Part 22

It has been observed, that a national debt contracted, no matter for what, occasioning in every thing an indispensable increase of price, the Colonies pay their quota of such a debt (notwithstanding the drawbacks) when they purchase goods at the rate to which the said debt has advanced them: it must also have been noticed, even how necessary it was that the price of commodities from the Colonies should increase in proportion to the price of those of the Mother-country, in order that the former might be able to answer that advance of prices, without hurting the two essential points, consumption and re-production; whence it follows, that if new taxes are introduced, _either directly or indirectly_, to defray their pretended proportion in the interest of the national debt, neither harm nor good will result, _if the price of their commodities be increased in the same proportion_; but that if they be taxed, without that increase in the price of their commodities, they will consume by so much less of national goods _or of foreign ones paid for in national merchandise_, that is, to the amount of the sum which the tax shall have taken from them: this point is evident. Thus it is, that after the war in 1755, all _Europe_ was obliged, as has been shewn, to increase her prices, so as to put them on a level with those in _England_; and had not _Great Britain_ submitted to that reciprocal advance, and all the rest of _Europe_ condescended to receive only, for the 13 _effective_ millions of their own goods, the 13 _nominal_ millions of that quantity of _English_ commodities which was worth 14, on account of the taxes only, the nominal million which would have remained in the hands of _England_, would have been without value, _and no longer reproduced for want of consumption, for want of means to pay for it, and to encourage such a reproduction_.

I think also that it is useless to examine whether the colonies can add any thing to the real power of a nation, since, in order to be convinced of the very reverse, it is enough to observe, that if 2 or 300 ships mounting from 10 to 120 guns be required, in order to protect effectually an extent of between 1500 and 2000 leagues of _colonial_ coasts, distant 1000, 1500, nay 4000 leagues from the mother-country, the 100,000 men employed in time of war, on those floating citadels, are always furnished by the Metropolis, and do not in any manner exempt her either from erecting those permanent citadels which must be scattered along the coasts of the mother-country, or from providing the number of men necessary to defend them in case of an invasion. In this point of view, the colonies would therefore rather diminish than increase the national power.

On the other hand, experience has just taught us, that as soon as those very colonies, for which it is pretended so much blood has been spilt, and so much money wasted, are in a situation to stand up in their own defence, there is no depending upon them, but inasmuch as they are on the footing of allies; and interest alone fixes the duration of every alliance.

The above three objects deserve not, methinks, any further dissertation: the question that merits a more particular scrutiny, is that which concerns the utility of those very colonies, when their weakness is a pledge of their fidelity.

That utility consists in securing to the mother-country, 1st, an exclusive mart for such goods as she thinks proper to export there; and 2dly, the exclusive sale of the returns, in which, it is said, she finds a compensation for the expence she is at to carry her goods to that market.

I shall investigate, under various points of view, all relative to those two objects, the utility of those colonies whose commerce is fully ascertained, before I speak of any other; and I shall only draw the necessary inferences from the most incontrovertible facts.

_1st._

We find in the Statements of Sir _Charles Whitworth_, that the exports from _England_ to the colonies, whose independence can no longer be disputed, amounted annually, upon a medium of 5 years, taken from 1769 to 1773, to the sum of 2,491,230_l._

Now the two wars of 1739 and 1755, undertaken, it is said, for the protection of those colonies, that is, _to preserve_ to the mother-country _the monopoly of them_, have cost _Great Britain_ 99,141,625_l._; and these 99 millions, though the interest has been reduced as often as possible, still cost _England_ annually 3,500,000_l._

It is then a sum of 3,500,000_l._ which, even so early as the year 1762, _England_ had resolved to pay annually, in order to preserve, and the better to secure to herself the exclusive privilege of exporting annually to _North-America_, _European_ goods to the amount of 2,491,230_l._

_2dly._

The imports from those colonies into _Great Britain_, upon a medium of the said 5 years, did not exceed the sum of 1,208,665_l._—_Great Britain_, therefore, has enjoyed during the space of 5 years, a pretended balance of 1,282,565_l._ against those colonies;—but is that glorious balance any thing more than the advantage of having given to those colonies, in the space of 5 years, a credit in the sum of 6,412,825_l._ supposing that such sum was the amount of her claims in that part of _America_, or of the half, if in fact half only of that sum remained due to her, notwithstanding the enormous appearance in Sir _Charles Whitworth_’s Statements?

_3dly._

If the colonies, now independent, will henceforth call in all the other nations of _Europe_ to a share in the advantage of crediting them in the same manner, can it be supposed that _England_ will not find in _Europe_, some other nation willing to receive that part of the _English_ credit, which the independent colonies shall no longer think proper to make use of? In this case, can any thing more be required, on the part of _England_, than to manufacture in less quantity such goods as suit only the inhabitants of _America_, and somewhat more of those that may suit the different nations of _Europe_; and to this first operation to add the complaisance of receiving a greater quantity of their goods than she has imported hitherto?—In this case likewise, what ruinous consequences could _England_ experience by exporting her goods to her neighbours, instead of sending them to _America_?

_4thly._

If the complaints set up by _England_ against the United States, are grounded only on their incapacity of making returns proportionate to the value of the goods exported there since the peace, are the United States to blame if _European_ cupidity has exported to _America_, in the space of six months, as much as its inhabitants could consume and pay for in two years? Does such an event, almost infallibly the result of a long interruption of correspondence, prove any thing more than the necessity of a balance between production and consumption, the advantage of knowing as soon as possible the difference from the one to the other, the inconvenience of a trade, in which we lose sight of our capital for whole years together, and the advantage of a trade which would 5 or 6 months after return to the hands of the _capitalist_ the stock he had laid out?

_5thly._

Had even those colonies remained in, or returned to a state of subjection to _England_, would not the same interruption of correspondence have been productive of the same inconvenience?—During the war, which terminated by the treaty of _Aix-la-Chapelle_, all the _French_ colonies had remained under the dominion of _France_, and yet during all the first, and great part of the second year of peace most of the _French_ goods were sold at _Martinique_ and _St. Domingo_, 15 and 20 _per cent._ below the prime cost in _Europe_;—between dependent and independent colonies, then, in this respect, who can perceive a shadow of difference?

_6thly._

If the _English_ merchants, after having over-stocked the _American_ markets with _European_ goods, have attempted to strip _America_ of the little money she had to boast of, and to leave her goods on her own hands, do the complaints set up in _England_ on this subject, prove any thing essential either to _England_, or to the rest of the world, more than the impossibility of carrying into execution beyond a certain degree, the plan, as destructive as it is absurd, of any other trade but that which is founded on a reciprocity of advantages, on _an exchange of the gifts with which Nature and Art have favoured one country, against those with which Nature and Art have favoured another country_? And even, upon a supposition, that _America_ should have returned under the domination of _England_, if the _English_ merchants had, in this case, attempted to wrest from her the little money she was possessed of, would not the _American_ colonists have been justified in taking every measure necessary to preserve it?—Would they in enforcing that right have been free from the misfortune, common to mankind, of always doing, in order to guard against an injury, much more than is either just or necessary?—The impossibility of making returns adequate to the extravagant invoices sent by the _French_ traders to their colonies in _America_, after the war I have mentioned, determined also the agents of the _French_ trade to strip those colonies of all the money they could lay their hands upon: no other way to put a stop to that spoliation was left, but to bore in the middle of their dollars a large hole, which restoring the equilibrium between the rapacity of the foreign trader, and the wants of the interior commerce, preserved within those colonies the trifling sum in specie that still remained there. Soon after, the equilibrium was also restored between the imports and the consumption; and from that instant an end was put to the thirst after money, as well as to the necessity of boring the dollars.—What difference then can exist, in this respect also, between a colony and a free State?

_7thly._

All the exports from _England_ to the colonies, the monopoly of which she has preserved by the peace, (including her trade to _India_) amounted, in 1773, to 2,430,420_l._ (for the details see Sir _Charles Whitworth_). Now the annual expence of the _British_ navy, and its accessaries, considering the increase in that of _France_, must be, at present, or will be soon, 2,000,000_l._ May it not be fairly concluded, that _England_ is about to pay the annual sum of 2 millions sterling, in order to maintain herself in the exclusive privilege of carrying annually to the distance of 1500, of 2000, of 4 or 6000 leagues, the value of 2,432,420_l._ in _European_ goods?—And would not that privilege be dearly bought, were not _France_ to lay out annually likewise 45 millions of livres _tournois_, in protecting her privileged exportation?

_8thly_,

I have at present before my eyes no other standard, whereby to estimate the exportation of _France_ to her sugar-colonies, than that of _England_ to hers; that exportation amounted, in 1773, to 197,236_l._ But the population of the _French_ colonies is far from being in a treble proportion to that of the _English_ colonies, and luxury is equal in both; yet let us suppose that the amount of the exports from _France_ to her colonies, including those she sends to _India_, be annually 80 millions _tournois_.—The interest of the national debt in _France_ is 202 millions _tournois_, (see _Administration des Finances de la France_) one half, or rather three fourths of which have been incurred for the protection of her establishments in those parts of the world.—May it not be said, that _France_ is at the yearly expence of 150 millions _tournois_, independently of the 45 millions for her navy, for the purpose of maintaining herself in the exclusive privilege of exporting every year the value of 80 millions _tournois_, in _European_ goods, to her possessions in _India_ and _America_?

_9thly_,

All the _European_ exports, carried by _England_ in the year 1773, either to _India_, _Africa_, or _America_, including the exports for which she held an exclusive privilege in the part of _America_ now independent, amounted to 4,975,192_l._ we shall say 5 millions:—if you value at 10 millions of the same currency, the exports of all the other nations of _Europe_ to those parts of the world, we shall find a capital of 15 millions sterling in goods annually exported from _Europe_:—but the yearly expence of a navy, which cannot be dispensed with for the protection of those exports, is valued at 8 millions sterling, 4 of which fall to the share of _England_ and _France_.

Exclusive of those 8 millions sterling, the interest paid by _England_ to acquire, preserve, and protect that part of _European_ exports that concerns her, amounts to about 6,500,000_l._ including that of the last war; the interest paid by _France_, comes nearly to the same sum; the interest paid by _Spain_ could not be computed, were the depopulation of that country to be taken into the account; but estimate them at 4 millions, including those which other _European_ nations have sacrificed to the same Idol: let us say nothing about _Holland_, who for many years (except the few last) has made some figure _Europe_, only by her good luck in alleviating the distresses of others, her sole motive for which was her own advantage: and we shall sum up, at last, an annual expenditure of 25 millions sterling, in interest and naval expences, incurred by _Europe_, in order to preserve the exclusive privilege, 1st, of exporting every year 15 millions sterling in _European_ goods to her colonies, both in _India_ and _America_; and, 2dly, of establishing in those colonies _the system of government best calculated to prevent that exportation from becoming more considerable_.

_10thly_,

We have observed, that the exports from _England_ to the colonies of _America_, and to _India_, amounted, in 1773, to 4,900 and some thousand pounds sterling, suppose 5 millions: now her importation of commodities from those various countries is about 5,900,000_l._ (see Sir _Charles Whitworth_); but we have also noticed, that she left yearly in _North America_ 1,282,000_l._ more than she received therefrom. This matter, considered in the most favourable light, that is, as a balance of trade, ought to be added to the former; and the whole together will give us a total of 7 millions, shewing an annual benefit of 2 millions some hundred thousand pounds sterling.

It appears then, that an annual benefit of 2 millions some hundred thousand pounds sterling costs _England_ annually 6,500,000_l._ interest for her debt, and 2 millions for the support of her navy.

_11thly_,

We have seen, that the annual and general exportation of _European_ goods to _America_ and _India_ amounted to about 15 millions sterling.—If 5 millions of _English_ exports return no more than 2 millions some hundred thousand pounds annual benefit to _England_, that _England_, who sets the highest price on her goods of all kinds, the general exportation of 15 millions, to which _England_ contributes only one third, cannot, of course, afford to the whole of _Europe_, a profit of above 6 millions and some hundred thousand pounds;—but it seems that a benefit of 6 millions and some hundred thousand pounds is dearly bought at the rate of 25 millions laid out annually by _Europe_, both in paying the interest of their respective national debts, and for the support of the _European_ navies designed to preserve, protect, and secure such a benefit.

_12thly_,

If it were very true, as it is to this day asserted, that those 25 millions of annual and indisputable expenditure, are in reality so many yearly losses to the nations who sustain it, might it not be reasonably concluded, would it not be impossible not to conclude, that all the colonies of _Europe_ were established only for her ruin?—If we only attend to the last war, which in fact loads the different nations who took a share in it, with an annual interest of 9 or 10 millions,—9 or 10 millions to be paid every year, partly to preserve the right, partly to obtain the permission of exporting _European_ commodities into a country, of which the inhabitants, besides their own importation, consume annually to the amount of only 2,491,230_l._ of those same commodities which are exported to them by others—who (to assume the trader’s phrase) cannot clear by that exportation, a greater annual profit than 3, 4, or even 500,000_l._! ... it seems indeed that one cannot see without surprise and concern, the shocking disproportion between the end proposed, and the sole means of obtaining it.

_13thly_,

If, on the contrary, it be true, as I maintain it to be, that after the peace, when a perfect equilibrium is restored to every thing, the 9 or 10 millions interest of the national debt, has no other effect but that of ADDING TO EVERY THING A NOMINAL VALUE WHICH INJURES NO ONE, THOUGH IT MAY BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO MANY; A NOMINAL VALUE, WHICH, IN EVERY STATE, PROPORTIONS ITSELF, FIRST TO THE SUM OF ITS REVENUE COMPARED TO THAT OF ITS DEBT, AND SOON AFTER TO THE DIFFERENCE WHICH THE DEBT CONTRACTED BY THE NATION CALLED THE MOST LOADED, AND WHICH, IN FACT, IS ONLY THE GREATEST EXPORTER, HAS PRODUCED IN THAT ENORMOUS QUANTITY OF THE GOODS SHE EXPORTS;—if it appear more reasonable to adopt that idea, than to give up a trade, which, without that very idea, would prove the most absurd, as well as the most destructive that human genius could invent, (_the alternative seems to be forcibly established_);—in this case the regret will be heart-felt, when we consider the loss of men sacrificed during the last war: but if from this general aggregate of truths little suspected, and much less reflected upon, there should result a system of Politics in _Europe_, of Administration in her different States, of Government in her Colonies, which should procure to _Europe_, at the least expence, the greatest exportation of that of which she has a superabundance, and the greatest importation of that in which she is deficient ... then indeed, then, might we find consolation for the evil, in adverting to its consequences.—And, upon this principle, what can _England_ have suffered by losing her sovereignty over _America_?

_14thly_,

The contagion of example has been apprehended. Let us suppose the fact. What then would be the loss sustained by _Europe_? None, I believe, unless the consequence of the general independency of the colonies, should be that they would give up _European_ commodities they have been used to, and which they can so readily procure by means of a multitude of other articles, which would be of no value to them were they not calculated to procure them those _European_ commodities which they are in the habit of consuming.—But I beg leave to ask, what purpose could their independence answer?—It appears to me, they could not think of it without a palpable folly; and that it is impossible they should think of it, _without that kind of vexation which brings a man to the necessity of choosing between two extremes_.—Another consideration, which tends to make _Europe_ easy, at least in regard to the colonies situated beyond the tropic, is, that no rivalship can subsist between them and their mother-countries in any thing that concerns the soil and industry.

In regard to the productions of the soil, all that part of _America_ inclosed within even the 30th degree of north, and the 30th degree of south latitude, could not yield, without double and treble expence, any thing that can be produced in _Europe_, and in the other part of _America_, from the 30th degree to the pole. And, on the other hand, at what an amazing expence must all _Europe_, jointly with that part of _America_ now independent, produce, even in a kind of degradation, what the other part of _America_ yields naturally in the most perfect state!

In regard to industry, can it be feared that the _South Americans, even supposing them independent_, should be tempted to import rough materials from _Europe_, in order to have them wrought by _American hands, which are so naturally and so profitably employed in the production of American articles_? Is it even to be feared that they should aim at a competition with the _Europeans_ in the exportation of _American_ articles, when they are in need of ship-timber, or rather when in this, much more than in any other respects, there is no _European_ work, which, if done in _America_, would not cost three times as much as when imported from _Europe_?—All _European_ prejudices, relative to commerce, are founded on the following principle, which may be looked upon as the _quintessence_ of the Navigation-Act:—_To do every thing ourselves, in order that no one’s assistance may be wanted,—that no one may do without our assistance,—and that no assistance be given, but at the prices prescribed by the Lords of the Seas._—The Navigation-Act was, without doubt, the last effort of the human mind about the middle of the 17th century[11].

It seems to me, that the only point which essentially concerns all _Europe_, in regard to other parts of the world, where she can give law, would be to find out _what kind of Administration would be the best calculated to increase in all those parts the consumption of ~European~ _goods, and to procure to herself a more considerable stock of foreign goods and products,—which would, as they have ever done, give, ~either directly or indirectly~, a fresh encouragement to her agriculture and manufactures_. Let any one examine, whether the utility of the colonies be not strictly confined to this single point.

I speak of all _Europe_, it is true, as if she formed but one State, whilst she is supposed to exhibit so many interests, and these so very opposite to each other. This question deserves a deeper discussion than I am able to give it; yet I presume to think that the answer I could give, might be susceptible of demonstration, had we, on all the countries in _Europe_, statements only similar to those which Sir _Charles Whitworth_ has given of the _British_ trade, and were we to add thereto the means and faculties which are to be met with in _England_ of procuring the details and proofs of every particular that concerns the public. Destitute however of an advantage so precious, so worthy of a nation sufficiently enlightened to dread nothing but being left in the dark on any part of her own interests, of a nation judicious enough not to disdain a ray of light, from whatever quarter it may come, and generous enough to perceive, with pleasure, that by enriching herself, she has, to this day, enriched all _Europe_;—

If it were admitted, that money is only the representation of value; that multiplying the sign, without multiplying the articles which it is calculated to represent, is debasing fruitlessly the representation; and that, on the contrary, multiplying the article is the most infallible means of attracting the sign and keeping it up to its value:

If it were acknowledged, that nothing contributes so much to the multiplying of the articles, as the multiplicity of the channels through which they can be introduced:

If it were acknowledged, that the multiplicity of channels in another nation, for the introduction of our own goods, is necessarily inseparable from the multiplicity of channels opened in our own country for the introduction of foreign goods:

If it were acknowledged, that with the fullest persuasion that money ought to be the sole aim of trade, it has only proved, hitherto, the means of supporting it: