CHAPTER VI.

THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.

(July-November 1917.)

The Change in the Military Situation—Haig’s Plan for Third Ypres—The Nature of the Problem—Von Armin’s Defensive Tactics—The “Pill-boxes”—The Attack of 31st July—The Attack of 16th August—The British Front reorganized—The 9th Division enters the Salient—Its “Pill-box” Tactics—The Night Assembly—The Attack of 20th September—The Fall of Potsdam Redoubt—The First Objective gained—The Second Objective gained—The Difficulties on the Left Flank—The Result of the Battle—Individual Exploits—The Brigade’s Losses—The Field Ambulance Work—The Brigade returns to the Salient—Moves to the Belgian Coast—The Close of Third Ypres.

When, on the last day of July 1917, Sir Douglas Haig launched his attack in the Ypres salient, the nature of the war had dramatically changed. The great plan conceived for 1917, of which the Somme had been the logical preliminary, had proved impossible. This was not due wholly or mainly to the failure of the ambitious offensive in April at Arras and on the Aisne. The real cause was the defection of Russia, for, by the failure of one great partner, the old military coherence of the Alliance had gone. The beleaguering forces which had sat for three years round the German citadel were wavering and straggling on the East. The war on two fronts, which had been Germany’s chief handicap, looked as if it might change presently to a war on a single front. Whatever victories might be won during the remainder of 1917, it was now certain that a decisive blow could not be delivered. The Teutonic League, just when it was beginning to crumble, had been given a new tenure of life. Up till then the campaign had been fought on data which were familiar and calculable. The material and human strength of each belligerent was known, and the _moral_ of each was confidently assessed. But with the Russian revolution new factors had suddenly appeared out of the void, and what had seemed solid ground became sand and quagmire. It was the old Europe which waged war up till the spring of 1917; but a new Europe had come into being by midsummer in which nothing could be taken for granted. Everywhere in the world there was the sound of things breaking.

Haig was compelled to protract the fighting in the Arras area so long as the French on the Aisne required his aid; but by the end of May he was free to turn his attention to the plan which, as early as the previous November, had been his main preoccupation. This was an offensive against the enemy in Flanders, with the aim of clearing the Belgian coast and turning the northern flank of the whole German defence system in the West. It was a scheme which, if successful, promised the most far-reaching results. It would destroy the worst of the submarine bases; it would restore to Belgium her lost territory, and thereby deprive Germany of one of her most cherished bargaining assets; it would cripple the enemy communications with the depôts of the Lower Rhineland. But time was the essence of the business. The blow must be struck at the earliest possible hour, for each week’s delay meant the aggrandisement of the enemy.

[Sidenote: _June 7._]

Haig’s first business was to clear his flanks for the coming attack, and on the 7th June, by one of the most perfect operations in the campaign, he won the Messines-Wytschaete ridge at a single bound. His next step was the advance east of Ypres. The famous Salient had during three years been gradually contracted till the enemy front was now less than two miles from the town. The Germans held all the half-moon of little hills to the east, which meant that any preparations for attack would be conducted under their watchful eyes. They were very conscious of the importance of the position, and the wary general who now commanded their IV. Army was not likely to be taken by surprise. This was Sixt von Armin, who had commanded the 4th Corps at the Somme, and had there shown himself one of the most original and fruitful tacticians on the enemy’s side.

The Battle of Messines was over by the 12th June, but for various reasons it was not till late in July that the date of the main advance could be fixed. It was now more than ever a race against time, for the precarious weather of autumn was approaching; and, unless the advance proceeded strictly according to time-table, it ran a grave risk of failure. The high ground east of the Salient must be won in a fortnight to enable us to move against the enemy bases in West Flanders and clear the coast-line. The nature of the countryside made any offensive a gamble with the weather, for the Salient was, after Verdun, the most tortured of the Western battlefields. Constant shelling of the low ground west of the ridges had blocked or diverted the streams and the natural drainage, and turned it into a sodden wilderness. Weather such as had been experienced on the Somme would make of it a morass where tanks could not be used, and transport could scarcely move, and troops would be exposed to the last degree of misery.

The coming attack was much canvassed in Germany beforehand, and von Armin, having learned the lesson of his defeat at Messines, had prepared his defences. In Flanders the nature of the ground did not permit of a second Siegfried Line. Deep dug-outs and concreted trenches were impossible because of the water-logged soil, and he was compelled to find new tactics. His solution was the “pill-box.” These were small concrete forts, sited among the ruins of a farm or in some derelict piece of woodland, often raised only a yard or two above the ground level, and bristling with machine guns. The low entrance was at the rear, and the “pill-box” could hold from eight to forty men. It was easy to make, for the wooden or steel framework could be brought up on any dark night and filled with concrete. They were echeloned in depth with great skill, and, in the wiring, alleys were left so that an unwary advance would be trapped among them and exposed to enfilading fire. Their small size made them a difficult mark for heavy guns, and since they were protected by concrete at least three feet thick, they were impregnable to the ordinary barrage of field artillery.

Von Armin’s plan was to hold his first line—which was often a mere string of shell craters—with few men, who would fall back before an assault. He had his guns well behind, so that they should not be captured in the first rush, and would be available for a barrage if his opponents became entangled in the “pill-box” zone. Finally, he had his reserves in the second line, ready for the counterstroke before the attack could secure its position. It will be seen that these tactics were admirably suited for the exposed and contorted ground of the Salient. Any attack would be allowed to make some advance; but if the German plan worked well, this advance would be short-lived and would be dearly paid for. Instead of the cast-iron front of the Siegfried area, the Flanders line would be highly elastic, but it would spring back into position after pressure with a deadly rebound.

[Sidenote: _July 31._]

The “preparation” for the battle lasted for the greater part of July, and every part of the Salient was drenched with our fire. On the last day of the month came the advance on a front of 15 miles—from the river Lys to a little north of Steenstraate, the main effort being that of the Fifth Army, under Sir Hubert Gough, on the 7½ miles between Boesinghe and the Zillebeke-Zandvoorde road. With the attack the weather broke. Gough’s purpose was to carry the enemy’s first defences, situated on the forward slope of the rising ground, and his second position along the crest. The opening day saw a brilliant success, for everywhere we captured the first line, and in many parts the second. But the weather prevented the series of cumulative blows which we had planned. For a fortnight we were compelled to hold our hand, since till the countryside grew dryer advance was a stark impossibility.

[Sidenote: _Aug. 16._]

The second stage of the Ypres struggle began on 16th August, when the Fifth Army attacked the German third position, the Gheluvelt-Langemarck line, which ran from the Menin road along the second of the tiers of ridges which rimmed the Salient on the east. These tiers, the highest and most easterly of which was the famous Passchendaele crest, had the common features that they all sprang from one southern boss or pillar, the point on the Menin road marked 64 metres, which we knew as Clapham Junction, and all, as they ran northward, lost elevation. The attack, which took place at dawn, made a considerable gap in the German third line, but it was very far from attaining its main objectives. That day, indeed, showed at its best von Armin’s new defensive method. The weather was in his favour, for the air was thick and damp, making airplane observation difficult, and therefore depriving us of timely notice of the enemy’s counter-strokes. The ground was sloppy, and made tangled and difficult with broken woods; and the whole front was sown with “pill-boxes,” against which we had not yet discovered the proper weapon. The result was a serious British check. The splendid courage of the Fifth Army had been largely fruitless. Fine brigades had been hurled in succession against a concrete wall, and had been sorely battered. The troops felt that they were being sacrificed blindly; that every fight was a soldiers’ fight, and that such sledge-hammer tactics were too crude to meet the problem. For a moment there was a real ebb of confidence in British leadership.

Sir Douglas Haig took time to reorganize his front and prepare a new plan. He extended Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army northward, so that it should take over the attack on the enemy front on the Menin road. Sorely tried divisions were taken out of the line, and our whole artillery tactics were revised. The “pill-box” problem was studied, and a solution was found, not by miraculous ingenuity, but by patient and meticulous care. Early in September the weather improved, and the sodden Salient began slowly to dry. That is to say, the mud hardened into something like the _séracs_ of a glacier, and the streams became streams again and not lagoons. But the process was slow, and it was not till the third week of the month that the third stage in the battle could begin.

[Sidenote: _Sept. 14._]

For this third stage the 9th Division was brought up from the Somme. It arrived at Brandhoek on 14th September, where it became part of Sir E. A. Fanshawe’s V. Corps of Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army. The next few days were spent in careful training for the impending attack. The terrain over which the advance was to be made was explained to all ranks, and, as before Arras, clay models were built and part of the training ground taped off to represent the area of assault for each brigade. No division had made a more elaborate study of the “pill-box” problem. Lukin had worked out the subject in detail with the brigadiers who were to lead the coming assault—General Dawson of the South African Brigade and General Frank Maxwell, V.C., of the 27th Brigade; and the division had reached its own conclusions as to the failure of our past efforts. The objectives set before it had already been attacked fruitlessly more than once, and the reason of failure seemed to be clear. The enemy came out of holes and dug-outs behind the attacking wave, and held up the second wave and isolated the first one. Hence Lukin and his brigadiers trained their men to stop at every “pill-box,” trench, or dug-out, and clear out all occupants, the troops behind them passing through them to a further attack. This leap-frog system was obviously dangerous and difficult against an irregular and intermittent line, for if part of the advance stopped the whole front might halt. Again, the men in the second wave would be apt to halt when they saw the advance in front of them cease. Nevertheless, in spite of its difficulties, it was beyond doubt the only method which offered a reasonable chance of success. The 9th Division also had its own views about artillery methods. The “pill-boxes” in front of it were carefully reconnoitred and located. In the attack it was arranged that the field-gun barrage should lengthen on both sides of a “pill-box,” so that the advancing troops, hugging their barrage, might get round its unprotected rear. The barrage was to be high-explosive instead of shrapnel, for the path of the former could be more exactly noted and closely followed.

[Illustration: THE SOUTH AFRICANS’ ATTACK AT THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.]

The front allotted to the 9th Division was some 2,000 yards north of the Ypres-Menin road. Through its centre ran the Ypres-Roulers railway. On its right was the 2nd Australian Division, and on its left the 55th Division of West Lancashire Territorials. The 9th Division formed the right of the Fifth Army. Its attack was to be on a two-brigade front, the South Africans on the left and the 27th Brigade on the right, while the 26th Brigade was held in reserve. The South Africans were disposed as follows: the 3rd Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, on the right, and the 1st, under Lieutenant-Colonel Heal, in support; on the left the 4th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel MacLeod,[21] supported by the 2nd, temporarily under Major Cochran. When the first objective had been taken, the two supporting battalions were to pass through, and attack the second and third objectives.

The British line at the moment lay on the east side of the Frezenberg Ridge. The first objective for the South Africans was roughly the line of the Steenbeek stream.[22] The second was a line running north and south a little west of the junction of the Ypres-Zonnebeke road and the Ypres-Roulers railway. This was now the main German position, part of the great Langemarck-Gheluvelt line. The final objective, known as the Green Line, was very slightly east of the second, and involved an advance mainly on the left wing of the attack. The purpose was to win the ridge which gave observation of Zonnebeke, and which, until it was captured, hindered all advance further north. The countryside was to the last degree blind and desperate. Not only was there a stream to cross, and many yards of swamp to struggle through, but the area included some of the most formidable “pill-boxes” on the German front, while in the main enemy line stood the Bremen Redoubt, and the stronghold made out of Zevenkote village.

[Sidenote: _Sept. 19._]

The starting-point being what it was, a night assembly in such an area was the most intricate of problems. On 17th September the South Africans moved into the front line, relieving the 125th Brigade. Wednesday, the 19th, was a clear, blowing day; but about ten o’clock in the evening the rain began, and fell heavily all that night. During the darkness the Brigade was getting into position for attack. The black night and the slippery ground made the whole operation extraordinarily difficult in a place devoid of communication trenches and honeycombed with shell-holes. The ground was so cut up that it was possible to move only by duck-board tracks, and it was hard to get reports back from the different units. Nevertheless, long before zero hour, the attacking battalions were in their place.

[Sidenote: _Sept. 20._]

At dawn the drizzle stopped, but a wet mist remained, which blinded our air reconnaissance. At twenty minutes to six, preceded by a barrage of high explosive and smoke shells, the attacking troops moved into the desert of mud. In the dim light, obscured by smoke, it was impossible to see their objective. The advance had scarcely begun when the German barrage came down on our old front line, so that the supporting battalions had to close up as near as possible to the leading troops.

The right battalion, the 3rd Regiment, had “A” Company, under Captain Vivian, on its right; “B” Company, under Captain Sprenger, in the centre; and “C” Company, under Captain Ellis, on the left; with “D” Company, under Captain Tomlinson, in support. Its strength was 20 officers and 617 other ranks. The left battalion, the 4th Regiment, had a strength of 21 officers and 511 other ranks. It had on its left “A” Company, under Captain Farrell; “B” Company, under Captain McCubbin, in the centre; and “C” Company, under Major Browne, on its right; with “D” Company, under Captain Gemmell, in support. Now was seen the value of their careful training. The 4th Regiment took the strong-points known as Beck House and Borry Farm in their stride, and by half-past six had reached their first objective. Seeing the place called Mitchell’s Farm in front of them, a party went through our own barrage and captured it, killing most of its garrison. A machine gun across the brook on their left flank gave trouble, so a platoon, under Second-Lieutenant Saphir, crossed the stream and took the German post there, bringing back the gun and twenty prisoners.

In the meantime the left wing of the 3rd Regiment had taken Vampir Farm and reached its objective. Its right, however, was held up by the position of the left battalion of the 27th Brigade, the 12th Royal Scots, who, in their area, had encountered the formidable redoubt known as Potsdam, which, in addition to other defences, included three “pill-boxes.” When “A” Company and part of “B” Company of the 3rd Regiment reached their objective they were too far in advance of their neighbouring brigade, and were subjected to a heavy enfilading fire from Potsdam. Captain Vivian of “A” Company immediately organized an attack on that point, leading the assault in person, but he, together with Lieutenants Coxen and Newbery, was killed. Captain Sprenger of “B” Company then collected all the men he could, both from the 3rd Regiment and the 1st, and with two Lewis guns and one machine gun he advanced by rushes from shell-hole to shell-hole against the redoubt. This gallant attack, combined with the pressure of the 27th Brigade from the west, brought about the fall of the place. The enemy was seen bolting south towards the Ypres-Roulers railway line, and in a quarter of an hour the fort was in our hands.

A halt was called for an hour before the attack on the second objective. After passing Potsdam it had been arranged between Dawson and Maxwell, with Lukin’s approval, that the area of the South African Brigade would be extended to the right till it included the northern bank of the railway. This made it important to clear that northern bank. Second-Lieutenant Lawrence of the 1st Regiment had accordingly been sent forward as soon as the attack began, and had met with no opposition till he came under machine-gun fire on the west side of Potsdam. Finding no troops near him, he retired till he fell in with some derelict tanks, when he turned south-east and reached the railway. Here he found some South Africans, who had become separated from the rest, clearing a dug-out on the south side of the line. Going eastward he found a large dug-out, where he took twenty German prisoners and captured three machine guns. He then found touch with the 12th Royal Scots, which had been his main object, and rejoined his battalion before the second stage of the battle began.

Just previous to the opening of this stage Lieutenant-Colonel Heal of the 1st Regiment saw some men of the 1st and 3rd Regiments, headed by Sergeant Frohbus, advance through our own barrage against a large “pill-box” immediately on their front. It was a place which would give trouble in the next advance, so he joined the party and took command. On calling on the inmates of the “pill-box” to surrender, some thirty or forty came out, but the remainder declined to move. All the loopholes and openings of the structure were closed, but a certain “Mike” Fennessy of the 3rd Regiment, a Johannesburger whose past career had been largely outside the confines of the law, managed to get a bomb either through a ventilator in the roof or through a window which had been blown open by a grenade. This set fire to the wood lining, and the garrison broke out and were shot down. Four machine guns were captured in the place.[23] The doings of this Johannesburger are a comment on the value of the scallawag in war. As the shepherd said to Dr. John Brown about his dog: “There was a deep sariousness about him, for he could never get eneuch o’ fechtin’.” Twice in former battles he had gone over with the first wave, and when their work was done managed to continue with their successors. At Arras he actually finished the day with a wholly different division, which he found had the farthest to go.

The 3rd and 4th Regiments now remained at the first objective and consolidated the ground, and the two supporting battalions at 7 a.m. moved against the second objective, the main Langemarck-Gheluvelt line. The 1st Regiment was on the right with a strength of 20 officers and 546 other ranks, and the 2nd on the left with a strength of 20 officers and 566 other ranks. The task of the 1st Regiment was easy, and it advanced smoothly towards its second objective. At 7.50 Colonel Heal was able to report that his section of the main German line had been taken. The 2nd Regiment, however, on his left, had a heavier duty. Mitchell’s Farm had been previously taken by the 4th, but the enemy was still holding Waterend Farm, and from beyond the stream was galling their flanks with machine-gun and rifle fire from the high ground at the place called Tulip Cottages and Hill 37—all in the area of the 55th Division. Before them, too, lay the strong Bremen Redoubt and the fortified village of Zevenkote. Nevertheless, the Bremen Redoubt and Zevenkote were carried, and with them the second German position. But the situation on his left made Major Cochran uneasy. The men of West Lancashire were held up by the enemy at Hill 37, and the South Africans had therefore an exposed flank. He extended his left, and captured Waterend Farm, together with three machine guns and seventy prisoners, and thereby found touch with the 55th Division, and formed a defensive flank. It was not till the afternoon that the Lancashire troops gallantly stormed Hill 37, which enabled the South African left to advance to the Green Line, the final objective, where they held a position consisting mainly of a string of shell-holes.

Meantime there was no word of von Armin’s usual counterstroke. The troops against us were some of the best in the German Army, part of the 2nd Guard Reserve. But the speed and fury of the advance of the 9th, the accuracy of their artillery barrage, and the skill with which they accounted for “pill-box” after “pill-box” had paralyzed the enemy. During the morning there seemed to be a concentration for a counter-attack near Bostin Farm, but this was dispersed by our guns. Only small parties moving from shell-hole to shell-hole advanced, and these never came nearer than 800 yards. By the evening of that day on nearly all the British front of attack the final objectives had been reached. The 9th Division had carried theirs in the record time of three hours.

That day’s battle cracked the kernel of the German defence in the Salient. It showed only a limited advance, and the total of 3,000 prisoners had been often exceeded in a day’s fighting; but every inch of the ground won was vital. Few struggles in the campaign were more desperate or carried out in a more gruesome battlefield. The mass of quagmires, splintered woods, ruined husks of “pill-boxes,” water-filled shell-holes, and foul creeks which made up the land on both sides of the Menin road was a sight which, to the recollection of most men, must seem like a fevered nightmare. It was the classic soil on which, during the First Battle of Ypres, the 1st and 2nd Divisions had stayed the German rush for the Channel. Then it had been a battered but still recognizable and featured countryside; now the elements seemed to have blended with each other to make of it a limbo outside mortal experience and almost beyond human imagining. Only on some of the tortured hills of Verdun could a parallel be found. The battle of 20th September showed to what heights of endurance the British soldier can attain. It was an example, too, of how thought and patience may achieve success in spite of every disadvantage of weather, terrain, and enemy strength.

[Illustration: SECOND-LIEUTENANT W. H. HEWITT, V.C., 2nd Regiment, South African Infantry.]

Delville Wood was still for the Brigade the most heroic episode in the War. But its advance on 20th September must without doubt be reckoned its most successful achievement up to that date in the campaign. It carried one of the strongest parts of the enemy’s position, and assisted the brigades both on its right and left to take two forts which blocked their way. The day was full of gallant individual exploits. The regimental commanders led their men not only with skill, but with the utmost dash and fearlessness. Heal was struck by shrapnel, and once buried by a shell; Thackeray was twice buried; Cochran was knocked down, but rose unhurt, though all thought him killed. “The regimental officers,” wrote Dawson on the 22nd, “were an awful sight this morning, haggard and drawn, unwashed and unshaven for four days, covered with mud and utterly tired, but very happy, and exceedingly proud of their men.” One N.C.O. and two men of the 2nd Regiment took seventy prisoners. Another man of the 2nd Regiment engaged a German in a bayonet duel and killed him; then a second, whom he also killed; then a third, when each killed the other. In dealing with the “pill-boxes,” individual courage and initiative were put to the highest test. It was for such an episode that Lance-Corporal W. H. Hewitt of the 2nd Regiment was awarded the Victoria Cross. He attacked a “pill-box” in his section, and tried to rush the doorway, but found a stubborn garrison within, and received a severe wound. Nevertheless he managed to reach the loophole, where, in his attempts to insert a bomb, he was again wounded. Ultimately he got a bomb inside, dislodged the occupants, and took the place.

[Sidenote: _Sept. 21-22._]

On the 21st there was heavy shelling, but no serious counter-attack on the 9th Division, though the 55th, on their left, faced and defeated a strong enemy attempt. Early on the morning of the 22nd the Brigade was relieved from the front line. Its casualties were not light. The 1st Regiment had 58 killed (including Captain J. T. Bain and Second-Lieutenant E. Spyker) and 291 wounded and missing; the 2nd Regiment had 61 killed (including Captain F. M. Davis, Lieutenant E. D. Lucas, and Second-Lieutenant A. B. Cooper) and 224 wounded and missing; the 3rd Regiment had 88 killed (including Captain E. V. Vivian, Captain and Adjutant A. W. H. M’Donald,[24] and Second-Lieutenants W. J. Blanchard, C. F. Coxen, N. Cruddas, N. T. Hendry, J. Newbery, W. P. Sweeney, and D. A. Williams) and 283 wounded and missing; the 4th Regiment had 56 killed (including Captain D. Gemmell and Second-Lieutenants B. D. Trethewy, A. Aitken, and W. G. S. Forder) and 197 wounded and missing. One death cast a gloom over the whole division, and might almost be regarded as a South African loss. General Frank Maxwell, the gallant commander of the 27th Brigade, was shot by a sniper on the morning of the 21st. He had won his Victoria Cross at Sanna’s Post, and had been a familiar figure in South Africa as a member of Lord Kitchener’s Staff. No one who remembers the old days in Pretoria can forget Frank Maxwell’s boyish daring and humour. There was no braver man or better soldier in the British Army.

In recounting the doings of the Brigade in this battle the subsidiary services must not be forgotten. The Field Ambulance had the hardest task which they had yet faced, for their posts were under constant shell-fire. In getting back the walking wounded they were much helped by the Décauville trains, which were run by a section of the South African railwaymen. Owing to the impossibility of making dug-outs the wounded, as they became numerous, had to be dressed in the open, and it was no light task to attend fifty wounded men on stretchers with shells dropping around. On the afternoon of the 21st, Captain Lawrie was wounded. About the same time a squad of Argyll and Sutherland stretcher-bearers was caught in a barrage, one being killed and another wounded. Sergeant Edgar of the South African Field Ambulance behaved with great gallantry in going into the barrage and rescuing the wounded man. In spite of every difficulty the arrangements worked with wonderful precision, and no casualties were ever better cared for than those of the Brigade. One small point may be mentioned to show General Dawson’s careful thought for his men. During a battle it was his custom to give every officer and man who came into his headquarters a cup of tea with a tot of rum in it, and his mess servants entered into the spirit of his instructions, and dispensed general hospitality. On the night of the 21st, when the four regiments were relieved in the front line, the Brigade headquarters mess supplied 690 cups of tea, with a staff of one cook and one waiter and an equipment of eight teacups and one teapot.

* * * * *

[Sidenote: _Oct. 12._]

[Sidenote: _Oct. 13._]

[Sidenote: _Oct. 23._]

The Brigade was not yet finished with Third Ypres. On 24th September it left the battle front, and on 4th October it was in the Houlle area, where for five days it underwent general training. On 10th October the 9th Division began to concentrate in the forward area of General Ivor Maxse’s XVIII. Corps with a view to relieving the 48th Division in line. It thus became again the right division of the Fifth Army. On 12th October it entered the support line, along the canal bank at Ypres. The battle, in the meantime, had moved slowly. By 25th September we had won all the interior ridges of the Salient and the southern pillar; but we were not yet within striking distance of the north part of the main Passchendaele Ridge. To attain this, we must lie east of Zonnebeke and the Polygon Wood, at the foot of the final slopes. Haig struck on the 26th September in fine weather, and took the Polygon Wood and Zonnebeke village. On 4th October, the very day fixed for a great German counter-attack, he struck again, and by a little after midday had gained all his objectives. He broke up forty German battalions, taking over 5,000 prisoners, and now held 9,000 yards of the crest of the ultimate ridge. On the night of the 13th the 2nd and 4th South African Regiments moved up to the front line, taking over trenches held by part of the 26th and 27th Brigades, which had been engaged in that attack on the 12th which was foiled by the disastrous weather. The relief was very difficult, for the whole country had become an irreclaimable bog, and the mud was beyond all human description. There was intermittent shelling during the 14th and 15th, and much bombing from enemy planes. On the night of the 16th the 2nd and 4th Regiments were relieved by the 1st and 3rd. For five more days the Brigade remained in the front trenches, taking part in no action, but suffering heavily from the constant bombardment. Between the 13th and the 23rd of October, when it moved out of the Salient, it had no less than 261 casualties in killed and wounded. The 9th Division now relieved the 41st Division in the Nieuport area, and remained on the Belgian coast till 20th November, a period of welcome rest. On 15th October Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner, who had commanded the 2nd Regiment since its formation, left the Brigade to take over the command of the 8th Brigade in the 3rd Division. He was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Christian.

[Illustration: THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.]

[Sidenote: _Nov. 6._]

In November the struggle at Ypres reached its close. On Tuesday, the 6th, the Canadians carried the last fragment of the Passchendaele Ridge, and wiped out the Salient, where for three years we had been at the mercy of the German guns. Sir Douglas Haig had not come within measurable distance of his major purpose, and that owing to no fault of plan, but through the maleficence of the weather in a terrain where weather was all in all. He gambled upon a normal August, and he did not get it. The sea of mud which lapped around the Salient was the true defence of the enemy. Consequently the battle, which might have had a profound strategic significance in the campaign, became merely an episode in the war of attrition, a repetition of the Somme tactics, though conspicuously less successful and considerably more costly than the fighting of 1916. Yet it will remain in history as a proof of the superb endurance and valour of the armies of Britain, fighting under conditions which for horror and misery have not been surpassed in war.