Part 28

The Bagdad Railway has been a nightmare resting heavily on all Europe for eighteen years--ever since the announcement in 1899 of the concession granted to the Anatolian Railway Company. No step ever taken by any European power anywhere has caused so much trouble, given rise to so many complications, and has been such a constant menace to the peace of the world. No European statesman to whom the destinies of his country have been committed has rested easily in the presence of this spectre of the twentieth century. In the last analysis the Bagdad Railway will be found to be the largest single contributing factor in bringing on the war, because through it more than through any other cause the mutual distrust among European powers has been nurtured until the entire atmosphere of international diplomacy became vitiated. The explanation of this remarkable phenomenon, transforming what appeared on the surface to be a magnificent commercial enterprise, with untold possibilities for usefulness, into a veritable curse, an excrescence on the body politic of Europe, is to be sought in the history of the highway through which the railway passes. The control of this highway is the key to the East--the Near and the Farther East as well. Such has been its rôle in the past--such is its significance today. * * *

The most recent events are merely the repetition on a large scale of such as took place thousands of years ago and at frequent intervals since. The weapons have changed, new contestants have arisen to take the place of civilizations that after serving their day faded out of sight, but the issue has ever remained the same. We are confronted by that issue today--the control of the highway that leads to the East. * * * The decisive battlefields for the triumph of democracy are in the West, but the decision for supremacy among European nations lies in the East. The Bagdad Railway is the most recent act in a drama the beginnings of which lie in the remote past. * * *

The course of events in the Near East since the entering wedge, represented by Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, is to be interpreted as the irresistible onslaught of the West to break down the barrier created in 1453. As we survey the successive steps in this onslaught, the struggle between France and England, culminating in the Convention of 1904, which gave France a dominant position in Morocco in return for allowing England a free hand in Egypt, the attempts of France and Russia to hedge in England in India, followed by England and Russia in dividing up their "spheres of influence" in Persia, the commercial and railway concessions secured by England, France, and Russia from Turkey, sinking ever deeper into a slough of desperate weakness, we see how these struggles, conventions, and partnerships all lead up to the dramatic climax--the struggle for the historic highway which is the key to the Near East. Its possession will mean in the future--as it always has in the past--dominion over Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and probably Arabia; and the Near East points its finger directly toward the Farther East. Under the modern symbol of railway control, Asia Minor, true to the genius of its history, once more looms up as a momentous factor in the world history. * * * The murder at Serajevo was merely the match applied to the pile all ready to be kindled. * * *

[Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE COMPLETED AND PROJECTED SECTIONS OF THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, THE GERMAN ENTERPRISE THAT FIGURED AMONG THE PRIMARY CAUSES OF THE WAR]

Full credit should be given to the German brains in which this project was hatched, and there is no reason to suspect that at the outset the German capitalists who fathered the enterprise were actuated by any other motive than the perfectly legitimate one to create a great avenue of commerce. When, however, the German Government entered the field as the backer and promoter of the scheme the political aspect of the railroad was moved into the foreground, and that aspect has since overshadowed the commercial one.

Had the original plan of the German group to run the Bagdad Railway across Northern Asia Minor from Angora been adhered to, the interior would have been kept free, and it is likely that a favorite English plan (afterward taken up also by the French Government) to run a railway from the Gulf of Alexandretta via Aleppo and the Euphrates to Bagdad might have been carried out. * * * The railway projects of Asia Minor and Syria might have remained purely commercial undertakings of great cultural value. The political aspect of railway plans in the Near East might have been permanently kept in the background.

The stumbling block that prevented the execution of the original plan was--strangely enough--Russia. Her opposition to the northern route brought about the change. Russia had plans of her own in Asia Minor and in the lands to the east beyond. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century Russia, fearing the extension of English power in the Far East, cast her eyes about for securing zones of influence that might bring her into touch with the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. She secured the co-operation of France in 1891, and it is both interesting and instructive to note that the Franco-Russian alliance was originally directed against England rather than against Germany. * * * She exacted from Turkey the Black Sea Basin agreement, formally sanctioned in 1900, which reserved to her the right to construct railroads in Northern Asia Minor. * * * At all events, her opposition was strong enough to secure a modification of the plan of the Bagdad Railway in favor of the transverse route, which, as it turned out, gave Germany a tremendous advantage over all rivals, though it also brought on the opposition of England. Russia was not prepared to allow any further advantage to be gained in the East by England. On the whole she still preferred Germany.

[England's opposition to Germany's new railway scheme became acute when it was publicly announced that the road was not to terminate at Bagdad, or even at Basra, but to run on to a point "to be determined" on the Persian Gulf. The Convention of 1902-3 made it evident that Germany had stolen a march on England, and that the prestige of France, too, had suffered. The favor shown to the German syndicate by the Turkish Government was evident. The terms were indeed unprecedented. Says Dr. Jastrow: "No wonder that there were great rejoicings in Germany when they were announced and gnashing of teeth outside of Germany." With the announcement of the 1902-3 concession and the formation of the Bagdad Railway Company as a successor to the old Anatolian Company, the German syndicate did offer English and French capitalists a share in the enterprise, and insisted that the plan was "international." But the "share" thus offered was merely assistance in financing what would remain a German matter--inasmuch as Germany reserved the control in the management's personnel. England and France therefore refused to

## participate.]

LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM

Von Jagow's Replies to the Prince's Revelations--Further German Comments

The revelations by Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London at the outbreak of the war, which were printed in the May number of CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE, produced a profound impression throughout the world, disclosing as they did the part played by the German Imperial Government in starting the war. German officialdom at once attacked Lichnowsky, compelling him to resign his rank and threatening him with trial for treason. On April 27, 1918, the Prussian upper house decided to grant the request of the First State Attorney of District Court No. 1 of Berlin for authorization to undertake criminal proceedings against Prince Lichnowsky. The State Attorney held that Prince Lichnowsky, in communicating to third parties documents or their contents officially intrusted to him by his superiors had infringed the secrecy incumbent on him.

In referring to the prosecution of the Prince, Maximilian Harden, in a May issue of the Zukunft, said:

"I will swear that there are dozens of men sitting there in these dark war hours who have written and said similar things in sharper and more bitter words." Herr Harden asked whether these would meet the same fate if their papers were stolen and exposed in German shop windows. "Many a trusted wife," he said, "must cry out in fear: 'But, you know, Ernst, Adolf, and Klaus have spoken more desperately.'"

The chief theme of Lichnowsky's memorandum, the editor of Die Zukunft asserts, was the danger to Germany of a too-close alliance with Vienna and Budapest, of the flirtation with Poland, and his insistence upon the necessity of friendly relations with a strong Russia. The German outcry against Lichnowsky, however, gave foreign countries the impression that the Prince had made fearfully damaging disclosures of Berlin's guilt. The question of blame, he says, "reflected almost an identical interpretation to that of our White Book, and a cool head would not have made a world sensation out of it." Harden concludes by saying that an ostracized Lichnowsky would become a power; but the Prussian Diet has no sense of humor.

In the May CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE an abridged version of the first reply of former Foreign Secretary von Jagow to Prince Lichnowsky was printed, but the document is of such importance that a translation in its entirety is herewith given.[4]

[Footnote 4: The full text of Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum, with the replies of Herr von Jagow, the Mühlon letter, comments of the German press, and other matter, has been published in a separate forty-page pamphlet by The Current History Magazine.]

Von Jagow's Two Replies to Lichnowsky

Practically coincident with the giving out for publication on March 19, through the semi-official Wolff Telegraph Bureau, of an account of a discussion in the Main Committee of the Reichstag of the memorandum of the former Ambassador at London, together with substantial excerpts from the main chapters of his work, the German Government got in touch with Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when the war began, and asked him to write an article calculated to counteract the effect of the Lichnowsky revelations. Herr von Jagow hastened to accede to this request, but he merely made matters worse for the German Government by practically admitting the correctness of Prince Lichnowsky's assertion that England did not want war and that Berlin was aware of this.

Copies of German newspapers received here show that, while the journals of all factions were practically of one mind in reproaching the German Foreign Office for its lack of diplomatic ability, the Pan-German and militarist organs laid special stress upon the implication in the von Jagow article that Germany might have been willing to drop its alliance with Austria if it could have been sure of contracting one with England, and the Liberal and Socialist papers declared that it was no use insisting any longer that Great Britain was guilty of the wholesale bloodshed of the world war, and that now nothing really stood in the way of moving for a peace by agreement.

These comments were so sharp on both sides that Herr von Jagow was soon moved to write another article defending his reply to Prince Lichnowsky and arguing that his statements regarding the Triple Alliance could by no means be interpreted as meaning that he would have been willing to abandon Austria-Hungary in favor of Great Britain. In this article, which was first printed in the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, von Jagow says he cannot understand how these statements can be taken to mean that he was an opponent of the alliance with Austria and was considering a choice between Austria and England. He proceeds to defend his own policy by reference to the fact that Bismarck was not content with the Triple Alliance on the one hand, and the famous "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia on the other hand, but in 1887 deliberately promoted agreements between Austria-Hungary, Italy, and England, with the object of "bringing England into a closer relationship to the Central European league and making her share its burdens." Bismarck's policy relieved Germany of some of her obligations, because "Austria-Hungary, supported by Italy and England, held the balance against Russia."

Then, as The London Times points out, carefully avoiding the history of the present Kaiser's reversal of Bismarck's policy and abandonment of the "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia, von Jagow defends his attempts to make British policy serve Germany's purposes. It was "because of the isolation of the Triple Alliance, which had come about in the course of years," that von Jagow "pursued a rapprochement with England." He did so, "not with any idea of putting England in the place of Austria-Hungary, but in order, by disposing of the Anglo-German antagonism, to move England to a different orientation of her policy." Germany "could not count upon Italy," and wanted other assistance in upholding Austria-Hungary in the Balkans against Russia. Herr von Jagow proceeds:

"The combination of England would have relieved us of the necessity of taking: our stand alone, when the case arose, for Austria-Hungary against Russia. As was effected by the agreements of 1887, a part of our obligations would have been laid upon other shoulders. It is in this sense that I spoke of the possibility of the loosening and the dissolution of old unions which no longer satisfy all the conditions.

"The alliance with Austria-Hungary was the cornerstone of Bismarckian policy, and that it had to remain. The expansion of the alliance into the Triple Alliance, by taking in Italy, was a means of supplementing the Central European grouping of the powers; it was an 'auxiliary structure,' by means of which Bismarck aimed at a further guarantee of peace, especially as he intended thereby to check Italy's Irredentist policy. Threads then ran to England via Italy. These threads gave way later, and this caused a considerable change in the attitude of Italy.

Friendly to England

"A friendly attitude on the part of England toward the Triple Alliance--what Professor Hermann Oncken calls the moral extension of the Triple Alliance over the Channel--was the aim of our policy, and in this we were sure of the complete accord of our allies. I never thought that the agreements about Bagdad and the colonies would mean an immediate alteration of England's course in European policy. These agreements were to prepare the way for this change of course. I was under no illusions about the difficulties which would still have to be overcome. But difficulties, and even resistance on the part of public opinion in one's own country, cannot prevent us from following a road that is seen to be right. The league between Germany and Austria-Hungary, supported by friendship with England, would have created a peace bloc of unassailable strength. The increasing Irredentism of Italy, her friction with Austria on the Adriatic, and the Russophile and also Irredentist tendencies of Rumania, would have lost their importance. Then, in given circumstances, the Triple Alliance treaty might have been modified. The union with England would also have secured us against Russian aggression, and the obligations imposed upon us by our alliance would thereby have been diminished.

"The road to this goal was long. The calm development was crossed by the Serajevo murders, and in the fateful hour of August, 1914, the English Government--instead of keeping peace--preferred to join in the war against us. The English Government has probably since then been assailed by serious doubts as to whether its choice was right. In any case, it assumed a considerable share of the guilt for the bloodshed in Europe."

Herr von Jagow then denies that his scheme was inevitably doomed to failure, saying that the policy of England is more liable to adaptation and alteration than the policy of any other country, and that "more far-seeing statesmen than those who were intrusted with the fortunes of the Island Empire in 1914--think only of the Pitts, Disraelis, and Salisburys--held other views about the orientation of England toward Germany and Russia."

"As matters stand today, attempts to arrive at clearness about the respective parts played by our enemies at the outbreak of the war, and about the greater or less degrees of guilt belonging to each of them, can have only a historical value. England has made the cause of our enemies her own, and so she also shall be made to feel how Germany defends herself against her enemies."

Full Text of von Jagow's First Reply

[Copyrighted]

_Herr von Jagow's first reply to Prince Lichnowsky, which was printed in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung March 23, 1918, follows:_

"So far as it is possible, in general, I shall refrain from taking up the statements concerning the policy obtaining before my administration of the Foreign Office.

"I should like to make the following remarks about the individual points in the article:

"When I was named State Secretary in January, 1913, I regarded a German-English rapprochement as desirable and also believed an agreement attainable on the points where our interests touched or crossed each other. At all events, I wanted to try to work in this sense. A principal point for us was the Mesopotamia-Asia Minor question--the so-called Bagdad policy--as this had become for us a question of prestige. If England wanted to force us out there it certainly appeared to me that a conflict could hardly be avoided. In Berlin I began, as soon as it was possible to do so, to negotiate over the Bagdad Railroad. We found a favorable disposition on the part of the English Government, and the result was the agreement that was almost complete when the world war broke out.

Colonial Questions

"At the same time the negotiations over the Portuguese colonies that had been begun by Count Metternich, (as German Ambassador at London,) continued by Baron Marschall, and reopened by Prince Lichnowsky were under way. I intended to carve the way later for further negotiations regarding other--for example, East Asiatic--problems, when what was in my opinion the most important problem, that of the Bagdad Railroad, should be settled, and an atmosphere of more confidence thus created. I also left the naval problem aside, as it would have been difficult to reach an early agreement over that matter, after past experiences.

"I can pass over the development of the Albanian problem, as it occurred before my term of office began. In general, however, I would like to remark that such far-reaching disinterestedness in Balkan questions as Prince Lichnowsky proposes does not seem possible to me. It would have contradicted the essential part of the alliance if we had completely ignored really vital interests of our ally. We, too, had demanded that Austria stand by us at Algeciras, and at that time Italy's attitude had caused serious resentment among us. Russia, although she had no interest at all in Morocco, also stood by France. Finally, it was our task, as the third member of the alliance, to support such measures as would render possible a settlement of the divergent interests of our allies and avoid a conflict between them.

"It further appeared impossible to me not to pursue a 'triple alliance policy' in matters where the interests of the allied powers touched each other. Then Italy would have been driven entirely into line with the Entente in questions of the Orient, and Austria handed over to the mercy of Russia, and the Triple Alliance would thus have really gone to pieces. And we, too, would not have been able to look after our interests in the Orient, if we did not have some support. And even Prince Lichnowsky does not deny that we had to represent great economic interests right there. But today economic interests are no longer to be separated from political interests.

"That the people 'in Petrograd wanted to see the Sultan independent' is an assertion that Prince Lichnowsky will hardly be able to prove; it would contradict every tradition of Russian policy. If we, furthermore, had not had at our command the influence at Constantinople founded by Baron Marschall, it would hardly have been possible for us to defend our economic interests in Turkey in the desired way.

Russia and Germany

"When Prince Lichnowsky further asserts that we only 'drove Russia, our natural friend and best neighbor, into the arms of France and England through our Oriental and Balkan policy' he is in conflict with the historical facts. Only because Prince Gortschakoff [Russian Premier] was guiding Russian policy toward a rapprochement with a France lusting for revenge was Prince Bismarck induced to enter into the alliance with Austria-Hungary; through the alliance with Rumania he barred an advance of Russia toward the south. Prince Lichnowsky condemns the basic principles of Bismarck's policy. Our attempts to draw closer to Russia went to pieces--Björki proves it--or remained ineffective, like the so-called Potsdam agreement. Also, Russia was not always our 'best neighbor.' Under Queen Elizabeth, as at present, she strove for possession of East Prussia to extend her Baltic coasts and to insure her domination of the Baltic. The Petrograd 'window' has gradually widened, so as to take in Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Finland and reach after Aland. Poland was arranged to be a field over which to send troops against us. Pan-Slavism, which was dominating the Russian policy to an ever greater degree, had positive anti-German tendencies.

"And we did not force Russia to drop 'her policy of Asiatic expansion,' but only tried to defend ourselves against her encroachments in European policy and her encircling of our Austro-Hungarian ally.

Grey Conciliatory

"Just as little as Sir Edward Grey [British Foreign Secretary] did we want war to come over Albania. Therefore, in spite of our unhappy experience at Algeciras, we agreed to a conference. The credit of an 'attitude of mediation' at the conference should not be denied Sir Edward Grey; but that he 'by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente' is, however, surely saying rather too much. Certainly he often advised yielding in Petrograd (as we did in Vienna) and found 'formulas of agreement,' but in dealing with the other side he represented the Entente, because he, no less than ourselves, neither would, nor could, abandon his associates. That we, on the other hand, 'without exception, represented the standpoint dictated to us from Vienna' is absolutely false. We, like England, played a mediatory rôle, and also in Vienna counseled far more yielding and moderation than Prince Lichnowsky appears to know about, or even to suggest. And then Vienna made several far-reaching concessions, (Dibra, Djakowa.) If Prince Lichnowsky, who always wanted to be wiser than the Foreign Office, and who apparently allowed himself to be strongly influenced by the Entente statesmen, did not know this, he surely ought not to make any false assertions now! If, to be sure, the degree of yielding that was necessary was reached in Vienna, we also naturally had to represent the Austrian standpoint at the conference. Ambassador Szögyeni himself was not one of the extremists; in Vienna they were by no means always satisfied with his attitude. That the Ambassador, with whom I was negotiating almost every day, constantly sounded the refrain of casus foederis is entirely unknown to me. It certainly is true that Prince Lichnowsky for some time past had not been counted as a friend of Austria in Vienna. Still complaints about him came to my ears oftener from the side of Marquis San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister] than from the side of Count Berchtold, [Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister.]

"King Nicholas's seizure of Scutari constituted a mockery of the entire conference and a snub to all the powers taking part in it.