VI.

THE GREAT FRENCH WAR.

The first incident of the war was connected with Toulon, which was partly Royalist and partly Republican. The story in full is to be found most dramatically rendered in _Ships and Men_, by David Hannay. Here it suffices to say that the Royalists and Moderates having coalesced at the eleventh hour, surrendered the town to Admiral Hood; that the British Government repudiated Hood’s arrangements, and that eventually in December, 1793, he was compelled to evacuate the place after doing such damage as he could and bringing away with him a few ships of the French navy.[42] The incident little concerns our naval history, the Navy being but a pawn in the political game of the moment. Indeed, it is mostly of some naval interest only because two figures, destined to bulk largely in future history, loomed up in it--Captain Horatio Nelson, of the _Agamemnon_, who laughed when the Spanish fleet excused its inaction by saying that it had been six weeks at sea and was disabled accordingly; and Napoleon, who, as much as anyone, served to hurry the English out.

Early in 1794 the British fleet had ninety-five ships of the line in commission, besides 194 lesser vessels. The _personnel_ amounted to 85,000.

The centre of interest was the French Brest fleet. Under Villaret-Joyeuse, a captain of the old Navy, made Admiral by the Terrorists, whose cause he had espoused, this fleet was by no means inefficient, like the undisciplined Toulon fleet had been. It carried on board the flagship Jean Bon St. André, the deputy of the State, who, whatever his faults, realised the meaning of “efficiency.” The bulk of the crew were men who had done well in America. Howe, on the other hand, commanded a somewhat raw fleet, hastily brought up to strength and still by no means “shaken down.”

Howe’s orders were threefold--to convoy a British merchant fleet; to destroy the French fleet; and to intercept a convoy of French grain coming from America.

From the 5th to the 28th May, Howe was keeping an eye on Brest and looking for the French convoy, the interception of which was more important than anything else, as France was dependent on these grain ships for the means to live.

On the 28th, the French fleet was sighted a long way out in the Atlantic. Villaret-Joyeuse, who was out to protect the grain convoy at all costs, drew still further out to sea, Howe following in pursuit.[43] Towards evening, the last French ship _Revolutionnaire_ (100), was come up with and engaged by six British (seventy-four’s), of which one, the _Audacious_, was badly crippled. The _Revolutionnaire_ herself was dismasted, but was towed away by a frigate in the night.

This particular incident is one of the most prominent examples of the power of the “monster” ship as compared with the “moderate dimension” ship[44] of the period. The six did not attack her simultaneously, and some were never closely engaged. She was magnificently fought also; but even when these elements are subtracted, the fact of the extraordinary resisting power exhibited remains. As only the _Audacious_, which attacked last, did much harm to the Frenchman, the explanation in this particular case probably lies in the stouter scantlings required for a ship of 110 guns, compared to smaller ships.

On the following day the action was renewed. Villaret-Joyeuse allowed his tail ships to drop into range of the leading British vessels with a view to crippling them. Howe cut the line, but being somewhat outmanœuvred by the French admiral, obtained no special advantage therefrom. Some of the French ships were, however, disabled, and had to be towed in the general action that was to follow later.

Two days’ fog now interrupted operations, but on Sunday, June 1st, battle was joined. The opposing fleets then consisted as follows:--

BRITISH. FRENCH. 3 of 100 guns. 1 of 120 guns. 4 of 98 guns. 2 of 100 guns. 2 of 80 guns. 4 of 80 guns. 16 of 74 guns. 19 of 74 guns. -- -- 25 26 -- --

This gives 2,036 British to 2,066 French guns, but as, at least, one Frenchman was considerably disabled, there was probably a slight British superiority.

Howe, more or less, arranged his heavy ships to correspond with the heavy ships of the enemy, and having hove-to half-an-hour for breakfast, flung the old fighting instructions[45] to the winds and bore right down into the enemy. In the _melee_ that ensued, some of the English failed to close, and seven of the French drifted to leeward out of action.

Of the French fleet, two eighty-gun and four seventy-four’s were badly mauled and eventually struck, while a seventh French ship, the _Vengeur_ (seventy-four) was sunk.[46] Four were badly disabled, but drifted to leeward out of the fight. On the British side a number of ships were badly damaged.

The fleets, having drawn apart, Villaret-Joyeuse succeeded in getting a portion of his fleet into some sort of order again, and threatened the disabled English ships. Howe protected these, but did not renew action; and the French, with the disabled ships in tow, made off.

Such was the battle of “the glorious First of June.” Howe has been greatly blamed since then for not having followed up his victory, but there are not wanting indications that the caution of Curtis, his captain of the fleet, who pleaded with Howe not to re-engage lest the advantage gained should be lost, was justified. Villaret-Joyeuse, the captain, hastily placed in command of a large fleet, was one of the most, if not the most, capable admirals France ever had against us. How badly all the French ships had suffered we now know, but the means of telling it were absent then. The all-important question of intercepting the grain convoy was also possibly present in Howe’s mind.

Be that as it may, the convoy was not intercepted. It reached France in safety, and all question of starving the Revolution into surrender was at an end. On that account the battle was reckoned as a victory by the French as well as in England.[47]

Other naval events of this year (1794) were the capture of Corsica, by Hood; and in the West Indies, the capture of Martinique and St. Lucia. Guadaloupe was also taken, but quickly re-captured. Among the prizes of the year was the French forty-gun frigate _Pomone_, which proved infinitely faster than anything in the English fleet. This led to much discussion in the House of Commons. A considerable party denied that any such superiority existed; others alleged that even if so, British ships were better and more strongly built. Others again attributed the circumstance to the heavy premiums awarded by the French Government to constructors who produced swift sailing ships.

Nothing of much moment came out of the discussion. Orders were issued that ships were to be built a little longer in future, and with the lower deck ports less near the water than heretofore, but the general tendency to over-gun ships in relation to their size still remained.

For the year 1795, the _personnel_ of the fleet was increased to 100,000, and provision was made for a very considerable increase of small craft. The Dutch declared war in January, but the year was not marked by any operations of much moment so far as they were concerned.

The principal theatres of naval operations were in the Mediterranean and the Channel. This year is marked by a curious indecisiveness, which had much to do with the formation of Nelson’s (who was serving in the Mediterranean as captain of the _Agamemnon_, sixty-four), subsequent character as an admiral.

The British fleet consisted of fifteen ships of the line, under Hotham. The French had got together fifteen sail at Toulon. These made for Corsica, in March, and on the way captured one of Hotham’s ships, the _Berwick_. With the remainder, Hotham put to sea, and on the 12th, off Genoa, he was sighted by the French. His fleet was in considerable disorder, and in the view of Professor Laughton, the incapacity of the French alone averted a disaster. In the desultory operations of the next two days, two prizes were taken and two English ships crippled. Nelson, who was mainly responsible for the prizes, urged Hotham to pursue and destroy the enemy, but the admiral refused.[48]

In July, Nelson, who was on detached service, was met and chased back to Genoa by the whole French fleet, which, however, drew off when Hotham’s fleet was sighted. Hotham, with a greatly superior fleet, came out, and eventually found the enemy off Hyeres. Chase was ordered and one French ship overhauled and captured; then, on the grounds that the shore was too near, Hotham hauled off.

These operations (or lack of them) on the part of Hotham, are important beyond most. In the view of Professor Laughton,[49] Hotham’s indecision was mainly responsible for the rise and grandeur of Napoleon’s career. Vigorous action on his part would have written differently the history of the world. As like as not, in addition to no Napoleon, there would also have been no Nelson, to go down as the leading figure in British naval history. The survival of the French fleet rendered possible that invasion of Italy which “made” Napoleon, and those sea battles which made Nelson our most famous admiral.

Villaret-Joyeuse (who had commanded the French fleet in the battle of the First of June) displayed considerable activity in 1795, capturing a frigate and a good many merchant ships. The weather, however, was against him, and he lost five ships of the line wrecked. He, notwithstanding, kept the sea with twelve ships of the line, and with these met Cornwallis with five, off Brest, on June 16th. Cornwallis retired, but was overhauled the next day, and his tail ship the _Mars_, (seventy-four) badly damaged, the French, as usual, firing at the rigging. Cornwallis, in the _Royal Sovereign_, (100) fell back to support the _Mars_, but was well on the way to be defeated when he adopted the clever ruse of sending away a frigate to signal to him that the Channel fleet was coming up. The code used was one known to have been captured by the French, and they, reading the signals, hastily abandoned the pursuit and made off.

Three days later, Villaret-Joyeuse did actually encounter the Channel fleet, under Hood (now Lord Bridport). He made off south, chased by Bridport, who had fourteen ships, mostly three-deckers, of which the French had but one. After a four days’ chase, Bridport came up with the tail of the enemy, off Lorient. A partial action ensued, in which three French ships were captured, after which Bridport withdrew. He gave as his reason the nearness to the French shore--exactly the reason that Hotham gave for neglecting a possible victory. In both cases, the reason was rather trivial. The practical assign it to the old age of the admirals concerned. To the imaginative, these two almost incomprehensible failures to take advantage of circumstances gave some colour to Napoleon’s theory of “his destiny.”

In this year, a number of East Indiamen were purchased for naval use. One of these, the _Glatton_, (fifty-six) was experimentally armed with sixty-eight pounder carronades on her lower deck, and forty-two pounders on the upper. On her way to join her squadron, she was attacked by six French frigates, of which one was a fifty-gun, and two were of thirty-six. She easily defeated the lot--another instance of the “big ship’s” advantage in minor combats. Despite this instance of what might be done, the heavy gun idea made no headway, and the _Glatton_ remained a unique curiosity, till many years later the Americans adopted it to our great disadvantage.

Towards the end of 1795 (December) Hotham was replaced in the Mediterranean by Sir John Jervis--an admiral of unique personality, who left upon the Navy a mark that easily endures to this day. Somewhat hyperbolically it has been said of him that he was the saviour of the Navy in his own day, and the main element towards its disruption in these times!

Jervis had made his mark in the War of American Independence, as captain of the _Foudroyant_. Discipline was his passion; and by means of it, he had made an easy capture of a French ship. Thereafter, he became a unique blend of martinet and genius.

He was the first openly to re-affirm Sir Walter Raleigh’s theory, quoted in an earlier chapter, that fortifications were useless against invasion, and that only on the water could an enemy be met successfully, combatting Pitt himself on this point. When the Great War broke out, his first employment was in the West Indies, where he achieved St. Lucia, Martinique and Guadaloupe. He went to the Mediterranean, at a time when France was numerically superior to us in the Channel, and when Spain was daily expected to declare war. The fleet to which he went was like all others, tending to a mutinous spirit, and finally he had to go out in the frigate _Lively_. In those days, for an admiral to take passage in anything less than a ship of the line was considered a most undignified thing. It rankled so with Jervis that he never forgot it, and years after harped upon it as a grievance. Of such character was the man who took command in the Mediterranean at the end of 1795.

In 1796, the _personnel_ of the Navy was increased to 110,000. Jervis, in the Mediterranean, did little beyond blockading Toulon, and training his fleet on his own ideas. Spain declared war in October; but her intentions being known beforehand, Corsica was evacuated, and at the end of the year the Mediterranean was abandoned also, Jervis with his entire fleet lying under the guns of Gibraltar. Nothing else was possible.

Elsewhere invasion ideas were uppermost in France, and 18,000 troops, convoyed by seventeen ships of the line and thirteen frigates, sailed from Brest for Bantry Bay, at the end of the year. Only eight ships of the line reached there; a gale dispersed the transports and nothing happened in the way of invasion. The only other event of the year was the capture of a Dutch squadron at the Cape of Good Hope. Matters generally were, however, so bad, that attempts were made to secure terms of peace from France. These attempts failed.

The year 1792 saw 108 ships of the line and 293 lesser vessels in commission. Something like sixty ships of the line were building or ordered, also 168 lesser craft. The first incident was the Battle of Cape St. Vincent (14th February, 1797). The Spaniards, having come out of Cartagena, were making for Cadiz, when sighted by Jervis.

The rival fleets were:--

BRITISH. SPANISH. 2 of 100 guns. 1 of 130 guns. 3 of 98 guns. 6 of 112 guns. 1 of 90 guns. 2 of 80 guns. 8 of 74 guns. 18 of 74 guns. 1 of 64 guns. -- -- 27 15 -- --

The battle is mainly of interest on account of Nelson’s part in it. The Spaniards were sailing in no order whatever, the bulk of them being in one irregular mass, the remainder in another. Jervis, in line ahead, proposed to pass between the two divisions, and destroy the larger before the smaller could beat up to assist them. The Spaniards, however inefficient they may have been in other ways, saw through this manœuvre, and their main body was preparing to join up astern of the British, when Nelson, in the _Captain_, flung himself across them and captured two ships by falling foul of them and boarding. Three other ships were captured, the rest escaped. In this battle, as in those of the year before, the same caution about following up the victory was observed, and the age of the admiral concerned has again been produced as the reason. But the thoughtful--taking the previous career of most of those concerned into consideration--may suspect the existence of some special secret orders about taking no risks, as yet unearthed by any historian. The only really workable alternative is Napoleon’s “destiny” theory already alluded to. Of the two, the secret order hypothesis is the more practical. Into the whole of these victories not properly followed up, it is also possible, though hardly probable, that the mutinous state of the _personnel_ entered.

[Illustration: THE “FOUDROYANT” ONE OF NELSON’S OLD SHIPS.]

In the battle of Cape St. Vincent, the Spaniards had an enormous four-decker, the _Santissima Trinidad_, of 130 guns. She was the first ship engaged by Nelson, and was hammered by most of the others closely engaged as well, but her size and power saved her from the fate of the rest of the ships that were with her.

It is difficult even now to assess the exact situation of the mutineers of 1797. The organised self-restraint of the Spithead Mutiny is hard to understand, when we remember the heterogeneous origin of the crews. “Jail or Navy” was an every-day offer to prisoners. Longshoremen, riff-raff, pressed landsmen, thieves, murderers, smugglers, and a few degraded officers, were the raw material of which the crews were composed. They were stiffened with a proportion of professional seamen, and it is these that must have leavened the mass, and kept the jail-bird element in check.

Pay was bad, ship life close akin to prison life, discipline and punishments alike brutal, and the food disgracefully bad. It was this last that brought about the mutiny. There is an old saying to the effect that you may ill-treat a sailor as you will, but if you ill-feed him, trouble may be looked for! One or two isolated mutinies, like that of the _Hermione_, were due to a captain’s brutality; but mainly and mostly bad food and mutiny were closely linked.

Commander Robinson[50] draws attention to the fact that the pursers themselves were hardly the unscrupulous rascals they were supposed to be on shore, and that the system and regulations of victualling were recognised by the seamen as at the bottom of the mischief.

The same authority quotes a contemporary:--

“The reason unto you I now will relate: We resolved to refuse the purser’s short weight; Our humble petition to Lord Howe we sent, That he to the Admiralty write to present Our provisions and wages that they might augment.”

Discontent had, of course, long been brewing, but the Admiralty seems to have been without any suspicions. They dismissed the petition as being in no way representative; later, having received reports to the contrary, ordered Lord Bridport’s fleet at Spithead to proceed to sea. On April 15th, when the signal to weigh anchor was made, the crews of every ship manned the rigging and cheered. No violence was offered to any officer; the men simply refused to work. Each ship supplied a couple of delegates to explain matters, and after an enquiry, their demands were granted and a free pardon given. Delays, however, ensued, and on May 7th, the fleet again refused to put to sea.

On this occasion, the officers were disarmed, confined to their cabins, and kept there, till a few days later a general pardon was proclaimed, when this mutiny ended. A similar mutiny at Plymouth was equally mild.

Of a very different character was the mutiny at the Nore, which broke out on May 13th, under the leadership of the notorious Richard Parker. Parker was a man of considerable parts, said to have been an ex-officer dismissed the service with disgrace, and to have entered as a seaman. He possessed undoubted ability and considerable ambition. He very clearly aimed at something more than the redress of grievances, since his first act was to put a rope round his own neck by instigating the crew of the _Inflexible_ to fire into a sister ship, on board which a court-martial was being held. Subsequently, delegates were sent to the Admiralty with extravagant claims, which--as Parker may have anticipated--were ignored.

Eleven ships of Admiral Duncan’s fleet (then blockading the Texel) had joined Parker by the first of June. Duncan was left with but two ships in face of the enemy. By showing himself much and making imaginary signals Duncan managed to conceal the facts from the Dutch: but he had considerable trouble to keep his two ships from joining the mutineers now blockading the Thames.

There is reason to believe that Parker was in touch with the Revolutionists in France and the dissatisfied Irish, but the bulk of the mutineers were altogether uninfluenced by political ideas. The mutiny began to waver. The ships at other home ports were unsympathetic, and Parker and his friends found men cooling off. In order to keep things together it was their custom to row round the fleet[51] and inspect ships suspected of being “cool,”--the side being piped for them. In one case, however, the boatswain’s mate refused to do so, and flung his call at their heads. On coming on board, they sentenced him to thirty-six lashes for “mutinous conduct!” On June 10th, despite this disciplinary system, two of the mutineer ships sailed away under fire from the others, and on the 14th, Parker’s own ship surrendered and handed him over to the authorities. He was hanged on June 29th.

In the Mediterranean fleet, mutiny broke out in two ships off Cadiz, but Jervis (now Earl St. Vincent), compelled the mutineers to hang their own ringleaders. In connection with this, Nelson, who was now rear admiral commanding the inshore squadron, wrote to St. Vincent--

“I congratulate you on the finish, as it ought, of the St. George’s business, and I (if I may be permitted to say so) very much approve of its being so speedily carried into execution, even although it is Sunday. The particular situation of the service requires extraordinary measures. I hope this will end all the disorders in our fleet: had there been the same determined spirit at home, I do not believe it would have been half so bad.”

It is noteworthy that in Nelson’s own ship there was no trouble whatever. The ship had had a reputation for insubordination, but shortly after Nelson joined her, a paper intimating that no mutiny need be feared was dropped on the quarter-deck. Nelson brought with him a reputation for taking a personal interest in his men. Then, as now, hard work and a dog’s life were not objected to, provided the personal equation were present.

St. Vincent proceeded to stamp out the embers of mutiny in his own fashion. He set himself to invest his rank with every circumstance of pomp, awe and ceremony. Every morning he appeared on the quarter deck in full dress uniform, paraded the Marines, and had “God save the King” played with all hats off. His regulations were catholic enough to embrace lieutenants’ shoe-laces. In all the pomp that he created the mutinous spirit was smothered.

To him is due the vast abyss between the quarter-deck and lower-deck which marks the Navy of to-day. Whether this, advantageous as it was a hundred odd years ago, is equally advantageous now, is another matter. It makes a barrier altogether different from that existing between officer and man in the Army--it is something closely akin to the racial differences mark in India; and this sorts ill with the democratic ideas of to-day, when class distinction is quite a different matter from what it was a hundred years ago.

There are still possible two views of the question. One is embodied in a letter I received some few years ago from a man from the lower-deck. He wrote, “When I was a boy in a training ship, my captain seemed to me something as far away and above me as God himself, and the impression thus created I have carried with me towards all officers ever since. Though in private life I might meet his brother with feeling of perfect equality, I could never be other than ill at ease meeting an officer in the same conditions.”

Here, at any rate, is the psychology of what St. Vincent aimed at. To-day, however, one is far more likely to hear about “the side of officers,” or that “officers, when cadets, are taught to regard the men with contempt!” The conditions are such, that despite mixed cricket and football teams, mutual sympathy between officers and men is well nigh impossible.

Of “the great God Routine” which St. Vincent set up, it is beyond question that it is to-day an irritating superfluity to both officers and men alike.

To resume. As the Spaniards obstinately refused to come out from Cadiz, St. Vincent sent Nelson in to bombard them with mortar boats; but this attempt to force them out did not succeed. Following upon this, Nelson, with three seventy-four’s, one fifty, three frigates and a cutter, was despatched to Santa Cruz. On the night of July 24th, he led a boat attack in person. Most of the boats missed the Mole and were stove in. Such as reached the Mole were met by a withering fire. Nelson was struck on the right elbow by a grape shot, and taken back to the _Theseus_, where his arm was amputated. Troubridge took command of the 300 odd men who had got ashore, and being surrounded by the Spanish, made terms, whereby the Spaniards found boats for his party to return to their ships. The squadron rejoined St. Vincent, and Nelson sailed for England to recover.

The blockade of the Texel had been vigorously maintained till October, when Duncan returned to Spithead to refit. He had no sooner done so than the Dutch, under De Winter, came out--presumably with a view to reaching Brest. Duncan’s frigates, however, promptly reported them, and sailing at once he met them off Camperdown, on October 11th.

The rival fleets were:--

BRITISH. DUTCH.

7 of 74 guns. 4 of 74 guns. 7 of 64 guns. 7 of 64 guns. 2 of 50 guns. 4 of 50 guns. -- -- 16 15 -- --

Duncan’s original plan was the old fashioned ship-to-ship system, but in the actual event, the Dutch line was broken. One of the Dutch fifty-gun ships fell back to avoid the _Lancaster_ (sixty-four), five others for some reason or other following her; the remaining nine fought desperately, till further resistance was impossible.

The prizes were:--two seventy-four’s, five sixty-four’s, two fifties, and a couple of frigates. Both the captured fifties were lost; the other ships were with great difficulty got to England. All were found to have been damaged beyond repair, and some of Duncan’s ships were in little better condition. His losses in _personnel_ were over 1,000 in killed and wounded. His crews, it is interesting to note, consisted mostly of Parker’s erstwhile mutineers.

During 1797, a few frigates only were lost. These included the _Hermione_, whose crew mutinied and handed her over to the enemy. The brutality of her captain, Pigot, whose idea of efficiency was to flog the last two men down from aloft, was the cause of this particular outbreak.[52]

In 1797, a large ninety-eight gun ship, the _Neptune_, was added to the Navy, also a seventy-four and a sixty-four. Private yards launched no less than forty-six frigates and smaller craft, and the total number of warships built, building and projected, was 696.[53]

For the year 1798, the _personnel_ voted was 100,000 seamen and 20,000 marines; and the total Naval Estimates amounted to £13,449,388.

In France, Buonaparte was forging to the front, and he threw himself into those schemes for the invasion of England which so appealed to the French mind and so terrified the British public. Ireland was selected as the most suitable spot, and two expeditions were prepared, one at Rochefort, the other at Brest. Of these, one, the Rochefort expedition, materialised in August, reached Killala Bay, in Ireland, and soon afterwards had to surrender to the English Army. The Brest expedition, escorted by a line of battle ship and a number of frigates, was more or less annihilated by Admiral Warren, on October 12th.

As already stated, the Mediterranean had become a species of Franco-Spanish lake. St. Vincent was outside Gibraltar, and he was still there when Nelson, in the _Vanguard_, arrived to join him as rear-admiral, at the end of April.

Nelson, with a small squadron, was at once despatched to discover what the French were doing at Toulon. Rumours of all kinds were current. He found fifteen ships of the line and a great many transports, news of which he sent to the Admiral. On the top of this came a gale, which dismasted the _Vanguard_. She was, however, towed into San Pietro, Sardinia, and hastily re-fitted, and four days later the ships were off Toulon again, only to find that the French had sailed.

Reinforced by ten sail of the line, under Troubridge, Nelson now sailed in search of the French fleet. Reaching Alexandria and finding nothing known there of the French, he worked back to Syracuse, where he revictualled in cheerful disregard of the neutrality remonstrances of the Governor. Thence he returned eastward, and having received information of where the French had last been seen, eventually found them anchored in Aboukir Bay, where he attacked them on the evening of August 1st, 1798.

The rival fleets were:--

BRITISH. FRENCH.

13 of 74 guns. 1 of 120 guns. 1 of 50 guns. 9 of 74 guns. -- -- 14 10, also 4 Frigates. -- --

The French, under Brueys, were drawn across the Bay in a “defensive position.” They were in no way a very efficient force, some of the ships being old and short of guns, all of them rather short-handed, and even so, manned with many new-raised raw men. On the other hand, they were so sure of the safety of their position that their inshore guns were not cleared for action. By all the naval theory of the day this idea of impregnability was justified.

The battle itself was simple enough. Nelson came down with the wind on the French van, approximately putting two of his ships one on either side of each of the Frenchmen, and so on, the rear being unable to beat up to support them. The result was the practical annihilation of the French fleet. Of the thirteen ships of the line, only two escaped in company with two frigates.

So complete a naval victory had never before been known. In all the battles of the previous two or three hundred years, the percentage of losses to the vanquished had been small. The battle of the Nile, therefore, received an attention perhaps beyond its intrinsic worth. As Nelson wrote to Howe:--“By attacking the enemy’s van and centre, the wind blowing directly along their line, I was enabled to throw what force I pleased on a few ships.” The real point of interest is not the result, which was foregone, but Nelson’s ability to see his opportunity and to make the utmost of it. Therein lay his superlative greatness.

Of the prizes, three were found to be new and good ships. One of them, the _Franklin_, was renamed _Canopus_, and as late as 1850 was still on the effective list of the British Navy.

The defeat of the French at the Nile had far reaching effects. Russia, Austria, Turkey, Naples and Portugal formed with England a great anti-French Alliance. A large Russian fleet appeared in the Mediterranean, but accomplished no services there. It was under suspicion of having private designs on Malta rather than of assisting the Alliance.

From 1762 onward, when Catherine the Great came to the throne of Russia, an enormous number of retired or unemployed English officers took service in the Russian Navy. To one of these, Captain Elphinstone (who subsequently re-entered the British service), has been traced the origin of the idea upon which Nelson acted in the battle of the Nile. To another, General Bentham, originally a shipwright, who returned to the British service in 1795, was due a revolution in dockyard management. To him was due the introduction of machinery into dockyards: a matter needing much diplomacy and caution, as popular feeling against machinery then ran high. However, by 1798, Bentham had steam engines installed in the dockyards. He also commenced the first caisson known in England, using it for the great basin at Portsmouth Yard. In the face of considerable opposition he also introduced deep docks, basins and jetties at Portsmouth, for the speedy fitting out of ships.

In 1799, the _personnel_ was settled at 120,000, and the Naval Estimates were £13,654,000.

In April of this year, the French, under Bruix, with twenty-five ships of the line, came out of Brest, which was being cruised off by Bridport with sixteen sail. Having warned Keith, who was blockading Cadiz, and St. Vincent, who lay at Gibraltar, Bridport fell back on Bantry Bay, where he was reinforced with ten ships.

[Illustration: GENERAL BENTHAM.]

Bruix ran down south, his orders being to join the Spaniards in Cadiz, but the weather was unfavourable and his crews so illtrained[54] that he made no attempt to attack Keith’s squadron, but ran on into the Mediterranean. Keith himself joined St. Vincent at Gibraltar.

On May 11th, St. Vincent arrived at Minorca with twenty sail. Nelson, with sixteen ships (of which four were Portuguese) was scattered over the Mediterranean, his base being at Palermo. On the 13th, Bruix reached Toulon, and a week later seventeen Spaniards from Cadiz reached Cartagena.

To prevent these joining up with Bruix, St. Vincent lay between the two bases: but the risk that either fleet might suddenly fall on Nelson was such, that he sent four of his ships to him. He was, however, presently reinforced with five ships, bringing his net total to twenty-one.

St. Vincent’s health having now given out, he handed the fleet over to Lord Keith, who learned that Bruix, with twenty-two sail, had left Toulon on the 27th May; but for some reason or other made for that place. Bruix reached the Spaniards at Cartagena, without interference, on June 23rd, and so had thirty-nine ships to oppose the British twenty-one. These, falling back upon Minorca, were there reinforced by ten ships from home, thus bringing the total up to thirty-one.

Meanwhile, Bruix putting to sea again at once, made for Cadiz, which he reached on July 12th, and leaving again on the 21st, made for Brest; Keith, some two weeks behind him, in pursuit.

The net result of Bruix’s cruise was that the French fleet at Brest rose to the enormous total of ninety warships, collected to cover an invasion of England. As, however, Napoleon, who was to command, did not reach France until October, nothing was done in 1799, thus allowing ample time for the concentration of English ships. Had the Brest Armada struck at once, matters for England had been none too rosy, since the only force guarding the Channel was Bridport’s fleet of twenty-six sail, at Bantry.

August saw 20,000 Russians landed at the Helder from British transports. These captured the Texel fortifications, inside of which lay what was left of the Dutch fleet. The Dutch admiral declined to surrender, but his crews refused to fight, and eventually the ships were handed over without firing a shot. The ships were found to be antiquated in design and badly built, and were never of any use to the English Navy.

In the latter part of this year, two Spanish frigates were captured by four English. These ships were bringing home the year’s South American treasure. The prize money divided among the four captains amounted to £160,000.

Twenty-one vessels were lost during the year. Only three of them, however, were lost by capture, and of these the largest was a ten-gun brig!

The prizes of the year consisted of eight French frigates, five Spanish frigates and twenty-four Dutch ships. In this year also the very fast French privateer, _Bordelais_, was taken, being chased and overhauled by the _Revolutionnaire_, an ex-French frigate, and the only frigate in the Navy at this time able to catch up with French ones.

The _personnel_ granted for the year 1800, was 110,000, with an additional 10,000 for March and April only. The ships in commission were 100 ships of the line, seventeen small two-deckers and 351 frigates and lesser craft.

No naval fighting of much importance took place, but the year was otherwise very momentous. Napoleon, who had made himself First Consul, was busy reorganising the French Navy, and one of his first acts was to offer terms of peace. These, however, were refused by the British Government.

On July 25th, the Danish frigate, _Freya_, out with a convoy, was met by some British ships. She refused to allow “the right of search.” Firing followed, and the _Freya_ was captured. An embassy, to explain matters to the Danes, went, accompanied by a fleet of nine ships of the line, five frigates and four bombs, under Admiral Dickson.

This action--the intentions of which were obvious--aroused the resentment of the Russian Emperor Paul. Nelson’s suspicion that the Russians wished to capture Malta for themselves, have already been alluded to. These intentions came to light now; for Paul, having got himself declared Grand Master of the Knights of St. John of Malta, seized some 300 British merchant ships in Russian ports, and said that he would not let them go till Malta (which was then besieged and about to fall to the British) was given up to him.

The British Government ignored the Malta claim, and many of the British merchant ships equally ignored the Russian orders about remaining in harbour. Quite a number sailed away; the rest, however, were seized and burned, by Paul’s orders. To reinforce himself against very probable reprisals, Paul--presumably influenced by Napoleon--formed the “Armed Neutrality.” Russia and Sweden signed on December 16th, and on the 19th, Denmark and Prussia.

Meanwhile, Malta, which had been blockaded and besieged by the British ever since the battle of the Nile, was in grievous straits. In February, 1800, the _Genereux_, seventy-four (one of the two ships of the line which escaped from the Nile), left Toulon, with some frigates, intent on relief. She was, however, intercepted and captured by Nelson.

In March, the _Guillaume Tell_, the other survivor of the Nile, which had been lying at Malta, attempted on the night of the 30th to run the blockade to procure help. In doing so, she encountered the British frigate _Penelope_, which chased her, attacking her rigging. The firing brought up two ships of the line, _Foudroyant_ and _Lion_, but the Frenchman made such a defence that both these were disabled before she was reduced to submission, and it was to the _Penelope_ frigate that she ultimately struck. This particular fight is generally reckoned as the finest defence ever made by a French ship.

Malta was eventually starved into surrender, and the final capitulation took place on the 5th September, 1800, after a siege of practically two years.

The capture of Malta was perhaps one of the finest exhibitions of “Admiralty” in the whole war. No waste of life in assaults took place: the fortress was systematically starved into surrender by the judicious use of Sea Power to prevent any relief.

In this year (1800), several ships were lost, the principal being the _Queen Charlotte_ (100), which was accidentally burned and blown up off Capraja, on the 17th of March. The majority of her crew perished with her. Eighteen other ships were wrecked, while two (a twenty gun and a fourteen) mutinied and joined the enemy. These were the only British ships that actually changed hands. Captures amounted to fourteen ships of from eighty to twenty-eight guns, and a large number of privateers and small craft.

The year 1801 saw the Estimates at £16,577,000. The _personnel_ voted was 120,000 for the first quarter of the year, after which it was to rise to 135,000, with a view to dealing with the Armed Neutrality. The number of ships in commission was substantially the same as in the previous year.

The avowed objects of the Armed Neutrality were to resist “the right of search,” to secure any property under a neutral flag, that a blockade to be binding must be maintained by an adequate force, and that contraband of war must be clearly defined beforehand. In substance, they amounted to the free importation into France of those naval stores of which she stood most in need. Wisely enough the British Government decided to break up the coalition by diplomacy, if possible, and failing that, by force. Incidentally, it may be noted that the Tsar, who was at the head of the coalition, was more or less a madman, in possession of a very considerable fleet.

In March, 1801, a fleet of twenty ships of the line and a large number of auxiliaries, under Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson as second in command, sailed for the Baltic. On arrival at Copenhagen, the Danes were found to be moored in a strong position under cover of shore batteries. The attack was confided to Nelson with twelve ships, which fared badly enough for Parker after the battle had lasted three hours to make a signal to withdraw.[55] Nelson, however, disregarded this, and continued till the Danish fire began to slacken an hour later. But as the Danes continually reinforced their disabled ships from the shore, and fired into those which had surrendered, the slaughter promised to go on indefinitely. Things being thus, Nelson, under a flag of truce, threatened to set fire to the damaged ships and leave their crews to their fate unless firing ceased. It has been alleged that this was a clever piece of bluff in order to extricate his ships from an awkward position: but all the evidence goes to show that he was fully in a position to carry out his threat, while as he made no attempt to move during the negotiations the bluff story is absurd. It appears to have been an act of humanity, pure and simple.

Ultimately, the bulk of the Danish fleet was surrendered, and a fourteen weeks’ armistice arranged, Nelson explaining that he required this amount of time to destroy the Russian fleet!

Subsequently the Swedish fleet was dealt with, but it took refuge under fortifications. About the same time news came that the mad Tsar had been assassinated, and that his successor had no wish to continue hostilities.

Nelson (now Commander-in-Chief) appeared off Kronstadt, under the guns of which the Russians had taken shelter in May. Negotiations followed,[56] and ultimately Russia was granted the right to trade with belligerents--probably a diplomatic concession in order to detach her sympathy from France.

In the meantime, Napoleon’s invasion schemes were shaping. To this day it is unknown whether he was serious or not at this, or for that matter, any other period. That he intended his preparations to be taken seriously (as they were by all save Nelson) is clear enough. It is further clear from his vast preparations that he would have used his flotilla had the chance occurred; but the mere fact that he never attempted actual invasion is of itself sufficient answer to all the homilies that have been written about Napoleon’s inability to understand “Sea Power.”

The army at Boulogne, the flat-bottomed boats, all served to keep England in a panic, and that was worth much. He had experience to guide him. Past experience was an English attack on the flotilla like that of Rodney many years before. In August, 1801, such an attack came, Nelson directing it. It was found fully prepared for and defeated with ease.

In the Mediterranean, Ganteaume, who had left Brest with seven ships of the line convoying 5,000 troops, reached Alexandria, but before he could disembark his soldiers, Keith appeared, and he hurried back to Toulon.

Linois left Toulon with a small squadron, and was driven into Algeciras, where he beat off Samaurez and a considerably more powerful squadron. Retreating from this, Samaurez fell in with a Spanish squadron, the ships of which, in the confusion of a night action, attacked each other, with the result that the two best ships were destroyed.

In October, 1801, the preliminaries of the Peace of Amiens were signed and hostilities ceased.

The total losses to the enemy in the war are given as follows by Campbell:--

FRENCH. DUTCH. SPANISH. TOTAL. Ships of the line 45 25 11 81 Fifties 2 1 0 3 Frigates 133 31 20 184 Sloops, etc. 161 32 55 248 --- TOTAL 516 ---

The corresponding British loss was only twenty-one ships of _all classes_, and of these only two ships of the line were captured. The bulk of British losses was accounted for by wrecks.