CHAPTER XIV

.

VAAL KRANTZ.

Substantial reinforcements--Guns taken to summit of Zwart Kop--Plan of attack on Vaal Krantz--Lie of the land--Another crossing of the Tugela--Demonstration towards Brakfontein--Bombardment of Vaal Krantz--Infantry storm the height--Difficulty of holding the position--Disappearing guns--Renewed attacks--Council of war--Evacuation of the ridge--Losses--Disappointment in Britain.

[Sidenote: Substantial reinforcements.]

Twice beaten back, twice discomfited, neither the general nor his army lost heart. No sooner had the army withdrawn across the Tugela than, in a review, General Buller told his men that he held the key to Ladysmith, and hoped yet to be in that town in a week. It is possible that this speech was made in accordance with suggestions from Capetown, so that the enemy's attention might be diverted from the great campaign, now about to begin in the west. Meantime he was strongly reinforced. Three thousand drafts from home reached him, more than replacing the losses of Colenso and Spion Kop. Not less important was the addition now made to his artillery. Two siege 5-inch guns supplemented his 4·7 weapons of position, and a great 6-inch naval gun on a special mounting was also sent up from Durban. Besides these, another Field Battery and A Horse Artillery Battery joined him, and thus, as the guns lost at Colenso were now replaced, he found himself with seventy-eight serviceable guns--an immense change from the days of Colenso and of the first operations in Natal. He received, too, the best part of another cavalry regiment--the 14th Hussars. General Woodgate, mortally wounded on Spion Kop and now lying betwixt life and death, was replaced in command of his brigade by Colonel Wynne. Thus all was ready for a fresh attempt.

[Sidenote: Guns taken to summit of Zwart Kop.]

[Sidenote: FEB. 4, 1900.] _Vaal Krantz to be Seized._]

The army remained in its camp at Spearman's Farm, close to Potgieter's Ford, until February 4. The wait was utilised to move six naval 12-pounders, two field guns, and the mountain battery, to the summit of Zwart Kop. The slopes of the mountain were so steep and precipitous that the work was one of no little difficulty and danger. Steel hawsers were employed, attached to trees on the summit, to warp up the heavier weapons; the little mountain 7-pounders were carried up on mule-back, but even the mules found it hard to keep their footing, and one in the battery fell and was killed. The first of the naval 12-pounders, too, had overturned on its way up and caused no little trouble. On January 30, the cavalry pushed out far to the west in a reconnaissance, the object of which was to distract the attention of the Boers, but they saw little of the enemy. The troops at Chieveley, to keep up the mystification, demonstrated at their end of the line and shelled the Boer works at Colenso.

[Illustration: BIVOUAC ON THE TUGELA AFTER SPION KOP.

The camp of the 3rd King's Royal Rifles on the evening of February 4.]

[Sidenote: Plan of attack on Vaal Krantz.]

[Sidenote: Lie of the Land.]

[Sidenote: [FEB. 4-5, 1900.]

The serious attack, however, was to be made from near Potgieter's Drift. Between Spion Kop, to the west of the drift, and Doorn Kloof, a yet higher summit which rose from the Tugela to the east, ran a comparatively low ridge, fronting Spearman's Hill and Zwart Kop. The left and western end of the ridge, known as Brakfontein, commanded the broad tongue of land which ran up from Potgieter's Drift in the direction of Ladysmith. It was strongly defended by four lines of Boer trenches, so constructed as to give complete cover against the British fire. Though demonstrations had been made against it during the week of battles, it had been found too strong for serious attack. But the right and eastern end of the ridge, known as Vaal Krantz, and rising just above the curve of the easternmost of the two inverted ⋃'s which the Tugela hereabouts describes, was not so strong. It was a bare, rocky, razor-backed ridge with comparatively flat ground to the east, over which ran a road to Ladysmith. Still further to the east rose Doorn Kloof, as it was somewhat incorrectly called, Doorn Kop being the real name, the highest mountain on the Tugela line and also the most irregular in outline--a picturesque tangle of peaks and watercourses and wooded valleys, affording the best of shelter to the Boers. Against Vaal Krantz General Buller determined to make his real effort; while once more demonstrating in the direction of Brakfontein. On February 4, instructions were issued to the leading officers. The Brigade to which General Wynne had just been appointed was to make the demonstration against Brakfontein, supported by General Coke's Brigade, by thirty-six field guns, the howitzers, and the position guns. The artillery was gradually to withdraw during the demonstration, and to come into action against Vaal Krantz. General Clery's Division, composed of the Second Brigade under General Hildyard and the Fifth Brigade under General Hart, with the Fourth Brigade under General Lyttelton temporarily attached, was to take position halfway up the eastern inverted ⋃, as if it intended to join in the attack on Brakfontein, but instead of doing so was at the appointed moment to build a new bridge over the Tugela and advance against Vaal Krantz. General Lyttelton was to storm this position after a thorough artillery preparation, when the guns were to follow him and take post on Vaal Krantz ridge, while the First Cavalry Brigade under General Burn Murdoch, composed of the 1st Dragoons, 13th and 14th Hussars, and A Battery of Horse Artillery, was to press up the road which ran under the Vaal Krantz ridge towards Ladysmith, breaking in upon the Boer rear. Lord Dundonald with the rest of the mounted men was to guard the British right from any counter-attack. Such was the plan, and it offered good promise of success. Now for the execution.

[Illustration: IN CAMP: GETTING DINNER READY.]

[Illustration: OFFICERS' MESS: PREPARATIONS FOR BREAKFAST.]

[Sidenote: Another crossing of the Tugela.]

On the 4th the troops began to move. Generals Hart and Hildyard crossed from the British left to the right; General Lyttelton withdrew from One Tree Hill and was replaced by Wynne; in all directions great clouds of dust rose from the rough tracks, indicating to the eyes of the expectant Boers the march of thousands of men. With dawn of the 5th the cavalry struck its camp on the left and also moved off--the squadrons at a walk. Pontoon bridges already spanned the Tugela to the east of Potgieter's Drift, allowing men readily to cross from the neighbourhood of One Tree Hill to the tongue of land enclosed by the river which runs up to Vaal Krantz. Yet another bridge was to be built at Munger's Drift, on the further side of the tongue, to allow the passage of troops from this tongue to the northern bank of the Tugela. The engineers with the pontoon train were ready, waiting to get to their work as soon as the demonstration against Brakfontein fully occupied the attention of the Boers.

[Illustration: SUNDAY AFTERNOON IN CAMP ON THE TUGELA.]

[Illustration:

_F. W. Burton._]

RETIRING THE BALLOON.

During the action at Vaal Krantz, the balloon came under heavy fire, and had to be retired out of range by means of the rope which holds it captive.]

[Sidenote: Demonstration towards Brakfontein.]

[Sidenote: FEB. 5, 1900.] _The Artillery get into Action._]

[Sidenote: [FEB. 5, 1900.]

The morning was hot and misty, and not till after 7 a.m. could the battle begin. Then the six batteries of field artillery deployed in front of One Tree Hill and opened a vigorous fire upon a quite invisible enemy. There was nothing to aim at except the Boer trenches, which appeared, as usual, untenanted. The enemy were grimly watching, with orders not to return a shot till the British infantry approached within 500 yards. Next, two battalions, the York and Lancasters and the South Lancashires, extended and moved forward towards Brakfontein in a long thin line of brown dots, followed by the batteries in succession. "Round the guns the long thin lines split and joined together again in front and went on," writes Mr. Atkins. "Here and there the lines were thick where the men had not yet had room to extend. Officers blew their whistles and threw their arms apart, and the knotted part of the line moved crabwise until the proper intervals were observed." Gradually the advance developed till the Boers began to feel real alarm for Brakfontein. The infernal thunder of the field guns and 4·7's, which had now joined in the game, echoed up through the valleys and reverberated among the mountain heights. And then at last the enemy's guns began to reply. These were barely a dozen in number, but they were well-placed; on Doorn Kloof was a huge 6-inch Creusot, which did not as yet disclose its presence; on the eastern slope of Spion Kop were two Krupp field guns, and at other points along the line were the much dreaded "Pom-Poms." Towards ten o'clock all the smaller Boer weapons began to fire; columns of dust spurted suddenly up beside the British batteries, telling that the enemy shot true; Maxim shells and shrapnel bullets lashed the surface of the veldt around them. But the gunners fired stolidly and steadily, and, as on many other occasions, the Boer projectiles caused trivial loss. The British howitzers now opened, hurling into the clouds from their squat throats the 50-lb. lyddite shells, which, when they fell, burst with a fearful concussion, tearing men in pieces. A correspondent with the Boers notes that in one case the upper and lower parts of one body were found no less than 100 feet apart. For some hours the shells fell on Brakfontein at the rate of ten a minute, but, wonderful to relate, the Boer casualties were by no means large. To direct the British fire the war balloon was sent up and information as to the enemy's whereabouts was transmitted from the observer in the car by telephone. This, by the way, was the second balloon to be employed by General Buller's army; the first had been damaged by Boer shrapnel, and eventually torn against rocks and rendered useless during the Spion Kop week.

And now it seemed to the Boers that once more victory was falling to them. The British attack was distinctly relaxing; battery after battery could be seen retiring in perfect order, crossing the Tugela by the pontoon bridge and moving off to the right. The enemy did not at once seize the fact that all this sound and fury veiled a mere demonstration, and that a withdrawal had been ordered from the first. The Boer guns redoubled their fire, and elicited a vigorous return from the heavy naval weapons on Zwart Kop, which were unmasked suddenly by felling trees in front of them.

[Illustration:

[_From photos by a British officer._

VIEW OF VAAL KRANTZ FROM BELOW ZWART KOP.]

[Illustration: BRITISH ARTILLERY ON ZWART KOP FIRING AT VAAL KRANTZ.

Officers and correspondents watching the effects of the fire. The smoke from bursting shells is seen on the distant hill.]

[Sidenote: FEB. 5, 1900.] _A Brilliantly-managed Demonstration._]

The engineers at Munger's Drift had got to work upon their bridge as the booming of the bombardment began. The Boers were not long in seeing them, and opened upon them a rifle and cannon fire which wounded eight men. In thirty minutes the task was accomplished with all the coolness and method which the Royal Engineers invariably displayed under fire. All was ready for the real attack upon Vaal Krantz, and at once General Lyttelton's Brigade crossed the river and extended, while battery by battery the guns stole off from in front of Brakfontein and deployed to support the infantry on the right. The withdrawal was effected in superb style; at intervals of ten minutes the six field batteries and the howitzers retreated, and, as they went, the shrapnel from the Boer guns rained round them. "Forward trotted the teams with the limbers for one battery, the unflinching gunners meanwhile loading and firing to the last minute," writes Mr. Burleigh. "When all was in readiness, the guns moved off in perfect alignment, the six upon one axle, as if on show parade. And yet it was deadly war, for the Boer shells were falling and tearing up the ground upon all sides.... The last three to be withdrawn were ammunition waggons. All the wounded and left material were placed very deliberately upon the two which had teams. For five minutes they waited, putting things to rights and rearranging harness, under a rainstorm of shells. Then they walked off the field, followed by shells, step by step." "Was there ever anything finer than British gunnery or so extravagantly dangerous?" was the reflection of another correspondent at this wonderful spectacle. Even the third ammunition waggon, the horses of which had been killed or wounded, was not abandoned. The gunners ran it back by hand and so saved it from capture. The ground was open and there was no cover of any kind, yet the casualties in the batteries were only about fifteen.

[Illustration:

_S. Paget._]

"WAS THERE EVER ANYTHING FINER, OR SO EXTRAVAGANTLY DANGEROUS?"

Gunners of the 78th Battery recovering a limber under a heavy fire.]

It now remained to bring back General Wynne's two battalions from their yet closer contact with the enemy. They had reached a point only 1,200 yards from the nearest Boer works at Brakfontein, and as the officers' whistles blew and the line of khaki-clad men leapt up from the ground, the enemy at last opened a fierce, spluttering rifle fire. Yet again the casualties were not heavy, though the running of the gauntlet of that storm of fire from invisible marksmen for about 1,000 yards must have been a grim experience. The total loss in the two battalions was about fifty killed and wounded. The retirement of our men gave scope for the usual Boer legends. Some professed that our infantry had fled in panic, while the field glasses of an American correspondent with the Boers were so powerful that they revealed to him desperate efforts on the part of our officers to check the flight and to persuade the men to advance. Whence he argued that Thomas Atkins "was beginning to funk it." Had he only been able to see into General Buller's mind he would have known otherwise. In fact, this demonstration was brilliantly managed with insignificant loss of life--no small achievement against such an enemy as the Boers.

[Sidenote: [FEB. 5, 1900.]

[Sidenote: Bombardment of Vaal Krantz.]

Soon after noon the batteries began the bombardment of Vaal Krantz, and all the heavy guns joined in the infernal concert. Never in this war had there been such an artillery display before. The naval guns and 5-inch siege pieces divided their attention between Vaal Krantz and the dongas under Doorn Kloof, where the Boer guns, from their higher altitude, had the distinct advantage; the 12-pounders and mountain guns fired wholly at the tangle of watercourses under Doorn Kloof; the field batteries and howitzers concentrated their efforts against Vaal Krantz. The slopes and ridge of that eminence were torn with projectiles of all kinds; the usual method being first to fire a couple of lyddite shells and then a half-dozen of shrapnel in a terrific volley. Not a living being should have been left on the hill if the theories of artillerists were correct. But in actual fact the execution was by no means what was expected. A good many Boers were killed and wounded, but a number of determined men still held their ground and did not flinch. A Boer correspondent tells us:--"Scattered about, crouching low among the boulders, and in the innumerable tiny ravines, the Boers, with the phlegm of their race, patiently endured the storm and waited for Tommy Atkins to come within rifle range. The boulders which covered them were shattered and splintered by the iron hail, but the Boers did not budge. It is really marvellous how the burghers manage to fight effectively while keeping so perfectly concealed. A wounded English officer, who was brought into the laager after the fight, told me that the men who carried him off the field were the first Boers he had seen. During the fight he had not caught a glimpse of a single man." Some idea of the nature of the artillery fire concentrated upon this point may be gathered from the fact that this correspondent picked up a double handful of shrapnel bullets in a space only 50 feet square.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Middlebrook._

ONE OF THE NAVAL GUNS ON ZWART KOP BOMBARDING VAAL KRANTZ.

The puff of smoke on the distant hill shows where a Boer magazine was exploded--it is believed, by a British shell.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Capt. Foot._

A LULL IN THE BATTLE.

This photograph was taken under fire during the battle of Vaal Krantz, and shows the Brakfontein position in the distance. The men in the foreground are awaiting the order to advance.]

[Sidenote: Infantry storm the height.]

[Sidenote: FEB. 5, 1900.] _Capture of the Ridge._]

From Zwart Kop the Vaal Krantz ridge was seen to be veiled in the dust and smoke thrown up by the bursting shells, and it was thought--and with good reason, as afterwards appeared, notwithstanding the Boer correspondent's tale of unflinching burghers--that the greater part of the enemy's force had retired from the hill. The artillery preparations had been completed as never before; the time had come for the infantry to storm the position. The 1st Durham Light Infantry on the left, and the 3rd King's Royal Rifles on the right accordingly extended and pushed forward under a sharp, enfilading rifle fire from the dongas below Doorn Kloof, and under a hail of bullets from the Boer guns' shrapnel. Unshaken, they pressed steadily on, availing themselves of every inch of cover--now vanishing from view as they sank down behind the ant heaps, now rising and rushing forward in a wavy line. They reached the foot of the smoking ridge, breasted it, and with a cheer gained the Boer trenches, from which the enemy fled precipitately, leaving only half-a-dozen armed Kaffirs to fight to the last. The Kaffirs were shot down, though not until one of them, who was wounded and who had been spared, had put a bullet through a British officer's wrist. Their presence showed that the Boers were ready without scruple to arm and employ black men against whites.

As the storming of Vaal Krantz began there was an exciting episode, a Boer "Pom-Pom" galloping from Vaal Krantz towards the Doorn Kloof dongas across open ground. The British artillery aimed at it shell after shell, but, so hard is a fast-moving object to hit at uncertain ranges, that the gun and its team escaped injury and went to earth in a donga, amidst a cloud of smoke from bursting shells.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Lieut. Salmond._

THE 1ST DURHAM LIGHT INFANTRY ADVANCING ON VAAL KRANTZ.

This photograph shows the Durhams in the act of passing one of the field guns. It was taken under fire, and is a quite typical view of a modern battlefield--the infantry advancing in open order, the gunners taking what shelter their gun affords. Even the insignificant size of the figures, especially of those near the trees in the middle distance, lost as they are in the expanse of landscape, is quite characteristic. Except for the noise, and the occasional dropping of a wounded man, a spectator would hardly know that anything serious was going on.]

[Sidenote: Difficulty of holding the position.]

About 4 p.m. the eastern end of Vaal Krantz was in British possession. But the Boers still held trenches along the western end, while from their positions on and under Doorn Kloof they could direct an enfilading fire upon General Lyttelton's Brigade. It had been intended to move the British artillery on to the ridge, but this was now found to be impossible. In the first place, the ridge itself was razor-edged, steep, and rocky, so that guns could not be handled upon it; in the second place, beyond it, but within easy rifle range, was a second ridge of even greater strength, still in the hands of the Boers. Thus the gunners would be too close to the enemy for the safe working of their guns, and the episode of Colonel Long's artillery at Colenso had shown that it was not good to be too close to the Boer marksmen. The long grass, too, on the sides of the ridge had been set on fire, and the dense volumes of smoke which this caused would have been a further obstacle to the gunners. The A Horse Artillery Battery was, however, sent forward, and it shelled the ridges held by the enemy. Towards evening the Boers delivered a vigorous counter attack, endeavouring to dislodge the British force from Vaal Krantz, but General Lyttelton's battalions, reinforced by the 2nd Devons from General Hildyard's Brigade, beat off the attempt with little difficulty, though it was found impossible to hold the eastern end of the ridge.

[Sidenote: [FEB. 5-6, 1900.]

[Sidenote: Disappearing guns.]

The night of the 5th was spent by the British troops in entrenching the position they had won, and providing cover against the enemy's shell fire. The Boers, on their part, were busy concentrating men from the east and the west to meet further attacks, and were mounting their 6-inch Creusots on the summit of Doorn Kloof. General Joubert's whole army was rapidly gathering to drive back the bold assailants, who had effected a lodgment in the centre. During the night skirmishing proceeded between the outposts, and with dawn the Boers opened a heavy fire upon Vaal Krantz and the British camps to the south of the Tugela. Several of the shells from the 6-inch guns on Doorn Kloof actually burst within a few yards of the British headquarters. Efforts were made to silence these inconveniently long-range weapons, but without success; and though, in the expressive words of a correspondent, the whole ground round these guns smoked with exploding shells like a lime kiln, the weapons were never hit or disabled. They were mounted on the disappearing principle, and their ugly muzzles only showed for a few seconds on the sky-line, vanishing when their messages of destruction were sped.

[Illustration: _O. Eckhardt._] [_After a sketch by E. Prater._

THE DURHAM LIGHT INFANTRY CAPTURING VAAL KRANTZ.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by C. Knight, Aldershot._

MAJOR-GENERAL LYTTELTON.

A short sketch of Major-General Lyttelton's military career is given on page 84. He took a distinguished part in the actions during the "week of battles" before Spion Kop, and commanded the attacking force at Vaal Krantz.]

[Sidenote: Renewed attacks.]

[Sidenote: [FEB. 6, 1900.]

To support General Lyttelton's men on Vaal Krantz, General Hildyard had already advanced to the foot of the hill, and held his Brigade in readiness to move at a moment's notice. Here, as before Spion Kop, and in precisely the same manner, the British advance had come to a standstill. Before, it was Spion Kop that flanked and enfiladed our line of attack; now, it was Doorn Kloof, and, unless this frowning mountain could be stormed, there was little prospect of any success. So councils of war deliberated, while a protracted, aimless battle raged along the front. On the afternoon of February 6, the Boers suddenly attacked Vaal Krantz and gained some ground; for whole minutes, indeed, it appeared as though the hill might be lost. But General Lyttelton speedily rallied his men, and with the Durhams and King's Royal Rifles regained the ground that had been lost by a brilliant bayonet charge. During the day a fresh pontoon bridge was built just under Vaal Krantz, so as to give easier access to that fiercely disputed point. At nightfall General Hildyard's men replaced General Lyttelton's weary battalions, and yet more trenches were constructed. In the darkness the Boers made a third attack upon the hill, but as before were repulsed with some trouble.

[Illustration: VOLUNTEER AMBULANCE-MEN BRINGING THE WOUNDED ACROSS THE RIVER BY MEANS OF THE PONT OR RAFT.]

[Sidenote: Council of War.]

Unless a resolute advance was made, Vaal Krantz was an utterly useless possession. It was exposed to fire from three sides; it was not a good artillery position; it had little natural strength; and it was now ascertained to be very far from being the "key to Ladysmith." The original intention, to follow up its seizure by a flank attack upon Brakfontein, had to be abandoned, because troops massing for such an attack would have been exposed to a devastating artillery fire from Doorn Kloof. The same consideration compelled the withholding of the cavalry who were to have menaced the Boer rear. Nothing remained, if the advance was to be pressed, but to storm the ridge which rose behind Vaal Krantz, and to assault and capture at the same time the lofty eminence of Doorn Kloof. A council of war was held to determine the course which should be taken. General Hart alone--"No-Bobs" as his soldiers called him, from the fact that he never bent his head before the storm of bullets--was for such an assault, which, it was allowed, must cost the lives or limbs of thousands of men. He was for going forward at all risks, and for storming Doorn Kloof. But the other officers were against so bold, so desperate, a course. They were for withdrawing and trying yet another line of approach to Ladysmith. To this General Buller was himself inclined, in view of the frightful difficulties of the country before him. Accordingly, a general retreat was once more ordered; General Hildyard's Brigade was to evacuate Vaal Krantz that night--the night of the 7th--and, with the rest of the army, to fall back to Springfield and Chieveley.

[Sidenote: Evacuation of the ridge.]

[Sidenote: FEB. 5-7, 1900.] _The "Key to Ladysmith" lost._]

[Sidenote: Losses.]

The retreat was accomplished with perfect order and success. General Hildyard's troops fell back with all their wounded; once more the Tugela was recrossed, and the bridges taken to pieces. The enemy offered no other molestation than a few shells, but watched with exultation the long lines of troops and waggons moving slowly eastwards all the 8th. There were some among the Boers who supposed that the relief of Ladysmith had been finally abandoned, and in the British force there was at least talk of such a dreadful possibility. The soldiers were gloomy and dispirited, yet they still had confidence in themselves and in their commanders, notwithstanding the errors of the past month. Only two brigades out of the five composing General Buller's army had been seriously engaged, and all longed for a real trial of strength. The British losses in the fighting at Vaal Krantz were by no means heavy. The killed were 25, wounded 344, and missing 5. The Boers on their part owned to 21 killed and 31 wounded, but their losses were probably nearly equal to those of the British, with a larger proportion of killed, owing to the effect of the tremendous shell-fire directed upon Brakfontein and Vaal Krantz. According to Boer accounts, no fewer than 5,000 projectiles were thrown against these two positions by the British guns. Seldom have more shots been fired with less effect.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Knight, Aldershot._

MAJOR-GENERAL WYNNE.

Commanding the Eleventh Brigade of the South African Field Force, was born in Ireland in 1846; joined the 51st Light Infantry in 1863; Adjutant, 1868-71; Superintendent of Signalling in the Jowaki Expedition, 1877; and served in the Afghan War of 1878-9; employed on special service in South Africa in 1881; commanded the 4th Battalion Egyptian Army, 1883-5; and has since held appointments as Deputy or Assistant-Adjutant-General at the Curragh, at Malta, and at Aldershot.]

[Illustration: MAP OF THE ACTION AT VAAL KRANTZ.]

[Illustration: THE WEST YORKSHIRE REGIMENT HOLDING VAAL KRANTZ.]

[Sidenote: Disappointment in Britain.]

The repulse at Vaal Krantz--for defeat it could scarcely be termed--marked the nadir of British fortunes in South Africa. It was the third occasion on which a British army had attempted to fight its way to Ladysmith and had failed. It was the climax of a long series of reverses--Stormberg, Magersfontein, Colenso, Spion Kop, and now Vaal Krantz--the darkest hour before the dawn. Yet already the preparations for the new campaign, which was to change disaster into triumph, were completed. By a dramatic coincidence, as General Buller's troops tramped sadly back to Chieveley, Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener were speeding on their way to Modder River Camp to inaugurate the invasion of the Free State and to effect the rescue of Kimberley. Orders were forthwith sent by the Field-Marshal to General Buller, to relieve Ladysmith at all costs. The load of responsibility was lifted from his shoulders, and he proved in the weeks to come that he had laid to heart the lessons of his costly experience. In England, the news of Vaal Krantz only accentuated the gloom which Spion Kop and the earlier defeats had caused. It was feared that General Buller's task was an impossible one, and that Ladysmith, exhausted by hunger and ravaged by disease, must, notwithstanding its superb defence, succumb to the grimly-resolute foe. Yet England still persevered--

"Baffled and beaten back, she works on still: Weary and sick of soul, she works the more, Sustained by her indomitable will,"

though face to face with "the sense that every struggle brought defeat."

[Illustration: A FEW GUNS FOR GENERAL FRENCH LEAVING RENSBURG STATION.]

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