V.

Mr. Spencer commenting upon his criticism of Kant’s idea of a Good Will, says:

“I find that in the above three paragraphs I have done Kant less than justice and more than justice—less, in assuming that his evolutionary view was limited to the genesis of our sidereal system, and more, in assuming that he had not contradicted himself.

“Clearly, I am indebted to Dr. Carus for enabling me to prove that Kant’s defence of his theory of ‘a good will’ is, by his own showing, baseless.”

Kant’s idea of a good will has nothing to do with evolution, and we can abstain here from discussing whether or not Kant was an evolutionist. Whether evolution is true or not, what difference does it make to the proposition, that a good will is the only thing which can be called good without further qualification (_ohne Einschränkung_)? Pleasure is good, but it is not absolutely good, there are cases in which pleasure is a very bad thing. We must qualify our statement and limit it to special cases. A good will, however, says Kant, is in itself good under all circumstances.

Did Mr. Spencer prove the baselessness of Kant’s proposition by proving evolution? Is it inconsistent to believe in evolution and at the same time to regard a good will as absolutely good, as good without reserve or limitation? I think not!