X.
THE COMING OF THE IRONCLAD.
The period immediately following the Crimean War saw a gradual change in the relations between England and France. In 1858 a panic similar to those with which later years have familiarised us began to arise, and in December, 1858, and January, 1859, a committee sat under the Administration of Lord Derby “to consider the very serious increase which had taken place of late years in the Navy Estimates, while it represented that the naval force of the country was far inferior to what it ought to be with reference to that of other Powers, and especially France, and that increased efforts and increased expenditure were imperatively called for to place it on a proper footing.”
This committee found that whereas in 1850 there were eighty-six British ships of the line to forty-five French ones, this ratio had altogether ceased to exist; and that both Powers had now twenty-nine screw ships of the line. Any other large ships had ceased to count.
In 1859 there also appeared the famous “Leipsic Article,” commenting on the decline of the British Fleet and the rise of the French. Certain extracts from this, though dealing with the past for the most part, are here given _en bloc_, for they indicate very clearly the circumstances in which, _under pressure from German influences, the modern British Navy came to be founded_. It is, to say the least of it, questionable whether but for this Teutonic agitation public opinion in England would ever have been aroused from its lethargy in time. This epoch-making article appeared in the _Conversations Lexicon_, of Leipsic.
After some prelude the article referred to the appearance of the French Fleet in the Crimean War:--
“The late war in the East (Crimean) first opened the eyes of Englishmen to the true position of affairs, and it was not without some sensation of alarm that they gazed at this vision of the unveiled reality. Here and there, indeed, an allusion, having some foundation in fact, had been heard, during the Presidency of Louis Napoleon, and had drawn attention to the menaced possibility of an invasion of the British Isles; but such notions were soon overwhelmed by the derision with which they were jeeringly greeted by the national pride.
“Those expressions of contempt were, however, not doomed to be silenced in their turn by the sudden apparition in the autumn of 1854 of thirty-eight French ships of the line and sixty-six frigates and corvettes, fully manned and ready for immediate action. During the three preceding years Louis Napoleon had built twenty-four line-of-battle ships, and in the course of the year 1854 alone thirteen men-of-war were launched, nine of which were ships of the line. In addition to these, the keels of fifty-two more, comprising three ships of the line and six frigates, were immediately laid down. The English had thus the mortification to be obliged not only to cede to their allies the principal position in the camp, but also reluctantly to acknowledge their equality on that element whereon they had hoped to reign supreme....
* * * * *
“If we carried our investigation no further than this we should naturally conclude that, with such a numerical superiority, sufficient in itself to form a very respectable armament for a second-rate power, England has very little to fear from the marine of France. We must not forget, however, that quality as well as numbers must be considered in estimating the strength of a Fleet. When we take this element into our calculations, we shall find the balance very soon turned in favour of France. We perceive, then, that while the English list comprises every individual sail the country possesses, whether fit for commission or altogether antiquated and past service (and some, like the _Victory_, built towards the close of the last or the beginning of this century), the French Navy, as we have observed, scarcely contains a single ship built prior to the year 1840; so that nearly all are less than twenty years old. This is a fact of the greatest importance, and indicates an immense preponderance in favour of France. Though many of England’s oldest craft figure in the ‘Navy List’ as seaworthy and fit for active service, we have no less an authority than that of Sir Charles Napier (in his Letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1849) that some are mere lumber, and many others cannot be reckoned upon to add any appreciable strength to a Fleet in case of need. Independently, too, of the introduction of the screw, such fundamental changes have been introduced, within the last fifty years, both into the principles of naval architecture and of gunnery, that a modern 120-gun ship, built with due regard to recent improvements, and carrying guns of the calibre now in ordinary use, would in a very short space of time put _ten_ ships like the _Victory_ _hors de combat_, with, at the same time, little chance of injury to herself.
“It is time, however, to turn our attention to another important part of the _material_, namely, artillery. Under this head we purpose designating, not only to the number of guns and their calibre, but also the mode in which they are served, for in actual warfare this, of course, is a primary consideration. If we take the received history of naval warfare for the basis of our investigation, we cannot fail to remark one notable circumstance in favour of the English, which can only be ascribed to their superiority in the use of this arm. That circumstance is the important and uniform advantage they have had in the fewer number of casualties they have sustained as compared with other nations with whom they may have chanced to have been engaged. To prove that our assertions are not made at random, we subjoin some statistics in support of this position. In April, 1798, then, the English ship _Mars_ took the French _L’Hercule_; the former had ninety killed and wounded, the latter 290. In the preceding February there had been an engagement between the English _Sybil_ and French _La Forte_, in which the killed and wounded of the former numbered twenty-one, and those of the latter 143. In March, 1806, the English ship _London_ took the French _Marengo_; the English with a loss of thirty-two, the latter of 145 men. On the 4th November, 1805, two English ships of the line engaged four French vessels, and the respective losses were, again, 135 and 730. On the 14th February, 1797, in an action between the Fleets of England and Spain, the English lost 300 and the Spaniards 800. On the 11th of October of the same year, in the engagement off Camperdown between the English and Dutch, the respective losses were 825 and 1,160. On the 5th July, 1808, the English frigate _Seahorse_ took the Turkish frigate _Badere Zuffer_, and of the Turks there fell 370 against fifteen English. Finally, in the same year the Russian ship of the line _Wsewolod_ was taken by two English ships of the line, with a loss to the latter of 303, and to the former of only sixty-two.
“This contrast, so favourable to England, has been constantly maintained, and can only be attributable to her superior artillery. Her seamen not only aimed with greater precision, and fired more steadily than those of the French and of other nations, but they had the reputation of loading with far greater rapidity. It was remarked, in 1805, that the English could fire a round with ball every minute, whereas it took the French gunners three minutes to perform the same operation. Then, again, the English tactics were superior. It was the universal practice of the French to seek to dismast an adversary; they consequently aimed high, while the English invariably concentrated their fire upon the hulls of their adversaries; and clearly the broadside of a vessel presents a much better mark to aim at than the mere masts and rigging. British guns were also usually of higher calibre, for though they bore the same denomination, they were in reality much heavier. Thus, the English _Lavinia_, though nominally a frigate of forty guns, actually carried fifty; and thirty-six and 38-gun frigates nearly always carried forty-four and forty-six. The English ship _Belleisle_, at Trafalgar, though said to be a seventy-four, carried ninety pieces of ordnance, while the Spanish ship she engaged, though called eighty-four had, in fact, only seventy-eight guns. From this disparity in the number and calibre of their guns, as well as in the mode in which they were served, it resulted that France and her allies lost eighty-five ships of the line and 180 frigates, while her antagonist only suffered to the extent of thirteen ships of the line and eighty-three frigates.
“It was not until the close of the war that France became fully aware to what an extent her inferiority in the above respects had contributed to her reverses; otherwise the unfortunate Admiral Villeneuve would not invariably have ascribed his mishaps to the inexperience of his officers and men, and to the incomplete and inferior equipment of his vessels. The truth was, that not only was the artillery, as we have shown, inferior, but the whole system in vogue at that period on board French ships was antiquated, having continued without reform or improvement for two hundred years; it was deficient, too, in enforcing subordination, that most essential condition of the power and efficiency of a ship of war.”
The French _inscription maritime_ is then dealt with at great length, after which occur the following passages, even more interesting perhaps to-day than when they were written:--
“In considering, then, what perfect seamanship really is, we must first adopt a correct standard by which to estimate it. The English sailor has been so long assumed as the perfect type of the _genus_ seaman, that the world has nearly acquiesced in that view, and _even we in Germany have been accustomed to rank our crews below the English, though it is an unfair estimate_. _There are no better sailors in the world than the German seamen, and there is no foreign nation that would assert the contrary._[85] On the other hand, it has also been the fashion universally to abuse French seamanship, and to speak of her sailors as below criticism. None proclaimed this opinion more loudly than the English; but in doing so they recurred to the men they had beaten under the Revolution and Bonaparte. The Crimean War, however, opened their eyes, and taught them that the French sailors of to-day were no longer the men of 1806, and that, to say the least, they are in no respect inferior to the British. England had for years been compelled to keep up a large effective force always ready for action, in consequence of the nature of her dependencies, which, as they consist of remote colonies across distant seas, required such a provision for their protection. This gave her an immeasurable superiority in days gone by. But since France in 1840 discovered her deficiency, it has been supplied by the maintenance of a permanent _experimental Fleet_, which, under the command of such Admirals as Lalande de Joinville, Ducas, Hamelin, and Bruat, has been the nursery of the present most effective body of officers and men; which, since 1853, have not ceased to humble the boasted superiority of England, besides causing her many anxious misgivings.
“Anyone who had the opportunity of viewing the two Fleets together in the Black Sea or the Baltic, and was in a position to draw a comparison, could not fail to be convinced that everything connected with manœuvring, evolutions, and gunnery was, beyond comparison, more smartly, quickly, and exactly executed by the French than by the English, and _must have observed the brilliant prestige which had so long surrounded England’s tars pale sensibly beside the rising glories of her rival_.”[86]
That this was not merely captious criticism is borne out by the following extracts from “The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.”:--
“We have great reason to be afraid of France, because she possesses a large disposable army, and our arsenals are comparatively undefended--London entirely so--and we have no sufficient naval force at home. Of ships (with the exception of steamers) we have enough; but what is the use of them without men? They are only barracks, and are of no more use for defence than if we were to build batteries all over the country, without soldiers to put into them.
* * * * *
“Such were our inadequate resources for defence, had the Russians been able to get out of the Baltic, and make an attempt on our unprotected shores.
* * * * *
“The great difficulty consisted in the manning of such a fleet. Impressment was no longer to be thought of; but, strange to say, the Bill which had passed through Parliament, empowering, in case of war, the grant of an ample bounty to seamen, was not acted upon, and consequently most of the ships were very inefficiently manned--some of them chiefly with the landsmen of the lowest class. Nothing had been done towards the training of the men, and no provision was even made to clothe them in a manner required by the climate to which they were about to be sent....
“Our Ambassador likewise warned the British Government that the Navy of Russia could not with safety be under-estimated, and, moreover, the Russian gunners were all well trained, while those of the British Squadron were _most deficient in this respect_. The object of the Russians, in wishing to get their best ships to Sveaborg, was the impression that Cronstadt would be first attacked; in which case, calculating on the strength of the forts to repel an assault, _they would have fresh ships wherewith to assail our disabled and weakened fleet, should they be obliged to retreat_.[87] Sir Hamilton Seymour warned our Government of the great number of gunboats the Russians could bring out, eighty of which were to be manned by Finns, fifty men to each boat....
* * * * *
“Such,” says the author of the biography, “were the reasons, no doubt powerful enough, for hurrying off, even without pilots, the ill-appointed and under-manned squadron placed under Sir Charles Napier’s command, at this inclement season of the year, when the periodical gales of the vernal equinox might be daily expected. The squadron, on leaving Spithead, consisted of four sail-of-the-line, four blockships, four frigates, and four steamers (not a single gunboat); and with this force, hastily got together, for the most part manned with the refuse of London and other towns, destitute of even clothing, their best seamen consisting of dockyard riggers and a few coastguard men--and without the latter, it has been alleged, the squadron could not have put to sea--with this inefficient force did Sir Charles Napier leave our shores, to offer battle to the Russian Fleet, consisting of seven-and-twenty well-trained and well-appointed ships of the line, eight or ten frigates, seven corvettes and brigs, and nine steamers, besides small craft and flotillas of gunboats, supposed in the aggregate to number one hundred and eighty....
* * * * *
“It is, probably, an unprecedented event in the annals of war, or, at least, in those of our history, that a fleet should be sent out, on a most momentous service so ill-manned that the Commander was directed to endeavour to ‘pick up,’ if possible, foreign seamen in foreign ports, and so ill-provided with munitions of war, that he was restricted in the use of what he most required, in order to render his inexperienced crews as efficient as possible. It is equally worthy of record that the Board of Admiralty, throughout the whole campaign, never supplied the Fleet with a single Congreve rocket, although it was no secret that great numbers had been made in London for the Russians, to whom they were of far less use than to the British Fleet, which could not well undertake any bombardment without them. The Board of Admiralty must have been perfectly aware of the conditions, in these respects, of that Fleet on whose efficiency so much depended, and from which so much was expected, for, in a letter to Sir Charles Napier, from a member of that Board, I find it recorded as his opinion, that the Emperor of Russia ought either to burn his Fleet, or try his strength with the British Squadron whilst he mustered double their numbers, and whilst our crews were ‘so miserably raw!’ Yet this inefficiency was fully and frankly admitted by Sir James Graham, from whom infrequent instructions arrived to supply the deficiency of good men by picking up foreign sailors in the Baltic. The anxiety of the First Lord upon this point was excessive. He was continually inquiring whether the Admiral had been able to ‘_pick up any Swedes or Norwegians_, who were good sailors and quite trustworthy.’ He was told to ‘enter them quietly.’ If he could not get Swedes and Norwegians, ‘even Danes would strengthen him, for they were hardy seamen and brave. There was, it is true, a difficulty with their Governments, but if the men enlisted freely, and came over to the Fleet, the First Lord did not see why the Admiral should be over-nice, and refuse good seamen without much inquiry as to the place from whence they came.’
“Admiral Berkeley, moreover, instructed the Admiral to the same effect. ‘Have any of your ships tried for men in a Norwegian port? _It is said that you might have any number of good seamen from that country._’ On the 18th of March the Admiral had been apprised that the _James Watt_, the _Prince Regent_ and _Majestic_ would now join him; ‘_but men are wanting_, and it is impossible to say how long it will be before they are completed.’ On the 4th of April Admiral Berkeley stated: ‘Notwithstanding the number of landsmen entered, we are come nearly to a dead standstill as to seamen; and after the _James Watt_ and _Prince Regent_ reach you, I do not know when we shall be able to send you a further reinforcement, _for want of men_! _Something must be done, and done speedily, or there will be a breakdown in our present rickety system._’”
The German article produced a great stir in England. This was followed up by the publication in 1859 of _The Navies of the World_, by Hans Busk, M.A., of Trinity College, Cambridge, who, while nominally casting cold water on the “Leipsic Article,” added fuel to the fire. This writer was one of the first to concentrate attention upon the fact that the French were building “iron-plated ships.”
From this scarce and remarkably interesting work I quote the following:--
“The determination of the French Government to build a number of iron or steel-cased ships imperatively obliges us to follow their example. The original idea of plating ships in this way, so as to render them shot-proof, is due, not, as is generally supposed in this country, to the present Emperor, but to a Captain in the French Navy, who, about a quarter of a century since, suggested that all wooden vessels should be sheathed with composite slabs of iron of fourteen or fifteen centimetres in thickness; that is to say, with stout plates of wrought-iron having blocks of cast metal between. A similar suggestion was made among others by General Paixhans; but one of the first to reduce it to practice was Mr. Stevens, of New York, the well-known steamship builder, who about ten years ago communicated to Mr. Scott Russell the results of a long series of experiments, instituted by the American Government, for the purpose of testing the power of plates of iron and steel to resist cannon-shot. Mr. Lloyd, of the Admiralty, proposed the adoption of plates 4ins. in thickness, instead of a number of thinner sheets, as recommended by the Emperor. The English and French floating batteries were, as is well known, protected upon Mr. Lloyd’s plan. From trials recently made, however, it has been pretty well ascertained that this iron planking, on whatever principle applied, will only repel hollow shot or shells; heavy solid projectiles of wrought iron, or those faced with steel, having been found, on repeated trials, to perforate the thickest covering which has ever been adopted, and that, too, even at considerable ranges.
“Mr. Reed,[88] already alluded to, proposes to protect only the midship portion of the ship, and to separate it from the parts fore and aft by strong watertight compartments, so that, however much the extremities might suffer, the ship would still be safe and the crew below protected; but, as he himself admits, there would obviously be no defence against raking shot.
“The French vessels last alluded to, follow the lines and dimensions of the _Napoleon_ (one of the best, if not the finest ship in their Navy); but they will only carry thirty or thirty-six guns, and the metal sheathing will be from ten to eleven centimetres (about 4¼ins.) in thickness. Two similar ships are to be commenced here forthwith; and as the First Lord of the Admiralty has prophetically warned us that they will be the most expensive ships ever constructed in this country, it is earnestly to be hoped that they may be found proportionately valuable, should their powers ever come to be tested; they will each cost from £126,000 to £130,000, or £4,200 per gun; the ordinary expense of a sailing man-of-war being about £1,000, and of a steamer from £1,800 to £2,000 per gun.”
After this follow various statistics of the French Fleet of no particular interest here except for the following passage:--
“Irrespective of the above are the four _frégates blindées_, or iron-plated frigates, two of which are now in an advanced state at Toulon.
“These ships are to be substituted for line-of-battle ships; their timbers are of the scantling of three-deckers; they will be provided with thirty-six heavy guns, twenty-four of them rifled, and 50-pounders, calculated to throw an eighty pound percussion shell. Such is the opinion of French naval officers respecting the tremendous power of these ships, that they fully anticipate the complete abolition, within ten or a dozen years, of all line-of-battle ships.”[89]
Here it is desirable to leave ships for a moment and deal with the corresponding stage of gunnery, which began to take on its modern form contemporaneously with the ironclad ship. In 1858–9 began that contest between the gun and armour, which can hardly be said to be ended even in our own day, for improved kinds of armour are still being sought and experimented with. To quote the work of Hans Busk and its contemporary summary:--
“A number of guns, cast at Woolwich, were sent to Mr. Whitworth’s works at Manchester to be bored and rifled. In April, 1856, trial was made with a brass 24-pounder of the construction above described. The projectiles employed on that occasion varied from two to six diameters in length, and a very rapid rotary motion was communicated to them. The gun itself weighed 13cwt.; the bore, instead of being of a calibre fitted to receive a spherical 24-pound shot, was only of sufficient capacity to admit one of 9 pounds. The hexagonal bore measured 4ins. in diameter, and was rather more than 54ins. long. It was entirely finished by machinery, and the projectiles were fitted with mathematical precision, the spiral in both cases being formed with absolute accuracy. The gun, externally, had only the dimensions of a 24-pound howitzer, but it projected missiles of 24 pounds, 32 pounds, and 48 pounds each, the additional weight having been obtained by increased length. Upon this new system, then, it will be seen that guns capable, under the old plan, of supporting the strain of a 24-pound ball, may be made with ease to throw a 48-pound shot; the reduction of the calibre allowing of a sufficient thickness of metal being left to ensure safety. The 32-pound and 48-pound projectiles used in the above experiments were respectively 11¾ins. and 16½ins. in length. They were pointed at the foremost extremity, being shaped and rounded somewhat like the smaller end of an egg. At the base they were flat, and slightly hollowed towards the centre. The gun was mounted for the occasion upon an ordinary artillery carriage, which shows no symptoms of having been strained, nor of being in any way injured by the concussions to which it had been subjected.
* * * * *
“Subsequently, some further experiments were made with the same gun with reduced elevation, when the projectiles, striking the ground at comparatively short distances, rebounded again and again till their momentum was expended. The first shot thus fired weighed 32 pounds, the charge of powder being only 3 ounces, and the gun having an elevation of 2 degrees. The projectile made its first graze at a distance of 92 yards, furrowing the ground for about 7ft., and leaving distinct indications of its rotary axial motion. It rose again to an elevation of about 6ft., grazing, after a further flight of 64 yds. The third graze (owing probably to the hard nature of the soil at the point struck) was at a distance of 70yds. further; after which it traversed some ploughed land, grazing several times, coming finally to rest after having accomplished altogether a distance of 492yds.
“The second shot also weighed 32 pounds; the charge, as before, consisted of 3 ounces of powder; but this time the elevation given to the gun was 3 degrees. The projectile first grazed the ground at a point 108yds. from the muzzle; the second graze was 126yds. further; but happening to touch the lower bar of an iron fence--a circumstance which appeared to affect its flight--it dropped finally after having accomplished 490yds. Some further experiments were then made with shot weighing 48 pounds each.
“These very reduced charges rendered it necessary to make use of wooden wads to fill the cavities in the base of the projectiles. This had a tendency to reduce very much the power of the gun.
“A further trial with the hexagonal gun was made at Liverpool on the 7th of May. Several shots, varying from 24 to 48 pounds in weight, were fired. The first, weighing 24 pounds, with a charge of 11 pounds of powder, attained a distance of 2,800 yards, the elevation given having been 8 degrees. These experiments could hardly be said to have exhibited the _maximum_ capacity of the gun, having been interrupted by the rapid rising of the tide. The average range of several 48-pound shots was 3,000 yards, but there is little doubt that a much greater distance will be achieved when Mr. Whitworth has perfected some guns he is now constructing.
“A good deal of attention having previously been drawn to the subject of Armstrong’s gun, respecting which few particulars had been allowed to transpire, on the 4th of March last the Secretary-at-War made an official statement to the House, and gave some details as to its alleged capabilities. Without describing its construction, he stated that one piece, throwing a projectile of 18 pounds, weighed but one-third as much as the ordinary gun of that calibre. With a charge of 5 pounds of powder, a 32-pounder attained a range of 5¼ miles; at 3,000 yards its accuracy, as compared with that of a common gun, was stated to be in the proportion of 7 to 1. At 1,000 yards it had struck the target 57 times successively, and after 13,000 rounds the gun showed symptoms of deterioration. In conclusion, it was said that the destructive effects occasioned by this new ordnance exceeded anything that had been previously witnessed, and that in all probability it was destined to effect a complete revolution in warfare.”
Armstrong’s own statement was:--
“Schemers whose invention merely figure upon paper, have little idea of the difficulties that are encountered by those who carry inventions into practice. For my part, I had my full share of such difficulties, and it took me nearly three years of continual application to surmount them.... Early last year a committee was appointed to investigate the whole subject of rifled cannon. They consisted of officers of great experience in gunnery; and after having given much time for a period of five months to the guns, projectiles, and fuses which I submitted to them, they returned a unanimous verdict in favour of my system. With respect to the precision and range which have been attained with these guns, I may observe that at a distance of 600 yards an object no larger than the muzzle of an enemy’s gun may be struck at almost every shot. At 3,000 yards a target of 9ft. square, which at that distance looks like a mere speck, has on a calm day been struck five times in ten shots. A ship would afford a target large enough to be hit at much longer distances, and shells may be thrown into a town or fortress at a range of more than five miles. But to do justice to the weapon when used at long distances, it will be necessary that gunners should undergo a more scientific training than at present; and I believe that both the naval and military departments of Government will take the necessary measures to afford proper instruction, both to officers and men. It is an interesting question to consider what would be the effect of the general introduction of these weapons upon the various conditions of warfare. In the case of ships opposed to ships in the open sea, it appears to me that they would simply destroy each other, if both were made of timber. The day has gone by for putting men in armour. Fortunately, however, no nation can play at that game like England; for we have boundless resources, both in the production and application of iron, which must be the material for the armour. In the case of a battery against a ship, the advantage would be greatly in favour of the battery, because it would have a steady platform for its guns, and would be made of a less vulnerable material, supposing the ship to be made of timber. But, on the other hand, in bombarding fortresses, arsenals, or dockyards, when the object to be struck is very extended, ships would be enabled to operate from a great distance, where they could bid defiance to land defences.”
After some observations, the author continued:--
“Notwithstanding the high estimation in which Sir William Armstrong’s guns are held, and deservedly so from their great intrinsic merit, they have certainly in Mr. Warry’s great invention a rival that may eventually be found to eclipse them.
“The Armstrong gun cannot be fired oftener than three times a minute, and the bore, it is said, has to be constantly sluiced with water; whereas Warry’s admits, as has been affirmed, of being discharged 16 or 18 times a minute, or 1,000 an hour, without difficulty, though of course not without heating, as some reporters have misrepresented. Guns of the former description are expensive, and must be made expressly by means of special machinery. Mr. Warry, on the other hand, asserts that he can convert every existing gun into a breech-loader upon his principle, and at a moderate outlay: an advantage of the greatest moment at the present time.
“This gun is fired by means of a lock. On one side of the breech there is a lever, so contrived that by one motion of the hand it is made to cock the hammer and to open the chamber. A second movement closes the charger again, pierces or cuts the cartridge, places a cap on the nipple, and fires the gun almost simultaneously.
“With a due supply of ammunition, therefore, a destructive torrent of shot and shell may be maintained _ad libitum_. It is not difficult to form a conception of the havoc even one such gun would occasion if brought to bear upon the head of an advancing column.
“The inventor has, besides, made application for a patent for a new coating he has devised for all kinds of projectiles, in lieu of any leaden or metallic covering, which has been found very objectionable in actual practice. The new coating, it is said, reduces the ‘fouling’ to a minimum.
“But we cannot turn even from this very brief consideration of the improvements in modern cannon without offering a few observations relative to an invention of a different kind, but one that may possibly prove of greater moment than either of the guns that have been described. This is the composition known as ‘Norton’s liquid fire.’ In the terrific character of its effect it rivals all that has been recorded of the old Greek fire; at the same time it is perfectly manageable, and may be projected from an Enfield rifle, from a field-piece, or from heavier ordnance. The composition Captain Norton uses consists of a chemical combination of sulphur, carbon, and phosphorus. He merely encloses this in a metal or even in a wooden shell, and its effect upon striking the side or sails of a ship, a wooden building, or indeed any object at all combustible, is to cause its instant ignition. This ‘liquid fire’ has apparently the property of penetrating or of saturating any substance against which it may be projected, and such is its affinity for oxygen that it even decomposes water and combines with its component oxygen. Water, consequently, has no power to quench it, and if burning canvas, set on fire in this way, be trodden under foot and apparently extinguished it soon bursts again into flames.”
It is not uninteresting to reflect that although Norton’s liquid fire came to nothing, yet the present century has already seen three variations on the idea.
The first instance is the type of big shell used by the Japanese at Tsushima. Little is known as to their exact composition, but they were undoubtedly extremely inflammable. Captain Semenoff in “The Battle of Tsushima” thus describes them:--
“The Japanese had apparently succeeded in realising what the Americans had endeavoured to attain in inventing their ‘Vesuvium.’
“In addition to this there was the unusual high temperature and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over everything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst. Of course, the steel did not burn, but the paint on it did. Such almost non-combustible materials as hammocks, and rows of boxes, drenched with water, flared up in a moment. At times it was impossible to see anything with glasses, owing to everything being so distorted with the quivering, heated air.
* * * * *
“According to thoroughly trustworthy reports, the Japanese in the battle of Tsushima were the first to employ a new kind of explosive in their shells, the secret of which they bought during the war from the inventor, a colonel in one of the South American Republics. It was said that these shells could only be used in guns of large calibre in the armoured squadrons, and that is how those of our ships engaged with Admiral Kataoka’s squadron did not suffer the same amount of damage, or have so many fires, as the ships engaged with the battleships and armoured cruisers.”
The second instance is the Krupp fire shell designed for use against dirigible balloons. The third is the “Thermite shell,” which, early in 1912, was proposed for adoption in France. It was calculated that one 12-inch A.P. shell exploding would melt half a ton of steel.
The following passage from Hans Busk is of interest:--
“In 1855 Mr. Longridge, C.E., proposed to construct cannon of tubes covered with wire wound round them so tightly as almost entirely to relieve the inside from strain. On the 25th of June of the same year Mr. Mallet read a paper advocating the construction of cannon of successive layers of cylinders, so put together that all should be equally strained when the gun is fired; thus the inside would not be subject to fracture, while the outside would be useless as in a cast mass. His method of effecting this was, as is well known, to have each cylinder slightly too small to go over the one under it till expanded by heat, so that when cool it compresses the interior and is slightly strained itself. Thirty-six-inch mortars have been made on the principle, and if they have failed with 40lbs. of powder, cast-iron must have failed still less. In 1856 Professor Daniel Treadwell, Vice-President of the American Academy, read a paper to that body recommending the same principle of construction; and Captain Blakely has himself for some years been endeavouring to urge its adoption by argument and direct experiments. In December, 1857, some trials were made with guns constructed by that officer; and the result of a comparative trial of a 9-pounder with a cast-iron service gun of similar size and weight gave results proving the soundness of his views; for Captain Blakely’s gun bore about double the amount of firing the service gun did, and being then uninjured, was loaded to the muzzle, and was thus fired 158 times before it burst.”
[Illustration: JOHN SCOTT RUSSELL.]
From these contemporary extracts it will be seen that by 1859 the germ of nearly every modern idea in connection with gunnery existed, and has since developed somewhat on “trial and error” lines for at any rate the greater part of the intervening period.
The contemporary situation as regards defence is also best summed up from the authority from whom the above gunnery extracts are taken:--
“The result of numerous trials appeared to convince those best competent to judge of such matters that iron plates, or, rather, slabs, eleven centimetres (about 4½ins.) in thickness, would offer adequate protection to a ship from the effects of hollow shot. Acting upon this impression, four floating batteries, resembling in most respects those constructed here, were ordered to be built, and notwithstanding the enormous difficulties connected with such an undertaking, these four vessels were turned out, complete in all respects, in ten months--an astonishing instance of the resources of French dockyards and the ability of French engineers.
“From this event may be dated the commencement of a new epoch in naval tactics. The next problem was to determine whether a form better adapted for progression than that of these batteries could not be given to vessels sheathed in a similar manner. Hence originated the iron-plated frigates (_frégates blindées_). The intention of their designer is, that they should have a speed and an armament at least equal to that of the swiftest existing frigates, but their colossal weight, and consequently their great draught of water, must almost preclude the fulfilment of this expectation. Should they prove successful, a number of larger ships of the same kind are to be commenced forthwith. It is difficult to understand how, in the case of these ships being found to answer, it will be possible for us to avert a real “reconstruction” of our Navy, or, how any other nation, aiming to rank as a maritime Power, can avoid the adoption of a similar course. In fact, the necessity has been appreciated, and we are already at work. But a good deal has to be accomplished ere the use of such vessels become universal. If these iron-plated vessels do resist shell, it seems certain, as has been already stated, that solid shot will either perforate at short ranges any thickness of metal that has yet been tried, or will so indent the sheathing at longer distances that the internal lining and rib-work of oak will be riven, shattered, loosened, or crushed to an extent that would almost as speedily put the ship _hors de combat_ as if she had but been built after the old fashion, much, as in days gone by, upon the introduction of gunpowder into warfare, the use of armour was found rather to aggravate, than to ward off, the injuries inflicted by gunshot. It was the result of the operations against Kinburn that more particularly gave rise to the high opinion at present entertained in favour of these _vaisseaux blindées_. Unwieldy and cumbersome as they appeared, they were certainly a great improvement upon the floating batteries used by the French and Spanish against Gibraltar in 1782. Those were merely enormous hulks, destitute of masts, sails, or rigging; their sides were composed of solid carpentry, 6ft. 6ins. in thickness, and they carried from nine to twenty-four guns. When in action, streams of water were made to flow constantly over their decks and sides, but notwithstanding every precaution, such an overwhelming storm of shell and red-hot shot was poured upon them by the English garrison that they were all speedily burnt. Not so the _Devastation_, _La Lave_, and _La Tonnante_ before the Russian fortress above mentioned, on the memorable 14th October, 1855. At 9 p.m. they opened fire, and in an hour and twenty-five minutes the enemy was silenced, nearly all the gunners being killed, their pieces dismounted, and all the ramparts themselves being for the most part demolished. To accomplish this destruction in so short a space of time, the three batteries, each carrying eighteen fifty pounders (supported, of course, by the fire of the English vessels), advanced in very shallow water within 800 yards of the walls, receiving themselves very little damage in comparison with the immense havoc they occasioned.”
From the above extract it is clear that the “impenetrable coat of mail” idea, popularly supposed to have led to the introduction of ironclads, never existed to any appreciable extent. Indeed, when the Committee, alluded to on an earlier page, concluded its labours in 1859, it merely recommended the conversion of nineteen more sailing ships into steamers. It was Sir John Pakington who decided to lay down a couple of “armoured steam frigates,” and to build them of iron instead of wood.
The French _frégates blindées_ were wooden ships, armoured. John Scott Russell is said to have been Pakington’s chief adviser in this matter of building iron armoured ships and disregarding all the laborious conclusions of Captain Chads against iron hulls.
As regards the general recommendations of the committee already referred to, these had resulted in 1861 in there being no less than sixty-seven wooden unarmoured ships of the line building or converting into “screw ships.”
The two iron-plated steam frigates were decided on without any popular enthusiasm concerning them. Now and again retired Admirals paid surreptitious visits to the French “_blindées_” and returned with alarming reports; but, with the possible exception of flying machines, no epoch-making thing ever came in quite so quietly as the ironclad. The wildest dreamer saw nothing in it beyond a variation on existing types. The ironclad was something which, by carrying a great deal of weight, could keep out shell; beyond that no one seems to have had any particular ideals whatever, except perhaps Sir Edward Reed.
Early in 1859 designs for a type of ship to “answer” the French _frégates blindées_ were called for, and fourteen private firms submitted designs. All, however, were discarded.
Details of the designs submitted were as follows:[90]--
=============+=======+=======+==========+======+======+======+====== |Length.|Breadth|Displ’m’t.|Speed.|Wt. of|Wt. of|I.H.P. Designer. | | | Tons. |Knots.|Armour| Hull | of | | | | |Displ.|Displ.| Eng. -------------+-------+-------+----------+------+------+------+------ Laird | 400.0 | 60.0 | 9779 |13½ | .11 | .51 | 3250 Thames Co. | 430.0 | 60.0 | 11180 | | .10 | .58 | 4000 Mare | 380.0 | 57.0 | 7341 | | .13 | .46 | 3000 Scott Russell| 385.0 | 58.0 | 7256 | | .18 | .38 | 3000 Napier | 365.0 | 56.0 | 8000 |13½ | | | 4120 Westwood & | | | | | | | Baillie | 360.0 | 55.0 | 7600 |13½ | .16 | .36 | 4000 Samuda | 382.0 | 55.0 | 8084 |13½ | .16 | .57 | 2500 Palmer | 340.0 | 58.0 | 7690 |13½ | | | 4500 Abethell | 336.0 | 57.0 | 7668 | | | | 2500 Henwood | 372.0 | 52.0 | 6507 | | .18 | .40 | 2500 Peake | 354.9 | 56.0 | 7000 | | .14 | .46 | 3000 Chatfield | 343.6 | 59.6 | 7791 | | .14 | | Lang | 400.0 | 55.0 | 8511 |15 | .14 | .53 | 2500 Cradock | 360.0 | 57.6 | 7724 | | .20 | .42 | 2500 Admiralty | | | | | | | Office | 380.0 | 58.0 | 8625 |14 | | | =============+=======+=======+==========+======+======+======+======
The Abethell and Peake designs were wooden hulled, all the others iron ships.
The two ships, _Warrior_ and _Black Prince_, as actually laid down, differed from the Admiralty design in certain details. The beam was increased slightly, and the displacement rose from 8625 to 9210.
The _Warrior_ was laid down on the 25th May, 1859, at the Thames Ironworks, Blackwall; the _Black Prince_ a little later at Glasgow.
[Illustration: THE _WARRIOR_, AS COMPLETED, 1861.]
In substances they were ordinary “wooden frigates,” built of iron instead of wood, with armour to protect most (but not all) of the guns. This was done by a patch of armour amidships, covering about 60% of the side. It was deemed advisable to protect the engines; otherwise as like as not the armour would have been over the battery only. Waterline protection was entirely unrealised, the steering gear of the _Warrior_ being at the mercy of the first lucky shot.
This, as Sir N. Barnaby has pointed out, was due to accepting existing conditions:--
“The tiller was necessarily above the water-line and was outside of the cover of the armour. The wooden line-of-battle ships, with which the designers of these first iron-cased ships were familiar, had required no special water-line protection, and when wheel ropes or tiller were shot away the ship did not cease to be able to fight. The line-of-battle ships, which they knew so well, had a lower, or gun deck about four feet above the water-line, and an orlop deck about three feet below the water-line. Between these two decks the ship’s sides were stouter than in any other part, and shot did not easily perforate them. When a shot did enter there, between wind and water, as it was called, ample provision was made to prevent the serious admission of water.
“In this between-deck space the sides of the ship were kept free from all erections or obstructions. The ‘wing passages’ on the orlop were clear, from end to end of the ship, and they were patrolled by the carpenter’s crew, who were provided with shot plugs of wood and oakum and sail cloth with which to close any shot holes. As against disabled steering gear there were spare tillers and tiller ropes, and only injury to the rudder head itself was serious.”
It is easy to-day to indicate where the old-time designers erred; and later on they realised and repaired their error with commendable promptitude. The really interesting point is that British designers evolved the ideal thing for the day, while the French evolved the idea of the ideal thing for the to-morrow. Unhappily for the latter, their evolution was unable to survive its birth till the day of its utility. _La Gloire_, the first French ironclad, was broken up more years ago than any can remember; the _Warrior_ and the _Black Prince_, though long ago reduced to hulk service,[91] still float as sound as when in 1861 the _Warrior_ first took the water. To the French belongs the honour of realising what armour protection might mean; but to England goes the credit of reducing the idea to practical application.
The _Warrior_ was designed by Messrs. Scott Russell and Isaac Watts, the Chief Constructor. Her length between perpendiculars was 380 feet. She carried originally a uniform armament of forty-eight 68-pounders smooth bores, weighing 95cwt. each. These fired shell and cast-iron spherical shot. The guns were carried as follows:--Main deck, thirty-eight, of which twelve were not protected by armour. On the upper-deck, ten, also unprotected.
This armament was subsequently changed to two 110-pounder rifled Armstrongs on pivot mountings, and four 40-pounders on the upper-deck; while the main-deck battery was reduced to thirty-four guns. At a later date it was again altered to four 8-inch 9-ton M.L.R., and twenty-eight 7-inch 6½-ton M.L.R.
In addition to her armour the _Warrior_ was divided into 92 watertight compartments, fore and aft. She had a double bottom amidships, considerably subdivided (fifty-seven of the compartments), but no double bottom in the modern sense.
The _Warrior’s_ engines, by Penn, were horizontal single expansion. On trial they developed 5,267 I.H.P., and the then excellent speed of 14.079 knots.[92] Her six hours’ sea speed trial resulted in a mean 5,092 H.P. and 13.936 knots.
[Illustration:
FRENCH LA GLOIRE WARRIOR & BLACK PRINCE HECTOR ACHILLES MINOTAUR NORTHUMBERLAND
EARLY BRITISH BROADSIDE IRONCLADS]
Save for her unprotected steering gear, the _Warrior_ may be described as a brilliant success for her era. She was launched on December 29th, 1860, and completed in the following year. The _Black Prince_ was completed in 1862.
The _Warrior_ and _Black Prince_, under a system which long endured in the British Navy, were followed by a certain number of diminutives, of which the first were the _Defence_ and _Resistance_, of 6,150 tons, with speeds of just under 12 knots, and an armament of 16 guns. The armour was the same, but the battery protection was extended fore and aft, so that all guns were inside it. These ships were completed in 1862.
Three more ships were projected, of which the _Hector_ and _Valiant_, completed in 1864 and 1865, were of precisely the same type as the _Resistance_, but displaced 6,710 tons, with about a knot more speed, and carried a couple of extra guns.
A third ship, originally intended to have been of the same class, was the _Achilles_, but, mainly owing to the influence of Mr. Reed (of whom more anon), who pointed out the danger of unprotected steering gear, her design was altered and a complete belt of 4½-inch armour given to her instead of a partial one.
Those changes in the design, together with an increased horse-power which produced on trial 14.32 knots, advanced the displacement of the _Achilles_ to 9,820 tons, while the armament was brought up to fourteen 12-ton guns and two 6½-ton. The weight of armour was 1,200 tons.
The _Achilles_, like many another ship that was to follow her, was the “last word” of her own day. No expense was spared in seeking to secure a maximum of efficiency in her. As originally completed she was a ship-rigged vessel, but with a view to improving her sailing efficiency, this was subsequently altered to a four-masted rig, which proved so little successful that eventually she reverted to three masts again.
In the meantime the authorities were so pleased with the _Achilles_ that three improved editions of her were designed. They were not completed until a new type of ship, which was completed before they were, replaced them; but chronologically they followed close upon the _Achilles_. They were laid down in 1861, and designed by Isaac Watts. They were named _Agincourt_, _Minotaur_, and _Northumberland_. They differed in minor details, but in substance were all about 1,000 tons more than the _Achilles_, and their increased displacement mostly went in one inch extra armour protection (5½-inch against 4½-inch).
As originally designed they were intended to mount seven 12-ton and twenty 9-ton guns, but at a very early date the first two were given a uniform armament of seventeen 12-ton. A small portion of this armament of the upper deck was provided with armoured protection for right-ahead fire.
[Illustration: THE _ACHILLES_ AS A FOUR-MASTER.
Photographed about 1866.]
In appearance they were magnificent ships, fitted with five masts. Being 400 feet between perpendiculars they were the largest ships of their time, and at sea always proved very steady under both sail and steam.
These ships were the subject of violent disputes between the Controller of the Navy and their constructor. The Controller insisted that they were extravagantly large ships, as compared to French ships. The constructor insisted that it was essential that for any given power and protection a British ship must be larger than a foreign one, because of her more extended probable duties, and the consequent necessity of a larger coal supply.[93]
[Illustration: THE _MINOTAUR_, 1867, ORIGINAL RIG.]
At and about this period there were a number of wooden ships-of-the-line building, which had been laid down from the year 1859 onwards. Following the French fashion, they were converted into ironclads. These ships, displacing from 6,100 to 6,830 tons, were the _Repulse_, _Royal Alfred_, _Zealous_ (laid down 1859), _Caledonia_, _Ocean_, _Prince Consort_, _Royal Oak_ (1860).[94]
The upper-decks of these ships were removed, and they were fitted with side armour, which was 4½ inches in the earliest to be treated, and 5½ inches in the latest. All of them carried sixteen 9-ton guns and four 6½-ton, with provision for ahead fire.
The experiment, though useful as a temporary expedient, was very expensive, and several of the ships had to be lengthened before anything could be done to them. None of them were very successful, and most of them disappeared from the Navy List at an early date.
This ends the period of “broadside ironclads”; of the best of which it may be said that they were nothing but efforts to adapt new ideals to old methods.