CHAPTER XI.

THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY.

(September 28-November 11, 1918.)

Foch’s Final Strategy—Progress of the Campaign in August and September—The End of the Siegfried Zone—The 66th Division in Action—The Fight of 8th October—The South Africans take their Objectives—The Fight of 9th October—The Brigade Captures Bertry, Maurois, and Reumont—The Line of the Selle reached—The Enemy Position at Le Cateau—Preparation for the Attack—Lieutenant Hewat’s Exploit—The Battle of 17th October—South African Captures and Casualties—Splendour of the Achievement—The Last Stage in the Campaign—Tanner’s Mobile Column—The Last Shots at Grandrieu—The Armistice.

As the last stage in this record approaches, it is necessary to gather up the threads of the campaign and observe the position of the great Allied movement at the time when the South Africans appeared again on the main front of battle. During the summer months Foch had warded off Ludendorff’s successive assaults, and had accumulated a reserve, which at the end of July, by the accession of the American troops, gave him a final superiority both in men and material over anything which the enemy could compass. He had also devised a system of tactics which embraced all that was best in the German plan, and avoided its defects. By his counterstroke on 18th July against von Boehn’s exposed flank he had given the _coup de grâce_ to Germany’s offensive, wrested from her the initiative, and forced her back in some confusion on her defences. But the final blow could not yet be struck. It was the business of Foch to keep the battle “nourished,” and at the same time to economize his forces till the moment came for the grand climax. He had to wear down the enemy methodically by attacks on limited fronts, ringing the changes over the whole battle-ground. The possession of abundant reserves and of such a weapon as his light tanks enabled him to “mount” a new action rapidly in any sector. After each blow he must stay his hand as soon as serious resistance developed, and attack instantly in another place. The enemy would thus be subjected to a constant series of surprises. Before his reserves could be brought up he would have lost heavily in ground and men; his “mass of manœuvre” would be needed to fill up the gaps in his front, and by swift stages that “mass of manœuvre” would diminish. From 8th August to 26th September it was Foch’s task to crumble the enemy front, destroy the last remnants of his reserves, force him behind all his prepared defences, and make ready for the final battle which would give victory.

The tale of that great achievement—one of the greatest in the history of war—can here only be sketched. The record of a brigade moves for the most part in the mist; its story is of tactical successes, which may be only a minute part in the major purpose. Rarely, indeed, does it appear, like the South Africans at Marrières Wood, in the very centre of the stage, and the work of a small unit become the key to the strategical fortunes of an army. On 8th August Haig struck east of Amiens, followed by Humbert on the 9th, and Mangin on the 18th. On the 21st Byng’s Third Army moved, and next day Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, and on the 26th Horne’s First Army astride the Scarpe. By the end of the month we had carried the Bapaume Ridge, the intermediate position which Ludendorff had hoped to hold till the coming of winter, when he could retire at leisure behind the Siegfried zone. On 2nd September the Canadians broke through the Drocourt-Quéant switch, and turned the Siegfried flank on the north. Steadily during the next week Haig forced the Germans behind the water line of the Canal du Nord, and inside the main Siegfried defences. On 12th September Pershing and the Americans far in the south put an end to the St. Mihiel salient. By the 24th Ludendorff was everywhere back in his last lines—the “granite wall” which the German army chiefs had told their countrymen could never be pierced. There he hoped to stand till such time as winter took the edge from the Allies’ ardour, and disposed them to compromise.

[Illustration: THE VICTORIOUS ADVANCE. OPERATIONS OF THE XIII. CORPS UP TO 11TH NOVEMBER 1918.]

He had not reckoned with Foch—nor with Haig, for on the 26th there began on the Meuse the _arpeggio_ of attack which broke through the defences prepared during four years, and in six weeks brought Germany to surrender. On the 27th Haig struck at the main Siegfried zone from Cambrai to St. Quentin, and his blow was meant to shatter. It is no secret that the opinion of his Allies and of his own Government was not favourable to his boldness: even Foch, while he agreed that the plan was the right one, doubted its feasibility. The British Commander-in-Chief took upon himself the responsibility of one of the most audacious operations of the War, and, daring greatly, greatly succeeded. That day Byng and Horne with the Third and First British Armies crossed the Canal du Nord, and next day reached the Scheldt Canal. On the 28th, too, the Belgians and Plumer’s Second Army swept east from Ypres, and Mangin and Guillaumat opened a new battle between the Ailette and the Vesle. On the 29th came the main blow at the Siegfried citadel, when Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, in conjunction with Byng and Débeney, crossed the Scheldt Canal, and stormed their way far into the fortified zone. In days of wind and cloud they enlarged this gap till St. Quentin fell, and Cambrai was utterly outflanked. On 30th October the Australians broke through the northern part of the Beaurevoir-Fonsommes line, the last of the Siegfried works, and looked into open country. Between the 27th September and the 7th October Haig had crossed the two great canals, and destroyed all but the final line of the Siegfried zone, while this final line in one part had been passed. The time had come for an advance on a broad front which should obliterate the remnants of the Siegfried works, and with them Germany’s last hope of a safe winter position. Her nearest refuge would be the Meuse, and, shepherded by Foch’s unrelenting hand, it was very certain that her armies would never reach the banks of that fateful river.

[Sidenote: _Sept. 28._]

On 28th September the 66th Division had been transferred to Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, and by the 5th October it had moved south to the old Somme area, and was in the neighbourhood of Ronssoy. It was now part of Sir T. L. Morland’s XIII. Corps, which contained also the 18th, 25th, and 50th Divisions. Of these, the 25th was composed of troops brought from the Italian front, and the 50th, like the 66th, of battalions from Salonika and Palestine. Two of the divisions of the corps were, therefore, made up largely of men who had malaria in their bones, and there was some doubt as to how they would stand an autumn campaign in Picardy—a doubt which was soon to be put at rest. The 18th and 25th Divisions and the South African Brigade were well seasoned to northern warfare.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 6._]

On 6th October the 66th Division was warned that it would be used presently in a major operation in which the Fourth and Third Armies would co-operate. The object was to destroy the remnants of the Beaurevoir line, and with it the Siegfried zone. The country was the last slopes of the Picardy uplands, where they break down to the flats of the Scheldt—wide undulations enclosing broad, shallow valleys. There was little cover save the orchards and plantations around the farms and hamlets, but there were many sunken roads, and these, combined with the perfect field afforded everywhere for machine-gun fire, made it a good land for rearguard fighting. The XIII. Corps was now the right flank of the Fourth Army, with the II. United States Corps on its right, and the British V. Corps on its left. The 66th Division was in the centre of the corps, and the task specially committed to it was the capture of Serain. General Bethell attacked with two brigades—the South African on the right and the 198th on the left, each on a two-battalion front. The starting-point was a line running north-west and south-east through the eastern outskirts of Beaurevoir village. In the South African Brigade the 2nd Regiment was on the right and the 4th on the left, with the 1st Regiment in support.

[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL D. M. MACLEOD, D.S.O., M.C., D.C.M., Commanding 4th Regiment, South African Infantry.]

[Sidenote: _Oct. 8._]

It was a wild, wet autumn morning when Byng and Rawlinson advanced on a seventeen-mile front, from south of Cambrai to Sequehart, while Débeney extended the battle four miles farther south. Zero hour for the Fourth Army was 5.10; for the Third Army, 4.30. The South African Brigade had moved on the 7th into the Siegfried lines at Bony, and by 3.30 a.m. on the 8th it had occupied its battle position. Unfortunately the assembly was not completed without loss. A preliminary attack by the 38th and 50th Divisions on Villers and Villers-Outréaux brought down a retaliatory barrage from the enemy, and among the wounded was Lieutenant-Colonel Bamford, the commanding officer of the 2nd Regiment. His place was taken by Major Sprenger.

The attack at 5.10, covered by a creeping barrage, moved swiftly towards its goal, and by 7 o’clock the South Africans had their first objective. The enemy resisted stoutly, and made full use of the sunken roads, especially at the Usigny ravine, which was in the ground of the 2nd Regiment. There he disputed every yard with machine guns and snipers, and did not yield till all his posts had been killed or captured. The whippet tanks, moving in front of the infantry, were mostly put out of action by shell-fire at the start, but one arrived opportunely at the Usigny ravine, and helped to break down the last resistance there. The 2nd Regiment took at this stage nearly 500 prisoners, two anti-tank guns, seventeen machine guns, and four field-pieces. These last were captured by a few men under Lieutenant E. J. Brook and Sergeant Hinwood, who pushed forward and rushed the guns 400 yards south-east of Petite Folie farm, and then turned them on the retreating enemy. The 4th Regiment on the left had also to face heavy machine-gun fire, but it swept through the German position at La Sablonnière and Hamage Farm, taking no less than thirty-five machine guns.

As soon as the first objective was won the ground was consolidated. Covering posts were pushed out, and the two regiments were reorganized. The supporting battalion, the 1st Regiment, had been caught in the early morning barrage on the railway embankment north of Beaurevoir, and had suffered 23 casualties. Later it moved east of Beaurevoir, and provided a platoon to reinforce the 2nd before retiring to brigade reserve. The losses so far in the assaulting battalions had not been unduly heavy. The 2nd had suffered most in its commissioned ranks. Lieutenant R. G. A. M’Carter had been killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bamford, Captain Symons, Lieutenant Egan, and Second-Lieutenants Giddy, Birrell, Fernie, Roberts, Gunn, and Francis wounded, the last officer subsequently dying of his wounds. The 4th had 45 men killed, and 4 officers and 194 men wounded.

[Illustration: SOUTH AFRICANS’ ATTACK.]

The first objective having been taken, the 199th Brigade, according to plan, took up the attack, leap-frogging the South African and 198th Brigades, and by 11 a.m. had taken Serain and reached the final line. For a little its left flank was exposed, for Villers-Outréaux was still in German hands. By three in the afternoon, however, the V. Corps had succeeded in carrying that village, and the XIII. Corps was able to establish itself securely east of Prémont and Serain. It had been a day of unblemished success. Haig and Débeney had advanced between three and four miles, and the Siegfried zone had disappeared in a cataclysm. The enemy was falling back to the Oise and the Selle, and for the moment was in dire confusion. Every road converging upon Le Cateau was blocked with troops and transport, and our cavalry were galloping eastward to harass the retreat. Next day Cambrai fell, and the Germans retired behind the line of the Selle. The war of positions had ceased, and the combatants were now in open country.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 9._]

On the 9th Byng and Rawlinson pressed their advantage against the stricken enemy, who had no position on which he could stand, short of the Selle river. The South Africans began the day in reserve, the attack on Maretz being conducted by the 198th and 199th Brigades. By 10 o’clock Maretz, Avelu, and Elincourt had fallen, and half an hour later the South Africans passed through the two brigades and moved against the second objective, a line east of Maurois and Honnechy and Gattignies Wood. There was some hope that before nightfall the crossings of the Selle might be seized and the ridge to the east, which, it was clear, were the immediate objects of the German retreat. But though the enemy was disordered, he was not in rout, and his machine gunners fought stubborn rearguard actions. The 2nd Regiment on the right, now under Major Sprenger, came under heavy fire as soon as it emerged from the eastern skirts of Maretz. As its left approached Gattignies Wood, it was strongly opposed by machine guns and snipers, but by the assistance of two armoured cars the southern part of the wood was cleared. On the right the advance was held up for half an hour by enemy posts along the Le Cateau railway. To add to Sprenger’s difficulties, the 4th Regiment, under MacLeod, on his left was compelled to veer north towards Bertry, since the troops on its left had fallen slightly behind and got out of touch. He was compelled to bring up one of his supporting companies, and presently established his line on the Cambrai railway, where many machine guns and prisoners were taken. Before him lay the villages of Maurois and Honnechy, which appeared to be lightly held, since some of the houses were flying white flags. Sprenger, with three companies in line and one in support, moved through the village with little opposition, and was received with wild enthusiasm by the French inhabitants. It was the first time the South Africans had liberated an area not cleared of its civil population. A little after 1 p.m. he reached his final objective, where he found his flanks exposed, since he had outrun the general advance.

Meantime MacLeod with the 4th Regiment had had severe fighting. His task was simple till he reached the northern edge of Gattignies Wood, which was held in strength by the enemy. By a flanking movement he overcame the resistance, and pushed on to the south-west skirts of Bertry. This village was not in the Brigade’s area, but the delay in the advance of the division on its left made any further movement by the 4th Regiment impossible till Bertry had been taken. Accordingly Captain Tomlinson, commanding the left company, swung northwards and occupied the village. By 4.30 p.m. MacLeod had reached his objective, and pushed outposts to link up with Sprenger. The Brigade was now established on a line east of Maurois and Honnechy.

The day had gone so well that it seemed as if more might be accomplished than had been forecast in the original plan. The cavalry was ordered to go through and ride for Le Cateau and beyond, in the hope of cutting the main enemy communications through Valenciennes. By 2 p.m. the Canadian Cavalry Brigade had gone forward, encircled Reumont, and formed a picket line beyond it. The South Africans were instructed to make good that village, and for the purpose Tanner brought up the 1st Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins. By dusk the work was accomplished, and Jenkins took over from the Canadian cavalry, occupying a line covering Reumont on the north and east. The more distant objective had proved impracticable. It was not possible to push through large bodies of cavalry, owing to the many strongly held machine-gun posts. That night the front of the 66th Division ran from the western skirts of Escaufourt, east of Reumont, to the east of Bertry station. For the South Africans it had been a day of distinguished achievement. The two battalions of assault had taken 150 prisoners, more than twenty machine guns; several anti-tank guns, and—at Bertry—a motor car containing a German officer. Their losses had been light. The 4th Regiment had one officer (Lieutenant R. Hill) and 23 other ranks killed, and 4 officers and 71 other ranks wounded. In the 2nd Regiment Second-Lieutenant H. Perry was the only officer casualty.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 10._]

On the 10th the Brigade was in reserve at Reumont and Maurois, where it was continuously shelled, the 1st Regiment sustaining some twenty casualties. That day the divisional advance was conducted by the 198th and 199th Brigades, who pressed forward to the slopes above the Selle. By noon they held the spurs overlooking Le Cateau from the west, and had patrols in the environs of the town itself. But Le Cateau was not to fall at the first summons. The 66th Division found itself much harassed by artillery fire from the high ground towards Forest in the north-east, which overlooked its position. On its right the 25th Division could do little so long as St. Benin was untaken, and St. Benin was in the area of the II. United States Corps, whose left division had been checked. The G.O.C. 25th Division, Major-General Charles, attacked St. Benin in the afternoon, and drove the enemy across the Selle, but was unable to follow him owing to the difficulty of the river crossings and the machine-gun fire from the railway on the eastern bank. In the evening General Bethell, with the 199th Brigade, attempted to carry the high ground east of Le Cateau and north-east of Montay. The 5th Connaught Rangers reached the railway east of the town; the 18th King’s Liverpool Regiment reached Montay, but found the banks of the Selle heavily wired and could not cross. General Bethell accordingly withdrew the Connaught Rangers to the west side of Le Cateau, where they held the line of the Selle as it passed through the town.

[Illustration: THE ADVANCE FROM MARETZ TO REUMONT.]

That night the II. United States Corps took over St. Benin, and the XIII. Corps lay north from it for the most part along the western shore of the Selle. The German 17th Reserve Division had arrived to reinforce the enemy, and his front along the east bank of the river was very strong. The wreckage of the fallen bridges had dammed the stream and flooded the low-lying meadows. It was clear that the forcing of the Selle line was not a task which could be carried out by the pursuing army “in its stride,” but required a careful and deliberate plan. For the enemy to stand awhile on the Selle was a matter of life or death, for otherwise he could not hope to extricate himself from Foch’s pincers.

* * * * *

It was now the eve of the last great fight of the Brigade—the last, indeed, of the campaign in the West. To understand it we must note the configuration of the battle-ground. The valley of the Selle at Le Cateau has on each side slopes rising to plateau country some 200 feet above the bed of the river. On the west these slopes mount gently in bare undulations, but to the east they rise more abruptly, and the country in that direction is intersected with many orchards and hedges. A spur running north-east from Montay to Forest gives direct observation up the valley and over the eastern uplands. The Selle at Le Cateau is from fifteen to twenty feet wide, and usually about four feet deep, but with the recent heavy rains it was now rising fast. South of the town it flows through marshy meadows; in the town itself the banks are bricked up, and it is spanned by two bridges; farther north towards Montay it runs through firm pasture land. Le Cateau is a town normally of some 10,000 inhabitants, full of solidly built houses and factories, the greater part of which are on the slopes east of the river. On its eastern side runs the railway to Solesmes, which with its embankments and cuttings gave the enemy a position of exceptional strength. A formidable strong-point was the railway station and yard, which were bounded on the east by a bank thirty feet high, while a mound farther east, which could not be seen from the west bank of the Selle, gave good observation southwards.

The position from the point of view of the defence was all but perfect. The wiring was everywhere elaborate, the machine-gun posts had been prepared on a lavish scale, and the buildings and cellars were admirably adapted for a prolonged resistance. Four enemy divisions held the place, and two of them were fresh from reserve. The importance which the German High Command laid upon a stand on the Selle—which they knew as the “Hermann Line”—was shown by orders captured during our attack. One, issued by General von Larisch commanding the 54th Corps, announced that the Army would accept a decisive battle on that line, which must be held at all costs. An order of an artillery group declared that the possibility of an armistice being arranged depended on the battle coming to a standstill on the Selle. Still another artillery order warned the troops that if the Hermann Line were held, a favourable peace could be arranged; otherwise there was no prospect of an end to the War. If the position was vital to the enemy, it was no less vital to the Allies. By 10th September the two main German salients—between the Lys and the Somme and between the Selle and the Argonne—had become precarious. Ludendorff had now but the one object, to protect the main lateral railway, from Lille by Valenciennes and Hirson to Mézières, long enough to permit of an orderly retreat. If it fell too soon, large parts of his front would be cut off. It was Haig’s aim to cut that railway as soon as possible by forcing the Selle and pressing on to Maubeuge across the many rivulets which drain to the Scheldt from the Forest of Mormal.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 11._]

On 11th October the position was that the XIII. Corps held ground in the skirts of Le Cateau west of the Selle and along the river line. A frontal attack was impossible, and the town must be enveloped by its flanks. On the south the floods were extending, and a crossing place must be sought well upstream, so the Corps extended its right wing to St. Souplet. Simultaneously with any advance in the south there must be a movement on the north to capture the ridge north-east of the town. The immediate objective was the Solesmes-Le Cateau railway and the easterly ridge; the ultimate goal the village of Bazuel.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 12-15._]

Several days had to be spent in preliminary work. On the night of the 11th the South African Brigade moved up from Reumont and relieved the 198th and 199th Brigades. The 1st Regiment held the line opposite Le Cateau with the 2nd and 4th Regiments in support on right and left. Between the 12th and the 15th the 1st pushed forward north of the town to the edge of the Selle. It was no easy task, for the western outskirts were not yet cleared of the enemy, and our positions were dominated by the high ground on the eastern bank and by the houses in the northern suburbs. In these days the 1st Regiment suffered some twenty casualties in officers and men, while a post of one N.C.O. and seven men was reported as missing. The next task was to establish bridgeheads in the area of the town itself, and in particular to hold the two ruined bridges. The capture of one of these was assigned to the 2nd Regiment, and Major Sprenger on the 15th ordered Second-Lieutenant R. D. Hewat, with one Lewis gun section and one rifle section, to establish posts east of the bridge on both sides of the road. Owing to the constant machine-gun fire the débris of the bridge could not be used, so Lieutenant Hewat and his men waded across the stream, heavily bombed all the while by the enemy, and carried out their instructions. During the 16th he was frequently attacked, but with seven survivors he held his ground, and when the general advance began next morning he was found engaged against three machine guns. Late that day he rejoined the Brigade after a most gallant feat of arms, having held out for over thirty-six hours.

The main attack of the XIII. Corps was fixed for the morning of the 17th. On the right the 50th Division, under Major-General Jackson, was to cross at St. Souplet and St. Benin, capture the railway embankment opposite them and the railway triangle, and then swing north and take the railway station. Their supporting troops were then to move on Bazuel. The South African Brigade was to cross the Selle north of the town, seize the railway, and link up with the 50th north of the railway triangle; and, in the final stage, swing forward its right and establish itself on the spur east of Le Cateau. Since the V. Corps on the left was not attacking, arrangements were made to obscure the enemy observation from the high ground north-east of Montay by a smoke barrage.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 16._]

Meantime, on the evening of the 16th, the 1st South African Regiment had attacked at 5.45 p.m. in order to win positions on the eastern bank, which would enable eight bridges to be thrown across the river, since it was necessary that the assaulting position should be on that bank. This work was successfully accomplished by “A” and “B” companies under Lieutenants Gray and M’Millan. It was found that strong wire entanglements had been constructed on the east shore, through which openings had to be cut to permit of the assembly of the assaulting battalions.

At 8 p.m. that evening the 4th Regiment on the right and the 2nd on the left—together with “D” Company of the 1st under Captain Thomson, which had been detailed to follow the 2nd—began to move forwards. The crossing of the river was slow work, owing to the slender footbridges and the narrow gaps in the wire. The South Africans, when they reached the east bank, found themselves in places not fifty yards from the enemy, who held the railway embankment, and had pushed forward machine-gun outposts to the riverside road. By 4.30 on the morning of Tuesday the 17th the assembly was complete, and the South Africans laboured to make their position secure. They had little time for the work, for zero hour was approaching and their situation would have been perilous indeed but for the merciful interposition of the weather. Just before dawn a heavy mist rose from the valley, blinding the enemy’s eyes, so that most of his artillery and machine-gun fire passed harmlessly over their heads. Casualties, however, could not be altogether avoided. Lieutenant M. E. Whelan, M.C., of the 2nd Regiment was severely wounded, and died on the following day; and Lieutenant E. J. Brook of the same regiment was killed, his body, riddled with bullets, being found five yards from a German machine gun.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 17._]

Zero hour for the 50th Division was 5.20 a.m., for it had much ground to cover before it could come into line with the 66th. The 151st Brigade crossed the river with ease, but met with a stubborn resistance at the station. The 149th Brigade followed for the attack on the second objective, and found like difficulties at the railway triangle. So soon as the news came that the 149th was over the Selle, it was time for the South Africans to advance. The Brigade had taken immense risks in its assembly, and escaped serious loss partly by the help of the fog, partly by the very boldness of the hazard, since it lay so close to the enemy that his fire was ineffective. But it was a welcome relief to officers and men when at 8.5 a.m. came the order to launch the attack.

The mist was still thick, and no man could see fifty yards before him. The first wave disappeared into the gloom, and those behind waited long before they got news of it. From the outset the attack had to face great belts of single and double apron wire, and heavy machine-gun fire from both flanks. After a hundred yards had been covered, the South Africans came upon a sunken road protected by a palisade, where the 4th Regiment was held up for some time, and suffered many losses. As they approached the railway they encountered another and more formidable obstacle—a belt of wire entanglements sixty yards deep. The railway at this point ran in a deep cutting, the sides of which were studded with machine-gun posts and rifle-pits. The South Africans rose to the emergency. They found a shallow trench used by the Germans as a route from the railway cutting to an outpost; they found a tortuous path through the wire made for the use of German patrols, where Major Clerk of the 4th Regiment shot the two sentries on duty; and by these roads slowly and patiently they filtered through to the railway. It was a magnificent feat of cool resolution, and it was performed under the most galling fire. Soon they were in the cutting, where stern fighting took place. It was Ludendorff’s old device of “infiltration” in miniature, and at 9.15 Captain Jacobs of the 2nd Regiment reported to Major Sprenger that the first objective had been reached.

The situation, however, was still full of danger. The first objective was beyond the railway line; but, since our troops could not dig themselves in in the open because of machine-gun fire, they were compelled to fall back to the railway itself, where they had some kind of cover, though the German field guns were accurately registered on it. Slowly they cleared the line, and by midday Tanner was able to inform General Bethell that he held the railway from a point 500 yards north of the railway triangle to the northern boundary of the XIII. Corps. Meanwhile “D” Company of the 1st Regiment, which had followed the 2nd, succeeded under great difficulties in its appointed task of establishing a defensive flank on the left between the railway and the Selle. Every officer of the company was wounded during the course of the day. The losses of the assaulting battalions had been high, and the 1st Regiment was now called upon to reinforce each with a company, while a little later the remaining company was sent forward to strengthen the left flank. One battalion of the 198th Brigade was busy clearing up in Le Cateau.

There could be no advance to the second objective yet awhile, for the 50th Division was in difficulties. It had not succeeded in carrying the railway triangle, and was involved in intricate fighting among the station buildings, much galled by machine-gun fire from the mound to the east. The 66th Division was called upon to help, and a battalion of the 198th Brigade was sent south of the town to attack towards the point where the Bazuel road crosses the railway. The Corps heavy artillery put down an intense bombardment from 3 p.m. to 3.30 p.m. on the station and the railway triangle, and it was proposed thereafter to send in the 150th Brigade. But at that moment came an enemy counterstroke against the junction of the 50th Division and the II. United States Corps, and the 150th Brigade had to be diverted south to restore the broken front. That evening, after fifteen hours of desperate fighting, the XIII. Corps held a line along the Arbre de Guise-Le Cateau road, through the east skirts of Le Cateau, and along the railway line to Baillon Farm, beyond which it bent back to the Selle. The town had been won, but not the vital ridge to the east.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 18._]

[Sidenote: _Oct. 19._]

The South African Brigade spent an uneasy night of “standing to.” The enemy’s bombing patrols were busy, his machine-gun and trench-mortar fire was accurate and intense, and his artillery fire, with light, heavy, and gas shells, was unceasing. At 5.30 a.m. on the 18th the 50th Division again attacked, and carried all its objectives, establishing itself on the Le Cateau-Catillon road, with outposts east and north-east of Bazuel. During the afternoon the 66th Division swung forward its right, and the task originally allotted to the XIII. Corps was completed. At 5 p.m. orders had been issued for a relief of the South African Brigade by the 199th, but owing to the lateness of the hour the relief was cancelled. Unfortunately this cancelling order did not reach “B” Company of the 1st Regiment till it had withdrawn, and in returning to the line it lost thirteen killed, while Second-Lieutenant R. MacGregor was mortally wounded. During the night the 1st Regiment lost also Second-Lieutenant C. H. Powell killed, while Second-Lieutenant C. H. Perrem was severely wounded. The final objective of the Brigade was established about 4.30 a.m. on the morning of the 19th, Captain King of the 2nd being wounded during the operation.

[Illustration: THE FIGHT FOR THE CROSSING OF THE SELLE.]

Such was the part of the South Africans in the forcing of the Selle, the last of their great battles. Between the 17th and 20th of October, in face of a most gallant resistance, Byng, Rawlinson, and Débeney had swept well beyond the river line and the Oise-Sambre Canal, and the way was open for Haig’s advance against Valenciennes and the Forest of Mormal. In the XIII. Corps area five brigades had in three days captured 7,000 yards of prepared positions defended by a difficult water line, had advanced 6,000 yards, and utterly defeated four German divisions, taking 25 officers, 1,226 men, and 15 guns. In this work the South Africans had played a pre-eminent part. Between the night of 7th October and the night of 19th October they had taken prisoner 4 officers and 1,238 other ranks, and had captured 367 machine guns, 19 trench mortars, 22 field guns, 4 anti-tank guns, and a mass of other equipment. Their casualties were 47 officers and 1,229 men, of whom 6 officers and 184 other ranks were dead.

The achievement on the 17th is worthy to rank with their advance at Third Ypres as a brilliant feat of offensive warfare, and as such it was praised by their comrades in arms. Brigadier-General Ian Stewart of the XIII. Corps Headquarters Staff wrote to Tanner: “I shall always look on the capture of the railway embankment north of Le Cateau as one of the most astounding feats of the War. It will be good for South Africa to know what a brave part her contingent played in the closing chapter of the Great War, and it is no little honour to have been the foremost troops of the British Armies in France when the curtain fell on the greatest tragedy the world has seen.” And when the war was over and the Brigade about to leave the 66th Division, Major-General Bethell wrote in his special order of the day: “In after life if any of you are up against what you imagine to be an impossible task of any description, call to mind the Boche position on the east bank of the Selle river north of Le Cateau, or ask some one who was there to depict it to you. Then remember that the South African Brigade crossed that stream and took that position, which the enemy thought impregnable to attack from that direction, and that, on looking back at it from the enemy’s side, it was hard to understand how the apparently impossible had been done by you.”

* * * * *

The fighting front of the XIII. Corps was now occupied by the 25th and 18th Divisions, and the 50th and 66th Divisions fell back into reserve. The South African Brigade was in rest billets at Serain till the 2nd November. Haig was now fairly embarked in open warfare, operating in a difficult country of large woods, many small villages, and an infinity of hedged enclosures. His first object was the line from Valenciennes to the Oise-Sambre Canal along the western edge of the Mormal Forest. The enemy had a strong water line in the canal and the Scheldt, and a good defensive position in the forest, but between the northern end of Mormal and the Scheldt was a gap of ten miles, and if Haig broke through the gap the position must crumble. On Wednesday, 23rd October, he struck on a front of fifteen miles, the Fourth Army using two corps, and the Third Army four. This was the beginning of the last great fight of the British Army, the Battle of the Rivers, fought in thick mists and drizzling rain. In two days Rawlinson, Byng, and Horne advanced six miles, and by the last day of October Haig was through the gap. Elsewhere, on the long front of the Allies, Débeney, Mangin, and Guillaumat were each some twenty-three miles from Hirson with an open country before them, and Gouraud and Pershing had broken the resistance in the tangled area west of the Meuse, and were ready for the final push on Mézières and Sedan. Meantime strange things were happening in Berlin. The new ministry which had come into power in Germany in the early days of October had opened feverish negotiations, and had made haste to recast the creed which had hitherto been Germany’s faith. On 27th October Berlin accepted President Wilson’s terms, which were that the only armistice to be considered must be one that made impossible the renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany, and was negotiated by a people’s Government and not by the Great General Staff. The acceptance of such conditions was tantamount to an admission of defeat in the field. On Saturday the 26th Ludendorff resigned his command. The twilight of the gods had fallen upon his old proud world, and the direction of affairs had gone for good from the hands of him and his kind.

By now the condition of the German armies was in the last degree desperate. On 21st March they had had a reserve of eighty fresh divisions, and during the summer no division was returned to the line without at least a month of rest and training. By 30th October they had but one fresh division, and the intervals of rest had shrunk to nine days. There were divisions on their front which mustered less than 1,000 rifles, and the total shortage of rifles to establishment was not less than 500,000. Their casualties since March had been some 2,500,000, of which at least 1,000,000 represented permanent losses. Of the 18,000 pieces of artillery on their front on 15th July, a third had since been captured or destroyed. Worse still, they had been manœuvred into a position from which retreat was in the long run impossible. Pershing and Gouraud were about to cut their main trunk line in the south, and Haig’s deadly pressure was shepherding them northward into the gap of Liége, where, unless an armistice intervened, on the scene of their worst infamies they would suffer a more terrible Sedan.

But it must not be thought that in those days the Allies, and especially the British, won easy victories. The enemy resisted with a gallantry and devotion worthy of a more honourable cause. Between the 27th September and the 11th November our First, Third, and Fourth Armies faced and defeated sixty-one divisions, of which twenty-one had been twice in the battle, eight thrice, and two four times. The rearguard actions by machine-gun posts were often brilliant and almost always resolute, and the defence of the Selle line, notably at Le Cateau, would have done credit to any troops. If we had broken through all the great prepared positions, we were none the less fighting in a country which allowed strong defences to be improvised, and the enemy did not fail to take advantage of it.

It should be remembered, too, that he massed his main strength against the British, for there, if anywhere, he must stand, since Haig was marching straight for Namur and the one narrow door still open to his frontiers. In especial he dared not weaken his artillery on that section, and Haig had to face the bulk of the dwindling complement of German guns. The shelling in those days seemed to many who had fought through the War to be the heaviest they had encountered. The South African Field Ambulance, which, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pringle and Major M. B. Power,[27] did magnificent work at that stage (it equalled its old record, for it was not in human power to surpass it), had a difficult task because of the steady German shell fire, which searched out all the back areas. As the advance grew faster, it became hard to keep up with the infantry, and to bring back the wounded expeditiously by ruined roads and broken bridges over distances unknown in the previous history of the campaign.

[Sidenote: _Nov. 2-4._]

[Sidenote: _Nov. 7-9._]

On 2nd November the South African Brigade moved forward from Serain. That day Valenciennes fell to the Canadians under Horne, and next day the German retreat increased its pace. By Monday the 4th, Pershing, who in three days had advanced twelve miles, had the southern railway at Montmédy and Longuyon under his fire. That bolt-hole had been closed. The time had come for Foch, as it came to Wellington on the evening of Waterloo, to give the signal for “everything to go in.” On the 4th Haig attacked on the thirty-mile front between Valenciennes and the Sambre, and by the next day the Forest of Mormal was behind him. The enemy’s resistance was finally broken, and his armies were not in retreat but in flight, with their two wings for ever separated. Through the fifty-mile pocket between Avesnes and Mézières the whole German forces in the south must squeeze if they would make good their escape, and the gap was hourly narrowing. Mangin and Guillaumat were close on Hirson, Gouraud and Pershing were approaching Mézières, and Haig had the Sambre valley as an avenue to Namur. Moreover, Foch had still his trump card to play, the encircling swing of a new American army north of Metz to cut off the enemy from his home bases. If a negotiated armistice did not come within the week, there would be a _de facto_ armistice of collapse and surrender. On the 7th Byng was in Bavai, and on the 8th in front of Maubeuge. That day Rawlinson took Avesnes, and on the 9th the Guards entered Maubeuge, while farther north Condé and Tournai were in our hands. On the 6th Gouraud was in Rethel, and on the 7th Pershing was in the western skirts of Sedan. On the 6th the German delegates, Erzberger and his colleagues, left Berlin on their embarrassed journey to Foch’s headquarters. On the 9th came the revolution in Berlin, and the formation of a Council of National Plenipotentiaries under Ebert. Next day the Emperor fled from Main Headquarters to seek sanctuary in Holland.

On the morning of the 8th the South African Brigade was in reserve to the 66th Division at Dompierre, just west of Avesnes. Next day it marched by Beugnies to Solre-le-Château—an arduous journey, largely over field tracks, since most roads and bridges had been destroyed by the enemy. Tanner had been informed by his divisional commander that, owing to the new situation, it had been resolved to create a mobile column under his command. This column was to be part of an advanced guard to cover the Fourth Army front, which guard was to be under Bethell, and was to include the 5th Cavalry Brigade. Tanner’s force was made up of his infantry brigade, “B” Battery 331st Brigade R.F.A. with six 18-pounders, “D” Battery of the same brigade with one section of 4.5 howitzers, the 430th Field Company R.E., “C” Company 100th Machine-gun Battery, two armoured cars, and two platoons of the XIII. Corps Cyclists. The general scheme was that the column should move on Beaumont, and cross the stream there, preceded by the 12th Lancers, while the remainder of the 5th Cavalry Brigade operated on its southern flank.

[Sidenote: _Nov. 10._]

At 7 a.m. on the morning of Sunday, 10th November—about the time when the courier of the German delegates was reaching Spa with Foch’s terms in his pocket—the column moved out from Solre-le-Château on the Beaumont road, Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Jenkins, with the 1st Regiment, forming the advanced guard. A culvert a mile to the east had been blown up, and took some time to repair, so it was 9.30 before the head of the column reached Hestrud. The 12th Lancers, who were in possession, reported that the enemy was in considerable force on the high ground north and south of Grandrieu. Tanner accordingly halted the main body under cover at the Bois de Madame, and ordered the 1st Regiment after a brief reconnaissance to deploy for attack in order to clear the way for the column. The attack of the 1st on a three-company front began at 10.30 with the fording of the Thure river, the road-bridge having been destroyed. The enemy, part of the Guard Reserve Corps, opened the sluices of a reservoir upstream, with the result that the assaulting troops were cut off till the flood subsided. Presently it became clear that they were facing an organized rearguard position, strongly held by machine guns, and supported by artillery.

The flanks of the advance were exposed; and since the bulk of the 5th Cavalry Brigade had not come up, General Bethell moved forward the 199th Brigade on the right of the South Africans in the direction of Sivry, where they were in touch with the 20th Hussars. The instructions of the advanced guard were to keep close to the enemy, but not to attack if he was found in a strong position. Accordingly Tanner did not force the advance, and in the afternoon the 1st Regiment was ordered to dig in. It was thought likely that the Germans might retreat during the night, so vigilant patrolling was carried out; but at dawn on the 11th the situation had not altered. In the meantime the bridge at Hestrud had been rebuilt by the Engineers.

[Sidenote: _Nov. 11._]

The morning of Monday, 11th November, was cold and foggy, such weather as a year before had been seen at Cambrai. Very early, while the Canadians of Horne’s First Army were entering Mons, the 1st Regiment attacked, but could make little progress, though a patrol under Second-Lieutenant Cawood managed to gain some ground on the left flank. By 8 o’clock a considerable advance was made on the right, where the 20th Hussars were feeling their way through Sivry. At 10 a.m. Tanner received by telephone the news that an armistice had been signed. “Hostilities,” so ran the divisional order, “will cease at 11 o’clock to-day, 11th November. Troops will stand fast on the line reached at that hour, which will be immediately reported by wire to Headquarters, Fourth Army Advance Guard. Defensive precautions will be maintained. There will be no intercourse of any description with the enemy until receipt of instructions.” The news must have reached the enemy lines earlier, and he signalized its arrival by increasing his bombardment, as if he had resolved to have no surplus ammunition left when the hour of truce arrived.

Punctually at 11 o’clock the firing on both sides ceased. There came a moment of dramatic silence, and then a sound as of a light wind blowing down the lines—the echo of men cheering on the long battle front. The meaning of victory could not in that hour be realized by the weary troops; they only knew that fighting had stopped, and that they could leave their trenches without disaster. The final “gesture” fell to the arm which from the beginning of the campaign had been the most efficient in the enemy service. At two minutes to eleven a machine gun opened about two hundred yards from our leading troops at Grandrieu, and fired off a whole belt without a pause. A German machine gunner was then seen to stand up beside his weapon, take off his helmet, bow, and, turning about, walk slowly to the rear.

At the hour of armistice the line reached by the advanced guard ran from Montbliart in the south, west of Sautain, through the Bois de Martinsart, round the eastern edge of Grandrieu to the western skirts of Cousolre. It represented the easternmost point gained by any troops of the British Armies in France. The South Africans had the honour of finishing the War as the spear-point of the advance to victory.