book II

of the _Eudemian Ethics_ (cf. 1246 b 4 seq., 1248 a 35, 1249 b 14); and probably therefore this part was a separate discourse. Meanwhile, however, the truth about the _Eudemian Ethics_ in general is that it was an earlier rudimentary sketch written by Aristotle, when he was still struggling, without quite succeeding, to get over Plato's view that there is one philosophical knowledge of universal good, by which not only the dialectician and mathematician must explain the being and becoming of the world, but also the individual and the statesman guide the life of man. Indeed, the final proof that the _Eudemian Ethics_ is earlier than the _Nicomachean_ is the very fact that it is more under Platonic influence. In the first place, the reason why the account of prudence begins by confusing the speculative with the practical is that the _Eudemian Ethics_ starts from Plato's _Philebus_, where, without differentiating speculative and practical knowledge, Plato asks how far good is prudence ([Greek: phronaesis]), how far pleasure ([Greek: haedorhae]); and in the _Eudemian Ethics_ Aristotle asks the same question, adding virtue ([Greek: harethae]) in order to correct the Socratic confusion of virtue with prudence. Secondly, the _Eudemian Ethics_, while not agreeing with Plato's _Republic_ that the just can be happy by justice alone, does not assign to the external goods of good fortune ([Greek: ehutuchia]) the prominence accorded to them in the _Nicomachean Ethics_ as the necessary conditions of all virtue, and the instruments of moral virtue. Thirdly, the emphasis of the _Eudemian Ethics_ on the perfect virtue of gentlemanliness ([Greek: kalokhagathia]) is a decidedly old-fashioned trait, which descended to Aristotle from the Greek notion of a gentleman who does his duty to his state (cf. Herodotus i. 30, Thucydides iv. 40) and to his God (Xenophon, _Symp_. iv. 49) through Plato, who in the _Gorgias_ (470 [Epsilon]) says that the gentleman is happy, and in the _Republic_ (489 [Epsilon]) imputes to him the love of truth essential to philosophy. Moreover, when Plato goes on (_ib._ 505 [Beta]) to identify the form of good, without which nothing is good, with the gentlemanly thing ([Greek: kalhon kai agathon]), without which any possession is worthless, he inspired into the author of the _Eudemian Ethics_ the very limit ([Greek: opos]) of good fortune and gentlemanliness with which it concludes, only without Plato's elevation of the good into the form of the good. In the _Nicomachean Ethics_ the old notion, we gladly see, survives (cf. i. 8): virtuous

## actions are gentlemanly actions, and happiness accordingly is being at

our best and noblest and pleasantest ([Greek: ariston kai kalliston kai aediston]). But gentlemanliness is no longer called perfect virtue, as in the _Eudemian Ethics_: its place has been taken by justice, which is perfect virtue to one's neighbour, by prudence which unites all the moral virtues, and by wisdom which is the highest virtue. Accordingly, in the end the old ideal of gentlemanliness is displaced by the new ideal of the speculative and practical life.

Lastly, the _Eudemian Ethics_ derives from Platonism a strong theological bias, especially in its conclusion ([Eta] 14-15). The opposition of divine good fortune according to impulse to that which is contrary to impulse reminds us of Plato's point in the _Phaedrus_ that there is a divine as well as a diseased madness. The determination of the limit of good fortune and of gentlemanliness by looking to the ruler, God, who governs as the end for which prudence gives its orders, and the conclusion that the best limit is the most conducive to the service and contemplation of God, presents the Deity and man's relation to him as a final and objective standard more definitely in the _Eudemian_ than in the _Nicomachean Ethics_, which only goes so far as to say that man's highest end is the speculative wisdom which is divine, like God, dearest to God.

Because, then, it is very like, but more rudimentary and more Platonic, we conclude that the _Eudemian_ is an earlier draft of the _Nicomachean Ethics_, written by Aristotle when he was still in process of transition from Plato's ethics to his own.

The _Magna Moralia_ contains similar evidence of being earlier than the _Nicomachean Ethics_. It treats the same subjects, but always in a more rudimentary manner; and its remarks are always such as would precede rather than follow the masterly expositions of the _Nicomachean Ethics_. This inferiority applies also to its treatment not only of the early part (i. 1-33 corresponding to E.N. i.-iv.), but also of the middle part (i. 34-11. 7 corresponding to E.N. v.-vii. = E.E. [Delta]-[Zeta]). In dealing with justice, it does not make it clear, as the _Nicomachean Ethics_ (