IV.
THE PERIOD OF THE DUTCH WARS.
With the accession of James I peace with Spain came about, but the Dutch being ignored in the transaction, out of this there arose that ill-feeling and rivalry which was later on to culminate in the Dutch wars.
In James I’s reign no naval operations of great importance took place, but considerable interest attaches to the despatch of eighteen ships (of which six were “King’s Ships”), to Algiers in 1520. This was the first appearance of an English squadron in the Mediterranean.
Under James I the numerical force of the Navy declined somewhat. The art of shipbuilding, however, made considerable advance.[11] A Shipwrights’ Company was established in 1656, and Phineas Pett, as its first master, built and designed a 1,400 ton ship named the _Prince Royal_. Pett introduced a variety of novelties into his designs, and the _Prince Royal_ and her successors were esteemed superior to anything set afloat elsewhere at the time.
Here it is desirable to turn aside for a moment in order to realise the influences at work behind Phineas Pett. It has ever been the peculiar fortune of the Royal Navy--and for that matter of the inchoate “Navy” which preceded its establishment--to have had men capable of “looking ahead” and forcing the pace in such a way that new conditions were prepared for when they arrived.
Of such a nature, each in his own way, were King Alfred, King John, Richard III, and Henry VII, but greater than any of these was Sir Walter Raleigh, whose visions in the days of Elizabeth and James I ran so clearly and so far that even now we cannot be said to have left him behind where “principles” are concerned. Drake was the national hero of Elizabethan days, but in utility to the future, Raleigh was a greater than he, albeit his best service was of the “armchair” kind.
The following extracts from Raleigh’s writings, except for geographical and political differences, stand as true to-day as when he wrote them about 300 years ago. The idea of a main fleet, backed up by smaller vessels, the idea of meeting the enemy on the water and so forth, are commonplaces now, but in Raleigh’s time they were quite otherwise. The italicised portions in particular indicate quite clearly in Elizabethan words the naval policy of to-day.
“Another benefit which we received by this preparation was, that _our men were now taught suddenly to arm, every man knowing his command, and how to be commanded_, which before they were ignorant of; and who knows not that sudden and false alarms in any army are sometimes necessary? To say the truth, the expedition which was then used in drawing together so great an army by land, and rigging so great and royal a navy to sea, in so little a space of time, was so admirable in other countries, that they received a terror by it; and many that came from beyond the seas said _the Queen was never more dreaded abroad for anything she ever did_.
“Frenchmen that came aboard our ships did wonder (as at a thing incredible) that Her Majesty had rigged, victualled, and furnished her royal ships to sea in twelve days’ time; and Spain, as an enemy, had reason to fear and grieve to see this sudden preparation.
“It is not the meanest mischief we shall do to the King of Spain, if we thus war upon him, to force him to keep his shores still armed and guarded, to the infinite vexation, charge and discontent of his subjects; for no time or place can secure them so long as they see or know us to be upon that coast.
“The sequel of all these actions being duly considered, we may be confident that _whilst we busy the Spaniard at home, they dare not think of invading England or Ireland_; for by their absence their fleet from the Indies may be endangered[12] and in their attempts they have as little hope of prevailing.
“Surely I hold that the _best way is to keep our enemies from treading upon our ground: wherein, if we fail, then_ must we seek to make him wish that he had stayed at his own home. In such a case, if it should happen, our judgments are to weigh many particular circumstances, that belong not to this discourse. But making the question general, _the position, whether England, without that it is unable to do so_: and, therefore, I think it most dangerous to make the adventure. For the encouragements of a first victory to an enemy, and the discouragement of being beaten to the invaded, may draw after it a most perilous consequence.
“Great difference, I know there is, and diverse consideration to be had, between such a country as France is, strengthened with many fortified places, and this of ours, where our ramparts are but the bodies of men. But I say that an army to be transported over sea, and to be landed again in an enemy’s country, and the place left to the choice of the invader _cannot be resisted on the coast of England without a fleet to impeach it; no, nor on the coast of France, or any other country, except every creek, port, or sandy bay had a powerful army in each of them to make opposition.... For there is no man ignorant that ships, without putting themselves out of breath, will easily outrun the soldiers that coast them_.[13]
“Whosoever were the inventors, we find that every age hath added somewhat to ships, and to all things else. And in mine own time the shape of our English ships hath been greatly bettered. It is not long since the striking of the topmast (a wonderful ease to great ships, both at sea and in harbour) hath been devised, together with the chain pump, which takes up twice as much water as the ordinary did. We have lately added the Bonnet and the Drabler. To the courses we have devised studding-sails, topgallant-masts, spritsails, topsails. The weighing of anchors by the capstone is also new. We have fallen into consideration of the lengths of cable, and by it we resist the malice of the greatest winds that can blow. Witness our small Millbroke men of Cornwall, that ride it out at anchor half seas over between England and Ireland, all the winter quarter. And witness the Hollanders that were wont to ride before Dunkirk with the wind at north-west, making a lee-shoar in all weathers. For true it is, that the length of the cable is the life of the ship, riding at length, is not able to stretch it; and nothing breaks that is not stretched in extremity. We carry our ordnance better than we were wont, because our nether over-loops are raised commonly from the water, to wit, between the lower part of the sea.
“In King Henry VIII time, and in his presence at Portsmouth, the Mary Rose, by a little sway of the ship in tacking about, her ports being within sixteen inches of the water, was overset and lost.
“We have also raised our second decks, and given more vent thereby to our ordnance lying on our nether-loop. We have added cross pillars[14] in our royal ships to strengthen them, which be fastened from the keels on to the beam of the second deck to keep them from setting or from giving way in all distresses.
“We have given longer floors to our ships than in elder times, and better bearing under water, whereby they never fall into the sea after the head and shake the whole body, nor sink astern, nor stoop upon a wind, by which the breaking loose of our ordnance, or of the not use of them, with many other discommodities are avoided.
“And, to say the truth, a miserable shame and dishonour it were for our shipwrights if they did not exceed all others in the setting up of our Royal ships, _the errors of other nations being far more excusable than ours_. For the Kings of England have for many years _being at the charge to build and furnish a navy of powerful ships for their own defence, and for the wars only. Whereas the_ French, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the Hollanders (till of late) _have had no proper fleet belonging to their Princes or States._ Only the Venetians for a long time have maintained their arsenal of gallies. And the Kings of Denmark and Sweden have had good ships for these last fifty years.
“I say that the aforenamed Kings, especially the Spaniards and Portugals, have ships of great bulk, but fitter for the merchant than for the man-of-war, for burthen than for _battle_. But as Popelimire well observeth, ‘the forces of Princes by sea are marques de grandeur d’estate--marks of the greatness of an estate--for _whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself_.’
“Yet, can I not deny but that the Spaniards, being afraid of their Indian fleets, have built some few very good ships; _but he hath no ships in garrison_, as His Majesty hath; and to say the truth, no sure place to keep them in, but in all invasions he is driven to take up of all nations which come into his ports for trade....
* * * * *
“But there’s no estate grown in haste but that of the United Provinces, and especially in their sea forces, and by a contrary way to that of Spain and France; the latter by invasion, the former by oppression. For I myself may remember _when one ship of Her Majesty’s would have made forty Hollanders strike sail and come to an anchor_. They did not then dispute de Mari Libero, but readily acknowledged the English to be Domini Maria Britannici. That we are less powerful than we were, I do hardly believe it; for, although we have not at this time 135 ships belonging to the subject of 500 tons each ship, as it is said we had in the twenty-fourth year of Queen Elizabeth; at which time also, upon a general view and muster, there were found in England of able men fit to bear arms, 1,172,000, yet are our merchant ships now far more warlike and better appointed than they were, and the Navy royal double as strong as it then was. For these were the ships of Her Majesty’s Navy at that time:
1. The Triumph 2. The Elizabeth Jonas 3. The White Bear 4. The Philip and Mary 5. The Bonadventure 6. The Golden Lyon 7. The Victory 8. The Revenge 9. The Hope 10. The Mary Rose 11. The Dreadnought 12. The Minion 13. The Swiftsure
to which there have been added:--
14. The Antilope 15. The Foresight 16. The Swallow 17. The Handmaid 18. The Jennett 19. The Bark of Ballein 20. The Ayde 21. The Achates 22. The Falcon 23. The Tyger 24. The Bull
“We have not, therefore, less force than we had, the fashion, and furnishing of our ships considered, for there are in England at this time 400 sail or merchants, and fit for the wars, which the Spaniards would call galleons; to which we may add 200 sail of crumsters, or hoyes of Newcastle, which, each of them, will bear six Demi-culverins and four Sakers, needing no other addition of building than a slight spar deck fore and aft, as the seamen call it, which is a slight deck throughout....
“I say, then, if a vanguard be ordained of those hoyes, who will easily recover the wind of any other sort of ships, with a battle of 400 other warlike ships, and a rear of thirty of His Majesty’s ships to sustain, relieve, and countenance the rest (if God beat them not) I know not what strength can be gathered in all Europe to beat them. And if it be objected that the States can furnish a far greater number, I answer that His Majesty’s forty ships, added to the 600 beforenamed, are of incomparable greater force than all that Holland and Zealand can furnish for the wars. As also, that a greater number would breed the same confusion that was found in Xerxes’ land army of 1,700,000 soldiers; _for there is a certain proportion, both by sea and land, beyond which the excess brings nothing but disorder and amazement_.”
I have quoted from Raleigh at considerable length--a length which may seem to some out of all proportion to the general historical scheme of this work. But of the three possible “founders of the British Navy,” King Alfred by legend, King Henry VII by force of circumstances, and Sir Walter Raleigh, Knight, by his realisation of certain eternal verities of naval warfare, the palm goes best to Raleigh, to whose precepts it was mainly due that England did not succumb to Holland in the days of the Dutch wars. Compared to the struggle with the Dutch, neither the Spanish wars, which preceded them, nor the great French wars which followed, were of any like importance as regarded the relative risks and dangers. And the interest is the greater in that where the United Provinces were, about and just after Raleigh’s time, Germany stands towards the British Navy to-day.
In 1618 the Duke of Buckingham was appointed Lord High Admiral and continued in that position after the accession of Charles I. Of the incapacity of the Duke much has been written, but whatever may be said in connection with various unsuccessful oversea enterprises, for which he was officially responsible, naval shipbuilding under his régime made very considerable progress.
Things were quite otherwise, however, with the _personnel_. Abuses of every sort and kind crept in unchecked, and the men were the first to feel the pinch. The unscrupulous contractor appeared, and with him the era of offal foods and all kinds of similar abuses, of which many have lasted well into our own time, and some exist still. The money allotted for the men of the fleet became the prey of every human vulture, the officers, as a rule, being privy thereunto. Besides food, clothing also fell into the hands of contractors who supplied shoddy at ridiculously high prices, with the commission to officers stopped out of the men’s pay.
Pay, nominally, rose a good deal, and in 1653 reached twenty-four shillings a month for the seaman, but the figures (approximately equal in purchasing value to the pay of to-day) convey nothing. The men were half-starved, or worse, on uneatable food, and their clothing was such that they went about in rags and died like rats in their misery.
The first naval event in Charles I’s reign is mainly of interest because of the peculiar personal circumstances that attended it. One King’s ship and six hired ships were despatched, nominally to assist the French against the Genoese. On arriving at Dieppe, however, the English officers and men discovered that they were really to be used against the revolted French Protestants of La Rochelle. This being against their taste, they returned to the Downs and reported themselves to the King. They were ordered to sail again for La Rochelle. One captain, however, point blank refused to do so. The other ships went, but the officers and men, with a single exception, having handed their ships over to the French, returned to England.
Little or nothing seems to have been done in the way of punishment to the mutineers (possibly on account of public opinion). But the incident sheds an interesting sidelight on the state of the Navy at the time. It is hardly to be conceived that the Army at the same period could have acted in similar fashion with equal impunity.
[Illustration: PHINEAS PETT, 1570–1647.
From the contemporary portrait by William Dobson in the National Portrait Gallery.]
The history of the British Navy of this period is the history of a navy lacking in discipline, and its officers divided against each other. Such expeditions as were undertaken against France and Spain signally failed. It is usual to attribute these failures to the mal-administration of the Duke of Buckingham, an unpopular figure. But whether this is just or not is another matter. The entire Navy was rotten to the core in its _personnel_. But Buckingham’s share in it would seem to have been inability to understand rather than direct carelessness.
Under the Duke’s régime the building of efficient warships continued to progress. The “ship money,” which was to cause so much trouble inland later, is outside the scope of this work, save in so far as its direct naval aspect is concerned. This, of course, was the principle that inland places benefited from sea defence quite as much as seaside districts. A great deal of the money was undoubtedly spent on shipbuilding; indeed, some of the trouble lay over alleged (and seemingly obvious) excessive expenditure on the “Dreadnought” of the period, Phineas Pett’s _Royal Sovereign_, a ship altogether superior to anything before built in England, and the first three-decker ever constructed in this country. She was laid down in 1635 and launched in 1657. An immense amount of gilding and carving about her irritated the economically minded, but it is questionable whether the objections were well informed.
Just about this time elaborate ornamentations of warships was the “vogue,” and it carried moral effect accordingly. What to the uninitiated landsmen merely spelt “waste of money on unnecessary display” spelt something else to those who went across the seas. Even in our own present utilitarian days a fresh coat of paint to a warship has been found to have a political value; and fireworks and illuminations (seemingly pure waste of money) have played their share in helping to preserve the peace.
John Hampden, according to his lights, was a patriot, and according to the purely political questions with which he was concerned he may also have been; but on the naval issue of Ship Money he was little more or less than the First Little Englander, and hampered by just that same inability to see beyond his nose which characterised the modern Little Englander who protested against “bloated naval expenditure.” The intentions were excellent--the intelligence circumscribed.
A contemporary account of the _Royal Sovereign_ is as follows:--
“Her length by the keele is 128 foote or thereabout, within some few inches; her mayne breadth or wideness from side to side, 48 foote; her utmost length from the fore-end to the stern, _a prova ad pupin_, 232 foote. Shee is in height, from the bottom of her keele to the top of her lanthorne, 76 foote; she beareth five lanthornes, the biggest of which will hold ten persons to stand upright, and without shouldering or pressing one on the other.
“Shee hath three flush deckes and a forecastle, an halfe decke, a quarter-decke, and a round house. Her lower tyre hath thirty ports, which are to be furnished with demi-cannon and whole cannon, throughout being able to beare them; her middle tyre hath also thirty ports for demi-culverin and whole culverin; her third tyre hath twentie sixe ports for other ordnance; her forecastle hath twelve ports, and her halfe decke hath fourteen ports; she hath thirteene or fourteene ports more within board for murdering-pieces, besides a great many loope-holes out of the cabins for musket shot. Shee carrieth, moreover, ten pieces of chase ordnance in her right forward, and ten right off, according to lande service in the front and the reare. Shee carrieth eleven anchores, one of them weighing foure thousand foure hundred pounds; and according to these are her cables, mastes, sayles, cordage.”
[Illustration:
_Ex. Fincham._
THE _ROYAL SOVEREIGN_.
The dotted lines represent a ship of the time of 1850.]
It remains to add that the ship was extraordinarily well built. She fought many a battle and survived some fifty years, and then only perished because, when laid up for refit in 1696, she was accidentally burned. And about sixty-three years ago (1852) naval architects still alluded to her with respect, nor did their designs differ from her very materially.
Wherever and however Charles I and the Duke of Buckingham failed, their shipbuilding policy cannot but command both respect and admiration. It is the curious irony of fate that--excepting King Alfred, and also Queen Elizabeth--it is the Sovereigns of England with black marks against them who ever did most for the Navy or understood its importance. And understanding what the Navy meant, generally secured these marks at the hands of some quite well meaning but intellectually circumscribed prototype or successor of John Hampden, to whom “meeting the enemy on the water” was an entirely indigestible theory, and a waste of money into the bargain. There is no question whatever that to them the sea appeared a natural rampart and ships upon it pure superfluity, save in so far as inconvenience to the shore counties might result. Later on, Cromwell, of course, acted on a different principle--but Cromwell was an Imperialist. Hampden was merely the “Insular Spirit” personified.
In 1639, a naval incident occurred which goes to discredit the popular idea of the impotence of the British Navy under Charles I, whatever its internal condition. Naval operations were in progress between Holland and France on the one side, and Spain on the other. The British fleet was fitted out under Sir John Pennington (that same Pennington who had commanded the squadron which refused to attack La Rochelle) with orders to maintain British neutrality.
The Spanish fleet took refuge from the Dutch in the Downs, whereupon Pennington informed the rival admirals that he should attack whichever of them violated the neutrality of an English harbour. The Spanish having fired upon the Dutch, the Dutch Admiral Van Tromp applied to Pennington for permission to attack the Downs. This was given, and the bulk of the Spanish fleet destroyed. The incident suggests that the English fleet was recognised as a neutral able to enforce its orders against all and sundry.
In connection with this, it is interesting to record the existence of a naval medal of the period, bearing the motto: “_Nec meta mihi quae terminus orbi_”--a free translation of which would be, “Nothing limits me but the size of the World.” However short practice may have fallen, Charles and his advisers had undoubtedly grasped the theory of “Sea Power.”
_THE CIVIL WAR._
When the Civil war began in 1642, the regular fleet consisted of forty-two ships. It was seized by the Parliamentarians and put under the Earl of Warwick, who held command for six years. With his fleet he very effectually patrolled the Channel, rendering abortive all over-sea attempts to assist the King with arms and ammunition.
On Warwick being superseded in 1648, the fleet mutinied, and seventeen ships sailed for Holland to join Prince Charles; but upon Warwick being reinstated the bulk of the fleet returned to its allegiance to the Parliamentarians. That the Parliamentarians were fully alive to the importance of naval power is evidenced by the fact that they seized every opportunity to lay down new ships; and “Parliament” once in power made it very clear indeed that the Sovereignty of the Seas would be upheld at all costs.
_THE FIRST DUTCH WAR._
Some forty years before, Sir Walter Raleigh, discussing the rise of the Dutch United Provinces, remarked: “But be their estate what it will, let them not deceive themselves in believing that they can make themselves masters of the sea.” He advised the Dutch to remember that their inward and outward passages were through British seas. There were but two courses open to the Dutch: amity with England or destruction of English naval power.
Since both nations had large commercial fleets, rivalries were inevitable; and for some long while previous to 1652, both sides were ready enough for a quarrel. Minor acts of hostility occurred. The Dutch failed to pay the annual tax for fishing in British waters. In May, 1652, a Dutch squadron refused to pay respect to the English flag. It was fired on accordingly, and after some negotiations, war was declared two months later.
The war is interesting because it saw an end to the old ideas of cross-raiding with ships regarded primarily as transports in connection with raids or to cover such. In this war fighting on the sea for the command of the sea first made a distinct appearance. Its birth was necessarily obscure and involved, both sides having the primary idea of attacking the commerce of the enemy and defending their own, rather than of attacking the enemy’s fleet. The earlier battles which took place were brought about by the defence of merchant fleets.
None of the battles of 1652 were conclusive, and though marked with extraordinary determination on both sides the damage done was, relatively speaking, small. The general advantage for the year rested slightly with the Dutch, mainly owing to Tromp’s victory over Blake, who was found in considerably inferior force in the Downs.
In February of the following year Tromp, with a fleet of seventy warships and a convoy of 250 merchant ships, some of which were armed, met Blake with sixty-six sail in the famous Three Days’ Battle.
In the course of this fight the Dutch lost at least eight warships, and a number of merchant-men variously estimated at from twenty-four to forty. The English admitted to the loss of only one ship. At the end of the third day, however, Blake drew off, and the Dutch admiral got what was left of his convoy into harbour.
Oliver Cromwell being now in full power, naval preparations were pressed forward with unexampled vigour, and on June 2nd an English fleet of ninety-five sail under Monk and Deane met Van Tromp and forced him to retreat. Reinforced by Blake with eighteen more ships the English fleet renewed the battle, ultimately driving Van Tromp into harbour with the loss of several ships.
On the 29th July the Dutch ran the blockade and came out. On the 31st a battle began in which Van Tromp was killed, and the Dutch with the loss of many ships driven into the Texel.
The English fleet, though it lost few ships, appears to have been badly mauled in this final battle, on account of which the Dutch claimed a victory.
[Illustration: BLAKE AND TROMP. PERIOD OF THE DUTCH WARS.]
In the following month the Dutch fleet again came out, and under De Witt took one convoy to the Sound and brought another back without interference. Just afterwards, however, their fleet was so severely injured by a tremendous three days’ gale that further naval operations were out of the question. Overtures for peace were therefore made, and concluded.
The types of English warships in this first Dutch war are given in Pepys’ Miscellany as follows:--
===================================================================== | | Length |Breadth.|Depth. |Burthen|Highest No. of Rate. | Name. |of Keel.| | | Tons. +-------------- | | ft. |ft. in. |ft. in.| | Men. | Guns. ------+-------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+-------+------ First |_Sovereign_ | 127 |46 6 |19 4 | 1141 | 600 | 100 Second|_Fairfax_ | 116 |34 9 |17 4½| 745 | 260 | 52 Third |_Worcester_ | 112 |32 8 |16 4 | 661 | 180 | 46 Fourth|_Ruby_ | 105½ |31 6 |15 9 | 556 | 150 | 40 Fifth |_Nightingale_| 88 |25 4 |12 8 | 300 | 90 | 24 Sixth |_Greyhound_ | 60 |20 3 |10 0 | 120 | 80 | 18 =====================================================================
The principal Dutch vessels were conspicuously inferior to the best of these English ones, and the war may be said to have been considerably decided by ship superiority. In the peace that followed--which was really very little better than an armed truce--the Dutch set themselves to build warships more on English lines. And, as we shall presently see, they evolved from the war,[15] future strategies based on its lessons.
Considering the number of battles and the desperate nature of them, it is perhaps curious to note the relatively small amount of damage done. With the advent of the porthole and the consequent multiplication of guns a hundred and fifty years before, it had seemed that any naval engagement must result in swift mutual destruction. Much the same kind of idea obtained as when at the end of 1910 a squadron of Dreadnoughts almost instantly obliterated a target five miles off. But as in the Armada fights, so in this First Dutch War, an immense amount of fighting was done with comparatively, and relatively to what might have been anticipated, small harm on either side.
This result is partly to be attributed to the fact that defence increased with offence. The warship proper was designed to stand hammering, and every increase in size, involving increased gun-carrying capacity, involved also increased strength of construction. Something may also be put down to the very inferior artillery then in use, and the great deal of boarding which took place.
There is some reason to believe that Cromwell, with his complete recognition of the advantages of naval power, with his assiduous energy in the creation of a strong fleet, recognised--as perhaps both Buckingham and Phineas Pett had done before--the advantages of the “big ship.” Yet under his rule no appreciable advance in size took place. Nor, for that matter, did it take place any time within a hundred and fifty years later on.
The reason is interesting. It was purely a matter of trees. The length of a ship was circumscribed by the height of trees; other dimensions by similar hard facts. The beam was dependent on the ship’s length; while the draught was governed by the harbours and docking facilities. It is doubtful whether any man ever sought to solve the problem of an invincible navy with more energy than Oliver Cromwell; yet under his rule nothing in the way of improvement was evolved at all comparable with the step taken with the _Royal Sovereign_ under the weaker Charles Stuart--Buckingham régime. The limitations of the tree proved the limitations of the ship.
When Cromwell died, his record was left in numbers. The Navy at his death consisted of 157 ships. His architectural improvements were but a new form of bottoms.[16]
Oliver Cromwell had not been long dead when the Navy--then under Monk--decided to restore the Monarchy. It sailed to Holland, embarked Charles II and James, Duke of York, and established Charles on the throne without opposition. Monk is popularly regarded as a political time-server. But in his change of sides he made one very important stipulation: that Charles was to pledge himself to the upkeep of the fleet. The fleet accomplished the Restoration. The bulk of evidence is that it did so with little regard for any issue other than the naval one.
_THE SECOND DUTCH WAR._
The second Dutch War broke out in 1665. As usual a state of unofficial war had preceded it. Both sides, having thought over the first war, had come to the conclusion that protecting their own merchant ships and attacking those of the enemy at one and the same time was an impossible proposition.
Both officially ordered their merchant ships to keep inside harbour; but in both nations there were traders who took their own risks at sea and found warships handy to protect them. None the less, this war is of much importance as the first in which the command of the sea, fleet against fleet, received general recognition.
The battles themselves of this war are of little interest. They were marked by that same equality of courage and determination which was an outstanding feature of the First War. Slight early English successes led to little but attacks on merchant shipping; then the Great Plague paralysed English efforts. The Dutch got to the mouth of the Thames, but a sudden sickness among their crews scared them off after a sixteen days’ blockade.
Following this the French took side with the Dutch; but inconclusive fighting still resulted, till the Dutch, imagining that they had done better than they really had, found themselves engaged in the battle of the North Foreland.
Defeated in this they retired to Ostend, and the English scored on their trade by landing operations and harbour attacks, the result of which Admiral Colomb has estimated as proportionately equivalent to sixty-six million pounds’ worth of damage at the present day! But it was conceded on the English side (_vide_ Pepys) that it was mainly a matter of luck that this immense blow was struck.
Shortly after this event, the Insular spirit asserted itself with what in these days is known as “Economy and Efficiency.” The Duke of York (afterwards James II) opposed it, but it was generally carried that the Dutch were defeated, and that a few economical fortifications would save the country against any further Dutch danger. No one having knowledge of the Dutch agreed. Indeed, the situation was precisely the same as when a few years ago the British Government cut down the Naval Programme. Charles II, peace talk being in the air, cut down expenses probably for his own ends; British Governments of the 1906–1907 era cut down with a view to expending the saving on “social reforms.” But the practical results were identical. The Dutch in their era did what the Germans did in our own--met the decrease by an increase. They omitted to consider the ethics involved; they looked merely after their own ends. The result was a great Dutch attack on the Thames, which, though not so serious as the similar previous English attack on them, produced an enormous amount of mischief.
That the Dutch did not bombard London itself was purely a matter of contrary winds and luck. They did destroy numerous new warships on the river, and Sheerness fell entirely into their hands. “Dutch guns were heard in London”--to quote the popular histories. Actually luck favoured the English, and diplomacy secured a peace which the reduced fleet could never have achieved. The pen, for the moment, proved mightier than the sword. England obtained thereby a peace favourable to her, while the Dutch secured a breathing space to enable them to prepare for the Third Dutch War, which, had the Second been carried to its end against them, would never have occurred.
_THE THIRD DUTCH WAR._
This War also began in the usual way--irregular attacks on commerce, without any declaration of war, and in March, 1672, an English Squadron wrecked havoc on the Dutch Indiamen. As in the Second War, the Dutch after this prohibited their merchant ships from proceeding to sea. No such prohibition took effect in England, where the merchant navy rapidly increased.
In the Second War the French were the allies of the Dutch. In the Third, they joined in with the English. In both cases their underlying political motive appears to have been to egg Great Britain and the Dutch on to mutual destruction. The assistance actually obtained by the Dutch from the French in the Second War was a minus quantity, and though in the Third, French ships actually joined the English fleet, the advantage therefrom ended there.
The allied fleet, under the command of the Duke of York, consisted of sixty-five English and thirty-six French warships, twenty-two fire ships, and a number of small craft. This fleet lay at Sole Bay (Southwold on the Suffolk coast). Here they were surprised by De Ruyter with ninety-one men of war, forty-four fire ships, and a number of small craft.
The _Royal James_, flagship of the Earl of Sandwich, who commanded one of the two divisions of the English Fleet, was attacked and destroyed by fire-ships, and the Earl was drowned in attempting to escape. The French Squadron under D’Estrées fell back and took little part in the fight. None the less, however, victory rested with the English, and the Dutch retreated to their own coasts, and were blockaded in the Texel. On shore the Dutch were badly pressed by the French armies, their naval energies being restricted accordingly.
With the approach of winter, the Allied fleet was broken up and returned to its harbours. In the early part of the following year, the Dutch conceived the project of blocking the English fleet in the Thames, and prepared eight ships full of stones with that object in view. This appears to have been the first instance of a device similar to that more recently unsuccessfully undertaken by the Americans, at Santiago de Cuba, in the Spanish-American War, and by the Japanese, at Port Arthur, in the Russo-Japanese War. The Dutch attack was never actually made; presumably circumstances did not admit of it. In the view of Admiral Colomb, it was frustrated by the English fleet putting to sea at an earlier date than had been expected.
The Allied fleet formed a junction off Rye, in May. It consisted altogether of eighty-four men-of-war, twenty-six fire-ships and auxiliaries. The English divisions were commanded by Prince Rupert and Spragge. The third division was under D’Estrées as before, but in order to avoid a repetition of what had happened at Sole Bay, the French ships were distributed in all three divisions of the fleet, instead of in a single division as they previously had been.
Having embarked a number of troops, the Allies sailed for Zealand, and found the Dutch fleet concentrating at the mouth of the Scheldt. It consisted of about seventy men-of-war, under De Ruyter, Tromp and Bankert. For some days, owing to fog and bad weather, no fighting was possible; but on the 28th of May, the Dutch weighed anchor and a battle of the usual sort took place, both sides claiming victory. The loss of life in the Allied fleet, crowded as it was with troops, was very heavy, and no attempt was made to follow up the Dutch, who had retired inside the mouth of the river.
On the 4th of June, the Dutch fleet again came out. The English retired before it. An entirely inconclusive action eventually resulted, after which each fleet returned to harbour.
Having embarked a number of fresh troops at Sheerness, the Allies again put to sea and appeared on the Dutch coast. No landing was, however, attempted; and on the 10th of August the final battle took place. The French fleet on this occasion was allowed to act by itself, and, as before, drew off and left the English to shift for themselves. Spragge, having had two flagships disabled, was drowned in moving to a third, and victory, such as it was, went to the Dutch. No further battles took place, and in 1664 peace was concluded.
The net result of these three wars was in favour of the English, but mainly on the trade issue.
At the beginning of the First, the Dutch had by far the larger merchant shipping. At the end of the Third, the proportion was reversed.
Although tactics, as we understand them, cannot be said to have been employed, certain definite war lessons were undoubtedly learned. It came to be thoroughly believed that the principal use of a fleet was to attack the fleet of the enemy; and on that account these wars are an important feature of English naval history.
Following the conclusion of peace, the English Navy was entirely neglected, and the condition of the ships became so bad that in 1679 a Commission was appointed and thirty new ships were laid down. But the majority of these ships, having been launched, were allowed to decay; Charles II’s early interest in the fleet having become a dead letter in his later years.
When James II came to the throne in 1685, he appointed another Special Commission, and the repair of the Navy was systematically undertaken. The _personnel_, however, was neglected. It remained in a very dissatisfied state, and tacitly agreed to his deposition.
At the abdication of James II, in December, 1688, the Navy consisted of 173 ships, manned by 42,003 men, and carrying 6,930 guns. Of these ships, nine were first-rate, 11 second, 39 third, 41 fourth, 3 fifth, and 6 sixth. There were 26 fire-ships and 39 small craft. The best of the first-rates in those days was the _Britannia_. She was of 1,739 tons, carried 100 guns and a crew of 780 men. Her length was 146 feet, her beam 47 feet 4 inches, and her draught 20 feet. The second-rate ships were 90 gun-vessels, third-rate 70 guns, and fourth-rate 54.
During James II’s reign, bomb vessels were first introduced and regular establishments of stores were instituted. It is somewhat difficult to assess how far naval progress was actually indebted to this, the first King of England who was a naval officer, and how far to the efforts of a determined few who realised the absolute importance of naval power. Probably of James I, as of all the Stuarts,[17] it may be said that they realised the principle, but required pressing to act upon it. To thus acting may be traced the unpopularity of at least some of the Stuarts--there are practically no signs that the nation generally understood the importance of a powerful Navy. All the indications are in a contrary direction.