CHAPTER III

.

THE INVESTMENT OF LADYSMITH, MAFEKING, AND KIMBERLEY.

The Boers seize the heights dominating Ladysmith--The Battle of Farquhar's Farm--White withdraws to save the town--The guns brought off--Dramatic advent of the Bluejackets--Loss of Carleton's column--Neglect of precautions at Ladysmith--The town beleaguered--Condition of affairs on the Western Frontier--Doubtful attitude of the Schreiner Ministry--First act of war--Attempts to capture Mafeking--The Boers seize Vryburg--Kimberley isolated--Bombardment commenced--Stormberg district abandoned by the British--Attitude of the Cape Dutch.

On October 27 a strong British column marched out of Ladysmith and reconnoitred. The enemy, being not as yet in sufficient strength, or possibly anxious to draw the British on, fell back, and there was nothing more than an interchange of shots.

[Illustration: MARITZBURG HOTCHKISS GUN DETACHMENT.

Shut up in Ladysmith; Lieut. Walker in command.]

[Sidenote: The Boers seize the heights dominating Ladysmith.]

There was a lull until the 30th. Between the 26th and 29th the Boers, repeating their Dundee tactics, seized the ridge to the north of Ladysmith known as Pepworth Hill, about 7,000 yards from the town, and placed two or more heavy 40-pounder siege guns in position there. They also brought up a large number of smaller guns--Schneider-Canet quick-firers and Maxim automatic 1-pounders--from the ample store with which the gold wrung from the Outlanders had provided them, and throwing up entrenchments, further strengthened a naturally strong and commanding position.

[Illustration: NATAL CARBINEERS WITH MAXIM GUN.

This picture represents the detachment under Lieut. Gallway in camp at Ladysmith. They were taken prisoners in the battle of Dundee.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 29, 1899.]

On October 29 a war balloon which had just arrived from England was sent up, and the Boer positions were reconnoitred. Late in the evening the greater part of two battalions of infantry--the Gloucesters and Dublin Fusiliers--under Colonel Carleton, with a mountain battery, a total of about 1,200 men, were detailed to move out, under cover of night, to seize two hills close to the Klip River and six miles to the north of Ladysmith, thus securing the British left for next day's work. The only enemies expected to be encountered in this direction were the Free Staters, who were reported to be in no great force.

[Illustration: LADYSMITH CAMP IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR.]

To the right of Carleton was Colonel Ian Hamilton with three battalions of infantry, the Imperial Light Horse, and three batteries. He took post facing Pepworth Hill during the night. On his right again was a brigade, five battalions strong, under Colonel Grimwood, with three batteries, facing the Boer position at Farquhar's Farm, to the north-east of Ladysmith.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by H. Nicholls, Johannesburg._

THE DEVONS IN ACTION.

This photograph was taken on the battlefield, and represents the Devonshire regiment in a position facing Pepworth Hill, firing from behind boulders, which form an effective cover. One of the men, having just fired, has risen to watch the effect of his shot. The photograph demonstrates the absence of smoke from modern rifle-fire.]

Last of all, on the extreme British right, was General French with the whole of the cavalry. Only a skeleton force was left behind to defend Ladysmith. The main attack was to be delivered by Hamilton's brigade upon Pepworth Hill.

[Illustration: PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF FARQUHAR'S FARM.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 30, 1899.] _The Boers Reinforced._]

Dawn came, and with it an unpleasant accompaniment in the shape of shells from the big Boer 40-pounders, which fell in the town. The battle opened when the British troops were noticed by the enemy to be drawn up in the appointed positions. In front of our men were green swelling hills or frowning ridges, the skylines broken only by the enemy's entrenchments and here and there by their field-guns. The whole country, indeed, seemed alive with their hosts, which held in ample force the horseshoe-shaped heights dominating Ladysmith from the east and north-east.

[Illustration: WAR BALLOON IN USE AT LADYSMITH.]

[Sidenote: The Battle of Farquhar's Farm.]

The enemy's field artillery opened from Pepworth Hill and Farquhar's Farm upon the British infantry; the British artillery kept under cover and did not reply till the hostile guns, which fired smokeless powder and which were therefore most difficult to find, had been located. Then at last our batteries got to work, and a fierce duel began. The ridge and the plain below were both one sheet of flame. The main Boer artillery position was soon a mass of small clouds of smoke from our bursting shrapnel. About 6·50 the enemy's guns seemed to be silenced, or fired only spasmodically, whereupon our guns shelled the gullies of the heights in which the Boer marksmen lay for shelter, driving them back. Gradually our artillery fire also abated, and the battle paused.

[Illustration: GENERAL JOUBERT, COMMANDING THE FORCES OF THE TRANSVAAL.

General Pietrus Jacobus Joubert, born at Cango, Cape Colony, 1833; State Attorney of Transvaal, 1867; acted as President during Kruger's absence in Europe, 1883-84. Has twice been an unsuccessful candidate for the Presidency.]

[Illustration: A BOER COMMANDO.

When occasion arises for a Boer commando to be called out, the Field Cornet or local magistrate rides round to the neighbouring farms and commandeers, _i.e._ orders out, the farmers into the field. They go out just as they are, with rifle, bandolier, their horse, and a piece of biltong, or dried meat, in their pocket. A collection of some two or three hundred farmers from one particular district is termed a commando.]

[Illustration: A BOER SHARPSHOOTER.

_R. Caton Woodville._] _By permission of H. Graves & Co._]

From the column on the left no news had arrived. About six heavy firing was heard in its direction; an hour later came the crash of a furious fusillade, in which the growl of the Maxim could plainly be heard. To this quarter was shortly afterwards seen moving a very strong commando of the enemy. It was observed pouring down a far-off hill "like a colony of ants on the march." The roar of firing on the left grew louder, and the battle broke out with renewed vigour over all the wide sweep of the quadrant. The Boer guns opened once more; it was clear that the enemy had been strongly reinforced. They showed all round in such strength that the Imperial Light Horse on the left centre had to fall back, and the British artillery in this quarter changed position slightly to meet the oncoming foe. A heavy fire checked the Boer advance, but could not defeat it; to prevent the main British force from being cut off from its left, our troops were thrust forward, battalion by battalion, until every available man was in line. [Sidenote: [OCT. 30, 1899.]

Two British batteries pushed forward into the open and dosed the Boer 40-pounders and other guns on Pepworth Hill with shrapnel so effectively that they almost ceased fire.

On the right, however, fresh Boer weapons were each minute coming into line, and the artillery preponderance hitherto on our side was threatening to pass from us. The enemy's automatic 1-pounder guns were

## particularly annoying, directing their stream of small but deadly

shells upon our guns and our infantry. Yet so splendidly was the British artillery handled that once more it got the better of the foe, checked the counter-attack on the right, and was paving the way for an infantry assault upon the Boer position at Farquhar's Farm when suddenly the most disquieting news arrived from Ladysmith.

[Sidenote: White withdraws to save the town.]

This was an urgent message from Colonel Knox, in command of the town, to Sir George White, stating that the enemy appeared to be on the verge of making a determined attack on Ladysmith and the British camp from the north. Without doubt the Boers advancing in this quarter were the commandoes which should have been held back by Carleton's unlucky column. General White could do nothing but retreat; there was only a mere handful of men in Ladysmith. But to withdraw his forces from a pitched battle, in the presence of a vastly superior enemy, was no easy task.

[Illustration:

_John Charlton._]

BRINGING OFF THE GUNS.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 30, 1899.] _Heroism of the Field Artillery._]

The battlefield at this moment was a strange spectacle. Though hill and plain spurted continuous flame, a man standing midway between the two armies could have discerned little. It was not the battle of the past with masses of men theatrically manœuvring amidst clouds of smoke, but the battle of to-day--of the future--a weird, empty-looking smokeless field, where only the fearful din of hidden guns and rifles, of Maxims, Nordenfelts and Hotchkisses, of bursting shell and shrapnel, told of the presence of two combatant peoples. The troops, even the guns, were, as far as could be, behind cover, whence it followed that the effects of the artillery fight, though nerve-shaking enough, were incommensurate on either side with all the tremendous sound and fury. The air was thick with splinters, shells, shrapnel, and bullets, yet this mighty storm burst for the most part ineffectually on the veldt.

[Illustration: NAVAL 45-POUNDER (4·7) GUN.

This is one of the guns of H.M.S. Doris, mounted on Captain Scott's improvised carriage, and brought from the Cape to Durban by H.M.S. _Powerful_. The photograph was taken while the gun was on its way to the front.]

[Illustration:

[_From a Photograph taken at Simonstown._

H.M.S. "POWERFUL."

Brought half a battalion from Mauritius, on Captain Lambton's own initiative, when proceeding from China to the Cape; and furnished the contingent which arrived so opportunely at Ladysmith during the battle.]

[Sidenote: The guns brought off.]

The two battalions of the King's Royal Rifles were the leading infantry, and as they were ordered to retreat came under a heavy fire, and were thrown into disastrous confusion. Indeed, for a moment it looked like complete rout, and had the enemy snatched his opportunity that would have been the end of the Ladysmith army. But with superb devotion the 53rd Field Battery galloped forward and prepared to offer the last sacrifice which artillery can make--to save the army at the cost of its own annihilation. The automatic Maxim shells rained upon the guns; a cloud of dust hid the 15-pounders from view; but the gunners stuck manfully, heroically to their task under a terrible cross-fire. For half-an-hour they held their ground; one limber was shattered; five out of six horses of one gun were killed. Then, at last, the five intact guns fell back. Nor was the sixth gun abandoned. Bombardier Saunders, Gunners Bright and Barron, and Drivers Macpherson, Darcy, and Stoddard, under Captain Thwaites, dashed back with a team and limber from the waggons and under a tremendous fire brought off the last weapon.

[Illustration: LANDING AT DURBAN OF REINFORCEMENTS FOR LADYSMITH.

The enthusiasm of the loyal colonists found expression in their lavish gifts to the soldiers and sailors on the way to the front. Cigars, pineapples, pillows, and ladies' visiting cards were pressed upon them, the last with promises to send anything which might be needed, "on demand."]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 30, 1899.]

This half-hour's delay was the salvation of Ladysmith. Already one of the two battalions from Durban, the 2nd Rifle Brigade, had arrived by train and deployed upon the battlefield, a most welcome help and reinforcement. The 53rd and 13th Batteries covered the retreat in the centre, the one withdrawing while the other shelled the enemy. As the town of Ladysmith was neared it was discovered that the report of an intended Boer attack had been either unfounded or premature. But the Boer 40-pounders on Pepworth Hill were pouring a galling fire into the town. Help was needed to keep these long range guns in order, for none of our field artillery weapons could drive their projectiles the required distance. Help was dramatically forthcoming.

[Illustration: MAXIM AUTOMATIC GUN.

The action of this gun will be readily understood on reference to this section. The block A travels to and fro on the guides C (one on each side). It is provided with a rising front B, which at each stroke runs up the inclined plane E, along the upper guide D, and picks up a cartridge from the continuous belt shown just below the letter M. At the next stroke this cartridge F is driven into the orifice G in line with the barrel and fired. The empty case is then withdrawn, and at the next stroke is forced into the orifice I, whence succeeding cases push it on till it drops out at L. The gun is started by hand, but when once working the "recoil" from the explosion of the cartridge drives the block A back, and the springs K and J then force it forward again. This reciprocating motion is kept up so long as the thumbs are pressed against the springs N. The barrel is surrounded by a cylinder full of water to keep it cool.]

[Illustration: LYDDITE SHELL

As fired by the large naval guns at Ladysmith. _a_ detonating pellet; _b_ weight; _c_ guncotton priming.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

SIGHTING A MAXIM GUN.

In this case the gun is mounted on a galloping carriage. Sometimes it is mounted on a tripod, as shown in the illustration at the foot of page 35.]

[Sidenote: Dramatic advent of the Bluejackets.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 30, 1899.] _The Disaster of Nicholson's Nek._]

Early that morning a Naval Brigade, 280 strong, from H.M.S. _Powerful_, under the orders of Captain Lambton, had arrived on the scene, bringing two Maxims, four long naval 12-pounders, and two 45-pounders. These weapons had been taken from on board the ships of the Cape Squadron or from the reserve naval stores, and by the ingenuity of Captain P. Scott of the Navy, and Assistant-Engineer Roskruge, had been mounted upon special carriages which would permit their being handled in the field. The sailors had with them a large supply of lyddite shells--shells charged with the terrible high explosive which had been tried for the first time in war at Omdurman, and which kill, without apparent injury, men fifty yards away from the spot where they burst, by the mere shock of their detonation. The bluejackets had come post-haste, standing on no ceremony, travelling up all night by train from Durban. The big 45-pounders were too heavy and cumbrous to be got into position in the exceeding emergency; the 12-pounders, however, at once moved out to the aid of the hard-pressed Natal Field Force.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Pearse._

LADYSMITH AND THE KLIP RIVER.]

The sturdy bluejackets, splendidly led, had whipped one of their guns into position almost before their arrival was known. "Action!" and the breech was opened and closed: "Fire!" and a shell went sailing towards the Boer 40-pounders. Then followed the fearful crash of the common shells. Eight missiles from the Navy gun did the work: the enemy's fire was stilled; and one more great record was added to the countless achievements of the ever-ready British Navy. Silence fell upon the field, and it was possible to number the slain.

In this battle, known as that of Farquhar's Farm, the British losses on the centre and right were about 60 killed and 240 wounded.

[Sidenote: Loss of Carleton's Column.]

The afternoon wore on and no news came in from Carleton's column on the left. Disaster had evidently befallen it, for stragglers and wounded brought in during the morning stories of an extraordinary stampede of mules during the night, which had thrown the little force into complete confusion.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by H. Nicholls, Johannesburg._

ARTILLERY RETURNING TO LADYSMITH AFTER THE BATTLE OF FARQUHAR'S FARM.

The waggons on either side of the street were loaded with ammunition and commissariat for a three or four days' fight. Owing to the disaster at Nicholson's Nek they never went into the field. The red-cross flag was flying from the Town Hall, which had been turned into a hospital.]

[Illustration: TRANSPORT MULES AT LADYSMITH.

The stampeding of some of these mules led to the disaster at Nicholson's Nek.]

[Illustration: BRITISH PRISONERS, CAPTURED AT NICHOLSON'S NEK, ON THE ROAD FROM THE STATION TO THE RACE-COURSE, PRETORIA.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 30, 1899.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 30, 1899.] _A Hopeless Struggle._]

What had happened was as follows. The column started at 10·30 p.m., with the Royal Irish Fusiliers leading, the six mountain guns and 208 mules in the centre, and the Gloucesters bringing up the rear. The night was very dark, but through the darkness could be heard the ominous sound of the snapping of breech-blocks on either flank, and occasionally the clear ring of a dropped rifle, indicating that the enemy was close at hand. Nearing the point which was to be seized the column had to make its way through a defile. While in the midst of this defile a shot was suddenly fired, and great boulders were rolled down from the precipitous mountain walls. On this the troops by order lay down and waited. As they were waiting a Boer picket galloped furiously through the midst of our men, and the mules took fright, easily wrenched themselves loose from the prostrate mule-drivers, and bolted back upon the Gloucesters. The Gloucesters in their turn mistook the terrified animals for a commando of Boers and fired upon them, increasing the turmoil and confusion. Nothing could stop the battery mules, and they tore through the ranks, taking with them the animals laden with the reserve ammunition for the infantry. The plight of the column was hopeless; it was in too great disorder promptly to retreat, and when daylight came it seized the nearest position available, some miles short of its original destination. This position was a flat-topped, stony hill, commanded by a ridge to the south, by a kopje to the east, and by two hills to the west, which were speedily occupied by the Boers. The British troops did the best they could; rough breastworks were built of stones and a brave resistance was offered to the terrible fire which the enemy speedily poured in from close range on all sides. But any success was out of the question; it only remained for the officers and men to be shot down till they could surrender with honour, or till Sir George White could send them help from Ladysmith. About 9 the Boer fire became very galling, and it was almost impossible for the British troops to reply. None of the enemy could be seen: there was only a persistent shower of bullets to indicate his presence. In no direction could shelter be obtained. The bullets came from east, west, north, and south.

[Illustration: THE TOWN HALL. LADYSMITH.]

[Illustration: LADYSMITH RAILWAY STATION.

This station was shelled by the Boers while the civilians were entraining to leave the town, but little damage was done.]

[Illustration: A CUTTING ON THE NATAL RAILWAY, NEAR LADYSMITH.]

[Illustration: THE LAST MAIL-TRAIN OUT OF LADYSMITH.]

Two companies of Gloucesters held the culminating point of the hill to the south. Soon after 9 they were driven back by the enemy's fire, when a party of Boers climbed to the position and swept the plateau at very close range with their rifles. Shelter was sought by the British soldiers upon the reverse slope of the hill, but even here they were found and shot down by the rifles of the enemy. Orders were given to the Irish Fusiliers to fix bayonets and die like men, when suddenly the "Cease fire!" sounded, and it was seen that someone in the British force had raised the white flag. The fury of the subalterns and of the soldiers was indescribable. Their rifles had to be forced from many of the men, and there were not a few who flung themselves down and sobbed at the shame and dishonour. Yet the column was in hopeless plight, and further resistance could only have meant useless slaughter. Twenty-nine officers, 898 men, and four guns of the mountain battery thus passed into the enemy's hands. Of the four guns, however, two were useless. About 150 men in all, many wounded, escaped into Ladysmith with tidings of the disaster, and 86 more, all wounded, were under flag of truce brought into the British hospitals. The killed on the field of battle numbered 52.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Capt. Lascelles Davidson._

DUMMY GUNS SET UP BY THE BRITISH TO DRAW THE ENEMY'S FIRE.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 30-NOV. 2, 1899.]

As the result of this defeat, it became certain that Ladysmith must stand a siege. Yet even now the town was not emptied of civilians, as it should have been, though all non-residents, who were for the most part spies, were ordered to take themselves off. The cavalry, who would be useless in a siege, were not sent south. The railway to the north of Ladysmith had not been destroyed, but was allowed to fall into the hands of the Boers intact, so that they were able to bring up from Johannesburg and Pretoria stores, munitions, and guns. This was a very serious mistake, as the Boers' weakest point was their transport; with the railway in their hands they were able with ease to maintain the siege.

[Illustration: 4·7-INCH NAVAL GUN, AS MOUNTED FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.]

[Illustration: NAVAL DETACHMENT WITH MAXIM GUN ON TRIPOD STAND.]

[Sidenote: Neglect of precautions at Ladysmith.]

In other directions there was an unfortunate amount of carelessness. For instance, on November 2 a Boer ambulance containing British wounded was allowed to enter the town, and was not immediately taken charge of by the British medical staff. It was afterwards discovered that the driver was a foreign artillery officer in the Boer service, who used his opportunity to examine the weak points of the town. This ruse was certainly unjustifiable, but steps might well have been taken to guard against it, for our generals knew by this time the character of the enemy. There were other grave abuses of the Red Cross flag; on October 30 the Boers masked one of their laagers with an ambulance, and on the 31st they built an emplacement for a gun under shelter of the sacred emblem.

[Illustration: NAVAL QUICK-FIRING GUN DETACHMENT.]

[Sidenote: The town beleaguered.]

On the night of the 31st all preparations for a siege were made. Earthworks were constructed by the garrison, the naval 4·7's placed in the best position, and ammunition and stores distributed at various points wide apart so as to be safe from fire.

[Illustration:

_John Charlton._]

NATAL FIELD ARTILLERY DESCENDING THE BANK OF A "SPRUIT" OR STREAM.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 3, 1899.]

November 1 was spent in getting in the wounded, under a flag of truce. Next day the Boers bombarded the town, mortally wounding Lieutenant Egerton, but had one of their laagers captured by the British cavalry and a battery of artillery. In the afternoon General French left by train for Pietermaritzburg; at Pieters, two stations south of Ladysmith, the Boers were in position with a Maxim 1-pounder and fired on the train. The General only escaped death by lying on the floor of the compartment, as projectiles riddled the side of the carriage. The engine-driver showed great pluck and presence of mind, and this, the last train to leave Ladysmith, got through the enemy's lines in safety. Later in the afternoon railway and telegraph communications were interrupted, and Ladysmith was isolated.

[Illustration: THE ARMOURED TRAIN DESTROYED BY THE BOERS AT KRAAIPAN.

The destruction of this train was the first overt act of war (see page 49). Kraaipan is a station between Mafeking and Vryburg on the Cape to Cairo Railway.]

On the 3rd a sortie towards Bulwana Mountain was made by the besieged force, but the Boers were found to be too strong to be attacked. Already the enemy was developing an advance southwards into the heart of Natal; on the 2nd, Colenso, where lay a small British garrison of bluejackets and Dublin Fusiliers, was shelled, and the probability of the detachment being isolated and overwhelmed was so great, that it was, perhaps somewhat precipitately, withdrawn. The great railway bridge across the Tugela fell into the enemy's hands. Here, again, it would have been wise for the British troops to have broken up the bridges instead of leaving them for the enemy's use. It was certain that the Boers, when they should be at last driven back, would not be so obliging.

[Illustration: GENERAL BULLER'S ARRIVAL AT CAPETOWN.

General Buller arrived at Capetown on the 31st October, the day after the battle at Farquhar's Farm and the disaster at Nicholson's Nek. He received a most enthusiastic welcome. The photograph represents the

## scene in Adderley Street.]

The situation in Natal was now unfortunate in the extreme. No British reinforcements were within reach. The main army in the Colony was beleaguered in Ladysmith; between the Boers and Durban were only the Colonial troops, at the outside not much over 2,500 strong, a few seamen landed from the British warships, and two regular battalions, the Dublin Fusiliers and the Borderers. A bold, decided advance, and the Boers might yet make good their boast of hoisting the four-coloured flag over Durban.

[Sidenote: Condition of affairs on the Western Frontier.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 1899.] _British Forces in Cape Colony._]

Meantime on the western frontier of the Boer republics the enemy was hard at work. The British forces in this direction were altogether insignificant. At De Aar, an important railway junction on the line between Capetown and Kimberley, was a handful of British troops guarding a great accumulation of stores for the use of the Army Corps when it arrived. The camp was practically undefended, and was open to a daring attack, for the garrison was too weak to occupy the heights which commanded it. Hopetown, on the Orange River, to the north of De Aar, was occupied by a diminutive force. At Orange River station the great bridge over the Orange River was held by a detachment of bluejackets, and by a handful of infantry entrenched at either end. Beyond that point, which is over 580 miles by rail from Capetown, the line to Kimberley had to be left unguarded. In Kimberley was a detachment of the Loyal North Lancashire battalion, a battery of garrison artillery with some old 7-pounder muzzle-loaders, and a considerable number of volunteers raised and armed by the De Beers Company, which worked the diamond mines. The main difficulty was the provisioning of the place, for there were some 10,000 Kaffir workers in the mines, who were not permitted by the Boers to go to their homes.

[Illustration: COL. PLUMER'S FORCE WATERING HORSES, ON THE WAY FROM BULUWAYO TO TULI.]

[Illustration: COLONEL PLUMER'S FORCE MARCHING OUT OF BULUWAYO.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 1899.]

Kimberley lies close to the Free State frontier and 647 miles north of Capetown. In an analogous position close to the Transvaal frontier, 230 miles further to the north, and on the long railway which descends from Rhodesia to the sea, stands Mafeking, with Vryburg halfway between it and Kimberley. At Mafeking had assembled a small British force of irregulars, raised by Colonel Baden-Powell, an officer of exceptional dash and capacity, from the splendid material available in Rhodesia, and some detachments of the British South Africa Company's police. Still further to the north and more than a thousand miles from the Cape were other small detachments under Colonel Plumer, at Palapye, Makloutsi, and Tuli, on the northern frontier of the Transvaal. Between these detachments and Mafeking, between Mafeking and Kimberley, between Kimberley and Orange River, the communications could not be protected, and were certain to be broken. Thus from the first it was evident that Mafeking and Kimberley would have to stand sieges of considerable duration.

[Illustration: RHODESIAN HORSE.

The Rhodesian Horse was originally formed during the Matabele War, in the course of which it did magnificent service. A contingent is here shown under the command of Lieut. Maurice Gifford. A detachment of this regiment proceeded to the relief of Mafeking under Colonel Plumer and repulsed the Boers on more than one occasion.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Elliott & Fry._

COLONEL R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL.

Colonel R. S. S. Baden-Powell, who is commanding the plucky little garrison of Mafeking, is forty-three years old, and was educated at Charterhouse. He joined the 13th Hussars in 1876, and has seen service in India, Afghanistan, and South Africa. His recently published textbook on the art of scouting has had an enormous circulation. He has also written many books of travel and sport, is a noted amateur artist and actor, and equally at home at scouting, fighting, pigsticking, polo, big-game shooting, hunting, yachting, acting, singing, writing, and painting. Major, 1892; Lt.-Colonel, 1896; Colonel, 1897.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Bassano._

LT.-COLONEL HERBERT S. O. PLUMER.

Has seen much active service in Africa. He was present at El Teb and Tamal in the Soudan War of 1884; and in South Africa, under Sir F. Carrington in 1896, he raised and commanded a corps of Mounted Riflemen. He commands the gallant little contingent of Rhodesians whose business it is to relieve Mafeking. Col. Plumer has an unusually happy knack of being able to get on well with colonial troopers.]

On the southern frontier of the Free State handfuls of troops occupied the important railway junctions of Naauwpoort and Stormberg, and there were British outposts at Aliwal North. It should be explained that three railways run from the littoral of Cape Colony inland to the Free State or the Free State frontier. The first comes up from Capetown to Kimberley by De Aar; the second from Port Elizabeth to Bloemfontein by Rosmead Junction and Naauwpoort; the third from East London by Stormberg to Springfontein on the Bloemfontein and Port Elizabeth railway. Lines from De Aar to Naauwpoort and from Rosmead to Stormberg connect the three. Stormberg and Naauwpoort were therefore points of the utmost strategical importance.

[Sidenote: Doubtful attitude of the Schreiner Ministry.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 11-17, 1899.] _The War on the Western Frontier._]

The attitude of the Dutch Ministry in power in Cape Colony was so dubious that defensive preparations were rendered most difficult. Mr. Schreiner, the Cape Premier, allowed tons of ammunition and hundreds of railway trucks to enter the Free State just before the war, and seems to have taken no steps of any kind to protect the Colony against invasion. The Cape Mounted Police, a superb body of men, 1,900 strong, the Cape Mounted Rifles, 1,000 strong, and the Cape Volunteers, 4,000 strong, were not drawn upon for defence as they should have been. The volunteers were not properly armed or supplied with ammunition. In fact, the Cape Ministry appeared to hold to the view that a strict neutrality ought to be preserved by the Colony. There may have been an object not altogether unfriendly in this--to keep quiet the Cape Dutch--or there may have been real disloyalty. But had 5,000 or 6,000 Cape Colonials been available at the outset, Stormberg could have been firmly held, and the Boers prevented from besieging Kimberley.

[Illustration: VICTORIA HOSPITAL, MAFEKING.

Repeatedly fired on by the Boers during the siege.]

[Illustration: FORT AT MAFEKING.]

[Sidenote: First Act of War.]

The Boers opened proceedings on the western frontier by advancing on October 11 under Commandant Cronje from Zeerust to Mafeking, while they broke the railway both to the north and south. On the 13th the siege began. On the night of the 12-13th an armoured train, bringing up two 7-pounder guns and ammunition, which had been sent forward from Capetown, was derailed at Kraaipan, a station forty miles south of Mafeking, and its contents and the party in charge were captured. The engine-driver and one man succeeded in escaping to the south. This was the first example which showed the utter uselessness of armoured trains operating without any support. A rail removed or thrown out of gauge, and they were at the enemy's mercy.

[Illustration: NATIVE VILLAGE, MAFEKING.]

The Boers seem to have anticipated an easy and an early success at Mafeking. The resources of the place were small; the garrison all told did not exceed 1,200 men, and was ill provided with artillery. But there was a large accumulation of stores and ammunition, which would at least enable the defenders to hold out for some months. Cronje had under him 4,000 or 5,000 men with good artillery, and had all the resources of the Pretoria arsenals and magazines behind him. He could draw guns of the heaviest calibre if he wanted them.

[Illustration: BOER COMMANDO CROSSING ALIWAL BRIDGE.]

[Sidenote: Attempts to capture Mafeking.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 17-31, 1899.]

On the 14th the enemy were engaged by the garrison, with an armoured train supporting, and were driven back with some loss. On the 17th the Boers began to shell the town with small field guns, but caused no loss. A few houses were slightly damaged, a dog was killed, and that was all. On the night of this day, as the Boers were pushing their trenches dangerously near the British lines, a sortie was brilliantly executed by Captain Fitzclarence with sixty men. He stormed the enemy's position at the point of the bayonet, and did great execution amongst the Boers, who were taken wholly by surprise. Various little sorties took place during the next few days, and Cronje gave courteous notice that he intended to bombard. At the same time he cut off the British water-supply.

[Illustration: BRITISH PRISONERS SEIZED AT VRYBURG.

The three armed men who are standing up are typical Boers of the district. Their prisoners are--Hellawell, of the London _Daily Mail_ and the _Cape Times_, in the centre; Townshend, of the _Bechuanaland News_, on the left; Lelyveldt, a compositor, on the right of the group; and a native guide.]

On the 24th the Boers placed three heavy siege guns in position, and with them shelled the town, while the smaller weapons kept up a heavy fire. Three bedrooms were wrecked, the gas plant destroyed, and the town set on fire. Next day the bombardment was resumed, and the enemy massed for an assault, compelling the little British force to leave the bomb-proofs and line the trenches. Day after day these experiences continued till on the 31st an assault was actually delivered upon Cannon Kopje, an outlying hill protected by a small fort. The Boers advanced under cover of the fire of four 15-pounder field guns and of a 5·9-inch siege gun, but were repulsed after a long and desperate struggle, in which the little garrison suffered severely and lost the services of Captains Marsham and Pechell, both of whom were killed.

[Illustration:

[_From a sketch by a British officer, brought through the enemy's lines by a native runner._

PLAN OF MAFEKING,

Showing the British and Boer lines and the spots where fighting took place during the early days of the siege.]

To keep his men in good spirits, always a hard task in a long siege, Colonel Baden-Powell held impromptu concerts, at which fragments of popular operas were given by the ladies and officers in the town. He speedily obtained the complete confidence of his men. No precaution was neglected; everything was foreseen; and in spite of his limited resources he was never beaten. By common agreement between the British and the Boers, Sunday was observed as a day of truce. Once or twice when the Boers were noticed to be digging trenches on that day, "B.-P.," as his men called him, drew Cronje's attention to the fact, and the digging stopped. The Boers, however, persistently shelled the hospital and a convent which the nuns had refused to abandon. These heroic ladies attended the sick and wounded, and took the fullest share in the hard work, setting an example which was above all praise.

[Illustration: ORANGE RIVER BRIDGE.

This bridge, carrying the railway from the Cape to Kimberley and Mafeking, marked the northern position of the British during the early days of the war. Although weakly held, it did not fall into the enemy's hands. The photograph shows the camp of the small force which held the northern or exposed end of the bridge.]

[Illustration: OORLOG'S SPRUIT BRIDGE, BETWEEN COLESBURG AND NORVAL'S PONT. DESTROYED BY BOERS, November 5.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 17-31, 1899.] _Bombardment of Mafeking._]

On November 7 the garrison made a very successful sortie, drawing the Boers under the fire of our ambushed artillery by a feigned retreat. The enemy broke and fled in great disorder, losing heavily. After this an interval of Boer inactivity followed, though the town was constantly shelled. Cronje, with a good number of his men, was withdrawn, as his services were wanted elsewhere, and Commandant Snyman replaced him. The position of the biggest of the Boer guns was altered; the Boer field artillery left for the south.

[Illustration: _G. Soper._] [_From a photograph by J. E. Neilly._

A LULL IN THE FIGHTING: DINNER-TIME AT MAFEKING DURING THE SIEGE.

This photograph represents the interior of the "Graveyard Redan," at the cemetery, and is shown on the extreme right of the plan on opposite page.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 12-15, 1899.]

The accuracy of the Boer fire was great. Seven successive shots from the 5·9-inch gun struck the front of one of the forts, completely destroying the earthworks, though, strangely enough, there was no loss of life. The convent was hit eight times; a shell struck a hotel and, bursting, moved a billiard table some inches without injuring those who were playing billiards. Another shell took off the roof of a house in which five men were breakfasting without wounding any of the five.

[Illustration: SCENE AT COLESBERG AT THE READING OF SIR ALFRED MILNER'S PROCLAMATION AGAINST DISLOYALTY.]

[Sidenote: The Boers seize Vryburg.]

Turning from gallant little Mafeking to the earlier stages of the siege of Kimberley, Boer forces had assembled at Boshof and Jacobsdal, the one to the north-east, the other to the south of that town, in readiness for a move when President Kruger gave the signal. On October 12 the Jacobsdal commando crossed the frontier, seized Modder River station, telephoned to Kimberley to try to find out the force in the town, and then made all preparations for the destruction of the iron bridge which spans the river at this point. The Boshof commando advanced on Riverton, a station on the railway to the north of the town, drove back a detachment of Cape Police, and looted and wrecked the town. On the 15th a brush between an armoured train with British troops on board and a small Boer force took place at Spytfontein, ten miles south of Kimberley. Several of the enemy were killed and wounded without any British casualties. On the same day Vryburg, half way between Kimberley and Mafeking, was evacuated by the Bechuanaland Police and seized by the enemy. On the 17th the Modder River bridge was destroyed with dynamite, a previous attempt to blow up the bridge-piers having failed. The Boers employed a number of "skilled Continental engineers," whose whereabouts and nationality will have to be inquired into after the war, to accomplish the work. Finally, Belmont station, a few miles north of the Orange River, was occupied by a detachment and fortified, while demonstrations were actually made against Orange River station. Thus Kimberley was thoroughly isolated and cut off from the outer world. The enemy now proceeded to "annex" Bechuanaland to the Transvaal, and Griqualand West to the Orange Free State, and to "commandeer" or expel all residents within these districts. Those who were "commandeered" had to serve against their own country. Most of the British residents took to flight, but a few who remained were seized and impressed for the Boer armies, in violation of all the dictates of international law and of the laws of war.

[Illustration: THE CAPTORS OF VRYBURG.

The Lichtenburg commando, reinforced largely by rebel farmers from Cape Colony.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 24-30, 1899.] _Fighting at Kimberley._]

To protect Kimberley from assault a hedge of thorn bushes was built round the town and earthworks were raised. The enemy, however, at first kept at a very respectful distance, and seemed contented simply to intercept communications. On October 24 a reconnoitring party under Major Turner went out to the north along the railway and came into collision with a small Boer force. Reinforcements were telegraphed for to Kimberley, and a couple of companies of North Lancashires with two armoured trains were sent up the line. The Boers were driven back; they lost Commandant Botha and several men, while the British had 24 killed and wounded. There was great excitement in Kimberley during the fight, crowds pouring out to watch the little British force at its work.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Bassano._

RIGHT HON. CECIL JOHN RHODES, P.C.

Born in 1853; the fourth son of the late Rev. Francis W. Rhodes, Rector of Bishop Stortford. He went to South Africa about 1870 in a poor state of health; eventually settled in Kimberley, and after many years of very hard work effected the amalgamation of the various diamond mining interests into the De Beers Company; has been Premier of Cape Colony; conceived and organised the Chartered Company of British South Africa; a thorough and ardent Imperialist, a wonderful man of business, and the builder of Greater South Africa. His personal exertions during the recent siege of Kimberley endeared him to every one in the beleaguered town.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by N. P. Edwards._

KIMBERLEY MARKET PLACE.]

[Sidenote: Kimberley isolated.]

[Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.]

[Sidenote: Bombardment commences.]

At the end of October the Boer force besieging the town was strengthened by detachments from Mafeking, and probably by recruits from amongst the disloyalists in the Griqualand West district. The investment became closer, and the enemy began to show more daring. On November 1, either by accident or by one of the enemy's shells, the dynamite stores of the De Beers Mining Company were exploded, causing a fearful shock and great alarm in the town. On the 7th, after two days' notice had been given, the bombardment of Kimberley began. About 70 shells, most of them of small size and very inferior quality, were fired by the enemy, but with no other result than to shatter a cooking pot. Amidst general mirth the fragments of this vessel were put up to auction, the best specimens fetching as much as a couple of pounds.

[Illustration:

_Frank Craig._]

SEIZING A KOPJE.]

[Sidenote: Stormberg district abandoned by the British.]

On the southern frontier the Boers remained inactive all October. Small detachments of them were observed at Bethulie, at Norvals Pont, and at the Colesberg Bridge. A larger commando 1,500 strong, with three guns, was noticed drilling and practising on the north bank of the Orange River. At this date 2,500 Boers were watching the Basutos, who, it was feared, would take advantage of the war to wipe off old scores. But owing to the tact and skill of Sir G. Lagden, the British Resident in Basutoland, this tribe of Kaffir warriors was kept so thoroughly in hand that it soon became safe for the enemy to withdraw their commandoes and move them to Norvals Pont and Bethulie. The Boers were further emboldened by the victory of Joubert before Ladysmith on October 30. On November 1 they crossed the Orange River in all directions and in considerable force, their main body making Stormberg Junction, some fifty miles south of the Free State border, its objective.

[Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.] _The Boers in Cape Colony._]

Stormberg Junction was a point the possession of which was almost vital to the British forces. It was easily defensible, and if lost might be very hard to retake. It commanded the lines of communication between the advance from East London and the advance from Port Elizabeth, so that if it fell into the enemy's hands the eastern portion of Cape Colony would be entirely cut off from the west. Through the later weeks of October it had been occupied by a small naval brigade with guns, and by a detachment of the Berkshire regiment. On November 3, by express orders from General Buller, this little garrison retired and fell back upon Queenstown, farther down the East London railway. At the same time a skeleton force at Naauwpoort was withdrawn to De Aar. The Boers pushed forward slowly; Aliwal North was occupied and rechristened Oliviersfontein, in honour of the Boer commandant; then they appeared in some force at Burghersdorp, some miles to the north of Stormberg, and destroyed a bridge at Steynsburg, on the line between Stormberg and Naauwpoort Junction. The disloyal farmers of this district crowded in numbers to the Free State flag, and the "commandeering" of British subjects and confiscation of British property went on merrily. It was a terrible time for the loyal Britishers, who had foreseen what was coming, but whose warnings had uniformly been disregarded.

[Illustration:

[_From a Photograph._

FACING THE BOERS.]

[Illustration: EX-PRESIDENT STEYN.

Martinus Theunis Steyn, President of the Orange Free State, was born at Wynburg (about 50 miles N.E. of Bloemfontein) Oct. 2, 1857. His father was a waggon-builder and farmer. He lived an outdoor life during his early years, and at twelve went to school at the Grey College in Bloemfontein. At nineteen he was sent to study law in Holland and England, and returned to his native State when twenty-five. He practised at the bar of the Supreme Court, became Attorney-General and (in 1889) a judge. In 1895, on the retirement of Mr. Reitz, he was elected President. It was not until September 1899 that he definitely threw in his lot with Kruger and the Transvaal Boers in opposition to the British Government.]

[Illustration: THE PRESIDENCY, BLOEMFONTEIN.

Formerly the official residence of President Steyn.]

[Sidenote: Attitude of the Cape Dutch.]

During these weeks there were signs of ferment in all directions in the Colony. The Boers had expected a rising of all the Dutch, and asserted that they had received promises to that effect from the leaders of the Bond or Dutch party at the Cape. Rifles and ammunition had certainly been surreptitiously poured into the Colony from the north and distributed to those whom the Boers thought they could trust. Trains with troops and munitions of war on board were fired upon well to the south of De Aar, and obstructions on many occasions were found placed upon the line. But the general attitude of the Dutch Colonials was a hedging one. They had no real grievance against the Imperial Government, which had given them the fullest measure of self-government, and, though sympathising warmly with the Boers, and sharing to some extent their dream of an independent South Africa under Boer rule, they waited for some big success before irrevocably throwing in their lot with the enemies of the British Queen.

[Illustration: HER MAJESTY ADDRESSING THE WIVES AND CHILDREN OF THE HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY AND RESERVISTS AT WINDSOR, November 29, 1899.

After reviewing the 1st Battalion of the Grenadier Guards, Her Majesty, with that unfailing sympathy which since the opening of war has endeared her more than ever to her subjects, spoke some words of good cheer to the wives and children of the Life Guards, the Blues, and the Reservists, who had that morning left for South Africa.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

HER MAJESTY REVIEWING AT WINDSOR THE COMPOSITE REGIMENT OF HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY UNDER ORDERS TO PROCEED TO THE CAPE (November 11, 1899).

The regiment consisted of men selected from the 1st and 2nd Life Guards and the Horse Guards Blue; preference was given to light weights, out of consideration for the horses. H.R.H. the Prince of Wales had bidden the regiment farewell on the preceding day.]

##