CHAPTER V

.

THE BEGINNING OF THE ADVANCE IN NATAL AND CAPE COLONY.

Natal threatened--Armoured trains--Ladysmith bombarded--Assault on the town--The Boers at Chieveley--Armoured train wrecked near Chieveley--Endeavours to clear the obstruction--Capture of Mr. Winston Churchill--The Estcourt garrison in danger--Shelling of Mooi River Camp--Boer advance checked at Nottingham Road--The Willow Grange fight--Arrival of Lord Dundonald and General Buller--Comparison of the opposing armies--The forward movement begins--Boer position at Colenso--Buller determines to attack.

The Boer success before Ladysmith on October 30 was not promptly followed up, probably because of the want of a properly organised transport, and the diminutive British forces outside the beleaguered town were given three or four very precious days to prepare for the worst. Colenso, we have seen, was evacuated on November 2, and the British garrison withdrawn to Estcourt, 27 miles farther south. The Boers occupied a strong position on a hill known as Grobler's Kloof, a little to the north of the Tugela, commanding thoroughly the roads between Ladysmith and Colenso. Upon this hill they placed heavy guns and erected entrenchments with two objects--the first to prevent the advance of a relief force from the south, the second to shut in Sir George White. They also showed well to the south of Colenso, in the neighbourhood of Frere, having apparently marched by the roads which lead down into the centre of Natal from the Upper Tugela region. They did not immediately occupy Colenso, but they made all preparations to destroy the two bridges, should such a measure become necessary.

[Sidenote: Natal threatened.]

The danger for Natal was great. Captain Percy Scott of the _Terrible_ landed with a large number of guns and bluejackets to defend Durban; works were erected at Pietermaritzburg, the capital of the Colony, and volunteer forces were raised with all possible expedition. The Imperial Infantry Corps, 1,000 strong, was enrolled at Durban and Pietermaritzburg; Murray's Mounted Volunteers, Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, the Umvoti Mounted Volunteers, and the Durban Light Infantry were among the other regiments raised by the Colony.

[Illustration:

_Frank Craig._]

COLD STEEL: BRITISH SOLDIERS DRIVING THE BOERS FROM A KOPJE.] [Sidenote: [Nov. 1899.]

Hundreds of refugees from Colenso and the abandoned districts poured down into the seaboard of Natal, yet there was no sign of panic. The women especially distinguished themselves by their fortitude and bravery in this hour of sad calamity. Nor did the Colonists reproach the Home Government, which had failed, in spite of many entreaties, adequately to garrison the Colony, though to the irresolution and tardiness displayed by the authorities at home all these sufferings were due.

[Illustration: DURBAN, THE BRITISH BASE IN NATAL.]

[Illustration: CAPTAIN PERCY SCOTT, C.B., OF H.M.S. "TERRIBLE."

Under Captain Scott's direction a number of 45-pounder naval guns were rapidly supplied with carriages, which gave them mobility and rendered them available as a sort of heavy field-gun. So mounted, they were of the greatest service both in the defence of Ladysmith and in our numerous assaults upon Boer positions. Captain Scott also designed a railway truck to carry the gun, and from which it could be fired.

[_Photo by West, Southsea._]

[Illustration: GUNS LANDED BY THE "TERRIBLE" AT DURBAN, ON CAPT. SCOTT'S CARRIAGES.]

[Sidenote: Armoured trains.]

An armoured train daily proceeded from Estcourt to reconnoitre in the direction of Colenso. Why this dangerous and clumsy contrivance should have been used for such a purpose it is difficult to say. The lives of somewhere about 100 men were daily risked upon an errand which could have been accomplished with infinitely greater ease by half-a-dozen mounted infantry. The train was tied of necessity to one line of advance or retreat; it was a conspicuous object, and made enough noise with its puffing and blowing to alarm all the Boers for miles around. Nothing could be easier for them than to bring up and lay their guns on some particular point of the line, removing one or two rails. If this were done after the train had passed, its retreat might be cut off and its capture rendered certain. The risk was a matter of common talk in the British camp, yet these foolhardy expeditions continued day by day.

[Illustration: ESTCOURT.]

[Sidenote: Nov. 4-9, 1899.] _Armoured Trains in Natal._]

On November 5 the armoured train carried two companies of the Dublin Fusiliers close to Colenso, when the enemy was sighted. The infantry detrained, but, as it was clearly seen that the Boers were endeavouring to cut the British line of retreat, entrained again and fell back towards Estcourt. Then the enemy in his turn retired, and the train advanced cautiously as far as Colenso station, while the British troops entered the town and removed at their leisure four waggon loads of shell, provisions, and stores. On the 9th the train advancing on Colenso found the line torn up about a mile from that town.

[Illustration: INSIDE AN ARMOURED TRAIN.]

[Sidenote: Ladysmith bombarded.]

Meantime the Boers had steadily bombarded Ladysmith. Day by day their heavy guns poured shell and shrapnel into the town, doing, however, very little damage, and inflicting insignificant loss of life. On November 4 General White opened negotiations with Joubert, in command of the Boer forces, for the removal of the sick and the women and children, who should have been sent away before the siege began, but who, with the lamentable want of foresight which characterised all our operations, had been allowed to remain in the town till the investment was complete. It is natural for a general officer in command of an investing force to refuse to allow a besieged force to rid itself of its encumbrances, but Joubert suggested that the non-combatants should be removed to a certain point outside the zone of fire. This point was afterwards known in the British camp as "Funkumdorf"; few of the wounded and very few indeed of the women consented to remove to it. In fact, the bearing of the British women was here, as in all other quarters, heroic, and above all praise.

[Illustration: THE LEE-ENFIELD RIFLE, USED BY THE BRITISH TROOPS.

The cartridges B are placed singly in the magazine A, from which a spring at the bottom forces them upwards till one of them enters the breech, when it is pushed forward by the bolt D into the chamber C and fired. The withdrawal of the bolt ejects the spent cartridge. There is a slide which, when required, cuts off the magazine and allows single cartridges to be used. F is a cleaner and oilcan carried within the butt.]

[Illustration: THE MAUSER RIFLE, USED BY THE BOERS.

The cartridges E are carried in a holder, from which, by one pressure of the thumb, they are released and dispose themselves in proper order in the magazine A. They are pressed upwards by a spring B, and forced, one at a time, into the chamber C by the bolt D. The rifle is sometimes provided with a bayonet, but this the Boers do not carry.]

[Illustration: LADYSMITH CAMP AND UMBULWANA.]

[Sidenote: Assault on the town.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 9, 1899.]

[Sidenote: NOV. 9-15, 1899.] _The Armoured Train Disaster._]

On the 9th the Boers delivered a half-hearted assault upon Ladysmith, and were repulsed with some loss. The main attack came from the north, and was met by the King's Royal Rifles and the Rifle Brigade. It was never pressed home, as the Boers did not approach within a thousand yards of the British works. They could be seen in all directions just out of range massed for an advance, but the advance was never made. There was a furious interchange of rifle and cannon fire, but little more. The British losses were absurdly small--only three killed and seventeen wounded. To what extent the enemy suffered it was difficult to say, but there is reason to think that the Boer losses were far heavier. When the conflict died away, the naval weapons fired a salute of twenty-one guns in honour of the Prince of Wales' birthday, and the troops sang the National Anthem "to the accompaniment of shrapnel and 100-lb. shells from the Boer guns shrieking through the air." Altogether the result of the fight was such as to make the enemy very chary of attacking our works, and to put fresh spirit into the beleaguered force. On this same day Mr. Kruger threatened that unless a Transvaal spy, named Marks, who had been arrested and confined in Ladysmith, were released, he would execute six British officers. The threat was received with the contempt which it deserved. It appeared that Marks was a member of the Transvaal detective service who had been in Natal gathering information before the war. As such his detention was perfectly justifiable; indeed, in any European struggle he would have been summarily shot.

[Illustration: THE EYES OF THE ARMY, NATAL POLICE ON PATROL.]

[Sidenote: The Boers at Chieveley.]

On November 12 the first ray of light pierced the deep gloom in Natal, when the first troops of General Hildyard's brigade landed from the _Roslin Castle_ at Durban. They were at once sent up country to Estcourt. On this same day a general movement of Boers coming from the Free State began upon Central Natal. On the 13th the railway line was destroyed at Chieveley, one station to the south of Colenso. A force of about 500 Boers was seen at Chieveley on this day. The armoured train arrived while they were actually at work destroying the line and temporarily drove them back. About the same time parties of Boers were seen at Estcourt, and some alarm began to be felt for the troops at that place. On the 14th the _Lismore Castle_ and _Yorkshire_ arrived at Durban, on the 15th the _Gascon_, and on the 16th the _Hawarden Castle_, and landed fresh reinforcements, which were hurried up to General Hildyard at Estcourt.

[Illustration: THE DUBLIN FUSILIERS CLIMBING INTO THE ARMOURED TRAIN ON THE DAY OF THE DISASTER.]

[Illustration: FIRING A GUN FROM AN ARMOURED TRAIN.]

[Sidenote: Armoured train wrecked near Chieveley.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 15, 1899.]

On the 15th a second and easily preventable reverse befell our troops in Natal, causing general discouragement. This was the derailment of an armoured train near Chieveley--a catastrophe which had been foreseen for some days by every private and subaltern in the British camp. Early on the 15th the train, with a company of Dublin Fusiliers, half a company of Durban Light Infantry, and one wretched little muzzle-loading 7-pounder gun from H.M.S. _Tartar_, mounted on a truck and manned by bluejackets, left Estcourt. The train passed Frere, the station south of Chieveley, in safety without seeing any Boers. Just beyond Chieveley, however, the enemy were made out in some strength upon a hill. A message reporting this fact was sent back to Estcourt, whereupon the train was promptly ordered to return to Frere. The order was obeyed, but when less than two miles from Frere, a hill in front commanding the line at a distance of only 600 yards, was seen to be held by the enemy. The Boers gave no sign of life till the train was close under them, and then opened a tremendous fire from their rifles and from two field guns and a Maxim automatic one-pounder. Simultaneously the driver of the locomotive put on all steam and the train headed furiously down a steep gradient towards Frere. But the enemy had made full preparations. A large stone had been placed on the line, and this derailed the leading truck (containing plate-layers' tools, a breakdown gang, and the guard), an armoured car behind it, and another truck. The occupants were flung through the air, and several of them severely injured. The engine, one armoured car, and the truck with the 7-pounder, kept the rails.

[Sidenote: Endeavours to clear the obstruction.]

Unfortunately the derailed armoured car and truck blocked the line and had to be removed. The Boer guns had changed their position, and opened a pitiless fire at a range of 1,300 yards. None the less, the men of the Durban Light Infantry and the Dublin Fusiliers, led by Captain Haldane and Mr. Winston Churchill--sometime a lieutenant in the Army and now acting as a newspaper correspondent--bravely set to work. Shells and bullets rained upon them, yet, in spite of this, one truck was dragged backwards and then toppled over so as almost to clear the line; it still overlapped slightly, and the engine was set to work to butt it aside. There was great danger of derailing or injuring the locomotive in this operation. Attempt after attempt was made carefully, with unsuccess. Each time the engine moved it a little, but only a little, and the successive pushes failed to clear the line. At last, however, a well-aimed shell struck the locomotive, setting the wood with which it was protected on fire, and the driver in despair turned on full steam. With a grating, tearing sound the engine tore its way past, but, unhappily, the armoured car and truck behind it parted their couplings, and could not be got past the obstruction. They had to be abandoned.

[Illustration: THE DISASTER TO THE ARMOURED TRAIN NEAR CHIEVELEY.

In which Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, the special correspondent of _The Morning Post_, son of the late Lord Randolph Churchill, distinguished himself by his gallant conduct.]

As many of the wounded as possible were placed on the engine, and keeping on the further side of it the survivors retreated. The Boers, however, poured in such a hot fire that order soon vanished from the British force. The engine had to put on steam to escape; the infantry were left behind, and dropped here and there crying for help. A few were doubling to some houses for shelter, when a wounded private raised the white flag.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER, K.C.M.G., K.C.B., V.C.

Born, 1839; entered 60th Rifles, 1858; served in China, 1860; Red River Expedition, 1870; Ashanti War, 1874; Kaffir War, 1878; Zulu War, 1878-9; Deputy Adjutant-General, 1885; Under Secretary for Ireland, 1887; Adjutant-General, 1890; Lieut.-General, 1891; in command at Aldershot, 1898; appointed to command of Army Corps, South Africa, 1899. Sir Redvers Buller arrived in Capetown October 31; having matured his plans he went on to Natal, arriving on November 25.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 15, 1899.]

[Sidenote: Capture of Mr. Winston Churchill and eighty men.]

At once the Boers galloped in upon the shattered remnants and demanded their surrender. Churchill was captured with the party; he had been on the engine, but upon reaching Frere had gallantly jumped down and gone back into the battle. Five of the British force were killed; twenty wounded and sixty unwounded prisoners were taken; fifteen wounded escaped on the engine, and about twenty men who were not on the engine got away through the bush. Thus needlessly and wastefully were a hundred men, whom the country could ill spare, thrown away. The defeat had, however, one excellent result. It thoroughly discredited the armoured train, and this death trap was used no more. Henceforward scouting was done by mounted men. The Boer detachment which had effected this capture was 300 strong, part of a commando of about 3,000 men who were moving south under General Joubert to raid Natal. The unhappy British prisoners were assembled and marched to Colenso, whence they were despatched to Pretoria. They were treated with extreme kindness. The Boer commander complimented them upon their defence, and permitted them to see the guns which had wrought their discomfiture. These were of the latest type, quick-firers, using fixed ammunition (_i.e._, with shell and cartridge made up together as in rifle ammunition), and of much greater range than British field guns.

[Illustration: FRERE BRIDGE, DESTROYED BY THE BOERS, November 24.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by the Biograph Co._

AT CHIEVELEY: SIGNALLING FOR REINFORCEMENTS.]

[Sidenote: The Estcourt garrison in danger.]

[Sidenote: NOV. 15-20, 1899.] _The Boers in Central Natal._]

In face of the Boer advance, the position of the garrison at Estcourt, which did not reach 3,000 men, became very serious. The place was commanded by heights from which the Boer long-range guns could bombard with effect, and from the numerical weakness of the British force and the want of water these heights could not be occupied by our men. There were no cavalry or mounted infantry beyond a couple of hundred men to meet and keep touch with the enemy. The only artillery available was composed of one or two naval 12-pounders and the Natal Government obsolete 9-pounder muzzle-loaders. The Home Authorities in their wisdom had decided that this was to be an infantry war; and the result was that the Boers by their extreme mobility, and the ubiquity which resulted from that mobility, were able to do what they liked. They could collect great quantities of cattle and loot, could isolate the British garrisons in Natal, and almost invest them. Had they determined to destroy the railway, the culverts, and the railway bridges south of Colenso the damage and delay caused would have been very great, but for some inscrutable reason they did little beyond wrecking the iron bridge at Frere and tearing up the rails in one or two places.

[Illustration: KAFFIRS DIGGING A TRENCH FOR THE BRITISH AT CHIEVELEY.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Elliott & Fry._

MR. WINSTON LEONARD SPENCER CHURCHILL

Is the eldest son of the late Lord Randolph Churchill, and inherits many of his father's brilliant qualities. He was born on November 30, 1874, and is therefore only a little over twenty-six years old. He was educated at Harrow and Sandhurst, and entered the Army in 1895. He served with the Spanish forces in Cuba in that year, and saw much Indian service with the Malakand Field Force in 1897; was orderly officer to the late Sir William Lockhart, and was attached to the 21st Lancers with the Nile Expeditionary Force in 1898, and present at the battle of Khartoum. On November 15, 1899, when an armoured train was captured by the Boers at Chieveley, Lieut. Churchill distinguished himself by his bravery; he was taken prisoner and deported to Pretoria, where he remained in prison at the State Model School for many weeks. On January 14 he escaped, and, after enduring very many hardships, he reached Delagoa Bay, and again went to the front.]

[Illustration: PRETORIA.

Showing in the foreground (above the point marked) the Model Schools where the British officers were imprisoned.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 20-22, 1899.]

[Sidenote: Shelling of Mooi River Camp.]

As the transports reached Durban a considerable force of British troops assembled at Estcourt between November 16 and 19. Two battalions of infantry, Bethune's mounted infantry--raised in Natal--and two batteries of artillery were the first to arrive. On the 18th there was skirmishing between the Boers and the British troops a couple of miles to the north of Estcourt. The enemy raised the Transvaal Flag at Weenen and scoured the whole country on both sides of the railway between Colenso and Estcourt. On the 19th Boers were seen at Highlands, two stations to the south of Estcourt and close to Mooi River, where a small British force was encamped. It was decided to attack the enemy under cover of darkness, and on the 20th 900 British infantry, 450 mounted men and two naval guns moved out from Estcourt under Colonel Hinde. But at the last minute news was received that the Boers were far stronger than had been supposed. Colonel Hinde hesitated to attack, and the opportunity was lost. On the 21st the British column tardily approached the enemy's position, and was about two miles off it when intelligence arrived that another Boer commando was approaching the railway from the west. Fearful of being cut off, after indulging in a little skirmishing with the Boers the British fell back to the railway, entrained, and retired precipitately to Estcourt. In the evening, the railway and telegraph south of Estcourt were broken and the British force there isolated. On the same day Mooi River Camp, where were 4,000 or 5,000 British troops, was shelled at extreme range. The boldness of the Boers is proved by the fact now known that they ventured upon this daring act in the face of a far superior force of disciplined troops with a second superior force to their rear.

[Illustration: LANCERS AT NOTTINGHAM ROAD.

The most southerly point reached by the Boers in Natal.]

[Illustration: THE CLOCK OF CHIEVELEY CAMP.

The cartridge-case of one of the large naval guns was used as a bell, a sword serving as clapper to strike the hours.]

By this Boer advance a small party of Natal Police, under Captain Cayzer, who had gone to Weenen to maintain signalling communication with Ladysmith, were all but cut off. They had an exciting time of it. Having climbed a mountain 5,000 feet high and set up their instruments, just as night fell a native brought them news that they were in the very midst of 1,200 Boers. Fortunately the night was pitch dark, pouring with rain, and in the plash of the deluge they were able to steal their way unperceived down a precipitous disused Kaffir track. At the bottom, however, it was found that Captain Cayzer's horse had broken its fetlock. One of the police took the Captain up behind, and in this plight the party rode before the enemy first into Greytown and then on to Pietermaritzburg.

[Sidenote: Boer advance checked at Nottingham Road.]

The most southerly point reached by small raiding parties of the Boers was Nottingham Road, twelve miles to the south of Mooi River Camp. Here they looted farms, destroyed the farmers' furniture, and did an immense amount of wanton damage.

[Illustration: TOUGH WORK FOR TOMMY; DRAGGING A HEAVY GUN UP A HILL.

[_From an Instantaneous Photograph._]

[Illustration: BRINGING IN THE WOUNDED FROM THE WILLOW GRANGE FIGHT.]

[Sidenote: The Willow Grange fight.]

[Sidenote: NOV. 22, 1899.] _The Action at Willow Grange._]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 22-24, 1899.]

To check this advance an effort was at last made on the 22nd by the troops at Estcourt. In the afternoon of that day the West Yorkshires, East Surreys, and Durban Light Infantry, with a naval 12-pounder, moved to Willow Grange. The gun was dragged up a steep hill known as Klobber's Kop. The Boers were in position upon Brynbella Hill, three miles away, and fired a couple of shots at the gun. During the night the column was strengthened by all the available mounted troops--two more battalions and a battery of artillery. The West Yorkshires and the East Surreys then advanced to storm the Boer position at daybreak in a terrific hailstorm, during which hailstones fell as big as eggs and wounded two or three men. They climbed the slopes of Brynbella and were close to the Boer camp when a picket challenged and opened fire. In a moment the British troops with fixed bayonets were upon the picket, but the Boers in camp had taken the alarm and fled along a ridge which extended for about a thousand yards, to the main force, now seen to be posted at the further extremity of the ridge. A heavy fire was opened upon the West Yorkshires, and the battalion promptly took shelter behind a low stone wall. Here the Boer guns shelled them with effect, while as the naval gun was unfortunately unable to reach the enemy, the British had no artillery of their own to reply. The position was quite untenable; there was nothing left except for the infantry to retire. The retreat was covered by the mounted men, and by a squadron of the Imperial Light Horse; it was not effected without difficulty, as the Boers poured in a tremendous fire, moving their guns forward to shell the infantry. The British losses were eleven killed and sixty-seven wounded, while Major Hobbs and eight men were taken prisoners. Major Hobbs had stayed behind to give aid to a wounded man. The affair was far from satisfactory, as the British force, with a great numerical preponderance, failed to dislodge or capture the enemy's commando. It had, however, in the end the desired result, since the Boers became anxious about their retreat and at once began to fall back.

[Illustration: COLENSO RAILWAY BRIDGE.]

[Illustration: BRINGING A BOER MESSENGER INTO THE BRITISH CAMP.

Bearers of messages between the opposing commanders, and in many cases ordinary prisoners of war, are blindfolded before being led into camp, in order that they may not be able to report particulars of the defences.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Knight._

GETTING A WAR-BALLOON READY: ADJUSTING THE TELEGRAPHIC APPARATUS.]

[Sidenote: NOV. 24-30, 1899.] _British Concentration Effected._]

[Sidenote: Arrival of Lord Dundonald and General Buller.]

This foray was not without its comic side. On November 24 the 6,000 British troops at Mooi River manned the trenches and prepared to do or die, under the impression that the enemy, in overpowering force, was all around. At that very moment the Boer commandos, 3,000 strong, were scuttling back to Colenso with their plunder, only too pleased to be unmolested. The high-water mark of the Boer advance had been reached. On the 24th the Estcourt force pushed forward to Frere unopposed, but found that further progress was stopped by the destruction of the railway bridge over the Blaauwkrantz. The engineers at once went to work to build a trestle bridge. In the next two days the railway was repaired between Estcourt and Mooi River. On the 30th Lord Dundonald, who had arrived and taken over the command of the mounted troops, pushed forward with 1,400 mounted infantry and a battery of artillery to Colenso, and drew a very heavy fire from the Boer positions. After reconnoitring these he fell back without the loss of a man. On the same day the railway bridge at Colenso was blown up by the Boers.

[Illustration: BRINGING UP A BATTERY OF FIELD ARTILLERY.]

In the meantime, during the closing weeks of November and the early days of December, no less than sixteen battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and five batteries of field artillery had arrived at Durban, and with them had come General Buller to take over the command. Added to the 4,000 men already under arms in the colony outside Ladysmith, they gave an available British force in the field of a little over 21,000. In this force the infantry numbered 18,000, the cavalry and mounted infantry 2,600, and the artillery 750 with 30 guns. A mountain battery armed with six miserable little screw seven-pounder muzzle-loaders should be added to this total.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Debenham & Smith._

MAJOR-GENERAL GEOFFRY BARTON, C.B.,

Took part in the Ashanti War of 1873-4, and in the Zulu War of 1879 in command of the 4th Battalion of the Natal Native Contingent. He again saw active service in the Egyptian War of 1882 as D.A.Q.G., and went through the battles of Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir. During the Soudan campaign of 1885 he was Assistant Military Secretary to Sir Gerald Graham. He commands the 6th Brigade of the South African Field Force.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Evelyn, Aldershot._

MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY JOHN THORNTON HILDYARD, C.B.

Had the command, until the beginning of the war, of the 3rd Infantry Brigade at Aldershot. Originally destined for the Navy, in which he served from 1859 to 1867; three years later he entered the Army, and in 1876 became Captain in the Highland Light Infantry. From that time forward his advance was rapid, and he attained his present rank in 1899. He served with the Egyptian Expedition in 1882, and was present at Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir. From 1893 to 1898 he was Commandant of the Staff College. Commands the 2nd brigade in South Africa.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 1899.]

[Sidenote: Comparison of the opposing armies.]

Certain points must now be noted as bearing upon the adequacy of this force for the work which was before it--the work of clearing a way to Ladysmith. In the first place the strength of the enemy was believed to be at least 25,000, and might easily be nearer 35,000. General Buller was thus, even adding in as available the 10,000 effectives at Ladysmith, by no means certain of outnumbering the enemy. In the second place he would have to act on the offensive, and would have to assail or "turn" strong Boer positions. To "turn" a position, it need scarcely be said, is to work round it. But positions held, as were these, by good and mobile troops cannot be successfully assailed, and certainly cannot be turned unless there is a considerable advantage of numbers on the assailants' side. In point of mobility General Buller's infantry could not compare with the Boers, who were, of course, to a man mounted, who slept in the open and needed no such elaborate transport system as is required in the British Army. While the British soldier was moving five miles the Boer could cover fifteen. Again, in artillery, which must be used freely to pave the way for an infantry attack, General Buller's army was very weak. The usual proportion in European armies is five guns to every thousand men; he had only thirty field guns, instead of 105, to 21,000 men. Finally, his mounted force was inadequate, and his transport system hastily improvised.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Elliott & Fry._

MAJOR-GENERAL THE HON. NEVILLE GERALD LYTTELTON, C.B.,

Took command of the 2nd Infantry Brigade at Aldershot last year. He was born in 1845, and was educated at Eton. He joined the Rifle Brigade in 1865, and served with it in Canada and India, seeing a good deal of

## active service. A.D.C. to Lord Spencer, Viceroy of India, from 1868 to

1873, and Military Secretary to Sir John Adye, Governor of Gibraltar, and to Lord Reay, Governor of Bombay. He went through the Egyptian campaign of 1882, and commanded a brigade in the Nile Expedition of 1898, being present at the battle of Khartoum. He was Assistant Military Secretary at the War Office during 1897 and 1898, and now commands the 4th Brigade in South Africa.]

All these considerations militated strongly against any substantial success. It is not known whether he asked of the Home Government a larger force, but if he did it was not granted him. Yet 50,000 men with 200 field guns would have been not one whit too great a strength for the proper performance of his task. Here as elsewhere in South Africa the disasters which befell British arms may be traced to these three causes--under-estimating the enemy's force, attempting to effect most difficult operations in a difficult country with inadequate strength, and failure to observe the precautions which the lessons of the past have shown to be necessary.

[Sidenote: NOV.-DEC. 11, 1899.] _Composition of the British Force._]

In the last week of November, General Buller's army was reinforced by two naval 4·7-inch guns and fourteen 12-pounders, which had been sent ashore from the _Terrible_ for the defence of Durban. These weapons, from their great range and extreme power, were a valuable addition to the British artillery, though, mounted on improvised carriages and drawn painfully by oxen, they could not compare in mobility with our field guns. They were manned by bluejackets, who proved themselves formidable marksmen.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Van Hoepen._

SOME OF THE MEN WHO KEPT US OUT OF LADYSMITH.

Boer farmers with their servants encamped on a hill overlooking the town.]

[Illustration: BOER COMMANDO WITH MAXIM GUN DRAWN BY HORSES.]

[Sidenote: The forward movement begins.]

On December 11th everything was ready for a forward movement. The troops were disposed as follows:--

HILDYARD'S BRIGADE. LYTTELTON'S BRIGADE. 2nd Royal West Surrey. 2nd Scottish Rifles. 2nd West Yorkshire. 1st Durham Light Infantry. 2nd East Surrey. 1st Rifle Brigade. 2nd Devonshire. 3rd King's Royal Rifles. 14th and 66th Field Batteries.

BARTON'S BRIGADE. HART'S BRIGADE. 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 1st Connaught Rangers. 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers. 1st & 2nd Rl. Dublin Fusiliers. 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers. 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 2nd Royal Fusiliers. 1st Borderers. 63rd and 64th Field Batteries.

DUNDONALD'S MOUNTED BRIGADE. 1st Royal Dragoons. 13th Hussars. Composite Regiment of Mounted Infantry. Bethune's Mounted Infantry. Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry. South African Light Horse. 7th Field Battery.

[Sidenote: [DEC. 12-14, 1899.]

Barton's brigade was the first to move out from Frere Camp. At dawn on December 12 it advanced to a kopje three miles south of Colenso. From this kopje the ground sloped smoothly and gently down to the River Tugela, hidden in its deep bed by scrub and brushwood.

[Sidenote: Boer position at Colenso.]

To the north in a hollow lay the tin roofs of the little village of Colenso and the road bridge, which the Boers had left intact. Across the river the outline of the enemy's works could be vaguely made out by powerful glasses along the slopes of two strongly fortified kopjes and beyond these on the high hills which rise to the north-west and which are known as Red Hill and Grobler's Kloof. At Fort Wylie, on a low hill just across the river, was another strong Boer position close to the railway and commanding the two bridges. Away on the extreme British right rose the steep purple slopes of Mount Inhlawe on the southern bank of the river. This mountain towered to a height of over 4,000 feet, dominating the whole neighbourhood. From its slopes and summit an enfilading fire could be directed upon any force attempting to cross the river near Colenso. It was held in strength by the Boers, who had built a military bridge over the Tugela to the north of it, though the fact was as yet unknown to the British. Nearer Colenso were the heights of Monte Cristo and Hlangwane, both, like Inhlawe, held by the Boers.

[Illustration: MAP SHOWING BULLER'S THREE UNSUCCESSFUL AND FINAL SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO DRIVE THE BOERS FROM THEIR POSITION ON THE TUGELA.]

The naval guns followed close on the heels of Barton, and took up a position facing Colenso on the evening of the 12th. On December 13 they opened fire on the Boer entrenchments at 7,200 yards, giving particular attention to the two kopjes. No reply could be drawn from the enemy. From time to time small groups of Boers were seen scattering as shells fell, but except for this there was silence in their positions.

On the 14th Hildyard's, Lyttelton's, Hart's, and Dundonald's brigades followed in the steps of Barton's, and encamped to the north of Chieveley, in sight of Colenso. The naval guns advanced somewhat and again bombarded the kopjes and Fort Wylie, at times also shelling a laager which could be seen 10,000 yards away, on a ridge beyond the river. Once more the Boers maintained absolute silence, and very few of them were seen. The general impression was that they were falling back, and that they did not intend to hold the line of the Tugela.

[Sidenote: DEC. 14, 1899.] _Preparations for the Great Battle._]

[Sidenote: Buller determines to attack.]

That evening General Buller determined to force the passage of the river with all his troops on the 15th. The mounted troops under Dundonald were to occupy Hlangwane Hill, covered by the 7th Battery; the English [Hildyard's] and Irish [Hart's] Brigades, supported by artillery, to advance towards the river and endeavour to cross by the fords, Hart's Brigade by the Bridle Drift, above Colenso, Hildyard's by the main ford close to the iron railway bridge. The 7th Battery was, if possible, to take up a position on Hlangwane Hill so as to enfilade the enemy's position. Barton's Brigade was to take ground between Hildyard's and Dundonald's, Lyttelton's between Hildyard's in the British centre and Hart's on the British left, ready to support either. The naval 4·7's and four of the 12-pounders, under Captain Jones of H.M.S. _Forte_, took up a position on the top of an eminence two miles from Colenso, prepared to set to work when the advance began.

[Illustration: THORNEYCROFT'S MOUNTED INFANTRY PACKING KIT AT MOOI RIVER CAMP, BEFORE GOING INTO ACTION.]

[Illustration: STEAM ROAD LOCOMOTIVES USED BY THE BRITISH GENERALS IN SOUTH AFRICA TO BRING UP SUPPLIES.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Lieut. Crawford._

LETTERS FROM HOME: DISTRIBUTING THE BRITISH MAIL IN CAMP.]

[Illustration: PANORAMA OF THE BATTLE OF COLENSO.

[_From a Sketch by Capt. W. S. Carey._

This picture includes about 2½ miles of the river, which divided the contending armies. It is taken from behind the British positions, looking almost due north towards Ladysmith, which lies behind the hills a little to the left of the centre. In the foreground are the 4·7-inch naval guns being brought into position by ox-teams. To the left is an armoured train, and in the extreme right a portion of a Kaffir kraal.]

[Illustration: DEATH OF LIEUTENANT ROBERTS, ONLY SON OF FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR, IN AN ATTEMPT TO RECOVER THE ABANDONED GUNS AT COLENSO.

Lieut. Roberts is seen on the extreme right of the picture. He fell mortally wounded; Capt. Congreve returned to his assistance, and brought him in.]

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