VI.

Mr. Spencer in admitting that “the general drift of the passages quoted makes it tolerably clear that Kant must have believed in the operation of natural causes ... in producing organic forms,” adds:

“He does not, however, extend the theory of natural genesis to the exclusion of the theory of supernatural genesis.”

How does Mr. Spencer prove his statement? Does he quote a passage from Kant which expresses his belief in supernaturalism? No, Mr. Spencer does not quote Kant, and it would be difficult to find a passage to suit that purpose. Mr. Spencer adduces a few unmeaning phrases gleaned at random and torn out of their context, and from these phrases he concludes that Kant believed in the supernatural. Kant spoke somewhere of “the wisdom of nature” who has things so arranged that the species might be preserved. If the wisdom of nature in preserving the species is to be taken literally, the phrase might prove that Kant believed nature to be a wise old woman. Kant spoke further of “the germ of reason placed in man whereby he is destined to social intercourse.” Does the usage of the word “destined” really “imply divine intervention,” as Mr. Spencer says? Mr. Spencer adds:

“And this [viz. Kant’s usage of these phrases] shows that I was justified in ascribing to him the belief that Space and Time, as forms of thought [sic!], are supernatural endowments.”

What might we not prove by this kind of loose argumentation!

Kant did not introduce any supernatural explanations; on the contrary, he proposed to exclude “supernatural genesis.” He says e. g. in a passage of the “Critique of Judgment” quoted on page 41 of the appendix:

“If we assume occasionalism for the production of organised beings, nature is thereby wholly discarded ... therefore it cannot be supposed that this system is accepted by anyone who has had to do with philosophy.”

And furthermore Kant rejects the partial admission of the supernatural, saying:

“As though it were not the same to make the required forms arise in a supernatural manner at the beginning of the world as during its progress.”

Mr. Spencer charges Kant with inconsistency. We do not intend to say that Kant was in all the phases of his development consistent with himself. But we do say that the charge of Mr. Spencer against Kant consists in this: the real Kant has said things which are incompatible with Mr. Spencer’s view of Kant.

This settles the sixth point.