III.

MR. PEIRCE’S LOGIC OF SCIENCE.

In spite of the fundamental difference that obtains between Mr. Peirce’s and our own world-conception, we must state that there are many most important points of agreement. Mr. Peirce says in his article “Illustrations of the Logic of Science,” (ibid. p. 3 and 7):

“The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know....

“The settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry.”

There are according to Peirce several methods of settling opinion, which swayed humanity in an historic succession: (1) The method of tenacity. Doubt being an uneasy and dissatisfied state, we cling tenaciously not merely to believing, but to believing just what we do believe. (2) The method of authority, which is that of the Roman Church and of all great political and religious institutions of the past. (3) The _a priori_ method, by which Mr. Peirce understands the fixing of belief agreeably to reason, i. e. to the subjective conviction of the individual thinker. All these methods have their merits, says Mr. Peirce (ibid. p. 13):

“The _a priori_ method is distinguished for its comfortable conclusions. It is the nature of the process to adopt whatever belief we are inclined to, and there are certain flatteries to the vanity of man which we all believe by nature, until we are awakened from our pleasing dream by some rough facts. The method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind.... But most of all I admire the method of tenacity for its strength, simplicity, and directness.”

It is apparent that the merit of the _a priori_ method so called is really a vice. The _a priori_ method so called is the basis of agnosticism. If according to my reason this, and according to your reason that, may be the truth, where does truth remain? If truth is purely subjective, truth becomes impossible. The method of settling belief agreeably to our individual tempers is the death of objective truth, of science and philosophy.

Mr. Peirce fully recognises the practical importance of thought. He says:

“The production of belief is the sole function of thought” (ibid. p. 289).

“Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions” (ibid. p. 5).

“What is belief? First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a _habit_” (ibid. p. 291).

“Thus, we come down to what is tangible and practical, as the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice” (ibid. p. 293).

Mr. Peirce is very far from considering philosophy as a mere matter of speculation or theory without practical importance. He says:

“What sort of a conception we ought to have of the universe, how to think of the _ensemble_ of things, is a fundamental problem in the theory of reasoning.”

The _a priori_ method, so called by Mr. Peirce, translated into practical life is not only the death of truth but also of morality. The objective criterion of truth is gone, and with it goes the objective standard of right and wrong. If that is true which seems so to my individual reason, then that is right which pleases me best. What is right to me might be wrong to you. Thus this method leads either to moral indifference, or to basing ethics upon the greatest amount of pleasure attainable, (Hedonism, as represented by Mr. H. Spencer, Prof. Harald Höffding, Professor Gizycki, and others,) or to relying upon the individual conscience as an absolute and ultimate authority.[75]

The method of settling opinion agreeably to individual reason is at present the most fashionable and widely spread conception, and it shows its influence in the almost universal acceptation of agnosticism to-day. Is that the final decision with which we have to rest satisfied? If it were, we would better return to the method of authority or tenacity. No, it is not the sum of all wisdom. The _a priori_ method so called represents a period of transition, which, if persistently pursued, will lead to the bankruptcy of thought, the desperate appearance of which is well disguised in the big sounding and modesty-parading term agnosticism. And here we return to the exposition of Mr. Peirce’s views. Mr. Peirce does not accept the _a priori_ method, he believes in “the logic of science.” Mr. Peirce says:

“To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect.... The method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science” (ibid. p. 11.)

“That whose characters are independent of how you or I think is an external reality” (ibid. p. 298).

“All the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which they can be applied.... They may at first obtain different results, but, as each perfects his method and his processes, the results will move steadily together toward a destined centre.... The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real” (ibid. pp. 299-300).

The word “fated” must be understood as Mr. Peirce understands it. He adds in a foot-note:

“Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and cannot be avoided.”