Book vii

. of the _Nicomachean_, which is [Zeta] of the _Eudemian_, pleasure is defined as [Greek: energeia taes kata thusin exeos anempodistos] (chap. 12, 1153 a 14-15); and in the _Magna Moralia_ as [Greek: hae kinaesis autou kai hae energeia] (ii. 7, 1204 b 28; cf. 1205 b 20-28). It is plain from the context that in the former definition "the natural condition" ([Greek: hae kata thusin exis]) refers to the soul which, while the body is regenerated, remains unimpaired (cf. 1152 b 35 seq., 1154 b 15 seq.); and in the latter definition the thing ([Greek: autou]), whose "motion, that is activity" is spoken of, is the part of the soul with which we feel pleased.

Down then to their common definition of pleasure as activity the three treatises present a harmonious system of morals, consistently with one another, and with the general philosophy of Aristotle. In particular, the theory that pleasure is activity ([Greek: energeia]) is the theory of two of his most authoritative works. In the _De Anima_ (iii. 7, 431 a 10-12), being pleased and pained are defined by him as acting [Greek: to] ([Greek: energein]) by a sensitive mean in relation to good or evil as such. In the _Metaphysics_ ([lambda] 7, 1072 b 16), in discussing the occupation of God, he says "his pleasure is activity," or "his activity is pleasure," according to a difference of readings which makes no difference to the identification of pleasure and

## activity ([Greek: energeia]). As then we find this identification of

pleasure with activity in the _Metaphysics_ and in the _De Anima_, as well as in the _Nicomachean Ethics_, the _Eudemian Ethics_ and the _Magna Moralia_, the only logical conclusion, from which there is no escape, is that, so far as the treatment of pleasure goes, any Aristotelian treatise which defines it as activity is genuine. There is no reason for doubting that the _Nicomachean Ethics_ to the end of

## Book vii ., the _Eudemian Ethics_ to the end of Book [Zeta], and the

_Magna Moralia_ as far as