Book vi

.) calls intellectual virtues, but the _Magna Moralia_ (i. 5, 35) virtues of the rational part of the soul, and right reason, it distinguishes (i. 35, 1196 b 34-36) science, prudence, intelligence, wisdom, apprehension ([Greek: upolaepsis]), in a rough manner very inferior to the classification of science, art, prudence, intelligence, wisdom, all of which are coordinate states of attaining truth, in the _Nicomachean Ethics_ (vi. 3). It distinguishes prudence ([Greek: phronaesis]) and wisdom ([Greek: sophia]) as the respective virtues of deliberative and scientific reason; and on the whole its account of prudence (cf. M.M. i. 5) is more consistent than that of the _Eudemian Ethics_. In these points it is a better preparation for the _Nicomachean Ethics_. But it falls into the confusion of first saying that praise is for moral virtues, and not for virtues of the reason, whether prudence or wisdom (M.M. i. 5, 1185 b 8-12), and afterwards arguing that prudence is a virtue, precisely because it is praised (i. 35, 1197 a 16-18). In dealing with continence and incontinence, the same doubts and solutions occur as in the _Nicomachean Ethics_ (