Part 13

The rehabilitation of the Napoleonic attack idea thus frankly accepted in Great Britain had taken place in France several years before the South African War, and neither this war nor that in Manchuria effectively shook the faith of the French army in the principle, while on the other hand Germany remains faithful to the "preconceived idea," both in strategy and tactics.[17] This essential difference in the two rival "doctrines" is intimately connected with the revival of the Napoleonic artillery attack, in the form of concentrated time shrapnel.

The Napoleonic artillery preparation, it will be remembered, was a fire of overwhelming intensity delivered against the selected point of the enemy's position, at the moment of the massed and decisive assault of the reserves. In Napoleon's time the artillery went in to within 300 or 400 yds. range for this act, i.e. in front of the infantry, whereas now the guns fire over the heads of the infantry and concentrate shells instead of guns on the vital point. The principle is, however, the same. A model infantry attack in the Napoleonic manner was that of Okasaki's brigade on the Terayama hill at the battle of Shaho, described by Sir Ian Hamilton in his _Staff Officer's Scrap-Book_. The Japanese, methodical and cautious as they were, only sanctioned a pure open force assault as a last resort. Then the brigadier Okasaki, a peculiarly resolute leader, arrayed his brigade in a "schematic" attack formation of four lines, the first two in single rank, the third in line and the fourth in company columns. Covered by a powerful converging shrapnel fire, the brigade covered the first 900 yds. of open plain without firing a shot. Then, however, it disappeared from sight amongst the houses of a village, and the spectators watched the thousands of flashes fringing the further edge that indicated a fire-fight at decisive range (the Terayama was about 600 yds. beyond the houses). Forty minutes passed, and the army commander Kuroki said, "He cannot go forward. We are in check to-day all along the line." But at that moment Okasaki's men, no longer in a "schematic" formation but in many irregularly disposed groups--some of a dozen men and some of seventy, some widely extended and some practically in close order--rushed forward at full speed over 600 yds. of open ground, and stormed the Terayama with the bayonet.

The decisive attack.

Such an attack as that at the battle of Shaho is rare, but so it has always been with masterpieces of the art of war. We have only to multiply the front of attack by two and the forces engaged by five--and to find the resolute general to lead them--to obtain the ideal decisive attack of a future European war. Instead of the bare open plain over which the advance to decisive range was made, a European general would in most cases dispose of an area of spinneys, farm-houses and undulating fields. The schematic approach-march would be replaced in France and England by a forward movement of bodies in close order, handy enough to utilize the smallest covered ways. Then the fire of both infantry and artillery would be augmented to its maximum intensity, overpowering that of the defence, and the whole of the troops opposite the point to be stormed would be thrown forward for the bayonet charge. The formation for this scarcely matters. What is important is speed and the will to conquer, and for this purpose small bodies (sections, half-companies or companies), not in the close order of the drill book but grouped closely about the leader who inspires and controls them, are as potent an instrument as a Frederician line or a Napoleonic column.

Controversy, in fact, does not turn altogether on the method of the assault, or even on the method of obtaining the fire-superiority of guns and rifles that justifies it. Although one nation may rely on its guns more than on the rifles, or vice versa, all are agreed that at decisive range the firing line should contain as many men as can use their rifles effectually. Perhaps the most disputed point is the form of the "approach-march," viz. the dispositions and movements of the attacking infantry between about 1400 and about 600 yds. from the position of the enemy.

The approach-march.

The condition of the assailant's infantry when it reaches decisive ranges is largely governed by the efforts it has expended and the losses it has suffered in its progress. Sometimes even after a firing line of some strength has been established at decisive range, it may prove too difficult or too costly for the supports (sent up from the rear to replace casualties and to augment fire-power) to make their way to the front. Often, again, it may be within the commander's intentions that his troops at some particular point in the line should not be committed to decisive action before a given time--perhaps not at all. It is obvious then that no "normal" attack procedure which can be laid down in a drill book (though from time to time the attempt has been made, as in the French regulations of 1875) can meet all cases. But here again, though all armies formally and explicitly condemn the normal attack, each has its own well-marked tendencies.

Current views on the infantry attack.

The German regulations of 1906 define the offensive as "transporting fire towards the enemy, if necessary to his immediate proximity"; the bayonet attack "confirms" the victory. Every attack begins with deployment into extended order, and the leading line advances as close to the enemy as possible before opening fire. In ground offering cover, the firing line has practically its maximum density at the outset. In open ground, however, half-sections, groups and individuals, widely spaced out, advance stealthily one after the other till all are _in position_. It is on this position, called the "first fire position" and usually about 1000 yds. from the enemy, that the full force of the attack is deployed, and from this position, as simultaneously as possible, it opens the fight for fire-superiority. Then, each unit covering the advance of its neighbours, the whole line fights its way by open force to within charging distance. If at any point a decision is not desired, it is deliberately made impossible by employing there such small forces as possess no offensive power. Where the attack is intended to be pushed home, the infantry units employed act as far as possible simultaneously, resolutely and in great force (see the German _Infantry Regulations_, 1906, §§ 324 et seq.).

While in Germany movement "transports the fire," in France fire is regarded as the way to make movement possible. It is considered (see Grandmaison, _Dressage de l'infanterie_) that a premature and excessive deployment enervates the attack, that the ground (i.e. covered ways of approach for small columns, not for troops showing a fire front) should be used as long as possible to march "en troupe" and that a firing line should only be formed when it is impossible to progress without acting upon the enemy's means of resistance. Thereafter each unit, in such order as its chief can keep, should fight its way forward, and help others to do so--like Okasaki's brigade in the last stage of its attack--utilizing bursts of fire or patches of wood or depressions in the ground, as each is profitable or available to assist the advance. "From the moment when a fighting unit is 'uncoupled,' its action must be ruled by two conditions, and by those only: the one material, an object to be reached; the other moral, the will to reach the object."

The British _Field Service Regulations_ of 1909 are in spirit more closely allied to the French than to the German. "The climax of the infantry attack is the assault, which is made possible by superiority of fire" is the principle (emphasized in the book itself by the use of conspicuous type), and a "gradual _building up of the firing line within close range_ of the position," coupled with the closest artillery support, and the final blow of the reserves delivered "unexpectedly and in the greatest possible strength" are indicated as the means.[18]

Defence.

The _defence_, as it used to be understood, needs no description. To-day in all armies the defence is looked upon not as a means of winning a battle, but as a means of temporizing and avoiding the decision until the commander of the defending party is enabled, by the general military situation or by the course and results of the defensive battle itself, to take the offensive. In the British _Field Service Regulations_ it is laid down that when an army acts on the defensive no less than half of it should if possible be earmarked, suitably posted and placed under a single commander, for the purpose of delivering a decisive counter-attack. The object of the purely defensive portion, too, is not merely to hold the enemy's firing line in check, but to drive it back so that the enemy may be forced to use up his local reserve resources to keep the fight alive. A firing line covered and steadied by entrenchments, and restless local reserves ever on the look-out for opportunities of partial counterstrokes, are the instruments of this policy.

Entrenchments.

A word must be added on the use of entrenchments by infantry, a subject the technical aspect of which is fully dealt with and illustrated in FORTIFICATION AND SIEGECRAFT: _Field Defences_. Entrenchments of greater or less strength by themselves have always been used by infantry on the defensive, especially in the wars of position of the 17th and 18th centuries. In the Napoleonic and modern "wars of movement," they are regarded, not as a passive defence--they have long ceased to present a physical barrier to assault--but as fire positions so prepared as to be defensible by relatively few men. Their purpose is, by economizing force elsewhere, to give the maximum strength to the troops told off for the counter-offensive. In the later stages of the American Civil War, and also in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905--each in its way an example of a "war of positions"--the assailant has also made use of the methods of fortification to secure every successive step of progress in the attack. The usefulness and limitations of this procedure are defined in generally similar terms in the most recent training manuals of nearly every European army. Section 136, § 7 of the British _Infantry Training_ (1905, amended 1907) says: "During the process of establishing a superiority of fire, successive fire positions will be occupied by the firing line. As a rule those affording natural cover will be chosen, but if none exist and the intensity of the hostile fire preclude any immediate further advance, it may be expedient for the firing line to create some. This hastily constructed protection will enable the attack to cope with the defender's fire and thus prepare the way for a farther advance. The construction of cover during an attack, however, will entail delay and a temporary loss of fire effect _and should therefore be resorted to only when absolutely necessary..._. As soon as possible the advance should be resumed, &c." The German regulations are as follows (_Infantry Training_, 1906, § 313): "In the offensive the entrenching tool may be used where it is desired, for the moment, to content one's self with maintaining the ground gained.... The entrenching tool is only to be used with the greatest circumspection, because of the great difficulty of getting an extended line to go forward under fire when it has expended much effort in digging cover for itself. The construction of trenches must never paralyze the desire for the irresistible advance, _and above all must not kill the spirit of the offensive_."

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

The organization of infantry varies rather more than that of other arms in different countries. Taking the British system first, the battalion (and not as elsewhere the regiment of two, three or more battalions) is the administrative and manoeuvre unit. It is about 1000 strong, and is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, who has a major and an adjutant (captain or lieutenant) to assist him, and an officer of lieutenant's or captain's rank (almost invariably promoted from the ranks), styled the quartermaster, to deal with supplies, clothing, &c. There are eight companies of a nominal strength of about 120 each. These are commanded by captains (or by junior majors), and each captain has or should have two lieutenants or second lieutenants to assist him. Machine guns are in Great Britain distributed to the battalions and not massed in permanent batteries. In addition there are various regimental details, such as orderly-room staff, cooks, cyclists, signallers, band and ambulance men. The company is divided into four sections of thirty men each and commanded by sergeants. A half-company of two sections is under the control of a subaltern officer. A minor subdivision of the section into two "squads" is made unless the numbers are insufficient to warrant it. In administrative duties the captain's principal assistant is the colour-sergeant or pay-sergeant, who is not assigned to a section command. The lieutenant-colonel, the senior major and the adjutant are mounted. The commanding officer is assisted by a battalion staff, at the head of which is the adjutant. The sergeant-major holds a "warrant" from the secretary of state for war, as does the bandmaster. Other members of the battalion staff are non-commissioned officers, appointed by the commanding officer. The most important of these is the quartermaster-sergeant, who is the assistant of the quartermaster. The two colours ("king's" and "regimental") are in Great Britain carried by subalterns and escorted by colour-sergeants (see COLOURS).

The "tactical" unit of infantry is now the _company_, which varies very greatly in strength in the different armies. Elsewhere the company of 250 rifles is almost universal, but in Great Britain the company has about 110 men in the ranks, forming four sections. These sections, each of about 28 rifles, are the normal "fire-units," that is to say, the unit which delivers its fire at the orders of and with the elevation and direction given by its commander. This, it will be observed, gives little actual executive work for the junior officers. But a more serious objection than this (which is modified in practice by arrangement and circumstances) is the fact that a small unit is more affected by detachments than a large one. In the home battalions of the Regular Army such detachments are very large, what with finding drafts for the foreign service battalions and for instructional courses, while in the Territorial Force, where it is so rarely possible to assemble all the men at once, the company as organized is often too small to drill as such. On the other hand, the full war-strength company is an admirable unit for control and manoeuvre in the field, owing to its rapidity of movement, handiness in using accidents of ground and cover, and susceptibility to the word of command of one man. But as soon as its strength falls below about 80 the advantages cease to counterbalance the defects. The sections become too small as fire-units to effect really useful results, and the battalion commander has to coordinate and to direct 8 comparatively ineffective units instead of 4 powerful ones. The British regular army, therefore, has since the South African War, adopted the _double company_ as the unit of training. This gives at all times a substantial unit for fire and manoeuvre training, but the disadvantage of having a good many officers only half employed is accentuated. As to the tactical value of the large or double company, opinions differ. Some hold that as the small company is a survival from the days when the battalion was the tactical unit and the company was the unit of volley-fire, it is unsuited to the modern exigencies that have broken up the old rigid line into several independent and co-operating fractions. Others reply that the strong continental company of 250 rifles came into existence in Prussia in the years after Waterloo, not from tactical reasons, but because the state was too poor to maintain a large establishment of officers, and that in 1870, at any rate, there were many instances of its tactical unwieldiness. The point that is common to both organizations is the fact that there is theoretically one subaltern to every 50 or 60 rifles, and this reveals an essential difference between the British and the Continental systems, irrespective of the sizes or groupings of companies. The French or German subaltern effectively commands his 50 men as a unit, whereas the British subaltern supervises two groups of 25 to 30 men under responsible non-commissioned officers. That is to say, a British sergeant may find himself in such a position that he has to be as expert in controlling and obtaining good results from collective fire as a German lieutenant. For reasons mentioned in ARMY, § 40, non-commissioned officers, of the type called by Kipling the "backbone of the army," are almost unobtainable with the universal service system, and the lowest unit that possesses any independence is the lowest unit commanded by an officer. But apart from the rank of the fire-unit commander, it is questionable whether the section, as understood in England, is not too small a fire-unit, for European warfare at any rate. The regulations of the various European armies, framed for these conditions, practically agree that the fire-unit should be commanded by an officer and should be large enough to ensure good results from collective fire. The number of rifles meeting this second condition is 50 to 80 and their organization a "section" (corresponding to the British half-company) under a subaltern officer. The British army has, of course, to be organized and trained for an infinitely wider range of activity, and no one would suggest the abolition of the small section as a fire-unit. But in a great European battle it would be almost certainly better to group the two sections into a real unit for fire effect. (For questions of infantry fire tactics see RIFLE: § _Musketry_.)

On the continent of Europe the "regiment," which is a unit, acting in peace and war as such, consists normally of three battalions, and each battalion of four companies or 1000 rifles. The company of 250 rifles is commanded by a captain, who is mounted. In France the company has four sections, commanded in war by the three subalterns and the "adjudant" (company sergeant-major); the sections are further grouped in pairs to constitute _pelotons_ (platoons) or half-companies under the senior of the two section leaders. In peace there are two subalterns only, and the _peloton_ is the normal junior officer's command. The battalion is commanded by a major (_commandant_ or strictly _chef de bataillon_), the regiment (three or four battalions) by a colonel with a lieutenant-colonel as second. An organization of 3-battalion regiments and 3-company battalions was proposed in 1910.

In Germany, where what we have called the continental company originated, the regiment is of three battalions under majors, and the battalion of four companies commanded by captains. The company is divided into three _Züge_ (sections), each under a subaltern, who has as his second a sergeant-major, a "vice-sergeant-major" or a "sword-knot ensign" (aspirant officer). In war there is one additional officer for company. The _Zug_ at war-strength has therefore about 80 rifles in the ranks, as compared with the French "section" of 50, and the British section of 30.

The system prevailing in the United States since the reorganization of 1901 is somewhat remarkable. The regiment, which is a tactical as well as an administrative unit, consists of three battalions. Each battalion has four companies of (at war-strength) 3 officers and 150 rifles each. The regiment in war therefore consists of about 1800 rifles in three small and handy battalions of 600 each. The circumstances in which this army serves, and in particular the maintenance of small frontier posts, have always imposed upon subalterns the responsibilities of small independent commands, and it is fair to assume that the 75 rifles at a subaltern's disposal are regarded as a tactical unit.

In sum, then, the infantry battalion is in almost every country about 1000 rifles strong in four companies. In the United States it is 600 strong in four companies, and in Great Britain it is 1000 strong in eight. The captain's command is usually 200 to 250 men, in the United States 150, and in Great Britain 120. The lieutenant or second lieutenant commands in Germany 80 rifles, in France 50, in the United States 75, as a unit of fire and manoeuvre. In Great Britain he commands, with relatively restricted powers, 60.

A short account of the infantry equipments--knapsack or valise, belt, haversack, &c.--in use in various countries will be found in UNIFORMS, NAVAL AND MILITARY. The armament of infantry is, in all countries, the magazine rifle (see RIFLE) and bayonet (q.v.), for officers and for certain under-officers sword (q.v.) and pistol (q.v.). Ammunition (q.v.) in the British service is carried (a) by the individual soldier, (b) by the reserves (mules and carts) in regimental charge, some of which in action are assembled from the battalions of a brigade to form a brigade reserve, and (c) by the ammunition columns.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The following works are selected to show (1) the historical development of the arm, and (2) the different "doctrines" of to-day as to its training and functions:--Ardant du Picq, _Études sur le combat_; C. W. C. Oman, _The Art of War: Middle Ages_; Biottot, _Les Grands Inspirés--Jeanne d'Arc_; Hardy de Périni, _Batailles françaises_; C. H. Firth, _Cromwell's Army_; German official history of Frederick the Great's wars, especially _Erster Schlesische Krieg_, vol. i.; Susane, _Histoire de l'infanterie française_; French General Staff, _La Tactique au XVIII^me--l'infanterie_ and _La Tactique et la discipline dans les armées de la Révolution--Général Schauenbourg_; J. W. Fortescue, _History of the British Army_; Moorsom, _History of the 52nd Regiment_; de Grandmaison, _Dressage de l'infanterie_ (Paris, 1908); works of W. v. Scherff; F. N. Maude, _Evolution of Infantry Tactics and Attack and Defence_; [Meckel] _Ein Sommernachtstraum_ (Eng. trans, in _United Service Magazine_, 1890); J. Meckel, _Taktik_; Malachowski, _Scharfe- und Revuetaktik_; H. Langlois, _Enseignements de deux guerres_; F. Hoenig, _Tactics of the Future_ and _Twenty-four Hours of Moltke's Strategy_ (Eng. trans.); works of A. von Boguslowski; _British Officers' Reports on the Russo-Japanese War_; H. W. L. Hime, _Stray Military Papers_; Grange, "Les Réalités du champ de bataille--Woerth" (_Rev. d'infanterie_, 1908-1909); V. Lindenau, "The Boer War and Infantry Attack" (_Journal R. United Service Institution_, 1902-1903); Janin, "Aperçus sur la tactique--Mandchourie" (_Rev. d'infanterie_, 1909); Soloviev, "Infantry Combat in the Russo-Jap. War" (Eng. trans. _Journal R.U.S.I._, 1908); British Official _Field Service Regulations_, part i. (1909), and _Infantry Training_ (1905); German drill regulations of 1906 (Fr. trans.); French drill regulations of 1904; Japanese regulations 1907 (Eng. trans.). The most important journals devoted to the infantry arm are the French official _Revue d'infanterie_ (Paris and Limoges), and the _Journal of the United Stales Infantry Association_ (Washington, D. C). (C. F. A.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] At Bouvines, it is recorded with special emphasis that Guillaume des Barres, when in the act of felling the emperor, heard the call to rescue King Philip Augustus and, forfeiting his rich prize, made his way back to help his own sovereign.

[2] Crossbows indeed were powerful, and also handled by professional soldiers (e.g. the Genoese at Crécy), but they were slow in action, six times as slow as the long bow, and the impatient gendarmerie generally became tired of the delay and crowded out or rode over the crossbowmen.

[3] As for instance when thirty men-at-arms "cut out" the Captal de Buch from the midst of his army at Cocherel.

[4] This tendency of the French military temperament reappears at almost every stage in the history of armies.