CHAPTER II

CENTRAL AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Early Political History of the Isthmus--Difficulty of Establishing a Stable Government--Annexation to Mexico--Establishment and Dissolution of the Central American Federal Republic--Strife Between Liberals and Conservatives--Description of Central American Governments at Present--Importance of the President--Political Parties, Patronage, and Graft--Revolutions.

On September 15, 1821, the principal civil and ecclesiastical personages of Guatemala City, with many of the royal authorities and the more prominent creoles, met in convention to proclaim the independence of the five provinces of the Viceroyalty of Guatemala, which had until that time been a dependency of the Spanish crown. The existing administrative machinery was not for the moment abolished, for many of the officials had approved of and had taken a prominent

## part in the action of the separatist party. The Governor General,

Brigadier Gainza, continued to exercise the executive power, and the local governors in Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica were instructed to do the same. In the capital, a committee of influential natives, called the _Junta Consultiva_, was appointed to assist the former royal authorities until a new form of government should be decided upon. There was no armed resistance to this action on the part of the mother country, for the latter, engaged in a prolonged struggle with her more important colonies in the South, was in no position to send troops to subjugate the inaccessible and relatively insignificant communities of Central America.

The prospect which confronted the provinces thus thrown upon their own resources was far from bright. They were ill equipped for existence as an independent nation. The creole aristocrats, who had led the movement for separation from Spain, and who now assumed control of the government, had had little training to fit them for the exercise of their new responsibilities, for few had received more than the most rudimentary education at home, and fewer still had traveled in foreign countries. None had had any practical experience in political affairs, for it had always been the policy of the royal authorities to fill official positions exclusively with Peninsular Spaniards,[6] thus excluding the natives of the colonies from all share in the administration. There were a half-score of brilliant leaders in the councils of the new nation, but they were notable rather for their exalted but impractical ideals than for any grasp of the concrete situation with which they had to deal at home. Their patriotism was of a high order, but their statesmanship left much to be desired. Among the common people, the great majority were ignorant and superstitious Indians, with a small admixture of Spanish blood and a thin veneer of Spanish civilization. They were scattered through a strip of land eight hundred miles in length, in isolated valleys, separated from one another by mountain ranges and pestilential jungles, where rough mule trails afforded the only means of communication. Throughout the greater part of the Isthmus, the people of each village, having little commerce with their neighbors or with the outside world, depended for subsistence almost entirely upon their own products. A few favored sections produced indigo, cochineal, or precious metals for export, but the expense of shipping these articles from the Pacific Coast to Spain, the only country with which the colonists were allowed to trade, was so great that the planters derived little profit from them. Standards of living were therefore little higher, even in the cities, than they had been three hundred years before.

The Central American nation was divided within itself from the very first. In Guatemala there was a bitter jealousy, created by the special privileges and the pretensions of the more favored classes, between the Peninsular officials and the creole great families on the one hand and between the latter and the merchants and professional men of less aristocratic origin on the other; and this feeling was intensified by radical differences of opinion about religious and economic questions. Besides the dissensions within the group which assumed the control of political affairs in the capital, there were factional conflicts and local civil wars in almost every part of the Isthmus. The provinces, which had long felt that their interests were sacrificed by the royal authorities to those of Guatemala, showed an inclination to dispute the authority of the new central government, and their insubordination was encouraged by the ambitious local governors, who desired to enjoy independent authority, and by the not inconsiderable party which still remained loyal to Spain. San Salvador, Comayagua, Leon, and Cartago, the seats of the provincial governments, were soon the centers of more or less open revolts against Gainza and the _Junta Consultiva_, while other towns, actuated on their side by jealousy of the local capitals, allied themselves to the party in control in Guatemala. The result was a condition of anarchy which throttled agriculture and commerce, and almost put an end to all semblance of organized government.

The inexperience of the creole leaders, and the conflicts between jealous social classes and rival towns, were the more disastrous because the Central American communities possessed no political institutions which could be used as the basis for the establishment of an independent government. In this respect they were in a situation very different from that of the United States in 1783, for in that country the state and local organizations had remained almost unchanged despite the revolution, and the creation of a new central authority had been made comparatively easy by the inherent political capacity derived from centuries of racial experience in self-government. In Central America, the country had been ruled for three hundred years by officials and laws imposed by an outside force, and when this force was withdrawn the old order fell to pieces, leaving nothing to take its place. The self-appointed revolutionary committees had little hold on the loyalty of the people, and little power to make their commands respected. The only political institution which may be said to have survived the change was the municipality. Even in colonial times, the wealthier creoles had been able to purchase positions in the _ayuntamientos_, or governing boards of the cities, and had thus had a voice in the management of certain purely local affairs. After the declaration of independence, the _ayuntamientos_ were in many places almost the only respected authority, and they played a large part both in maintaining order and in organizing the _juntas_ which took charge of provincial affairs. But they never formed a real basis for the formation of state and national governments, because their independence and authority, which had been small under Spanish rule, was taken from them early in the revolutionary era by the military despots who obtained control of affairs. Their prominence during the transitional period after 1821 contributed little to the establishment of orderly government, for they were the foci of the local jealousies which did more than anything else to keep the country in a state of anarchy.

The organization of a permanent government, to take the place of the provisional revolutionary committees, consequently presented a difficult problem. There was from the first a strong party which favored the establishment of a federal republic, but the majority of the wealthy classes, who had supported the declaration of independence only because of their jealousy of the Peninsular Spaniards who monopolized the official positions and because they realized that the mother country was no longer in a position to protect her colonies from outside aggression and internal disorder, doubted the ability of the people of the Isthmus to rule themselves under republican institutions, and advocated the union of the five provinces with Iturbide’s Mexican empire. This party soon grew very strong as the result of disorders which broke out in Honduras and Nicaragua, and on January 25, 1822, the _Junta Consultiva_ voted in favor of the annexation. General Filísola, the representative of the Emperor, reached the capital a few months later, and proceeded at once with an army against the people of San Salvador, who had refused to recognize his authority. He had barely overcome the resistance of the republicans there when news arrived that Iturbide had fallen.

Filísola, returning to the capital, called together a congress of representatives from each of the five provinces, to which he turned over his power. This body, assuming the title of National Constituent Assembly, declared the former Central American colonies a federal republic, and appointed a provisional executive committee of three men, who exercised a precarious authority, subject to constant interference by the Assembly, for two years. During this time, the Assembly framed an elaborate constitution, modeled on that of the United States, establishing a federal government in Guatemala City, and state governments in each of the five provinces. A president and five _Jefes de Estado_, chosen by the people through electoral colleges, took the place of the Captain General and the royal provincial governors, and the law-making power was placed in the hands of a Congress of one chamber. The system of checks and balances in the American constitution was taken over and made more intricate by elaborate provisions for the maintenance of the independence of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments and for the prevention of abuses of power.

The Assembly also adopted much progressive legislation, which did away with many of the worst features of the Spanish regime. From the first, however, its sessions were disturbed by irreconcilable differences of opinion between the radical members, who were in the majority, and the clergy and many of the rich landowners and merchants, who disapproved of the proposed reforms. As a result of this conflict, two parties were formed, which called themselves “Liberals” and “Conservatives.” The Liberals controlled the first constitutional congress, which met in 1825, and elected their candidate, Manuel José Arce, President of the Republic. The latter, however, soon quarreled with his own party, dissolved the congress, and even overthrew and reorganized the state government of Guatemala, with the aid of the Conservatives. These arbitrary acts caused revolts in many parts of the Isthmus, and especially in Salvador. The people of that state had always been peculiarly jealous of the control of their affairs from Guatemala, and their hostility towards the capital had been increased by the opposition of the federal authorities to the creation of a new diocese in their territory. Under the leadership of Father Delgado, who aspired to the bishopric, they united with the disaffected party in Honduras and Guatemala in a two years’ war against Arce, and finally succeeded in overthrowing him (1829).

Francisco Morazán of Honduras, the leader of the victorious army, was proclaimed President of the Federation in 1830. The Guatemala state authorities who had been expelled by Arce were reinstated, and Liberal supremacy was established by force of arms throughout the Isthmus. There were frequent Conservative revolts, however, and even the people of Salvador, who had played the principal part in Morazán’s triumph, showed their former jealousy of domination from Guatemala by turning against him. Their resistance was overcome by force in 1831, but it was thought politic to transfer the seat of the federal government to San Salvador. After this, Morazán’s prestige waned rapidly. His efforts to repress disorder were unavailing, and the Conservatives gradually regained control of many of the state governments. The last federal congress, which adjourned in 1838, declared the states free to govern themselves independently; and in 1839, when Morazán’s second term came to an end, his authority was recognized nowhere outside of Salvador. He was expelled from Central America in the following year by an army from Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.

The breakdown of the federal system was inevitable. Even those responsible for the adoption of the constitution of the United States as a model had little idea how that constitution really worked, and had no conception of the spirit of compromise and of mutual respect for legal rights which alone made the existence of a government such as they wished to establish possible. Many of the state governors refused to obey the federal officials, and were overthrown by the latter and replaced by adherents of the faction in power in the capital. The Congress, attempting to tie the hands of the executive, was reduced to impotence by the use of the army. The President himself succumbed before the end of his term to a revolution in which all of the disaffected elements took part. Even a better organized government would probably have been unable long to maintain order in a country where distances were so great, means of communication so inadequate, and sectional jealousies so intense as in Central America.

Equally inevitable was the breakdown of the democratic institutions which the leaders of the constituent assembly had sought to create. The elections soon became a farce because of the ignorance and indifference of the great mass of the people. The history of the Central Americans had never taught them respect for the will of the majority, and there was consequently little inclination from the first to accept an unsatisfactory verdict at the polls in good faith. The authorities gradually learned to bring pressure to bear upon the voters in the interests of the party in power, and as time went on assumed a more and more complete control of the balloting, until candidates opposed by the government ceased to have any chance of success. At the same time the members of the opposition party were restrained or expelled from the country, to prevent their intriguing or revolting against the government. Within a few years authority established and upheld by force was the only authority which was recognized or respected, and there was no means of changing the officials in power, and consequently no recourse against bad government, except revolution. Civil war had thus become an indispensable part of the political system.

For some years after 1839, there was intermittent internal and international strife, with hardly an interval of real peace, in nearly every state of the Isthmus. Costa Rica alone, because of her peculiar social conditions, which will be described in a subsequent chapter, led a comparatively tranquil existence in her isolated valley. Elsewhere the establishment of stable governments seemed impossible. Conflicting ambitions, mutual persecutions, and sectional jealousy, as well as differences over religious and economic questions, divided the political leaders of the community into vindictively hostile factions, which had no means of settling their disputes except by an appeal to arms. The state governments, resting upon the outcome of revolutions, had little claim to legality or to the respect of the community, and they were compelled to maintain their position, where they maintained it at all, by force and by tyrannical repression of attempts to overthrow them. Besides the opposition of disaffected classes at home, they faced also the constant danger of intervention by neighboring state governments which were in the hands of the opposite party, for the solidarity created by mutual action in federal affairs led the Conservatives and Liberals in each state to assist their former brothers in arms in other states even after all formal political connection had been broken. This solidarity was strengthened by the ambition of a large section of the Liberal party to re-establish the old federal union by force, under the leadership of the followers of Morazán, and by the opposition to this plan on the part of the Conservatives.

During the greater part of the period from 1839 to 1871, the Conservatives, under the leadership of the aristocratic-clerical party in Guatemala, were dominant throughout the Isthmus. The Liberals secured control for short terms at different times in Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, but in almost every case they were overthrown by the intervention of Rafael Carrera, the President of Guatemala. These Conservative governments, although usually controlled by the wealthiest and most respectable classes in the community, did little to improve the desperate political and economic situation into which the continual civil war had plunged the new republics, partly because of frequent changes in the personnel of the governments and frequent dissensions within the ruling class, and partly because of the inherent weakness of administrations established and upheld by the force of a foreign government.

In 1871-72 the Liberals returned to power as the result of a concerted movement in Guatemala, Honduras, and Salvador. This revolution effected far more than a mere change of presidents; it marked the destruction of the old aristocratic-clerical party as the dominant force in politics. In Guatemala, where the Conservative leaders were exiled or imprisoned, and both the great families and the Church were deprived of a great part of their property and influence, the old regime has never been restored. Its disappearance greatly weakened the position of its allies in Honduras and Salvador. A very similar though almost bloodless revolution occurred in Costa Rica in 1870, when General Tomás Guardia overthrew the “principal families” which had hitherto controlled the government. In Nicaragua, where party divisions were based rather on local rivalries than on class distinctions, the change from the old order to the new was neither so sudden nor so complete, and the Granada aristocracy was able to maintain itself in power until 1893.

The Conservative party continued, indeed, to exist as a political force, but it was no longer a social group which stood for definite principles and points of view so much as mere organization of professional politicians. The influence of the great families became less and less, and the leadership in the party was assumed by military chiefs whose objects and ambitions were little different from those of their opponents. Since 1871, party lines have tended to disappear, and it has made little difference in political conditions whether an administration was controlled by one faction or the other. In Honduras and Salvador, in fact, even the party names have almost ceased to be used, and in Nicaragua they denote merely the adherents of rival cities. It is difficult to say how strong the old aristocracy still is in Guatemala because of the ruthless suppression of all manifestations of political opinion by the government.

Since 1871, the republics of the Isthmus have been governed for the most part by strong, absolute rulers, who have concentrated all power in their own hands and who have on the whole been more successful in maintaining order than the frequently changing and less centralized administrations controlled by the Conservative oligarchy. Revolutions and revolts still occur, but they are less often victorious than formerly, for the relative power of the government has greatly increased. The agricultural development of recent years has made the wealthy classes, who have capital invested in coffee and sugar plantations, inclined to frown on attempts to plunge the country into civil war; and the improvement and the increased cost of artillery and other military material have made it more difficult to equip a revolution strong enough to overcome the regular army. Individual presidents, supported by strong military forces, have thus been able to hold the supreme authority for long terms of years, and to establish highly centralized, comparatively efficient administrations, which have done much to encourage the development of the country. Whatever may be the disadvantages of the exercise of irresponsible power by one man, there can be no doubt that the Central American countries have made more progress under governments of this kind than they did under the constantly changing administrations of their early history, which had neither the prestige nor the military power necessary to maintain order. Until the other departments, and especially the legislatures, had been reduced to subjection by the executive, the action of the latter was often almost completely paralyzed, and more than one president was forced to resign by petty disputes arising purely from personal jealousy. Under such conditions it was of course impossible to pursue any definite and coherent policy.

The majority of the Central American governments at the present time are republican only on paper, although the forms of the various constitutions are still observed. Elections are held regularly in all of the five republics, but they are controlled by the administration, which almost invariably secures the triumph of the official ticket. The extent to which this control is exercised varies with the character and the strength of the President. In most cases, opposition candidacies are simply not permitted, and anyone engaging in propaganda unfavorable to the government’s party is severely dealt with. At other times, only known adherents of the President are allowed to cast their votes, and the ballots, if necessary, are fraudulently counted. Even in Costa Rica, where comparative freedom prevails, the citizens are sometimes intimidated or coerced, and the authorities are able to bring pressure to bear in many ways, by promises of favors or by petty persecutions. Such practices are made easier by the fact that the voting is open and public, as the Australian ballot is unknown. One or two real elections, in which the government has not desired or has not dared to impose its will on the country, have been held in each of the five republics, but they have usually not been participated in by a large part of the people outside of the cities, and they are looked back upon for generations as events far out of the ordinary. As a rule changes in the presidency come about only when the chief magistrate voluntarily relinquishes his office to a member of his own party, or when the opposition is victorious in a civil war.

So long as he can maintain himself in office and suppress revolts against his authority, a Central American president is an absolute ruler, who dominates all other departments of the government. He appoints and removes every administrative official, and through his ministers directly supervises every branch of the public service. The revenues are collected and expended under his orders with a more or less perfunctory regard for the budget voted by the legislature, and with little pretense of making an accounting for them. He not only executes, but also makes and unmakes the laws, either through his control of the Congress, or simply by executive decree. The army and the police are under his absolute command. Even the courts usually decide the more important cases which come before them in accordance with his wishes. His power is curbed only by the fear of losing the support of his followers or of being overthrown by a popular revolt, and neither of these dangers is ordinarily very great so long as he retains the loyalty of his friends by gifts of offices and money, and prevents political agitation by an effective use of the army and police.

The national legislatures, in spite of the constitutional provisions aiming to make them independent and co-ordinate departments of the government, have in practice little authority of their own. Except in Nicaragua, where the bi-cameral system now prevails, each of the republics has a Congress of one chamber. The members of these are theoretically elected by the people for a term of two or four years, but they are in reality chosen by the administration like other officials, and are therefore little more than a mouthpiece of the president. Any attempt on the part of the Congress to oppose the wishes of the executive, in fact, is discouraged by the use of force or by minor persecutions, such as the withholding of salaries or the molestation of the delegates by the police. Not infrequently differences of opinion arise in regard to matters of little significance, but in matters of serious importance the Congress rarely attempts to assert its own will.

With the judicial department, the case is much the same. The Supreme Court, elected for a fixed term either by the Congress or by the people, usually appoints and removes all minor judges and judicial employees. This system has worked well in Costa Rica, where the tribunals are generally independent and honest, but in the other republics political considerations are apt to play a large part not only in the selection of judges but in the decision of cases. The courts are subjected to much the same kind of pressure as the legislature, and there are few of them which would dare to oppose themselves to the expressed wishes of the president. They therefore do little or nothing to protect private citizens against abuses of power by the executive authorities or by the minor officials.

The president is assisted by ministers whom he appoints and who are responsible to him alone. The most important portfolios are those for War, Public Works, Finance and Public Credit, and Government. The minor departments--Justice, Public Instruction, Charities, etc.--are generally placed in charge of subsecretaries. The heads of the departments are rarely more than advisors and aids to the president, who directs their policy and passes on practically all of their acts. They have no independent authority, and as a rule no real influence over the conduct of affairs when the chief executive is a man of strong character.

The local administration is under the direction of the Department of Government, which has a representative subject to the orders of the minister, and through him responsible to the president, in every town and village throughout the country. Each republic is divided into from seven to twenty-three departments, under governors who are at the same time military commanders, “_jefes políticos y comandantes de armas_.”[7] These officials, who are appointed by the president, enforce the laws, collect the taxes, and control the expenditure of government funds in their jurisdictions, and for these purposes have under their orders practically all of the subordinate national authorities. The departments are subdivided into “municipalities”--districts which include a town or village with the surrounding country--where the central authority is represented by a minor official commonly called _comandante_,[8] who commands a few soldiers and is intrusted with the duty of maintaining order and enforcing the laws. These departmental and local authorities are too frequently petty tyrants, who show little respect for the private rights or the property of the inhabitants of the districts under their jurisdiction. As they are subject to little real restraint in their own sphere of action, they are able to exploit the people of the lower classes practically as they please, and even persons of wealth and social position are not free from their persecutions unless they can protect themselves by the exercise of political influence. Redress against abuses of power is difficult to secure, because the courts usually cannot or dare not interfere, and the higher authorities, more concerned with the loyalty than with the official virtue of their subordinates, take little interest in protecting the rights of common citizens.

In each municipal district, there is a local government, or _municipalidad_, consisting of one or more _alcaldes_, or executive officers, and a board of _regidores_, or aldermen. This body, which has wide jurisdiction over matters of purely local interest, such as the repairing and lighting of streets, the building of roads and bridges, and the enforcement of sanitary regulations, is elected by popular vote and is theoretically independent of the local representatives of the department of government. In practice, however, the latter dominate its actions, and prevent the _alcaldes_ from carrying out any action of which they do not approve. The members of the _municipalidad_ themselves, moreover, are in most places nominated by the central government, which controls their election as it does that of other officials. In any event they are prevented from playing a very prominent part in the promotion of local interests by the lack of funds. Their revenues, which are derived mainly from taxes on business establishments and fees for water and other public services, rarely suffice to carry out any very important improvements, and their credit is very poor. As a result, the central government is forced to construct and administer all of the more expensive public works, and to exercise many of the other functions which are assigned to the local boards by law.

It can be readily seen that in a political organization such as has just been described the character of the administration will depend almost entirely upon the capacity and disposition of the man at its head. An able president, in a Caribbean Republic, exercises an absolute power for which it would be difficult to find a parallel anywhere in the civilized world.[9] He is not restrained, like the absolute monarchs of Europe and Asia, by dynastic traditions or religious considerations, and he has little need to consider public opinion so long as he retains the good will of the army and of the office holders who owe their positions to him. He can often re-elect himself for term after term, and he is responsible to no one for the exercise of his authority or for his management of the public revenues. The country is so small that he can, and does, extend his control to matters of minor and purely local importance, even interfering with his fellow-citizens’ personal affairs and family relations, without regard for the most sacred rights of the individual. It is in his power to exile, imprison, or put to death his enemies, and to confiscate their property, while at the same time he can enrich and advance his friends. The ever-present possibility of revolution, it is true, prevents too great an abuse of power in some of the more enlightened republics, but in the others centuries of misgovernment and of the oppression of one class by another have done away with respect for individual rights to such an extent that the cruelest and most arbitrary rulers are tolerated because the people feel that they would only risk their lives and property, without improving their condition, by revolt.

Only an exceptionally able man, however, can exercise such despotic power for a long period. A chief executive of less force of character will generally find it impossible to maintain his position or will be dominated by his political associates. Often a military leader or a powerful minister is the real ruler. It is frequently said that a strong, autocratic government is that which is best suited to the peculiar conditions of tropical America, because it affords the greatest security to agriculture and commerce and the best protection to foreign investments. Many Central American presidents, however, inspired by patriotism and by republican ideals, have refused to exercise dictatorial powers, allowing the other departments of the government a measure of independence, and relinquishing their offices to a more or less freely elected successor at the end of their legal term. These have not always been so successful in maintaining order and in carrying out public improvements as their less scrupulous contemporaries, because they have been unable to act with the same decisiveness and effectiveness which are possible where all authority is concentrated in the hands of one man; but such administrations at least provide an opportunity for the people to gain some experience in self-government, and make for a more healthy national political life than can be found where the expression of opinion in the press and even in conversation is curbed by a military despotism. When a long-standing and strongly established dictatorship breaks down, moreover, there is too frequently a period of disorder which destroys all of the advances made during years of peace. The entire organization of the government, built around one commanding figure, goes to pieces when the leader, either through death or incapacity, is compelled to relax his hold; and it is very rarely that a new man is at once found who is capable of keeping the administrative machine together. In those countries, such as Costa Rica, where the presidency is a position of less influence and profit, and where the custom of rotation in office prevails, it is comparatively easy to settle the question of the succession peaceably, in accordance with the law or by an agreement between the political leaders; but where all parties have been subjected for years to the autocratic rule of one man, and compelled humbly to obey his commands, none of the factional chiefs can tolerate the thought that a personal rival may succeed to the same position. For this reason, the fall of a Central American dictator is generally followed by a more or less prolonged civil war, which only ends when one group of men succeed in imposing their will upon the others.

It would be impossible for a single individual, who can rely neither upon the loyalty due to an hereditary sovereign nor upon the prestige enjoyed by a chief magistrate chosen by a majority of the people, to impose his absolute authority upon the whole nation, were it not for the peculiar political conditions existing in Central America. In all of the five republics, the common people show little hostility to despotism as such and little disposition to attempt to influence the selection or to guide the policy of their rulers. Neither the illiterate and oppressed Indian _mozo_ of Guatemala nor the prosperous and conservative _concho_ of Costa Rica has any real conception of the meaning or of the possibilities of democratic institutions, and both are willing to leave the conduct of political affairs to their superiors. For them, the government, with the forced military service and the compulsory labor on public works which it demands, is simply a necessary evil, and attempts to change its personnel by civil war arouse more dismay than enthusiasm. Few among the lower classes enter into revolutionary uprisings voluntarily. The upper classes, on the other hand, are interested in politics not so much for the sake of principles or policies, as because they wish to secure a share of the offices and spoils which provide many of them with a comfortable living at the expense of the rest of the community. There are among them many professional politicians and military leaders who have no other lucrative occupation, and the number of these has been swelled considerably in recent years by the fact that the commerce and to a less extent the large scale agriculture of the five republics have fallen under the control of foreigners, leaving many formerly wealthy native families impoverished. By the use of offices and money, therefore, the government can always secure adherents and build up a strong following, the members of which are deeply interested in its remaining in power because their positions depend upon it. It is upon a political organization of this kind, and upon the army, that the president must rely for holding in subjection his personal enemies and the mass of the ignorant and indifferent common people.

The military force is the chief support of the government. The highest officers in this are usually influential and trusted members of the president’s party, for the very existence of the administration depends upon their loyalty. The standing army itself is composed of a few thousands of ragged, barefooted conscripts of the most ignorant type, commanded by professional soldiers of little education or social position, who have in many cases risen from the ranks themselves. Theoretically every male citizen is liable to military service, but in practice all but the poorest classes secure exemption in one way or another. There is little fairness or system in recruiting. When additional soldiers are needed, the required number of peasants or laborers are simply seized, taken to the _cuartels_, and forced to enlist for a longer or shorter period, whether they have already performed their legal service or not. When news is received that troops are being raised in a given vicinity, every able-bodied man goes into hiding; and in certain capitals, one frequently sees small parties of “volunteers,” bound with rope and under a heavy guard, being brought in from the country to augment the garrison. Since soldiers of this type think little for themselves, and follow blindly the commands of their leaders, it is the latter who really control the army. In spite of the immense power which they might exert, however, these officers are usually merely the tools of the civilian politicians, who secure their support by giving them money and conferring military honors upon them. Although each republic has been governed at times during its history by men who were professional soldiers, the number of real military dictators has been surprisingly small.

Although the great historic political parties have disintegrated, and in some states have disappeared altogether, there is always a more or less open and organized opposition to the government, made up of the rivals of the men in power and of the discontented elements which have not received their share of the offices and spoils. These factions, in the main, simply represent personal and local jealousies and ambitions. Their members are held together by ties of blood and of friendship, always potent in a Latin American country, but especially so in these little republics, whose people have until recently had comparatively little intercourse with the outside world and have become closely related by continual intermarriage. Enmities between prominent families become especially bitter in such communities, as does also the jealousy between different towns and villages, which, though but a few miles apart, have little commercial or social intercourse with one another. Questions of national policy, and plans for the development of the national resources play a small part in political contests. The prominent leaders are not so much the representatives of theories or tendencies as men who have won the confidence and loyalty of the people of their towns and villages, or who are the heads of powerful family connections, and the intrigues and the struggles for power between such men and their followings are the principal motive of the civil wars which are still so frequent in many of the five republics. The factions which dispute the control of the government in the four northern republics still call themselves Liberals and Conservatives, but there is at the present time little difference in their policies or in the character of their membership. They are in reality mere combinations between the ambitious leaders of smaller groups, each of whom is striving to advance his own fortunes and those of his friends.

The animosities created by former civil wars, however, as well as the bitterness of the struggles for office at the present time, still make the feeling between the different factions very intense. In some of the republics, each group of men which has secured control of the government has endeavored to consolidate its power, and to avenge its members for past injuries at the hands of the party which it has overthrown, by severe and often utterly unjustifiable treatment of its defeated enemies. The latter are frequently reduced to a point where they find life in their own country almost intolerable. The more influential leaders of the opposition are exiled or imprisoned, and sometimes deprived of their property by confiscation or forced loans, and the rank and file of the party are subjected to all of the persecutions which the greed or the vindictiveness of the new authorities may suggest. Many of the measures taken are really necessary, especially when there is danger of a counter revolution; but they do much to keep alive a bitter personal hatred between the rival groups of politicians. Within the last few years, the realization of this fact has led the governments of many of the republics to adopt a more humane and civilized policy, but the customs formed during a century of civil war have made the execution of such a policy very difficult.

The fact that the control of the government is seized and held by each succeeding administration by force naturally inclines the victorious party to treat it as the spoils of war. A sweeping change of employees, from cabinet ministers to janitors, takes place upon the accession of each new president, and causes a demoralization of the public service which can easily be imagined. Not only are inexperienced and inefficient men given official positions, but the pay roll is loaded down with salaries to useless or purely ornamental functionaries, appointed as a reward for political services. The schools and certain other governmental activities, such as the telegraphs, are to a slight extent saved from the general disorganization by the fact that the small salaries paid and the special abilities required in them make the positions unattractive to the sinecure-hunting professional politicians; but even in these, the experienced and faithful employee has no chance against the man who has powerful friends.

Favoritism in appointments is not, however, so grave an evil as the graft which is more or less prevalent in the governments of all of the five republics. This corruption is due partly to the tendency to regard official positions as the fruits of a temporary victory, from which as much profit as possible is to be secured while the domination of the party in power lasts, and partly to the fact that it is impossible for many of the employees to live on their ridiculously inadequate and often irregularly paid salaries. In some of the countries, where there have been long periods of despotic government by one man, who has subordinated every other consideration to the maintenance of his personal following and the consolidation of his power, conditions are almost incredibly bad. From the postal clerk who steals illustrated reviews out of the mail boxes, to the high official who mysteriously becomes the owner of large amounts of property during his tenure of office, the servants of the nation rob their fellow-citizens by an infinite variety of methods. The President and the ministers derive profits from the granting of concessions and contracts; the local officials exact tribute from those who depend on them for protection; and every other employee who has regulations to enforce or favors to dispense endeavors to secure small sums from those who are affected by his performance of his duties. Under these military dictatorships, the irresponsible authority enjoyed by the officials, and their continual abuse of their position, result eventually in a deplorable vitiation of political ideals and official morality among the members of all

## parties, for the opponents of such an administration, on coming into

power in their turn, are too often unable to resist the temptation to follow the example of their predecessors, and to avenge and indemnify themselves for their sufferings at the hands of their enemies.

The most harmful corruption is that which exists in the courts. Cases are too often decided with regard only to the influence of the persons involved or to the inducements which they hold out, and political considerations play a very large part wherever they arise. In some countries, in fact, the President has often intervened openly in judicial questions, forcing the magistrates to decide them as he desired. Where the evidence makes impossible or ridiculous the verdict which the court would like to render, cases are very likely to be held up indefinitely by the loss of necessary documents, or the decision is purposely made invalid by allowing technical defects in the procedure. A magistrate who attempts to perform his work conscientiously frequently has his decisions reversed by the upper courts or left unexecuted by administrative officials, and is himself not unlikely to be deprived of his position.

Such corruption, however, has reached its extreme development only in a few cases, where particularly unscrupulous men have obtained absolute control of the government. In the majority of the five republics, graft flourishes to an alarming extent, but is neither so universal nor so disastrous to the public morals. Ideas of official virtue are rather lax among most of the professional politicians, but there are nevertheless comparatively few who do not show a sincere desire to carry out the duties of their offices faithfully and efficiently, even though profiting at the same time from their position in ways which an Anglo-Saxon official would consider illegitimate. In Costa Rica, as we shall see, the employees of the government receive fairly adequate salaries, which under normal conditions are regularly paid, and, in consequence perhaps of this fact, perform their duties as honestly and efficiently as the officials of the average North American state. In each of the other governments, there are officials whose integrity is above suspicion. These, however, are the exception rather than the rule, and graft will apparently always be one of the most salient characteristics of Central American administration so long as the moral standards and political conditions of the Isthmus remain what they are.

The execution of the criminal laws is usually lax and sometimes corrupt. The members of the upper classes can generally evade punishment, or at least escape with light penalties, even when they have committed a serious offense, provided the offense be not political. There is none of the five countries in which atrocious murders have not been committed with impunity, and frauds of a disgraceful character carried out without fear of justice, by persons of social prominence, within very recent years. Where the lower classes are involved, the laws are enforced rather more severely, but in an irregular manner, and criminals frequently escape punishment through the venality or the carelessness of the courts or of their jailers, when there are no special circumstances to make the government anxious to hold them. Those who are convicted and sentenced are usually employed under a heavy guard on public works, and receive in return for their labor a small amount of money with which they can buy food. The death penalty is very rarely enforced for any non-political crime, although it is said that it is the custom of the military officials in some of the countries to shoot suspects at the time of their arrest, in order to avoid the trouble and expense of trying them. Notwithstanding the inactivity of the officials, however, there is not a large amount of brigandage in Central America, and deeds of personal violence, if we except the bloody encounters which occur every Sunday under the influence of _aguardiente_, are comparatively few. The people seem to be peaceable and law-abiding by nature, even in places where there is no organized force to hold criminals in check.

The worst features of the Central American governments are due chiefly to the fact that the officials are subject to so little control by public opinion. Those who benefit by the acts of the administration support it whatever its defects, while those who do not, oppose it regardless of its merits. The sentiment of the ruling class as a whole may influence the government in non-political matters, but in taking measures to strengthen their own position the president and his advisors are rarely deterred by considerations of legality, popularity, or morality. An administration does not weaken itself so much by the violation of rights guaranteed by the constitution as by failing to provide offices and other rewards for its own supporters. The press, as a means for shaping public opinion, has little political importance, for even in those countries where it is not subject to a close censorship, the majority of the newspapers are too partisan or too venal to command general respect.

The only remedy against bad government is revolution. This, unfortunately, almost invariably proves worse than the evil which it seeks to cure. The civil wars of the last ninety-six years have wrought incalculable harm in all of the five republics except Costa Rica, not only by the destruction of lives and property, but by making force the only basis of authority, and by placing men of military ability rather than constructive statesmen in positions of power. The numerous Central American patriots who have worked with all their will and energy for the establishment of efficient administration and the economic progress of their countries have found their efforts nullified by the continual disorder which has made peaceful evolution impossible. Time after time, by an outbreak of civil war, all classes of the population have been forced to suspend their regular occupations, and crops, livestock, and other property have been carried off for provisions or for loot. Under such conditions there is little incentive for the natives to develop their agricultural properties or for foreigners to invest money in railways or in mines. The resources and energies of the governments, wasted in maintaining their military supremacy over their enemies, have not been available for the construction of the much needed roads and railways or for the execution of the sanitary measures which are all but indispensable in a tropical country. As the result of these conditions some of the republics of the Isthmus have made little progress since their declaration of independence, although those which have enjoyed comparative peace have advanced rapidly in prosperity and civilization. The first requisite for the improvement of the economic and political conditions of Central America is the substitution of some peaceful means of changing the personnel of the governments for the costly and destructive method of revolution.

FOOTNOTES:

[6] By Peninsular Spaniard is meant a native of European Spain.

[7] In Costa Rica, the departments are called provinces, and their administrative heads, _gobernadores_.

[8] This is not the official designation, which differs from country to country. In Guatemala, they are called _comisionado político y comandante militar_, in Nicaragua, _agente de policía_, in Costa Rica, _jefe político_, etc.

[9] It should be stated that the description of Central American governments in this chapter does not apply in all its details to Costa Rica. In that country, although the written constitution and the framework of the government are the same as in the other countries, political conditions are, in fact, very different. The President comes into office, in most cases at least, by a free election rather than a revolution, and exercises a far less absolute power than elsewhere on the Isthmus. The peculiar conditions existing in Costa Rica will be described in a subsequent chapter.

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