value to per Journey Transport. of Meshed Kharwar in Days. Trade. (650 lbs.) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- £ s. £ 1. Nushki, _viâ_ Turbat 1000 6 0 85 Mainly 22,654 Camels 2. Bunder Abbas, _viâ_ Narmashir and Neh and Turbat 900 5 0 80-120 ” - 3. Bunder Abbas, _viâ_ Yezd and Turbat 1020 6 0 100-140 ” - 4. Bushire, _viâ_ Yezd and Turbat 932 6 10 100-140 Mainly 35,592 5. Baghdad, _viâ_ Kermanshah Mules and Teheran 1050 8 10 120-150 Mules and 14,491 6. Trebizond, _viâ_ Tabriz Camels andTeheran 1380 12 0 150-180 Mainly 17,770 Camels ----------------------------------------------------------------------

[Illustration: THE PERSIAN COMMISSIONER]

It is, however, a question of politics more than of trade, and the Nushki-Nasratabad route is of less significance beside the political considerations which attach to the future state of Seistan. In this way the importance of the latter is as great as the value which attaches to Herat, because the occupation of Khorassan by Russia would imply a dominating control of Seistan. Moreover, any movement across Khorassan upon Seistan places the road to Kandahar from Herat, together with the strategical points of Sabzawar and Farah, at the mercy of Russia, a contingency which is certainly to be avoided in the present disordered condition of our own house in Asia. Seistan is equally related to the strategic positions of Russia in Central Asia and India, insomuch that if Russia were to become installed there the obstacle to an advance upon India, which is presented by Afghanistan, would have been surmounted and the road to the Gulf opened. Although she might not make any actual forward movement from Seistan towards India, countless opportunities would occur to her to foment disturbances among the Baluchi peoples and to spread an actively hostile propaganda throughout the trans-frontier region. Such a forward movement, too, an actual advance of 300 miles, would impose upon the Government of India many additional outlays of money, besides keeping India in a continuously unsettled and anxious state. It will be seen that the interests of Russia and India in Seistan proceed on identical lines. If India were able to control Outer Seistan an important position would be established from which she could frustrate Russia’s designs along the Perso-Afghan border and in the direction of the Persian Gulf. To do this it is not so much the interests of Seistan as our position in Afghanistan and Persia which require to be considered. The advantage with respect to Persia rests just now with the Russians, whose activity can only be countered with effect by a permanent understanding with the Amir and the strengthening of Persia in some enduring fashion. With Kandahar linked up by railway with India, Afghanistan definitely united in arms with us, and Persia, freed from the wiles of Russia, once more dependant upon us, our position along the Perso-Afghan border would be endowed with such strength that the combination well might serve to check any further Russian activities in the Middle East.

NOTE.--The names of the officers on the Seistan Mission were as follows:

_Political._--Colonel A. H. (now Sir Henry) McMahon, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.; Capt. Ramsay (Personal Assistant).

_Irrigation Officer._--Mr. Ward, C.I.E.

_Survey Officer._--Mr. Tate.

_Infantry Escort._--Major H. F. Walters, 124th Baluchistan Infantry; Lieut. A. E. Stewart, 124th Baluchistan Infantry; Lieut. Brett, 124th Baluchistan Infantry.

_Cavalry Escort._--Lieut. C. P. Landon.

_Commanding Camel Corps._--Capt. R. C. Bell, Central India Horse.

_Doctor._--Major W. Irvine, I.M.S.

[20] The area of Seistan Proper is 3847 square miles.

[21] The area of Outer Seistan is 3159 square miles.

[22] Sir H. McMahon before the Royal Geographical Society. April 1906.

[23] “Sport and Politics under an Eastern Sky.” Earl of Ronaldshay.

[24] “On the Outskirts of Empire in Asia.” Earl of Ronaldshay.

[25] “Khurasan and Sistan.” Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Yate.

[26] The telegraph stations are Nushki, Mull, Dalbandin, Meroi, Mashki Chah, Sainduk, Killa Robat.

[27] Telegraph stations.

[28] “The Middle Eastern Question.” Valentine Chirol.

[Illustration: A CARAVAN OF PACK-PONIES]

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