CHAPTER IX

THE CAUSES OF CENTRAL AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS

Civil War as a Characteristic Central American Political Institution--Character and Extent of the Conflicts--Forces back of Them: Unfitness of the People for Democratic Government, Oppression by the Party in Power of its Enemies, Rivalry for Office, _Personalismo_ and _Localismo_--Indifference of the Mass of the People--Hope for Improvement--Effects of Contact with the Outside World.

The most important fact in the history of the Central American republics, from their declaration of independence down to the present time, has been the almost continuous civil war from which the majority of them have suffered. Their inability to establish stable governments has retarded their economic and social progress in the past, and is a menace to their welfare and even to their national existence today. The development of agriculture, the building of roads and railroads, and the civilization and education of the masses of the people, have been discouraged, both by strife between factions at home and contests with neighboring governments, and by the misrule resulting from the predominance of the military elements which have been brought to the front by the premium which these conflicts have placed on armed force. The weakness of the five countries, moreover, has frequently exposed them to acts of aggression from foreign powers, and in recent times their very independence has been endangered because the apparent incapacity of most of them for self-government has led to a general belief in Europe and America that they must one day fall under the control of some stronger power. Under modern conditions, it is impossible for a government which cannot maintain order and secure to the lives and property of foreigners the protection which international law demands to expect that its rights of sovereignty, or even its territorial integrity, should be scrupulously respected by governments which are more powerful and better organized. The elimination of internal disorder is therefore one of the most serious problems which confronts the people of the Isthmus.

If one asks the average Central American, whether of the educated classes or of the common people, what has been the principal cause of the revolutions which have occurred in his country, he will almost certainly answer: the ambition of professional politicians and the abuse of power by the government,--the desire of each member of the ruling class to hold office, and the tendency of each administration to use its authority for the personal benefit of those who control its policy and for the gratification of their hatred of their opponents. The force of this reply can be readily appreciated by one who has seen the conditions which exist in some of the five republics, but the causes assigned are nevertheless hardly adequate to explain the extreme prevalence of internal strife in the five republics. There are many countries with perfectly stable governments which are cursed with politicians more ambitious and more selfish than those who have been prominent in revolutions in Central America, and many also where the opponents of those in power are treated with far more severity than falls to the lot of the defeated party there. The reasons given indicate, perhaps, the motives which actuate those who participate in each revolt, but they do not explain the underlying causes which have made uprisings against the government more frequent in Central America than in almost any other part of the civilized world. These causes must be sought, not in the aspirations and immorality of any one relatively small group of men, such as that which figures in Central American political affairs, but rather in the nature and working of the governmental institutions and in the economic and social condition of the people as a whole.

The way in which revolution became the only means by which the political institutions of the five republics could be worked has already been described. The constitutions which were drawn up for the federal government and for the five states in the years 1823-25 provided, as we have seen, for the choosing of the more important officials by popular elections; but the holding of real elections soon proved to be impossible, because of the ignorance and indifference of the great majority of the people, and the lack of experience in self-government among the ruling classes. The parties which were contending with one another for the control of the government soon yielded to the temptation to employ force and fraud to attain their ends; and the voting for officials consequently became, first an occasion for periodic disorders, accompanied frequently by an appeal to arms, and then a mere farce, in which the triumph of the administration candidate was assured by the pressure exerted by the government. Within a few years after the declaration of independence, force had come to be recognized as the only means by which power was secured and held, and revolution was not only the sole remedy for bad government, but the one way in which a change of officials could be effected. Civil war was thus an indispensable part of the political system.

Revolutions were of almost yearly occurrence throughout the Isthmus during the first half century after the declaration of independence, for the development just described took place in each of the five countries. In some, however, there was early apparent a tendency towards avoiding actual warfare, so long as the established government pursued a policy which made its rule tolerable to the parties not represented in it. Even when disaffection grew so strong that a change was inevitable, attempts were usually made to bring about a compromise. Force still remained the basis of all authority, and potential revolution the only corrective of bad government, but actual fighting between the factions was rare. In Costa Rica, where this tendency was strongest, practically no blood has been shed in political quarrels for nearly sixty years. Nicaragua and Honduras, on the other hand, have had frequent and sanguinary revolutions throughout their history as independent nations. This difference between them and their peaceful neighbor is enough to indicate that other factors, besides the mere impossibility of changing their governments except by force, have contributed to make them turbulent. Before attempting to explain what these factors are, however, it is necessary to understand the nature of Central American revolutions and the character and the motives of the persons who participate in them.

In the first place, it should be borne in mind that the average revolution is not a movement which embraces a very large number of people or which calls into play deep economic or social motives. The countries themselves are very small, for the largest barely exceeds fifty thousand square miles in area. In all of them, except Salvador, much of the national territory is so sparsely settled, and often so impenetrable and unhealthful, that it hardly enters into consideration as a theater of military operations. Of the total population, which is probably not more than 600,000 in Nicaragua, Honduras, or Costa Rica, only a very small portion is sufficiently interested in politics to participate voluntarily in a civil war. Revolutionary armies, therefore, rarely reach any great size, and they rarely need to in order to succeed. The military force of the government is small, ill-equipped, and poorly trained, and not infrequently part of it proves disloyal in a political crisis. Although it is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy how many soldiers are actually under arms at a given time in such countries as Nicaragua or Honduras, it seems very doubtful if the total exceeds two or three thousand, and these are scattered through the country to such an extent that a much smaller revolutionary force, sometimes of less than a hundred men, can seize and hold an important strategic point before the government has time to rally its forces. After an uprising has started, both sides fill their ranks by voluntary recruiting and impressment, but neither is able to raise or to fit out any army which would seem very formidable to a single well-trained regiment. It is only necessary to recall the stand which William Walker, with a few hundred dissolute and undisciplined adventurers, was able to make against the combined military power of the five republics, in order to appreciate the actual force at the disposal of a Central American government. Yet these governments are nevertheless able to suppress the greater part of the revolts which occur against their authority.

The spirit which causes the revolutions is not often one which arouses very much enthusiasm among the people at large. Their leaders are usually inspired by a thirst for offices and spoils or a desire for revenge against political rivals who have oppressed them, and the rank and file are actuated mainly by sectional or class jealousy, but rarely by any genuine political motives. There are of course many men in politics who seek to obtain control of the government, even by revolution, in order to effect economic and social reforms. Generous and patriotic ideas are found both among the chiefs and their followers in all parties, but they play a smaller part in actually bringing about a revolt than do the less creditable but still very human motives upon which the political parties are built up.

Revolutions are rarely the result of a widespread conspiracy among the people. Even a large portion of the active members of the party interested often know little about the plans of the leaders until an armed uprising has already taken place. The procedure followed is much the same in nearly all cases. A group of factional chiefs, with a few score of their more intimate personal followers, raise the standard of revolt with a pronunciamento against the government, naming one of their number as provisional president. An attempt is made either to seize from within some town in which the revolutionary party is

## particularly strong, or to invade the country from outside, occupying

one of the seaports as a base of operations. The latter is perhaps more common, because the important members of the opposition party are generally in exile. The revolution not infrequently gains its foothold, as did that of 1909 in Nicaragua, through the treachery of local authorities who turn over to it the soldiers and the military supplies under their control, or by the disaffection of high officials sufficiently influential to carry with them a considerable part of the army. Arms and supplies are secured from some neighboring government which has reasons for wishing to overthrow the existing administration, or from foreign corporations and speculators who wish concessions or special privileges. A revolt often attains formidable proportions in this way before the government can raise and equip an army to send against it, as it usually starts in regions remote from the capital, where it is able to consolidate its forces before it meets with serious opposition. In the districts still under the control of the authorities, meanwhile, martial law is proclaimed, known or suspected adherents of the party responsible for the revolution are thrown into jail, horses and other property are requisitioned for the army, and every able-bodied man of the laboring and artisan classes, except those who succeed in concealing themselves, is pressed into service as a soldier. The result, of course, is an immediate paralyzation of agriculture and commerce. A revolution thus begun often lasts several months before there is a decision, although only a few battles are fought, and only two or three thousand men, and often less, are engaged on each side. If the rebels win a few successes at the beginning, or if the government is unable to defeat them after a prolonged campaign, the president usually falls, because of his loss of prestige and because of the defection of the always numerous politicians who desire above all else to be on the winning side. When this occurs, there is a complete demoralization of all of the departments of the administration, accompanied, not infrequently, by a split in the victorious party or a counter revolution on the part of the defeated. Order is not restored until one strong leader or group of leaders has established himself or itself in complete military control.

Since these revolutions are the work of so small a proportion of the people, their causes must evidently be sought not so much in any inherent disorderliness and lawlessness of the nation as a whole, as in the questions which have divided the classes interested in politics, and in the conditions which have made it possible for these classes to plunge the community into civil war time after time by their incessant feuds, without being effectually checked by the desire of the rest of the country for peace.

The instigators and leaders of Central American revolutions are in almost every case the pure-blooded, or nearly pure-blooded, descendants of the _conquistadores_, and one of the chief causes of these phenomena must therefore be sought in the characteristics which the creole aristocracy has inherited from its sixteenth century ancestors. Among the Spaniards who founded the colonies on the Isthmus there were a few respectable families, but the majority were adventurers, fugitives from justice, and soldiers who had been left without occupation by the cessation of the wars against the Moors, and came to America in search of excitement and easily gained wealth. In exploring and subjugating the Indian kingdoms, they showed a bravery and an indomitable energy which have few parallels in history, but as colonists they were turbulent, lawless, and unprincipled. Their cruelty towards the Indians has already been described. Their dissensions among themselves, before the government at home had firmly established its military control over them, forecasted what might be expected when the authority of Spain should be withdrawn, for the bloody clashes between rival exploring parties, the vindictiveness and treachery exhibited towards one another by ambitious governors who could not agree upon the extent of their respective jurisdictions, and the occasional uprisings, like that of the Contreras brothers in Nicaragua, among the rabble of the Spanish settlements, made the annals of the Central American provinces during the sixteenth century one long chronicle of bloodshed. After the declaration of independence, it was the descendants of the early colonists who carried on the civil wars which lasted almost without intermission for so many years. The leaders of the political factions,--the men who fill the higher offices when their party is in power and bear the brunt of the opposition at other times,--are still for the most part members of the white upper class, even though the exclusiveness of the old creole aristocracy has been broken down.

It is rather surprising to find the native landholders and merchants, who have more interest than anyone else in the maintenance of order and good government, taking the lead in the civil wars which have made order and good government impossible. But the feuds which have divided the educated and wealthy classes among themselves have been so bitter that it has been impossible down to the present time for their leaders to co-operate with one another in establishing and supporting a stable and efficient government. The custom of proscribing and despoiling political enemies has kept alive and intensified the personal hatred between the members of the rival parties even in those countries where there are no fundamental economic or social questions upon which the ruling classes are divided. After a change of government, the more prominent adversaries of the victorious party are usually exiled or imprisoned; their property is taken from them either by outright confiscation or forced loans; and their constitutional rights are little respected by the officials or by the courts. When an outbreak against the government is attempted or threatened, many of those of its opponents who are still at liberty are seized, and even their wives and children are subjected to imprisonment and mistreatment, and sometimes, as under the government of President Zelaya in Nicaragua, to barbarous tortures. These persecutions, inspired not only by a determination to prevent uprisings against the government, but often by a desire for revenge and for the gratification of individual spite, frequently make the situation of the enemies of the administration so intolerable that they prefer to risk everything in a revolt rather than to submit. This has been especially true in countries where continual revolutions have kept party feeling at white heat, accustoming all classes to regard civil war almost as a normal condition, and forcing the government to take severe measures against all whom it thinks likely to resist its authority by force of arms. Peace can never be hoped for under these conditions. The only republics of Central America which have made any real progress towards stable government are those where the opponents of the party in power are treated with comparative fairness, and where confiscation and imprisonment for political reasons are rare.

Resistance to oppression, however, is by no means the only motive which leads members of the upper classes to engage in intrigues and revolts against the government. The pursuit of office is in itself an attractive occupation, for every member of the small ruling class has a comparatively good chance of becoming president or cabinet minister or of attaining some other honorable and lucrative position. The rewards offered by politics are on the whole greater than those held out by the more solid occupations, especially in those countries where continual disorder make agriculture and commerce a precarious means of securing a livelihood, for very few of the native planters or merchants receive so great an income as they could secure, legitimately or illegitimately, at the expense of the community if they could reach one of the higher positions in the government. Politics, moreover, provides the natural outlet for the energies of those members of the upper class who have no property. This is especially true of the great majority of the lawyers, doctors, and dentists, few of whom secure a respectable living from their overcrowded professions.

Many members of the wealthy and educated classes, however, have always worked for peace, realizing that revolutions not only deprived their property of most of its value, but also lessened their own influence in the community by raising demagogues and purely military leaders to positions of prominence. The influence exerted by this moderate party has depended upon the economic development of each country. In Costa Rica and Salvador, where the cultivation of coffee has been developed until it offers a more attractive field of endeavor than politics, the great landholders have been a powerful factor in bringing about the establishment of stable government. In Guatemala also, the prosperity of agriculture has probably favored peace, although the bitterness of party strife in that country and the backwardness of the Indian population have greatly retarded its political development. Agriculture in Honduras and Nicaragua, on the other hand, being still in a primitive condition, affords a comparatively unattractive occupation, and politics may still be said to be the chief interest of the propertied classes.

Although the landholding and professional classes furnish the leaders, the revolutions would hardly be possible without the participation of the far more numerous other elements in the community. The half-breed artisans in the towns and villages form perhaps the largest part of the factional armies. These laborers, who have little property, and therefore, so far as they can see, little direct interest in the preservation of peace or the economic well-being of the community, find in civil war both a welcome source of excitement and an avenue for personal advancement and profit, for the opportunities for loot during the campaigns, and the rewards distributed among the adherents of the victorious party after a successful revolution, make conspiracy and revolt a more lucrative occupation than hard labor at a trade. There is no way in which the intelligent but unstable _ladino_, little inclined to steady manual or intellectual labor, can so easily achieve wealth and influence as by the pursuit of politics,--a vocation which makes it possible for a boy of the humblest, barefooted, illiterate family, coming from a thatched, one-room hut in the mountains, to rise to a position where he is addressed as “Great and Good Friend” by the heads of the leading nations of the world. Not a few artisans and professional soldiers of this class have actually risen to such a position, and some, especially in the Liberal party, have been presidents of their countries for long periods. Ordinarily, however, they play a less prominent part in affairs than the members of the white aristocracy, who have the advantage of superior education, social prestige, and wealth.

Those who hope to derive some direct individual profit, however, form but a small part of the number of persons engaging in a typical revolution. The rebel leaders would have but little hope of overcoming the advantage conferred on the government by its control of the administrative machinery, and above all of the standing army and military stores, if they did not receive active support from adherents far too numerous to be rewarded by offices or money in the event of victory. The principal motive which brings together the rank and file of a revolutionary army is “_personalismo_,”--the devotion to individual chiefs, sometimes the heads of great families, sometimes professional soldiers, sometimes mere demagogues, whose relation to their followers is usually not so much that of political leaders as of friends and patrons. Ties of blood, friendships, and gratitude for favors received or expected play a much greater part in holding these factions together than community of ideals or principles; and the very nature of the parties consequently makes the strife between them the more bitter and compromise the more difficult. Closely connected with this _personalismo_ is _localismo_, the jealousy and rivalry between town and town, which makes the political leaders of each hostile to those in other parts of the country and enables them too often to carry the common people with them in their armed opposition to a government controlled by their enemies. We have already seen how disastrous an influence this spirit has exerted in the history of the Isthmus, and how it has been intensified by continual internal strife and by the persecution of the people of one section by those of another.

Other factors also have often contributed, though usually in a minor degree, to bring about an uprising against the government. Religious questions have been a source of much trouble, although they are less important at present than in the early history of the Isthmus. The Church has now lost its one-time influence through the decline of religious feeling among the people, but in the first half century after the declaration of independence it was often strong enough to instigate a revolt against a government which oppressed it, or, by its own exactions, to cause one against a government which supported it. Abuses of power by the officials, or the adoption of a policy which directly injured a large portion of the people, have sometimes done much to make a revolution possible, and dissatisfaction with the existing administration, apart from any desire to put any other group of individuals in power, always causes many persons to join the ranks of the rebel army. Many others take part merely for the sake of excitement and plunder,--because they wish to fight and to “eat fat cows.” The revolutions, when they have once started, naturally attract all of the discontented and adventurous elements in the community. But it is _personalismo_ and _localismo_ which make it possible for them to start, and which hold the armies participating in them together through the exigencies of the conflict.

Only a small part of the people, however, enter at all into these party conflicts. The great majority, especially in the rural districts, know little and care less about political affairs. They dislike and fear the revolutions, which often involve forced military service for themselves and destruction for their livestock and their little patches of corn and beans, but they have been so accustomed to misgovernment and exploitation ever since their ancestors were conquered by the Spaniards that it never occurs to them to make a concerted effort to check the disorderly tendencies of the politicians. It is this ignorance and indifference of the masses of the people, rather than any disposition to turbulence in the nation as a whole, which has prevented the establishment of stable government in many of the Central American republics, by making it impossible to hold elections and work the constitution by peaceful means, and by permitting rival cliques of professional office-seekers to plunge the country into civil war time after time for the gratification of personal ambitions and feuds, without other restraint than that suggested by their own interests.

It is sometimes asserted that it is the Indian and part Indian element which is chiefly responsible for the disorders in Central America. This view seems to find justification in the tranquillity of Costa Rica, where the population is almost entirely of Spanish descent, but it is, in fact, very unjust to a race which is on the whole more peaceful, law-abiding, and industrious than the descendants of their conquerors. The Indians rarely participate in a revolution. In Guatemala, where they have retained their racial identity more than in any other part of the Isthmus, they have hardly ever risen against the government since their final subjugation at the beginning of the colonial period, although they have always been forced to serve against their will both in the standing army and in revolutionary forces. The only real popular uprising which has occurred in that republic,--the revolution which placed Carrera in power in 1838, originated not among the Indians but among the ignorant _ladinos_ in the districts east of the capital, where the conditions are far more similar to those of Honduras and Nicaragua than to those which prevail throughout the greater part of Guatemala itself. It was among the half-breeds that Carrera secured the followers who enabled him to establish his military despotism, and it was these same half-breeds, under the influence of the village priests, who made the Church so strong a factor during the Conservative administration. In Nicaragua, the semi-civilized rural population in the district of Matagalpa and the villages which have retained their distinctly Indian character in the southwestern Sierras have as a rule remained neutral, so far as they could, in the contests between Leon and Granada, although the Indians of Matagalpa revolted on one occasion, about thirty years ago, when they were forced to aid in constructing a telegraph line into their country. The Indians in the four northern countries, indeed, are responsible for the revolutions only in the sense that they are helpless to prevent them. Their situation is very different from that of the common people of Costa Rica, where the early extinction of the aborigines made possible the development of a compact, homogeneous community of white peasants, among whom it was comparatively easy to establish stable political institutions.

The causes of Central American revolutions, therefore, may be said to be: first, the attempt to impose political institutions copied from one of the world’s most advanced democracies upon a country where elections were absolutely impossible; second, what may be called the habit of revolution among the ruling class and the people of many of the towns,--a habit formed during the turbulent years that followed the breakdown of the federal constitution, and perpetuated by the bitterness of personal feuds and sectional jealousy, the pursuit of politics as a money-making occupation, and the mutual persecutions of rival factions; and third, the backwardness of the masses of the people, which has not only made the republican constitutions unworkable, but has also prevented those who in the long run suffer most from civil war from exerting any effective influence for peace.

None of these causes can be said to be permanent. There is no reason to suppose that stable governments will not be attained eventually in all of the five republics, as a result of the education of the people. The public schools, which have been established in the last quarter century even in the remote country districts of the Isthmus, have already done much to improve the situation and enlarge the outlook of the masses of the population, and to hasten the approach of the day when they will be able to assume the control of their own affairs through the democratic machinery which already exists on paper, and to protect themselves against the disastrous consequences arising from the factional quarrels of selfish professional politicians. This influence makes itself felt slowly, but the social and political effects of popular education, once they have asserted themselves, can never be undone. The penetration of foreign ideas and the increase of wealth and improvement of standards of living which have resulted from the development of foreign commerce are also doing their part in changing the situation of the countries of the Isthmus. The landholding classes, as we have seen, are already exerting a strong influence in behalf of peace in the more prosperous countries, for their success in agricultural pursuits has greatly lessened their interest in politics. The laboring classes, also, have found new opportunities for employment and advancement, and are beginning to learn by experience that their own welfare is dependent upon the peaceful development of their country. The factors in favor of stable government have thus been immeasurably strengthened.

Those who hope for the ultimate political regeneration of the Isthmus receive much encouragement from the example of Costa Rica, which started upon her independent existence with the same institutions and the same inexperience in self-government as her neighbors. Costa Rica, it is true, has owed her freedom from civil war largely to her isolation and her homogeneous European population, but the substitution of a popularly elected and constitutional government for the military tyrannies which had existed at first there as well as in other parts of the Isthmus was due primarily to the education of the common people and to the increasing realization on their part of their interest in the conduct of public affairs. There is no reason to suppose that a similar development will not take place eventually in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Salvador, and even among the Indians of Guatemala. The people of those countries have never had the opportunities for peaceful progress which the prosperous peasants of Costa Rica have enjoyed, but there seems little reason to suppose, from observation of the races as they work side by side in schools and public offices, that the Indian or the _mestizo_ of the other republics is inherently less capable of advancement or less fitted for self-government than his fellow-citizen of Spanish descent.

The changes brought about by increased intercourse with foreign countries have on the whole favored stability and good government, but in some respects they have been far from beneficial. While agriculture or commerce has been made a more attractive occupation than conspiracy and revolt for many of the great landholders, many others have been driven out of these pursuits and into politics, as the only means of making a living which remained open to them, by the immigration of more efficient foreign planters and business men. We have already seen to what an extent this has taken place in some of the five countries. The interest in peace among the classes who by wealth and education are best qualified to be the leaders of the community has been lessened by the loss of their property, and the number of professional politicians and revolutionists who are almost entirely dependent upon the pursuit of office for support has been swelled by members of many families which formerly devoted their energies to more useful occupations.

Not a few of the foreigners, moreover, have taken part in civil wars and disturbances, for the furtherance of purely selfish aims, and to the great detriment of the native community. The North American or European professional revolutionist, usually an adventurer or a fugitive from justice in his own country, is a type which is all too familiar in the more disorderly countries of the Isthmus. He is rarely anything more than a mercenary soldier, ready to offer his services to the highest bidder, but his presence is a source of annoyance and danger to the constituted authorities, and the viciousness and greed of some who have been rewarded for their assistance in war with official positions has equaled if not exceeded that of the most depraved native leaders. The participation of these men in the armies on both sides of a civil contest, moreover, is often a positive danger to the Central American countries, because of the regrettable readiness of the great powers of the world to protect their citizens in their real or fancied rights even when they are engaged in an occupation so little commendable as that of making war for money against a constituted government. A significant example of the difficulties which arise from this source was afforded by the events which followed the shooting of two American adventurers during the Nicaraguan revolution of 1909.[44]

Still more dangerous to the welfare of the Central American countries are the foreign corporations which, for equally unworthy purposes, often render open or covert aid to a revolutionary movement, in order to assure themselves of the protection and favor of the new government. There is unfortunately little doubt that recent uprisings in Honduras and Nicaragua have been financed and supplied with arms from New Orleans, or that they have owed their success largely to the aid thus received. So long as the resources of the five republics continue to be developed under special concessions and privileges, there will inevitably be a strong temptation for the large fruit companies and other corporations having interests there to intervene in political affairs, because of the great part which official favor or disfavor plays in determining the conditions under which they do business. Such a situation is disastrous to the internal peace of the countries involved, for any discontented faction can usually secure support from some group of investors or speculators who think that they can further their interests or secure valuable concessions by promoting a revolution. In the governments which come into power in this way, however, the influence of the foreign corporations which have aided them is generally far less than might be expected, for Central American political leaders are none too grateful and none too scrupulous about carrying out obligations which they have entered into; and they rarely lose sight of their distrust of the foreigner in their appreciation of his assistance.

The disturbing influences introduced by intercourse with other countries, however, are offset, and more than offset, by the pressure which foreign governments, actuated by a desire to protect their subjects who have settled or invested capital in Central America, have exerted in behalf of peace. The United States, especially, has been forced to take positive action to prevent civil and international wars in the Isthmus, not only because its commerce and its investments there are larger than those of any other nation, but also because its settled policy not to permit European intervention in the affairs of the weaker American nations has made it necessary to adopt measures which deprive other powers of an excuse for interference. Inspired by a desire to promote the stability and well-being of its neighbors, the United States has in the last ten years taken more and more radical steps to safeguard the peace of the Isthmus, until it has finally reached the point of actually suppressing revolutions in one of the countries by force. Its influence has therefore become the most potent factor, for good or for evil, both in the external and the internal affairs of the five republics. No description of Central American conditions would be complete without a discussion of the way in which this influence has been exercised.

FOOTNOTES:

[44] See Chapter XI .

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