Part 20

General Sir Herbert Plumer, who took over the command of the British troops in Italy after their arrival there, Nov. 10, 1917, submitted his official report March 9, 1918. He stated that he found on his arrival that the situation in Italy was disquieting, the Italian Army having received a severe blow, and the aid that the British and French might give could not be immediate owing to difficulties of transport. As it was then uncertain whether the Italians could hold the Piave line, it was arranged that two British divisions in conjunction with the French should move to the hills north and south of Vicenza. By the time the troops had reached this position the situation had improved and an offer was made by the British in conjunction with the French to take over a sector of the foothills of the Asiago Plateau. But as snow was imminent and special mountain equipment was difficult to provide, the suggestion was made by the Italians that the British should take over the Montsello sector, with the French on their left. This was agreed to.

Sir Herbert considers that the entrance of the French and British had an excellent moral effect and enabled the Italians to withdraw and reorganize. The Montsello sector, which was taken over on Dec. 4 and work immediately begun on its defense, is described by Sir Herbert as a hinge to the whole Italian line, joining the mountain portion facing north, from Mount Tomba to Lake Garda, to the Piave line held by the 3d Italian Army.

December was an anxious month. Several German divisions were east of the Piave, and an attempt to force the river and capture Venice was considered likely. Local attacks grew more and more severe, and, though the progress of the enemy was not great and Italian counterattacks were constantly made, the danger of a break-through increased. The Austrians were being encouraged to persevere in the hope of getting down to the plains for the Winter.

Rear lines of defense were constructed, and as time passed and the preparations were well forward the feeling of security grew, and was further increased by the recapture by the Italians of the slopes of Monte Asolone on Dec. 22. The following day Mount Melago and Col del Rosso, on the Asiago Plateau, were lost, but the Italians regained the former by a counterattack. Though Christmas Day found the situation still serious, especially on the Asiago, where the Italians, while fighting stubbornly, suffered from strain and cold, the situation showed signs of improvement. This outlook was brightened still further by the capture of Mount Tomba, with 1,500 prisoners, by the French. In this

## action British artillery assisted.

"During all this period," the dispatch continues, "we had carried out continuous patrol work across the River Piave and much successful counterbattery work. The Piave is a very serious obstacle, especially at this season of the year, the breadth opposite the British front being considerably over 1,000 yards, and the current 14 knots. Every form of raft and boat has been used, but wading has proved the most successful, though the icy cold water made the difficulties even greater. In spite of this there has never been any lack of volunteers for these enterprises.

"On Jan. 1 our biggest raid was carried out by the Middlesex Regiment. This was a most difficult and well-planned operation, which had for its objective the capture and surrounding of several buildings held by the enemy to a depth of 2,000 yards inland, provided a surprise could be effected. Two hundred and fifty men were passed across by wading and some prisoners were captured, but, unfortunately, the alarm was given by a party of fifty of the enemy that was encountered in an advanced post, and the progress inland had therefore, in accordance with orders, to be curtailed. The recrossing of the river was successfully effected, and our casualties were very few. An operation of this nature requires much forethought and arrangement, even to wrapping every man in hot blankets immediately on emerging from the icy water.

"The 3d Italian Army also opened the year well by clearing the Austrians from the west bank of the Piave about Zenson. This was followed on Jan. 14 by the attack of the 4th Italian Army on Mount Asolone, which, although not entirely successful, resulted in capturing over 400 Austrian prisoners. The situation had by this time so far improved that I offered to take over another sector of defense on my right in order to assist the Italians. This was agreed to, and was completed by Jan. 28. On this day and the following the 1st Italian Army carried out successful operations on the Col del Rosso--Mont Val Bella front, on the Asiago Plateau. The infantry attacked with great spirit, and captured 2,500 Austrians. British artillery took part in the above operation."

General Plumer states that in February the weather was bad, much snow having fallen, and operations were hampered. Although the British had not taken part in serious fighting, yet they had some share in the improvement which, he says, had taken place.

The work of the R. F. C., under Brig. Gen. Webb-Bowen, during the period under review (says Sir Herbert) has been quite brilliant. From the moment of arrival they made their presence felt, and very soon overcame the difficulties of the mountains. They have taken part in all operations, and rendered much assistance to the Italians in the air. They have carried out a large number of successful raids on enemy aerodromes, railway junctions, &c., and have during the period destroyed sixty-four hostile machines, a large proportion of which were German, and nine balloons, our losses to the enemy during the period being twelve machines and three balloons.

A comparison of the photographs of hostile battery positions when our artillery entered the line with the positions now occupied shows that the enemy batteries have been successfully forced back almost throughout the whole front. Some British artillery assisted both in French and Italian operations, and a frequent interchange of British and Italian batteries was made, together with counterbattery staff officers, in order that experience of each other's methods might be gained. Every effort was made to illustrate the value of counterbattery work, the value of which we had learned by experience in France, but which the Italians had not hitherto fully appreciated.

"The Italians were only too anxious to profit by any experience we could give them, and this was done not only by frequent interchange of visits of commanders and staffs to the various sectors of defense, but by the establishment of schools of instruction, at which a large number of Italian officers actually underwent the courses. About 100 Italian officers attended the courses at the various schools, together with some French officers. Similarly, British officers underwent courses at French and Italian schools."

Sir Herbert thanks the Italian authorities for their assistance, especially General Diaz, Chief of the Staff, and expresses indebtedness to Generals Fayolle and Maistre, in command of the French troops.

Emperor Charles's "Dear Sixtus" Letter

French Supplemental Statement Corroborates Its Authenticity

The publication of the letter of Emperor Charles of Austria to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus, in which he sought a separate peace with France, referring to the "just claims" of France to Alsace-Lorraine, and which caused the downfall of Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Secretary, was followed by this official denial by the Austrian Government:

The letter by his Apostolic Majesty, published by the French Premier in his communiqué of April 12, 1918, is falsified, (verfaelscht.) First of all, it may be declared that the personality of far higher rank than the Foreign Minister, who, as admitted in the official statement of April 7, undertook peace efforts in the Spring of 1917, must be understood to be not his Apostolic Majesty but Prince Sixte of Bourbon, who in the Spring of 1917 was occupied with bringing about a rapprochement between the belligerent States. As regards the text of the letter published by M. Clemenceau, the Foreign Minister declares by All Highest command that his Apostolic Majesty wrote a purely personal private letter in the Spring of 1917 to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon, which contained no instructions to the Prince to initiate mediation with the President of the French Republic or any one else, to hand on communications which might be made to him, or to evoke and receive replies. This letter, moreover, made no mention of the Belgian question, and contained, relative to Alsace-Lorraine, the following-passage: "I would have used all my personal influence in favor of the French claims for the return of Alsace-Lorraine, if these claims were just. They are not, however." The second letter of the Emperor mentioned in the French Premier's communique of April 9, in which his Apostolic Majesty is said to have declared that he was "in accord with his Minister," is significantly not mentioned by the French communiqué.

This statement drew forth from the French Government the following reply:

There are rotten consciences. The Emperor Charles, finding it impossible to save his face, falls into the stammerings of a man confounded. He is now reduced to accusing his brother-in-law of forgery, by fabricating with his own hand a lying text. The original document, the text of which has been published by the French Government, was communicated in the presence of M. Jules Cambon, Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and delegated for this purpose by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Republic, who, with the authorization of the Prince, handed a copy of it to the President of the Council.

The Prince spoke of the matter to M. Ribot himself in terms which would have been devoid of sense if the text had not been that published by the French Government, is it not evidence that no conversation could have been opened, and that the President of the Republic would not even have received the Prince a second time, if the latter, at Austria's instance, had been the bearer of a document which contested our rights instead of affirming them?

The Emperor Charles's letter, as we have quoted it, was shown by Prince Sixte himself to the Chief of State. Moreover, two friends of the Prince can attest the authenticity of the letter, especially the one who received it from the Prince to copy it.

The Serbian Government, moreover, gave the lie direct to Count Czernin's statement in reference to offering peace to Serbia. Premier Pashitch was asked in the Skupshtina at Corfu by Deputy Marco Trifcovitch whether Count Czernin's statement was true. He replied that he had denied Count Czernin's statements as soon as he had received the text of the speech from Amsterdam, and that he welcomed this fresh opportunity of declaring before Parliament that, so far as Serbia was concerned, the statements were totally inaccurate. (Exclamations from the right, "Czernin lied!") The Premier then proceeded to say that Count Czernin had never made peace overtures to Serbia, and that, if he had, such proposals would not have been accepted. "All the statements of Count Czernin," continued M. Pashitch, "are only the result of Austro-Hungarian intrigues."

Premier Clemenceau explained in detail before three committees of the French Chamber, the Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Army, and the Navy, which represented practically one-fourth of the total membership, the circumstances connected with the letters; it was unanimously agreed that there was nothing in the situation to justify any further consideration than had been given them. The Paris Temps gave the following details concerning their receipt:

The Emperor's two letters, and the conversations arising out of them, will form an essential part of the proceedings before the committees today. The letter from the Emperor to Prince Sixte of Bourbon-Parma was communicated to M. Poincaré on March 31 last year, but it remained in the possession of the Prince, who gave a copy of it to M. Ribot, by whom it was placed in the archives of the French Foreign Office. "Let us add," says the Temps, "that in the course of the interview which he had with Lloyd George at Folkestone a few days after the copy of the letter came into his possession that M. Ribot handed a copy of this copy to the British Premier. A little later in the interview which took place at St. Jean de Maurienne, in Savoy, between the chiefs of the British, French, and Italian Cabinets the question was raised as to what should be done in case the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet took steps toward peace negotiations. An agreement was come to without difficulty between the Allies as to the line of conduct to be adopted in such an eventuality. Let us add that this first letter sent to Prince Sixte had determined the Allies to ask for further explanations, as the result of which Prince Sixte received from his imperial brother-in-law a second letter, which was also communicated to M. Poincaré and M. Ribot. We have no right to give any indication on this subject, but we believe we can state that this second letter was regarded unanimously by the Allies as of such a nature that it would not permit them to pursue the conversations further."

Kaiser Wilhelm in the following telegram accepted without reserve Emperor Charles's statement that the Sixtus letter had been distorted:

Accept my heartiest thanks for your telegram, in which you repudiate as entirely baseless the assertion of the French Premier regarding your attitude toward French claims to Alsace-Lorraine, and in which you once again accentuate the solidarity of interest existing between us and our respective empires. I hasten to inform you that in my eyes there was no need whatever for any such assurance on your part, for I was not for a moment in doubt that you have made our cause your own, in the same measure as we stand for the rights of your monarchy. The heavy but successful battles of these years have clearly demonstrated this fact to every one who wants to see. They have only drawn the bonds close together. Our enemies, who are unable to do anything against us in honorable warfare, do not recoil from the most sordid and the lowest methods. We must, therefore, put up with it, but all the more is it our duty ruthlessly to grapple with and beat the enemy in all the theatres of war. In true friendship, WILHELM.

As a sequel to the matter it was reported from Vienna that the mother of Empress Zita and Prince Sixtus had been compelled to leave Vienna and live in retirement at her estates, remote from the Austrian capital.

THE ISSUES IN IRELAND

Official Report of the Irish Convention--Full Text of the Chairman's Summary of the Proceedings

The Irish home-rule question, in consequence of the failure of the Irish Convention to agree, became an important war issue in the Spring of 1918 on account of its effect upon Great Britain's man-power measures.

Premier Lloyd George, on May 21, 1917, announced the Government's decision to summon a convention of Irishmen representing all parties and interests to endeavor to reach an agreement on the home-rule question. The Sinn Feiners refused to send representatives, but all other factions were represented in the convention, which met July 25, 1917, at Dublin and elected Sir Horace Plunkett Chairman. The report of its recommendations was made public April 13, 1918, in three separate documents--the proposals for a scheme of Irish self-government, adopted by vote of 44 to 29 in a total membership of 90; a protest by the Ulster Unionist delegates, who dissented from any agreement, and the report of 22 Nationalist delegates, who were unable to agree to the fiscal proposals. The majority proposals were accepted by practically all the Nationalists, all the Southern Unionists, and 5 out of 7 of the Labor representatives.

The summary of the proceedings, presented by Sir Horace Plunkett, and the scheme of government as agreed upon by the majority, are of importance historically for a comparison with subsequent measures of home rule, which the British Government announces it intends to introduce before putting into force conscription in Ireland.

THE CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY

Sir Horace Plunkett's letter reads:

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the proceedings of the Irish Convention. For the immediate object of the Government the report tells all that needs to be told:

It shows that in the convention, while it was not found possible to overcome the objections of the Ulster Unionists, a majority of Nationalists, all the Southern Unionists, and five out of the seven Labor representatives were agreed that the scheme of Irish self-government set out in Paragraph 42 of the report should be immediately passed into law. A minority of Nationalists propose a scheme which differs in only one important particular from that of the majority. The convention has, therefore, laid a foundation of Irish agreement unprecedented in history.

I recognize that action in Parliament upon the result of our deliberations must largely depend upon public opinion. Without a knowledge of the circumstances which, at the termination of our proceedings, compelled us to adopt an unusual method of presenting the results of our deliberations, the public might be misled as to what has actually been achieved. It is, therefore, necessary to explain our procedure.

Adopting the Report

We had every reason to believe that the Government contemplated immediate legislation upon the results of our labors. The work of an Irish settlement, suspended at the outbreak of the war, is now felt to admit of no further postponement. In the dominions and in the United States, as well as in other allied countries, the unsettled Irish question is a disturbing factor both in regard to war effort and peace aims. Nevertheless, urgent as our task was, we could not complete it until every possibility of agreement had been explored. The moment this point was reached--and you will not be surprised that it took us eight months to reach it--we decided to issue our report with the least possible delay. To do this we had to avoid further controversy and protracted debate. I was, therefore, on March 22, instructed to draft a report which should be a mere narrative of the convention's proceedings, with a statement, for the information of the Government, of the conclusions adopted, whether unanimously or by majorities.

It was hoped that this report might be unanimously signed; and it was understood that any groups or individuals would be free to append to it such statements as they deemed necessary to give expression to their views. The draft report was circulated on March 30, and discussed and amended on April 4 and 5. The accuracy of the narrative was not challenged, though there was considerable difference of opinion as to the relative prominence which should be given to some parts of the proceedings. As time pressed, it was decided not to have any discussion upon a majority report, nor upon any minority reports or other statements which might be submitted. The draft report was adopted by a majority, and the Chairman and Secretary were ordered to sign it and forward it to the Government. A limit of twenty-four hours was, by agreement, put upon the reception of any other reports or statements, and in the afternoon of April 5 the convention adjourned sine die.

The public is thus provided with no majority report, in the sense of a reasoned statement in favor of the conclusions upon which the majority are agreed, but is left to gather from the narrative of proceedings what the contents of such a report would have been. On the other hand, both the Ulster Unionists and a minority of the Nationalists have presented minority reports covering the whole field of the convention's inquiry. The result of this procedure is to minimize the agreement reached, and to emphasize the disagreement. In these circumstances I conceive it to be my duty as Chairman to submit such explanatory observations as are required to enable the reader of the report and the accompanying documents to gain a clear idea of the real effect and significance of the convention's achievement.

I may assume a knowledge of the broad facts of the Irish question. It will be agreed that of recent years the greatest obstacle to its settlement has been the Ulster difficulty. There seemed to be two possible issues to our deliberations. If a scheme of Irish self-government could be framed to which the Ulster Unionists would give their adherence, then the convention might produce a unanimous report. Failing such a consummation, we might secure agreement, either complete or substantial, between the Nationalist, the Southern Unionist, and the Labor representatives. Many entertained the hope that the effect of such a striking and wholly new development would be to induce Ulster to reconsider its position.

Ulster Issue Unsolved

Perhaps unanimity was too much to expect. Be this as it may, neither time nor effort was spared in striving for that goal, and there were moments when its attainment seemed possible. There was, however, a portion of Ulster where a majority claimed that, if Ireland had the right to separate herself from the rest of the United Kingdom, they had the same right to separation from the rest of Ireland. But the time had gone by when any other section of the Irish people would accept the partition of their country, even as a temporary expedient. Hence, the Ulster Unionist members in the convention remained there only in the hope that some form of home rule would be proposed which might modify the determination of those they represented to have neither part nor lot in an Irish Parliament. The Nationalists strove to win them by concessions, but they found themselves unable to accept any of the schemes discussed, and the only scheme of Irish government they presented to the convention was confined to the exclusion of their entire province.

Long before the hope of complete unanimity had passed, the majority of the convention were considering the possibilities of agreement between the Nationalists and the Southern Unionists. Lord Midleton was the first to make a concrete proposal to this end. The report shows that in November he outlined to the Grand Committee and in December brought before the convention what looked like a workable compromise. It accepted self-government for Ireland. In return for special minority representation in the Irish Parliament, already conceded by the Nationalists, it offered to that Parliament complete power over internal legislation and administration, and, in matters of finance, over direct taxation and excise. But, although they agreed that the customs revenue should be paid in to the Irish Exchequer, the Southern Unionists insisted upon the permanent reservation to the Imperial Parliament of the power to fix the rates of customs duties. By far the greater part of our time and attention was occupied by this one question, whether the imposition of customs duties should or should not be under the control of the Irish Parliament. The difficulties of the Irish Convention may be summed up in two words--Ulster and Customs.

Customs and Excise Problem

The Ulster difficulty the whole world knows; but how the customs question came to be one of vital principle, upon the decision of which depended the amount of agreement that could be reached in the convention, needs to be told. The tendency of recent political thought among constitutional Nationalists has been toward a form of government resembling as closely as possible that of the dominions, and, since the geographical position of Ireland imposes obvious restrictions in respect of naval and military affairs, the claim for dominion home rule was concentrated upon a demand for unrestricted fiscal powers. Without separate customs and excise Ireland would, according to this view, fail to attain a national status like that enjoyed by the dominions.