Part 19
There is that in man which enables him to meet every blow of fate with unblanched face--save one. When the blow is aimed at his soul, then he shrivels. It was in her soul that this woman was smitten, as she saw the house of her God thus. And that is why there in the land of death the churches and cathedrals are all in ruins. To make the altars of Arras gaze on the clouds and the stars, and make the winds wail through the colonnades of Rheims, was deemed the surest and swiftest way of spreading terror and affright. So the devotées of Odin declared war upon God. For a little while the tribal deity and the belligerent dynast reign supreme. The homeless and bereft, the great multitude who are as those standing on the rubble-heap, are verily left with nothing but their eyes to weep with.
It is amazing how soon one gets assimilated to the most horrifying environment. In a few days one can walk through a town which has been turned into heaps without even a shock of wonder, just as at home one reads the war news and the list of the dead without any realization. In these days we need to be stung broad awake now and then. A city in ruins becomes deadly monotonous--until one is wakened.
One day, when the sun broke forth heralding the Spring, the promise of green on a clump of tangled rose bushes tempted me to turn into the garden of a shattered villa. It was as thousands of others: the hearthstones looked upward to the clouds, and the household goods lay piled tier on tier of rotting lumber as floor fell on floor. In the centre of the green a shell hole took my eye, and I picked my way toward it. Out of the earth at the bottom of the hole there obtruded the bones of a man's arm. In haste, the dead had been thrown into the shell hole and lightly covered. And the rains had washed so much of the earth away. And that bone brought the realization that I stood in the midst of one vast cemetery.
Everywhere and all around under the feet are the nameless dead--men, women, and little children. These last are the nightmare of this horror. Formerly nations recovered from war swiftly; the cradles filled up the gaps. But here the children are dead. To the eye of faith the Star of the East shines still with splendor over every spot where a babe lies. But that Star has been extinguished in this region of doom. The altar is buried, the hearthstone is in the rain, and amid the welter of rubbish you can see the children's cots twisted and rusting and woeful. A woman breaking into sobs inside a ruined church door; a body in a shell hole in a garden, a child's cot rusting on a rubbish heap--these open the eyes and make them see.
These things did not come by the arbitrament of war. It wasn't shrapnel and high explosives that wrought the desolation. From the battlements of the old citadel one can see the dead town lie spread, and the houses hit by shells are few and far between. The houses destroyed wantonly by the enemy ere they retreated are easily recognized, for the walls fell outward by the internal explosions. Ninety-five per cent. have fallen outward, and the wall of the church is likewise. This ancient sanctuary was wantonly destroyed by the retreating enemy. What amazes one is the appalling stupidity of such a crime. If the Germans destroyed the town, that was their right, the might of the sword, and their act could perhaps be justified. But to destroy the church is to destroy what even Attila spared, and so outrage the conscience and instinct of the world. There is never an excuse to seek when an outrage is perpetrated by the enemy. A hospital ship is sunk--but, of course, it is carrying munitions! A church is turned into a ruin, but its towers are used as observation posts! Poor little towers in a land of airplanes and captive balloons! If the churches had been spared, as they were spared in the world's darkest ages, humanity would know that the German soul was still alive. But now the world knows that it is up against an enemy that threatens body and soul alike--an enemy that not only kills the body, but destroys the soul! What an amazing stupidity!--but it is through such stupidity that God lays up judgment against the day of wrath.
Lloyd George and General Maurice
A Speech in Which the Premier Routed His Enemies and Revealed Some Inside Facts
A flurry arose in British Parliamentary circles early in May which for a day or so threatened to wreck the Lloyd George Government, but which resulted in a new triumph for the Premier and a humiliating defeat for those who had intrigued against him. It was precipitated by Major Gen. Sir Frederick Barton Maurice, who had been Director of Military Operations until April, 1918, when he was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Radcliffe. His removal had been due to a public utterance in which he had criticised General Foch for not coming sooner to the assistance of the British after the beginning of the German offensive.
On May 7 General Maurice published a letter in which he definitely asserted that the Premier had made a misleading statement to the House of Commons April 9, when he asserted that the British Army in France on Jan. 1, 1918, was considerably stronger than on Jan. 1, 1917; that he misstated the facts regarding the number of white divisions in Egypt and Palestine; also that Bonar Law, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had made a misstatement in denying that the extension of the British front in France had been ordered by the Versailles War Council.
A resolution was introduced by former Premier Asquith for the appointment of a committee to investigate the charges. The Lloyd George Government accepted the challenge and announced that they would regard the passage of the resolution as a vote of censure and would resign if it was carried. The debate on the resolution occurred May 9 and resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Government, the vote to uphold the Lloyd George Ministry being 293 to 106; the Irish members were not present.
In his address the Premier took up the charges in detail. Regarding the figures of the British strength he quoted from a report from General Maurice's own department, initialed by his deputy, dated April 27, 1918, which concluded with these words:
From the statement included, it will be seen that the combatant strength of the British Army was greater on Jan. 1, 1918, than on Jan. 1, 1917.
He also showed that his statements regarding the relative strength of the opposing forces in France and the number of white divisions in Egypt were based on figures furnished by General Maurice's department.
Regarding the extension of the British front in France the Premier made some interesting disclosures showing that the extension was made by agreement of Field Marshal Haig and General Pétain, and not by the Versailles Council. He said:
Before the council had met it had been agreed between Field Marshal Haig and General Pétain, and the extension was an accomplished fact. Field Marshal Haig reported to the council that the extension had taken place. There was not a single yard taken over as a result of the Versailles conference--not a single yard of extension.
In discussing this phase Lloyd George proceeded as follows:
Extending the British Line
Of course, the Field Marshal was not anxious to extend his line. No one would be, having regard to the great accumulation of strength against him, and the War Cabinet were just as reluctant.
There was not a single meeting between the French Generals and ourselves when we did not state facts against the extension, but the pressure from the French Government and French Army was enormous, and what was done was not done in response to pressure from the War Cabinet. It was done in response to very great pressure which Sir Douglas Haig could not resist and which we could not resist. We are not suggesting that our French allies are asking unfairly. That is certainly not my intention.
There was a considerable ferment in France on the subject of the length of the line held by the French Army as compared with our army. The French losses had been enormous. They had practically borne the brunt of the fighting for three years. There was a larger proportion of their young manhood put into the line than in any belligerent country in the world. They held 336 miles. We held a front of 100 miles.
That is not the whole statement, because the Germans were much more densely massed in front of ourselves. Not only that, but the line we held was much more vulnerable. Practically the defense of Paris was left to us, and the defense of some of the most important centres, but there was the fact that you had this enormous front held by the French Army, as compared with what looked like the comparatively small front of ours.
Shortage of Farm Labor
In addition to that, the French Army at that time was holding, I think, a two-division front on our line in order to enable us to accumulate the necessary reserves for the purposes of the attack in Flanders. That was part of the line which, I believe, was held before by the British and French.
The French were pressing in order to withdraw men from the army for purposes of agriculture. I ought to explain that their agricultural output had fallen enormously, owing to the fact that they had withdrawn a very large proportion of their men from the cultivation of the fields, and they felt it essential that they should withdraw part of their army for the purpose of cultivating the soil, and they were pressing us upon these topics.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, and the Cabinet felt that it was inevitable that during the Winter months there should be some extension, and we acknowledged that something had to be done to meet the French demands, and to that extent we accepted the principle that there must be some extension of the line.
At that time the Field Marshal was under the impression that the Cabinet had taken a decision without his consent. The Chief of the Imperial Staff upon that sent the following memorandum to the War Cabinet. I will read it, but first, with reference to the Boulogne Conference, I may, perhaps, say that that was the first time we had a discussion with the French Ministers. The subject of discussion was a rather important foreign office. It was not summoned in the least to discuss an extension of the lines. We never knew that was to be raised. Sir William Robertson and I represented the British Government, and M. Painlevé, the Prime Minister, and General Foch represented the French Government.
When Sir William Robertson discovered that the Field Marshal was under the impression that we had come to a decision without his consent he sent the War Cabinet a memorandum, in which he says:
"At the recent Boulogne Conference the question of extending our front was raised by the French representatives. The reply given was that, while in principle we were, of course, ready to do whatever could be done, the matter was one which could not be discussed in the absence of Sir Douglas Haig, or during the continuance of the present operations, and that due regard must also be had to the plan of operations for next year.
"It was suggested that it would be best for the Field Marshal to come to an arrangement with General Pétain, when this could be done. So far as I am aware no formal discussion has taken place, and the matter cannot be regarded as decided. Further, I feel sure that the War Cabinet would not think of deciding such a question without first obtaining Sir Douglas Haig's views. I am replying to him in the above sense."
That, I think, was on the 19th of October. The War Cabinet fully approved of the communication. Sir Douglas Haig communicated, and said that it threw a new light on the Boulogne position. I think that we have a right to complain of the way in which it has been rumored about that Sir Douglas Haig protested.
The War Cabinet's Decision
The fact that Sir William Robertson had explained and Sir Douglas Haig had stated that the explanation threw new light has never been repeated. That is how mischief is done.
On Oct. 24 this question was first formally discussed by the War Cabinet. There was further pressure from the French Government, and Sir William Robertson gave his views as to the time which the British Government ought to take, and this conclusion is recorded in the minutes of the War Cabinet as follows:
"The War Cabinet approve of the suggestion of the Chief of the Imperial Staff that he should reply to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig in the following sense: The War Cabinet are of the opinion that in deciding to what extent the British troops can take over the line from the French regard must be had to the necessity of giving them a reasonable opportunity for leave, rest, and training during the Winter months and to the plan of operations for the next year, and, further, while the present offensive continues it will not be possible to commence taking over more line.
"Under these circumstances the War Cabinet fear that until this policy is settled it will be premature to decide finally whether the British front is to be extended by four divisions or to greater or lesser extent."
The resolution was communicated to Sir Douglas Haig by Sir William Robertson, and we never departed from it. After that came the Cambrai incident and the Italian disaster, which necessitated our sending troops to Italy. That made it difficult for the Field Marshal to carry out the promise he made to General Pétain for a certain extension of the front. Then the present French Prime Minister came in, and he is not a very easy gentleman to refuse. He was very insistent that the British Army should take over the line.
Clemenceau Suggested Versailles
We stood by the position that that was a matter to be discussed by the two Commanders in Chief. We never swerved from that position. At last M. Clemenceau suggested that the question should be discussed by the military representatives at Versailles, and that the Versailles Council should decide if there was any difference of opinion. The military representatives discussed the question, and the only interference of the War Cabinet was to this extent. We communicated with the Chief of Staff, who was then in France, and with Sir Douglas Haig to urge on them the importance of preparing their case for the other side so as to make the strongest possible case for the British view.
The military representatives at Versailles suggested a compromise, but coupled with it recommendations as to steps which ought to be taken by the French Army to assist the British if they were attacked, and by the British to assist the French if they were attacked, which was even a more important question than the extension of the front.
That recommendation came up for discussion at the Versailles Council of Feb. 1. Before that meeting Sir Douglas Haig and General Pétain met and entered into an agreement as to the extension of the front to Brissy, and Sir Douglas Haig reported that to the Versailles Council. When the discussion took place there no further extension of the line was taken at all as a result of the discussion.
That is the whole story. I was to make it perfectly clear that in the action Sir Douglas Haig took for the extension of the line he had the full approval of the British Cabinet, having regard to the pressure of the French Government and military authorities. Sir Douglas Haig had no option except to make the extension. He was in our judgment absolutely right in the course he took. Naturally, he would have preferred not to have done it, but the British Government fully approved of the action he took.
The real lesson of the discussion is the importance of unity of command. It would never have arisen if you had had that. Instead of one army and one commander responsible for one part of the line, and another army and another commander responsible for another part of the line, we have one united command responsible for the whole and every part. It was the only method of safety, and I am glad we have it at last.
It was not so much a question of the length of the line held by one force or the length held by another. It was a question of reserves massed behind.
The Premier ended with a plea for a truce to political "sniping." On May 13 it was announced that as a disciplinary measure General Maurice had been placed on "the retired list."
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The New British Service Act
Provisions of Law Which Raises Military Age
The new British Military Service act became effective in April, 1918, having passed both houses of Parliament by large majorities; it immediately received the royal assent. The provision applying conscription to Ireland was suspended temporarily, on the assumption that it would not be enforced until a measure of home rule for Ireland was agreed upon. The main provisions of the new service measure are as follows, as analyzed by The London Times:
RAISING OF MILITARY AGE
Men Up to 50.--Obligation to military service imposed upon every male British subject:
1. Who has at any time since Aug. 14, 1915, or who for the time being is in Great Britain, and
2. Who on April 18, 1918, had attained the age of 18 years and had not attained the age of 51 years or who at any subsequent date attains the age of 18 years.
Men Up to 55.--If it appears necessary at any time for the defense of the realm, his Majesty may, by Order in Council, declare the extension of the obligation to military service to men generally or to any class of men up to any age not exceeding 56 years. The draft of any such order is to be presented to each house of Parliament, and will not be submitted to his Majesty in Council unless each house presents an address, praying that the order may be made.
Doctors.--Duly qualified medical practitioners, who have not attained the age of 56 years, are made immediately liable to military service.
FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR
The clause in the act of May, 1916, excepting from military service any person who has been "a prisoner of war, captured or interned by the enemy, and has been released or exchanged," is to cease to have effect. It is, however, provided that the change shall be without prejudice to any undertaking, recognized by the Government, and for the time being in force, that any released or exchanged prisoner of war shall not serve in his Majesty's forces during the present war.
TIME-EXPIRED MEN
The act of May, 1916, provided that the service should not be prolonged of men who, when their times for discharge occurred, had served a period of twelve years or more and had attained the age of 41 years. This section is to cease to have effect.
EXTENSION TO IRELAND
Method of Procedure.--His Majesty may, by Order in Council, extend the act to Ireland, with the necessary modifications and adaptations.
Legal Proceedings.--An Order in Council may be issued to make special provision for the constitution of the civil court before which proceedings for any offenses punishable on summary conviction under the Reserve Forces act, the Army act, and the Military Service acts are to be brought in Ireland. The order may also assign any such proceedings to a specified civil court or courts.
WITHDRAWAL OF EXEMPTIONS
His Majesty may, by proclamation declaring that a national emergency has arisen, direct that any certificates of exemption other than those granted on the grounds of ill-health or of conscientious objection shall cease to have effect.
THE TRIBUNALS
The Local Government Board or the Secretary for Scotland may make regulations for the following purposes:
1. For providing for applications for certificates of exemption, including appeals, being made to such tribunals, constituted in such manner and for such areas as may be authorized.
2. For establishing special tribunals, committees, or panels for dealing with particular classes of cases.
3. For regulating and limiting the making of applications.
4. For making other provision to secure the expeditious making and disposal of applications.
It is provided that such regulations shall not alter the four grounds for applications for certificates of exemption--the expediency, in the national interests, that a man should be engaged in other work, business or domestic reasons, ill-health, and conscientious objection.
PENALTIES
Any person making a false statement with a view to preventing or postponing the calling up of himself or any other person, or for any medical examination, is to be liable to six months' imprisonment.
It is to be the duty of any man whose certificate has been withdrawn, or who no longer satisfies the conditions on which it was granted, to transmit it forthwith to the local office of the Ministry of National Service. If he fails without reasonable cause to do so, he will be liable to a fine of £50.
MEDICAL EXAMINATION
Any man holding a certificate of exemption (other than one from combatant service only) or applying for its renewal may at any time be required to present himself for medical examination or re-examination.
VOLUNTEER OBLIGATION
Every man granted a certificate of exemption is to join the Volunteer Force for the perid of the war, unless the tribunal dealing with the case orders to the contrary.
CONVENTIONS WITH ALLIED STATES
The act is to be read with previous acts in relation to the act of 1917, which confirmed conventions with allied States making subjects of those States in this country liable for military service. That
## act is also to apply to Ireland, if the act is extended to Ireland.
EXCEPTIONS
The exceptions from the act are the following:
1. Men ordinarily resident in the Dominions.
2. Members of the regular or reserve forces or of the Dominion forces, and territorials liable to foreign service.
3. Men serving in the navy, the Royal Marines, or the air force.
4. Certain categories of officers and men who have left or been discharged from the forces in consequence of disablement or ill-health; and men medically rejected, if, on further medical examination after April 5, 1917, they have been certified to be totally and permanently unfit for any form of military service.
5. Men in holy orders or regular ministers of any religious denomination.
British Aid to Italy
General Plumer's Dispatch
The report was published May 10, 1918, that 250,000 Italian troops had been concentrated in France to swell the reserves of the allied armies against the German offensive, and that this had been accomplished without weakening the Italian front, which was preparing for a threatened Austrian attack. No statement was made regarding the British troops that had gone to Italy's aid during the disaster to the Italian armies in 1917.