CHAPTER IV.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT.

(July-December 1916.)

The Brigade attached to the First Army—In the Trenches at Vimy—The Difficulties of the Later Stages of the Battle of the Somme—The Country around The Butte de Warlencourt—The Brigade enters the Line at Eaucourt l’Abbaye—The Attack of 12th October—The Capture of the Pimple—The Attack of 18th October—The Fighting of the 18th and 19th—The Brigade withdrawn to the Arras Area—General Lukin takes Command of the 9th Division.

[Sidenote: _July 27._]

After the fight at Longueval and Delville Wood the 9th Division left the Somme and was transferred from the XIII. Corps in the Fourth Army to the IV. Corps, under Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson, in Sir Charles Monro’s First Army. The South African Brigade marched to Maricourt on 23rd July, where it entrained for Hengest, and on the 27th arrived in the Frévillers area, north of the main road between Arras and St. Pol.

[Sidenote: _Aug. 11._]

[Sidenote: _Aug. 23._]

Here its first task was reorganization. Drafts to the number of 40 officers and 2,826 other ranks had been sent from Bordon during July, and their training had to be completed before they could be absorbed into the different regiments.[13] On 5th August, the Army Commander, Sir Charles Monro, inspected the Brigade, which at the moment showed a parade strength of 62 officers and 2,523 men. On the 11th the King visited Frévillers and walked down the village street, which was lined by the 1st Regiment in fatigue dress. By the third week in the month the Brigade was sufficiently rested and reconstituted to take its place once again in the front line, and on 23rd August it took over from the 26th Brigade the Berthonval and Carency sections of the Vimy area. At that date the Germans held the crown of the celebrated ridge, and the British front ran along its western slopes. Different battalions of the Brigade held the first-line trenches until 23rd September, and thereby enlarged their experience of modern war, for they were enabled to realize for the first time the discomfort of trench fighting amid perpetual rain. For the greater part of the time the weather was abominable, the men were standing in two feet of water, and the last few days it rained so heavily that the parapets crumbled, and every available man had to be employed on their repair. It was a foretaste of what awaited them in October.

[Sidenote: _Sept. 13._]

Vimy was a quiet area, for the great battle on the Somme continued; and this stage was for the Brigade almost barren of incident. The exception was a raid into the enemy’s trenches on the night of the 13th September, carried out by parties from “B” and “D” Companies of the 2nd Regiment, under the command of Lieutenants Lilburn and Walsh. There was a bright moon occasionally obscured by passing clouds; but the raiding parties managed to reach the enemy’s side of our wire without being observed. Our artillery put down a barrage, and under its cover the men doubled across No Man’s Land and jumped into the German trenches, the barrage lifting as they arrived there. Prisoners were secured, dug-outs were bombed, and at a prearranged signal the raiders returned to their lines before the German barrage began. Their casualties were only two, though one was so severely wounded that he could not be moved from the German lines. Sir Charles Monro sent a message to General Lukin to express his admiration for the way in which the raid had been conducted—the meticulous care in its preparation, and the gallantry and enterprise displayed in its execution.

[Sidenote: _Sept. 23._]

[Sidenote: _Oct. 8-9._]

On 23rd September the Brigade was relieved, and on the 25th it moved to a new training area, that of the Third Army. On 5th October the 9th Division was restored to the Fourth Army, and on the 7th the South Africans marched southward to the Somme. Next day, in heavy rain, they relieved the 141st Brigade of the 47th (London Territorial) Division in Mametz Wood, now a bleak desolation, and on the 9th moved to High Wood, where they took over from the 142nd Brigade. The 9th Division was now side by side with another famous Scottish division, the 15th, and part of General Pulteney’s III. Corps.

[Sidenote: _Sept. 3._]

Since the 20th of July much had happened on the Somme. The advance of 1st July had carried the first enemy position on a broad front; but the failure of the attack north of the Ancre had made the breach eight miles less than the original plan. The advance of 14th July gave us the second enemy position on a still narrower front—from Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval. The danger now was that any further movement might result in the formation of a sharp and precarious salient; so Haig broadened the breach by striking out to left and right, taking first Pozières and the high ground at Mouquet Farm, and then on the other flank Guillemont and Ginchy. This made the gap in the second enemy line seven miles wide, and brought us in most places to the highest ground, from which direct observation could be had over the slopes and pockets to the east. On 3rd September the Allies everywhere between Thiepval and Estrées were facing the German third line. At the outset of the battle this third position had been only in embryo, but before the assault of 14th July it had been for the most part completed, and by the beginning of September it had been elaborately fortified, and a fourth position prepared behind it. The third line was based on a string of fortified villages which lay on the reverse slopes of the main ridge—Courcelette, Martinpuich, Flers, Lesbœufs, and Morval. Behind it was an intermediate line, with Le Sars, Eaucourt l’Abbaye, and Gueudecourt as strong points in it. Further back lay the newly-made fourth line, just west of the Bapaume-Péronne road, covering the villages of Sailly-Saillisel and Le Transloy. This was the line protecting Bapaume, and at the moment the final German prepared position.

The fighting during July and August had greatly weakened the enemy forces. All the most famous German units had appeared—the pick of the Bavarians, the 5th Brandenburgers, and every division of the Guard and Guard Reserve Corps. The time was ripe early in September for a new attack which should accelerate the enemy’s decline, and give the British front a new orientation. Haig’s immediate aim was to break through the German third line; but his ultimate objective was a thrust north-eastward across the Upper Ancre, so as to get behind the great slab of unbroken enemy positions from Thiepval northward. The moment was propitious for a new blow. The French on the British right had won conspicuous successes; Brussilov was still pinning down the Austro-German forces on the Eastern front; Sarrail had just launched an offensive in the Balkans; Rumania had entered the war, and was pouring troops into Transylvania; and the recent changes in the German High Command had for the time being slightly dislocated the machine.

[Sidenote: _Sept. 15._]

[Sidenote: _Sept. 25-26._]

On Friday, 15th September, Haig struck from a point south-east of Thiepval to Ginchy, with a force the larger part of which, such as the Guards, the Canadians, and the New Zealanders, was fresh to the Somme area. He used for the first time the new British tanks, and in one day advanced to an average depth of a mile on a front of more than six, taking Courcelette, Martinpuich, and Flers. Only on his right, where the Guards were faced with an impossible task, was there any serious check. On 25th September he struck again between Combles and Martinpuich, and for the second time advanced one mile on a front of six, and took Morval, Lesbœufs, and Gueudecourt, while on the 26th the right wing of Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army carried Thiepval and the whole of that crest. That evening the Allied fortunes in the West had never looked brighter. The enemy was now back in his fourth line, and had lost all the advantages of the higher ground. His _moral_ was seriously shaken, and it appeared as if his great machine was getting out of gear. If heaven granted a fine autumn there was good hope that a further advance might drive him from the Bapaume ridge and crumble his whole front between Arras and Péronne.

That hope was destined to fail. The guns were scarcely silent after the attack of the 26th when the weather broke, and October was one succession of tempestuous gales and drenching rains. Now appeared the supreme difficulty of trench warfare. For three months the Allies had been slowly advancing, blasting their way forward with their guns before each infantry attack, and the result was that the fifty square miles of old battle-ground which lay behind their front lines had been tortured out of recognition. The little country roads had been wholly destroyed, and, since they never had much of a bottom, the road-menders had nothing to build upon. New roads were hard to make, for the chalky soil had been so churned up by shelling that it had lost all cohesion. In all the area there were but two good highways, and by the third month of the battle even these showed signs of wear. The consequence was that there were now two No Man’s Lands—one between the front lines, and one between the old enemy front and the front we had won. The second was the bigger problem, for across it must be brought the supplies of a great army. It was a war of motor transport, and we were doing what the early Victorians had pronounced impossible—running the equivalent of steam engines not on prepared tracks but on high-roads, running them day and night in endless relays. The problem was difficult enough in fine weather, but when the rain came it turned the whole land into a morass. Every road became a watercourse, and in the hollows the mud was as deep as a man’s thighs. The army must be fed, troops must be relieved, guns must be supplied, so there could be no slackening of the traffic. Off the roads the ground was one vast bog, dug-outs crumbled in, and communication trenches ceased to be. Behind the British front lay six miles of sponge, varied by mud torrents. It was into such miserable warfare, under persistent rain in a decomposing land, that the South African Brigade was now flung.

The line of the Fourth Army from a point north-east of Courcelette ran southward for the most part along the foot of the slopes which culminated in High Wood, and which were known to us as the Thiepval-Morval ridge. But a special topographical feature must be noted, for on it depended the fighting in October. From that ridge a series of spurs descended eastward into the hollow, one of which specially concerns us—the hammer-headed spur immediately west of Flers, at the end of which stood the odd tumulus called the Butte de Warlencourt. Below the eastern edge of this spur lay the German fourth position. It was a position on reverse slopes, and thus screened from direct observation, though our command of the high ground to the west gave us a view of its hinterland. Our own possession of the heights, great though the advantages were, had this drawback, that our communications had to descend the reverse slopes, and were thus partly exposed to the enemy’s observation and long-range fire. The task of Sir Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army in this sector was, therefore, to carry the spurs, and so get within assaulting distance of the German fourth line. The spurs were not part of the German main front, but were held as intermediate positions, every advantage being taken of sunken roads, of ruins, and of the undulations of the country. They represented for the fourth German line what Contalmaison had represented for the second; till they were carried no general assault on the main front could be undertaken. Further, their capture would relieve our difficulties by giving us certain cover for our advanced gun positions, and shelter for the bringing up of supplies.

At first things went well. From Flers north-westward, in front of Eaucourt l’Abbaye and Le Sars, ran a very strong trench system which we called the Flers line, and which was virtually a switch connecting the old German third line, now in our hands, with the intermediate positions on the spurs. The capture of Flers gave us the south-eastern part of this line, and during the last days of September and the beginning of October we won the rest of it. On the 1st of October the 50th and 47th Divisions carried the Flers line north of Destremont Farm, and the ruined abbey of Eaucourt, though in the latter remnants of the 6th Bavarian Division made for some days a stout resistance. On 7th October the 23rd Division took the village of Le Sars, on the Albert-Bapaume road; but the 47th Division, on their right, failed to reach the Butte de Warlencourt. These two divisions were now relieved, and the 15th and the 9th took their places, with orders to carry the Butte and the German intermediate line.

* * * * *

[Sidenote: _Oct. 9._]

During the day of 9th October the 2nd South African Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Christian, to the strength of 20 officers and 578 other ranks, took over the portion of the front line to be held by the Brigade. The relief, with the exception of two posts, was complete by 1.25 a.m. on the 10th, and shortly before daybreak the missing posts were discovered. During that night a number of wounded, belonging to the outgoing 141st Brigade, were brought in by the South Africans.

The attention of the reader is now requested to the map opposite page 92. The boundary of the 9th Division on the left was the road from the Butte de Warlencourt to Martinpuich, where it ran along the depression of the ground west of Eaucourt. The South African Brigade was on the left of the division, and its brigade boundary ran through the ruins of Eaucourt l’Abbaye, beyond which the 26th Brigade held the front. The 27th Brigade was in divisional reserve. “B” and “C” Companies of the 2nd Regiment held the front line, as shown in the map, together with two strong posts, Nos. 58 and 77, on their left and right fronts respectively. “A” and “D” Companies were in the support trenches of the old Flers line running along the south-west, side of Eaucourt l’Abbaye. The German, front trenches, known to us as Snag and Tail, lay about 1,000 yards from our front line, and conformed roughly to its shape. Beyond them, running through the Butte de Warlencourt, was the enemy main intermediate position, cutting the Albert-Bapaume road beyond Le Sars. The confused fighting of the past weeks and the constant rains had made the whole front on both sides indeterminate. Odd lengths of fantastically-named trenches abounded, and at any one moment it was doubtful which were held by the Germans and which could be claimed by the British. Sir Henry Rawlinson’s first task was to clear the ground up to the Butte, which would bring him directly in front of the German fourth position, running through Le Transloy and Ligny-Thilloy.

On the left of the South African front, and under their control, stood the ruins of a mill. The first instructions of the 2nd Regiment were to link up the posts 58 and 77 with the mill; but owing to the slowness of the relief this could not be done till the second night, when some 600 yards of trench were dug. During the whole of the 10th and the 11th the 2nd Regiment was heavily shelled; but their casualties were not large. On the 11th General Furse issued orders for an attack during daylight on the 12th in conjunction with the 26th Brigade on their right, and the 44th Brigade of the 15th Division on their left. The enemy’s trenches were accordingly reconnoitred, and a certain number of machine guns located. So far as could be judged, there was no wire in the immediate vicinity. Orders were issued to push out a post to the point marked 93, and to link it up with the mill, but this instruction was presently cancelled. A new communication trench was dug between Flers trench and the front line.

[Illustration: THE FIGHTING BEFORE THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT, BATTLE OF THE SOMME.]

[Sidenote: _Oct. 12._]

The attack on the 12th was fixed for 2.5 in the afternoon. The assault was to be carried out on a one-battalion front by the 2nd and 4th Regiments, the 2nd Regiment leading, with the 3rd and 1st in reserve. There were two objectives; the first the enemy trenches called Snag and Tail, and the second the main intermediate line through the Butte de Warlencourt. The cloudy morning dissolved after midday in a drizzle of rain. At 2.5, after a well-arranged barrage, the 2nd Regiment crossed the parapets, closely followed by the 4th, under Major Hunt. One minute after zero an enemy barrage of exceptional violence began, with the result that in a quarter of an hour the telephone wires to the front line were cut, and no reports were received for some time. In the misty weather it was impossible to see any distance, and the difficulty was increased owing to a smoke barrage, which we had laid down around the Butte, drifting in our direction. Presently it appeared that the enemy was following a new practice. The ground over which we were attacking was a gentle slope, perfectly suited to machine-gun fire. He had his machine guns placed well back in prepared positions, and caught our attack at long range. Under this blast no troops could live, and presently the impetus of the assault died away, long before the first objective had been obtained.

At 4 p.m. General Lukin received a message from Captain Ross of the 4th Regiment that he, with some details of the 2nd, was holding a line of shell-holes and a shallow trench half-way between our old front line and the first objective, and that in front of him, near the first objective, was a company of the 4th, while a part of the 2nd seemed to be farther forward. Lukin had already sent forward a company of the 3rd Regiment to hold the old front line, and he now ordered two officers’ patrols from this company to clear up the situation. They reported during the evening that the Brigade had nowhere reached its first objective. As the attacking battalions had suffered heavily, and were now more or less disorganized, Lukin ordered the 3rd Regiment to relieve them, while the 1st was moved up in support. The relief was no light task, owing to the congested state of the communication trenches, and the difficulty of obtaining reliable guides; and it was not till after dawn on the 13th that the 2nd and 4th Regiments were brought back to High Wood.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 13._]

Early on the 13th it was discovered that Lieutenants Pearse and Donaldson, with about sixty men, had dug themselves in at a very exposed point near the enemy’s line, and due south of the post at point 93. Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, commanding the 3rd Regiment, instructed Captain Montgomery, who commanded “C” Company in it, to open up visual communication with Lieutenant Pearse, and tell him that he could not be relieved till after dark. This was found to be impossible; but Lieutenant Cruddas succeeded in reaching the place and ascertaining the exact position of the party, with the result that they were brought back safely during the evening. Meantime much work had been done in digging trenches and establishing what ground had been won. A new trench, afterwards known as Pearse’s Trench, was dug from our old line to the point which he had held, and made a jumping-off ground for future operations.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 14._]

Orders were received from the division at 6.15 p.m. to reconnoitre the deserted strong-point 93, with the object of occupying it. A patrol, under Lieutenant Mallett, reached it with little opposition, and found there many signs of German occupation, including a field and two machine-gun emplacements and a deep dug-out. This place was soon to become only too familiar to us under the name of the Pimple, a little mound some 60 feet long, 12 feet wide, and from 12 to 15 feet high.[14] The patrol did not return till daybreak, so it was impossible to occupy the Pimple that night; but the 3rd Regiment were instructed that the following evening, as soon as the dark fell, they must enter into possession of the place, so that it might be linked up with the rest of the line. Accordingly, early on the night of the 14th, “B” Company of the 3rd Regiment, under Captain Sprenger, was detailed for the work. Lieutenant Mallett led the advance for 400 yards and reached the mound, which was thereafter garrisoned by a party under Lieutenant Medlicott. Lieutenant Mallett then entered the trench running from the Pimple towards the enemy position in Snag and Tail trenches, and bombed the enemy out of a portion of this till he was driven back by machine-gun fire and severely wounded. Another party, however, under Lieutenants Harris and Estill, continued the work, and succeeded in taking and holding a considerable part of this section of the old German communications. That night the place was heavily bombed by Germans moving along the trenches, and soon after dawn on the 15th a working party was seen approaching. As they were in close order, a Lewis gun was turned on them, and the squad was dispersed with many casualties. The garrison of “B” Company continued to hold the Pimple and the captured trenches until relieved by “A” Company of the 3rd on the night of the 15th. The casualties during the operation amounted to 3 officers (Lieutenant Medlicott killed, Captain Sprenger and Lieutenant Mallett wounded, the latter subsequently dying of his wounds) and 35 other ranks. It was one of the most gallant exploits during this stage of the battle.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 16-17._]

On the night of the 16th the 3rd Regiment retired to the support line, and their place in the front trenches was taken by the 1st, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson. Meantime, large working parties had been employed in widening and deepening the communication trench between the Pimple and our front line and back to Flers Switch. During the 17th Dawson took his company commanders round the whole trench system, pointing out the limits of each company’s front and the points to be attacked, for on that day orders had come from the division for an assault in the early morning of the 18th against the same objectives which had been attacked without success on the 12th. Such coaching was a most needful preliminary, for every hour, under the shelling and the weather, the landscape was growing more featureless. To the eye it was only a waste of wrinkled grey mud.

[Illustration: SCENE OF SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE’S ADVANCE AGAINST THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT POSITION.]

All that evening and for most of the night heavy rain fell, so that the trenches and parapets were mere undulations in a quagmire. The front-line trench being deep and narrow with few fire-steps, it was difficult for the men to leave it, and realizing this, the company commanders began getting their troops out more than an hour before the time fixed for the attack. Zero hour was at 3.40 a.m., and when it came the three assaulting companies of the 1st Regiment were already for the most part formed up in No Man’s Land.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 18._]

Keeping as close as they dared to their barrage, the South Africans advanced, with “C” Company on their left, “B” Company in the centre, and “A” on the right. They disappeared into the rain, and for several hours were unheard of. When news came it was news of failure. “C” Company, under Captain Jenkins, passed the communication trench leading south from the Pimple, and came to that junction of Tail and Snag trenches which we called the Nose of the Switch. Here they were held up by wire at the foot of a steep bank in front of the German line, and were also heavily bombed from the trenches themselves. The leading platoon was almost entirely shot down, and though an officer and six men of the following platoon managed to get into the German trench, they, too, immediately fell. The only officer left was Captain Jenkins, who was himself wounded; and, seeing that the enemy line was so strongly held, and that there was no hope of success for what remained of his company, he ordered the company sergeant-major to withdraw the survivors to their original line. The casualties of “C” Company were 69 out of the 100 who crossed the parapet.

The fate of “A” and “B” Companies was still harder, and to understand it the reader must again turn to the map. The two companies advanced rapidly behind our barrage and entered Snag Trench, Captain Whiting, who commanded “B” Company, being mortally wounded half-way across. They failed, however, to realize that they had reached their objective, and continued beyond it. The whole place was so battered by shell-fire that the trench outlines had become obscure. They saw about 600 yards on their right some of the Highlanders of the 26th Brigade, but they had now wholly lost touch with their flanks, and the enemy was filtering in between them and their old front. Lieutenant Stapleton with a few stragglers succeeded in returning, after killing some twelve Germans and taking nineteen prisoners; two officers and sixteen other ranks were captured; but with these exceptions all the men of “A” and “B” Companies were killed.[15]

At daybreak a gallant attempt was made by Major Ormiston, commanding the troops on the Pimple, to bomb along the trench leading to the junction of the Tail and Snag trenches, but it broke down under machine-gun fire from the German strong-point at the Nose. A block was established about 50 yards up the trench from the Pimple, but no further progress could be made, since the trench dipped into a hollow, and was wholly commanded by the Germans at the Nose.

Such was the position on the morning of the 18th. During the night a company of the 3rd Regiment, under Captain Langdale, had been moved forward to the front line and put at Dawson’s disposal, and a company of the 4th Regiment was sent to replace it in the support line. Presently Langdale took up his position in Pearse’s Trench, and on Dawson’s instructions sent out a patrol to look for “A” and “B” Companies. The patrol returned at two in the afternoon, having obtained no information. The situation, therefore, was that “C” Company had failed in the attack with heavy losses, and that “A” and “B” Companies had disappeared. The key of the enemy position was clearly the Nose, and until this could be thoroughly bombarded progress was impossible. Communications, however, were so difficult that all day Dawson was asking for the bombardment of the Nose, and all day our guns were firing on the wrong point.

That afternoon Dawson was ordered to renew the attack at 5.45 p.m. He decided that “D” Company of his own 1st Regiment should attack from the Pimple, while Captain Langdale’s Company of the 3rd should advance from Pearse’s Trench. If the Nose was to be taken it must be attacked along Snag Trench from the east. Owing to the appalling condition of the trenches, which were now all but impassable, Captain Langdale advanced with only one platoon and two Lewis gun teams. He entered Snag Trench without opposition, and moved along it to the right for some 200 yards, where he made a block and left a Lewis gun. He then moved westward to a point about 25 yards from the Nose, where he came upon three German machine guns in action. He did not feel strong enough to attack them himself, and after remaining there about an hour withdrew his men to the original front line. The bombing attack from the Pimple had also failed. Dawson ordered Captain Langdale to return at once and reoccupy Snag Trench, and this was done between twelve and one on the morning of the 19th.

[Sidenote: _Oct. 19._]

Meanwhile Lukin had sent forward a company of the 4th Regiment, under Captain Ross, with instructions to carry out a fresh attack at the junction of Snag and Tail trenches. Captain Ross reached the front line about 4 a.m. on the morning of the 19th. At about five o’clock the enemy launched an assault with bombs and _flammenwerfer_ against Captain Langdale’s and Captain Ross’s men in Snag Trench, and drove them out, with heavy casualties to Captain Ross’s company. The leader was wounded, and Lieutenant Young, V.C., killed. The position now was that Snag and Tail trenches were held in force by the enemy, and that we were everywhere back in our old line except on the extreme right, where some details of the 3rd and 4th Regiments seemed to be on the left flank of the 26th Brigade.

On the morning of the 19th it was decided to make another attempt to clear Snag Trench, and for the purpose a company was dispatched from the 3rd Regiment, under Lieutenant Elliott. All that morning the two machine guns at the Pimple, under Major Ormiston, had enfiladed the trench. It often happened that small bodies of Germans, unable to stand the strain, would leave cover and bolt across the open towards the Butte, making an excellent target for our snipers and machine gunners.[16] By the afternoon few of the enemy were left in Snag Trench; but the machine guns were still at the Nose, and our artillery seemed unable to touch them.

At noon Lieutenant Elliott reported to Dawson, and was instructed to enter Snag Trench, to get in touch with the 26th Brigade on his right, and then to work his way towards the Nose and drive out the enemy there. At five minutes to three Lieutenant Elliott entered Snag Trench without difficulty, but failed—apparently owing to insufficient bombs—to advance towards the Nose, beyond which Major Ormiston was waiting to attack as soon as there was a supporting movement from the east. The thing had now become hopeless. Dawson had not a single officer or man, with the exception of his adjutant, fit to make another journey to the front line. The mud was so thick that rifles, machine guns, and Lewis guns were constantly jamming, and among the little party on the Pimple there was not one rifle which could be fired. In many of the trenches the mud was three feet deep, and the wounded had to be dug out at once before they suffocated. Every man was utterly exhausted.[17]

[Sidenote: _Oct. 20._]

That night the remnant under Dawson was relieved by the 6th K.O.S.B. from the 27th Brigade, and early on the morning of the 20th all were back in High Wood.

So ended the tale of the South Africans’ share in the most dismal of all the chapters of the Somme, a chapter which, nevertheless, deserves to rank high in the record of British hardihood. The enemy held his ground with admirable skill and resolution. The fighting had not the swift pace and the obvious successes of the earlier battles. We were striving for minor objectives, and such a task lacks the impetus and exhilaration of a great combined assault. Often the action resolved itself into isolated struggles, a handful of men in a mud-hole holding out till their post was linked up with our main front. Rain, cold, slow reliefs, the absence of hot food, and often of any food at all, made those episodes a severe test of endurance and devotion. So awful was the mud that each stretcher required eight bearers, and at the end battalion runners, though carrying no arms or equipment, took from four to six hours to cover the thousand odd yards between the front line and battalion headquarters. To show the utter exhaustion of the troops, at High Wood after the relief many men were found lying fast asleep without overcoats or blankets, and stiff with frost. To add to their discomfort, there was a perpetual and inevitable confusion of mind. The front was never at any one moment clearly defined, and officers led and men followed in a cruel fog of uncertainty. Such fighting could not be other than costly. In the ten days from the 9th to the 19th October the South African casualties were approximately 1,150, including 45 officers, 16 of whom were killed.[18]

On 21st October the Brigade, with the exception of the 3rd Regiment, which was in High Wood in reserve to the 27th Brigade, moved to Mametz Wood. On the 23rd orders were received that the Brigade would be in reserve in the attack to be carried out by the 9th Division on the 25th. Presently these orders were cancelled, and the entire division was taken out of the line. At the end of the month it moved north to an area south of the Doullens-Arras road, and became part of Major-General Aylmer Haldane’s VI. Corps in Sir Edmund Allenby’s Third Army.

[Illustration: BRIG.-GEN. FRED. STEWART DAWSON, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., Commanding 1st South African Regiment, and later South African Brigade.]

During November the 1st South African Regiment was in huts at Duisans, the 2nd at Lattre St. Quentin, the 3rd at Wanquetin, and the 4th billeted in Arras, where it was engaged in improving the defences of that city. The other regiments were occupied in training, in the construction of new roads and cable trenches, and in the other preliminary work necessary in the area of a coming battle. For it had already been decided by Sir Douglas Haig that the great thrust of the spring would be from Arras eastward.

[Sidenote: _Dec. 2._]

November of that year was not the sodden downpour of October. There were seasons of high wind and sharp frost, which were a grateful relief after the monotony of the Butte de Warlencourt fighting. On 2nd December General Lukin was promoted to the command of the 9th Division, with the rank of Major-General, on General Furse’s appointment as Master-General of the Ordnance. All South Africans felt their Brigadier’s advancement to be a personal tribute to the Brigade which he had so gallantly led. He was succeeded in its command by Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson of the 1st Regiment, who was succeeded in turn by Major F. H. Heal.