chapter VII
, he was unable to establish relationships with others and had a resentment for authority and any discipline flowing from it. While he demonstrated the ability to act secretively and alone, without regard to the consequences to himself, as in his defection to the Soviet Union, he does not appear to have been the kind of person whom one would normally expect to be selected as a conspirator.
Residence in the Soviet Union
Lee Harvey Oswald was openly committed to Marxist ideology, he defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, and resided there until June of 1962, eventually returning to the United States with a Russian wife. In order to evaluate rumors and speculations[C6-96] that Oswald may have been an agent of the Soviet Union, the Commission investigated the facts surrounding Oswald’s stay in Russia. The Commission was thus fulfilling its obligation to probe all facts of possible relevance to the assassination, and does not suggest by this investigation that the rulers of the Soviet Union believed that their political interests would be advanced by the assassination of President Kennedy. On this question, the Secretary of State testified before the Commission on June 10, 1964 as follows:
I have seen no evidence that would indicate to me that the Soviet Union considered that it had an interest in the removal of President Kennedy or that it was in any way involved in the removal of President Kennedy.
* * * * *
I have not seen or heard of any scrap of evidence indicating that the Soviet Union had any desire to eliminate President Kennedy nor in any way participated in any such event.
Now, standing back and trying to look at that question objectively despite the ideological differences between our two great systems, I can’t see how it could be to the interest of the Soviet Union to make any such effort.
* * * * *
I do think that the Soviet Union, again objectively considered, has an interest in the correctness of state relations. This would be particularly true among the great powers, with which the major interests of the Soviet Union are directly engaged.
* * * * *
I think that although there are grave differences between the Communist world and the free world, between the Soviet Union and other major powers, that even from their point of view there needs to be some shape and form to international relations, that it is not in their interest to have this world structure dissolve into complete anarchy, that great states and particularly nuclear powers have to be in a position to deal with each other, to transact business with each other, to try to meet problems with each other, and that requires the maintenance of correct relations and access to the leadership on all sides.
I think also that although there had been grave differences between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, I think there were evidences of a certain mutual respect that had developed over some of the experiences, both good and bad, through which these two men had lived.
I think both of them were aware of the fact that any Chairman of the Soviet Union, and any President of the United States, necessarily bear somewhat special responsibility for the general peace of the world. Indeed without exaggeration, one could almost say the existence of the northern hemisphere in this nuclear age.
* * * * *
So that it would be an act of rashness and madness for Soviet leaders to undertake such an action as an active policy. Because everything would have been put in jeopardy or at stake in connection with such an act.
It has not been our impression that madness has characterized the actions of the Soviet leadership in recent years.[C6-97]
The Commission accepts Secretary Rusk’s estimate as reasonable and objective, but recognizes that a precise assessment of Soviet intentions or interests is most difficult. The Commission has thus examined all the known facts regarding Oswald’s defection, residence in the Soviet Union, and return to the United States. At each step the Commission sought to determine whether there was any evidence which supported a conclusion that Soviet authorities may have directly or indirectly influenced Oswald’s actions in assassinating the President.
_Oswald’s entry into the Soviet Union._--Although the evidence is inconclusive as to the factors which motivated Oswald to go to the Soviet Union, there is no indication that he was prompted to do so by agents of that country. He may have begun to study the Russian language when he was stationed in Japan, which was intermittently from August 1957 to November 1958.[C6-98] After he arrived in Moscow in October 1959 he told several persons that he had been planning his defection for 2 years, which suggests that the decision was made while he was in the Far East.[C6-99] George De Mohrenschildt, who met Oswald after his return from the Soviet Union, testified that Oswald once told him much the same thing: “I met some Communists in Japan and they got me excited and interested, and that was one of my inducements in going to Soviet Russia, to see what goes on there.”[C6-100] This evidence, however, is somewhat at variance with Oswald’s statements made to two American newspaper reporters in Moscow shortly after his defection in 1959,[C6-101] and to other people in the United States after his return in 1962.[C6-102] Though his remarks were not inconsistent as to the time he decided to defect, to these people he insisted that before going to the Soviet Union he had “never met a Communist” and that the intent to defect derived entirely from his own reading and thinking. He said much the same to his brother in a letter he wrote to him from Russia explaining why he had defected.[C6-103] Which of Oswald’s statements was the more accurate remains unknown.
There is no evidence that Oswald received outside assistance in financing his trip to the Soviet Union. After he arrived in Moscow, Oswald told a newspaper correspondent, Aline Mosby, that he had saved $1,500 out of his Marine Corps salary to finance his defection,[C6-104] although the news story based upon Oswald’s interview with Aline Mosby unaccountably listed the sum of $1,600 instead of $1,500.[C6-105] After this article had appeared, Marguerite Oswald also related the $1,600 figure to an FBI agent.[C6-106] Either amount could have been accumulated out of Oswald’s earnings in the Marine Corps; during his 2 years and 10 months of service he received $3,452.20, after all taxes, allotments and other deductions.[C6-107] Moreover Oswald could certainly have made the entire trip on less than $1,000. The ticket on the ship he took from New Orleans to Le Havre, France, cost $220.75;[C6-108] it cost him about $20 to reach London from Le Havre; his plane fare from London to Helsinki, where he received his visa, cost him $111.90; he probably purchased Russian “tourist vouchers” normally good for room and board for 10 days for $300; his train fare from Helsinki to Moscow was about $44; in Moscow he paid only $1.50 to $3 a night for his room and very little for his meals after his tourist vouchers ran out;[C6-109] and apparently he did not pay his hotel bill at all after November 30, 1959.[C6-110] Oswald’s known living habits indicate that he could be extraordinarily frugal when he had reason to be, and it seems clear that he did have a strong desire to go to the Soviet Union.
While in Atsugi, Japan, Oswald studied the Russian language, perhaps with some help from an officer in his unit who was interested in Russian and used to “talk about it” with Oswald occasionally.[C6-111] He studied by himself a great deal in late 1958 and early 1959 after he was transferred from Japan to California.[C6-112] He took an Army aptitude test in Russian in February 1959 and rated “Poor.”[C6-113] When he reached the Soviet Union in October of the same year he could barely speak the language.[C6-114] During the period in Moscow while he was awaiting decision on his application for citizenship, his diary records that he practiced Russian 8 hours a day.[C6-115] After he was sent to Minsk in early January 1960 he took lessons from an interpreter assigned to him for that purpose by the Soviet Government.[C6-116] Marina Oswald said that by the time she met him in March 1961 he spoke the language well enough so that at first she thought he was from one of the Baltic areas of her country, because of his accent. She stated that his only defects were that his grammar was sometimes incorrect and that his writing was never good.[C6-117]
Thus, the limited evidence provides no indication that Oswald was recruited by Soviet agents in the Far East with a view toward defection and eventual return to the United States. Moreover, on its face such a possibility is most unlikely. If Soviet agents had communicated with Oswald while he was in the Marine Corps, one of the least probable instructions they would have given him would have been to defect. If Oswald had remained a Marine radar specialist, he might at some point have reached a position of value as a secret agent. However, his defection and the disloyal statements he made publicly in connection with it eliminated the possibility that he would ever gain access to confidential information or programs of the United States. The very fact that he defected, therefore, is itself persuasive evidence that he was not recruited as an agent prior to his defection.
The Commission has investigated the circumstances under which Oswald obtained a visa to enter the Soviet Union for possible evidence that he received preferential treatment in being permitted to enter the country. Oswald left New Orleans, La., for Europe on September 20, 1959,[C6-118] having been released from active duty in the Marine Corps on September 11, 1959.[C6-119] He went directly to Helsinki, Finland, by way of Le Havre, France, and London, England, arriving at Helsinki on Saturday, October 10, 1959.[C6-120] Oswald probably arrived in Helsinki too late in the evening to have applied for a visa at the Soviet Union consulate that night.[C6-121] In light of the rapidity with which he made connections throughout his entire trip,[C6-122] he probably applied for a visa early on Monday, October 12. On October 14, he was issued Soviet Tourist Visa No. 403339, good for one 6-day visit in the U.S.S.R.[C6-123] He left Helsinki on a train destined for Moscow on October 15.[C6-124]
The Department of State has advised the Commission that it has some information that in 1959 it usually took an American tourist in Helsinki 1 to 2 weeks to obtain a visa,[C6-125] and that it has other information that the normal waiting period during the past 5 years has been a week or less.[C6-126] According to the Department’s information, the waiting period has always varied frequently and widely, with one confirmed instance in 1963 of a visa routinely issued in less than 24 hours.[C6-127] The Central Intelligence Agency has indicated that visas during the 1964 tourist season were being granted in about 5 to 7 days.[C6-128]
This information from the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency thus suggests that Oswald’s wait for a visa may have been shorter than usual but not beyond the range of possible variation. The prompt issuance of Oswald’s visa may have been merely the result of normal procedures, due in part to the fact that the summer rush had ended. It might also mean that Oswald was unusually urgent in his demands that his visa be issued promptly. Oswald himself told officials at the American Embassy in Moscow on October 31, when he appeared to renounce his citizenship, that he had said nothing to the Soviets about defecting until he arrived in Moscow.[C6-129] In any event, the Commission has found nothing in the circumstances of Oswald’s entry into the Soviet Union which indicates that he was at the time an agent of the U.S.S.R.
_Defection and admission to residence._--Two months and 22 days elapsed from Oswald’s arrival in Moscow until he left that city to take up residence in Minsk. The Commission has considered the possibility that Oswald was accepted for residence in the Soviet Union and sent to Minsk unusually soon after he arrived, either because he had been expected or because during his first weeks in Moscow he developed an undercover relationship with the Soviet Government. In doing so, the Commission has attempted to reconstruct the events of those months, though it is, of course, impossible to account for Oswald’s activities on every day of that period.
Oswald’s “Historic Diary,”[C6-130] which commences on October 16, 1959, the date Oswald arrived in Moscow, and other writings he later prepared,[C6-131] have provided the Commission with one source of information about Oswald’s activities throughout his stay in the Soviet Union. Even assuming the diary was intended to be a truthful record, it is not an accurate guide to the details of Oswald’s
## activities. Oswald seems not to have been concerned about the accuracy
of dates and names,[C6-132] and apparently made many of his entries subsequent to the date the events occurred. Marina Oswald testified that she believed that her husband did not begin to keep the diary until he reached Minsk, 3 months after his arrival in Russia,[C6-133] and scraps of paper found in Oswald’s possession, containing much the same information as appears in his diary,[C6-134] suggest that he transcribed the entries into the diary at a later time. The substance of Oswald’s writings has been carefully examined for consistency with all other related information available to the Commission. In addition, the writings have been checked for handwriting,[C6-135] and for consistency of style, grammar, and spelling with earlier and later writings which are known to be his.[C6-136] No indication has been found that entries were written or coached by other persons.[C6-137]
However, the most reliable information concerning the period Oswald spent in Moscow in the latter part of 1962 comes from the records of the American Embassy in Moscow,[C6-138] the testimony of Embassy officials,[C6-139] and the notes of two American newspaper reporters, Aline Mosby [C6-140] and Priscilla Johnson,[C6-141] who interviewed Oswald during this period. Oswald’s correspondence with his brother and mother has also been relied upon for some relatively minor information. The findings upon which the Commission based its conclusion concerning Soviet involvements in the assassination were supported by evidence other than material provided by the Soviet Union[C6-142] or Oswald’s writings. The Central Intelligence Agency has also contributed data on the normal practices and procedures of the Soviet authorities in handling American defectors.
The “Historic Diary” indicates that on October 16, 1959, the day Oswald arrived in Moscow, he told his Intourist guide, Rima Shirokova, that he wished to renounce his American citizenship and become a Soviet citizen. The same day, the guide reportedly helped Oswald prepare a letter to the Soviet authorities requesting citizenship.[C6-143] The diary indicates, however, that on October 21 he was informed that his visa had expired and that he would be required to leave Moscow within 2 hours.[C6-144] During the preceding days, according to the diary, he had been interviewed once and perhaps twice by Soviet officials.[C6-145] During this period the KGB,[B] the agency with primary responsibility for examining defectors arriving in Russia, undoubtedly investigated Oswald as fully as possible. In 1959, virtually all Intourist guides were KGB informants, and there is no reason to believe that this was not true of Oswald’s guide.[C6-146]
[B] The Committee for State Security, best known by its Russian initials, “KGB,” is a lineal descendant of the revolutionary ChEKA and has passed through numerous changes of name since 1917 with little change of function. Presently the KGB handles all Soviet counterintelligence operations and is the instrument for various types of subversive activities. It is responsible for the internal security of the Soviet state and the safety of its leaders. In addition it shares responsibility for foreign espionage
## activities with the intelligence component of the Ministry
of Defense, the “GRU.” The KGB would have the primary responsibility for keeping track of a defector such as Oswald.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs or “MVD” was for many years the designation of the organization responsible for civil law enforcement and administration of prisons and forced labor camps in the Soviet Union. During a part of its history it also directed vast economic combines. In January 1960, the central or all-union MVD was abolished and its powers transferred to the MVD’s of the several Soviet republics. A further change took place in the summer of 1962, when the republic MVD’s were renamed Ministries for the Preservation of Public Order and Safety. In the past few years the republic MVD’s have been gradually divesting themselves of their economic functions. When Lee Harvey Oswald was in the Soviet Union though, the MVD still carried on substantial economic activities. For example, inmates of the MVD-administered “corrective labor colonies” engaged in brickmaking, heavy construction work, and lumbering.
In the Commission’s report, the term KGB will be used, as above, to describe the principal Soviet counterintelligence and espionage service. Oswald often inaccurately referred to the “secret police” as the MVD; and in any quotations from him, the Commission will reproduce his actual words. Whenever the Commission refers to the MVD, it will be referring to it as defined in this footnote.
According to Oswald’s diary he attempted suicide when he learned his application for citizenship had been denied.[C6-147] If true, this would seem to provide strong evidence that, at least prior to October 21, there was no undercover relationship between Oswald and the Soviet Government. Though not necessarily conclusive, there is considerable direct evidence which indicates that Oswald did slash his wrist. Oswald’s autopsy showed that he had a scar on his left wrist and that it was of the kind which could have been caused by a suicide attempt.[C6-148] The medical records from the Botkinskaya Hospital in Moscow, furnished by the Soviet Government, reveal that from October 21 to October 28 he was treated there for a self-inflicted wound on the left wrist.[C6-149] The information contained in these records is consistent with the facts disclosed by the autopsy examination relating to Oswald’s wrist and to other facts known about Oswald. Although no witness recalled Oswald mentioning a suicide attempt,[C6-150] Marina Oswald testified that when she questioned her husband about the scar on his wrist, he became “very angry,” and avoided giving her a reply.[C6-151] Oswald’s character, discussed in the following chapter, does not seem inconsistent with a suicide or feigned suicide attempt, nor with his having failed to disclose the suicide attempt. Many witnesses who testified before the Commission observed that he was not an “open” or trusting person, had a tendency toward arrogance, and was not the kind of man who would readily admit weaknesses.[C6-152]
Oswald appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow on October 31, 1959, 3 days after his release from the Botkinskaya Hospital.[C6-153] He did not give the officials at the Embassy any indication that he had recently received medical treatment.[C6-154] Oswald’s appearance was the first notification to the American Government that he was in Russia, since he had failed to inform the Embassy upon his arrival,[C6-155] as most American tourists did at the time.[C6-156] In appendix XV, Oswald’s dealings with the Embassy in 1959 until his return to the United States in 1962 are described in full, and all
## action taken by the American officials on his case is evaluated. His
conduct at the Embassy has also been considered by the Commission for any indication it may provide as to whether or not Oswald was then
## acting under directions of the Soviet Government.
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 913
NOTE HANDED BY OSWALD TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW ON OCT. 31, 1959]
At the Embassy, Oswald declared that he wished to renounce his U.S. citizenship,[C6-157] but the consul to whom he spoke, Richard E. Snyder, refused to accept his renunciation at that time, telling him that he would have to return to complete the necessary papers.[C6-158] However, Oswald did give the consul his passport[C6-159] and a handwritten statement requesting that his American citizenship be “revoked” and “affirm[ing] [his] * * * allegiance” to the Soviet Union.[C6-160] (See Commission Exhibit No. 913, p. 261.) The FBI has confirmed that this statement is in Oswald’s handwriting,[C6-161] and Snyder has testified that the letter’s phrases are consistent with the way Oswald talked and conducted himself.[C6-162] During the approximately 40-minute interview, Oswald also informed Snyder that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps, intimating that he might know something of special interest, and that he had informed a Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information concerning the Marine Corps and radar operation which he possessed.[C6-163] Although Oswald never filed a formal renunciation, in a letter to the Embassy dated November 3, 1959, he again requested that his American citizenship be revoked and protested the refusal to accept his renunciation on October 31.[C6-164] (See Commission Exhibit No. 912, p. 263.)
While at the Embassy,[C6-165] and in a subsequent interview with an American journalist,[C6-166] Oswald displayed familiarity with Communist ideological arguments, which led those with whom he spoke to speculate that he may have received some instruction from Soviet authorities. Oswald’s familiarity with the law regarding renunciation of citizenship, observed by both Embassy officials,[C6-167] could also be construed as a sign of coaching by Soviet authorities. However, Oswald is known to have been an avid reader[C6-168] and there is evidence that he had read Communist literature without guidance while in the Marine Corps and before that time.[C6-169] After his arrival in Moscow, Oswald most probably had discussions with his Intourist guide and others,[C6-170] but none of the Americans with whom he talked in Moscow felt that his conversations necessarily revealed any type of formal training.[C6-171] The “Historic Diary” indicates that Oswald did not tell his guide that he intended to visit the Embassy because he feared she would disapprove.[C6-172] (See Commission Exhibit No. 24, p. 264.) Though Oswald gave Snyder the impression “of an intelligent person who spoke in a manner and on a level, which seemed to befit his apparent level of intelligence,”[C6-173] correspondent Priscilla Johnson, who spent about 5 hours talking with him,[C6-174] received a much less favorable impression:
He liked to create the pretense, the impression that he was attracted to abstract discussion and was capable of engaging in it, and was drawn to it. But it was like pricking a balloon. I had the feeling that if you really did engage him on this ground, you very quickly would discover that he didn’t have the capacity for a logical sustained argument about an abstract point on economics or on noneconomic, political matters or any matter, philosophical.[C6-175]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 912
LETTER MAILED BY OSWALD TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 24
OSWALD’S OWN ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW OCT. 31, 1959
Excerpts from his “Historic Diary”]
A comparison of the formal note Oswald handed Snyder[C6-176] and his letter of November 3[C6-177] with the provisions of section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act[C6-178] suggests that Oswald had read the statute but understood it imperfectly; he apparently was trying to use three out of the four ways set out in the statute to surrender his citizenship, but he succeeded in none.
Moreover, persuasive evidence that Oswald’s conduct was not carefully coached by Soviet agents is provided by some of his actions at the Embassy. The single statement which probably caused Oswald the most future trouble was his declaration that he had already volunteered to a Soviet official that he would, if asked, tell the Soviet Government all that he knew about his job in radar as a Marine. Certainly a statement of this type would prejudice any possibility of his being an effective pro-Communist agent.
Further, though unquestionably evidencing anti-American sentiments, Oswald’s behavior at the Embassy, which brought him exceedingly close to expatriation, was unlikely to have increased his value in any capacity to the Soviet Union. Richard E. Snyder, the official who interviewed Oswald on October 31, testified that he “had every reason to believe” that Oswald would have carried through a formal--and therefore effective--renunciation of his American citizenship immediately if he had let him.[C6-179] However, as a defector, Oswald could have had considerable propaganda value without expatriating himself; and if he had expatriated himself his eventual return to the United States would have been much more difficult and perhaps impossible. If Snyder’s assessment of Oswald’s intentions is accurate, it thus tends to refute the suggestion that Oswald was being coached by the Soviets. In addition, reporters noticed Oswald’s apparent ambivalence in regard to renouncing his citizenship--stormily demanding that he be permitted to renounce while failing to follow through by completing the necessary papers[C6-180]--behavior which might have detracted from his propaganda value.
According to Oswald’s “Historic Diary”[C6-181] and the documents furnished to the Commission by the Soviet Government,[C6-182] Oswald was not told that he had been accepted as a resident of the Soviet Union until about January 4, 1960. Although on November 13 and 16 Oswald informed Aline Mosby[C6-183] and Priscilla Johnson[C6-184] that he had been granted permission to remain in the country indefinitely, the diary indicates that at that time he had been told only that he could remain “until some solution is found with what to do with me.”[C6-185] The diary is more consistent with the letter Oswald wrote to his brother Robert on December 17, saying that he was then, more than a month after he saw Johnson and Mosby, about to leave his hotel,[C6-186] and with some later correspondence with his mother. Oswald mailed a short note to his mother which she received in Texas on January 5; that same day she mailed a money order to him in Moscow, but it apparently got there too late, because she received it back, unopened, on February 25.[C6-187] Oswald’s conflicting statement to the correspondents also seems reconcilable with his very apparent desire to appear important to others. Moreover, so long as Oswald continued to stay in a hotel in Moscow, the inference is that the Soviet authorities had not yet decided to accept him.[C6-188] This inference is supported by information supplied by the CIA on the handling of other defectors in the Soviet Union.[C6-189]
Thus, the evidence is strong that Oswald waited at least until November 16, when he saw Miss Johnson, and it is probable that he was required to wait until January 4, a little over 2½ months from October 16, before his application to remain in Russia was granted. In mid-November Miss Johnson asked Oswald whether the Russians were encouraging his defection, to which Oswald responded: “The Russians are treating it like a legal formality. They don’t encourage you and they don’t discourage you.”[C6-190] And, when the Soviet Government finally acted, Oswald did not receive Soviet citizenship, as he had requested, but merely permission to reside in Russia on a year-to-year basis.[C6-191]
Asked to comment upon the length of time, 2 months and 22 days, that probably passed before Oswald was granted the right to remain in the Soviet Union, the CIA has advised that “when compared to five other defector cases, this procedure seems unexceptional.”[C6-192] Similarly, the Department of State reports that its information “indicated that a 2-month waiting period is not unusual.”[C6-193] The full response of the CIA is as follows:
Oswald said that he asked for Soviet citizenship on 16 October 1959. According to his diary, he received word a month later that he could stay in the USSR pending disposition of his request, but it was another month and a half before he was given his stateless passport.
When compared to five other defector cases, this procedure seems unexceptional. Two defectors from US Army intelligence units in West Germany appear to have been given citizenship immediately, but both had prior KGB connections and fled as a result of Army security checks. Of the other three cases, one was accepted after not more than five weeks and given a stateless passport apparently at about the same time. The second was immediately given permission to stay for a while, and his subsequent request for citizenship was granted three months later. The third was allowed to stay after he made his citizenship request, but almost two months passed before he was told that he had been accepted. Although the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon after told the US Embassy that he was a Soviet citizen, he did not receive his document until five or six months after initial application. We know of only one case in which an American asked for Soviet citizenship but did not take up residence in the USSR. In that instance, the American changed his mind and voluntarily returned to the United States less than three weeks after he had requested Soviet citizenship.[C6-194]
The Department of State has commented as follows:
The files of the Department of State reflect the fact that Oswald first applied for permission to remain in Russia permanently, or at least for a long period, when he arrived in Moscow, and that he obtained permission to remain within one or two months.
A. Is the fact that he obtained permission to stay within this period of time usual?
_Answer_--Our information indicates that a two months waiting period is not unusual. In the case of [name withheld] the Supreme Soviet decided within two months to give Soviet citizenship and he was thereafter, of course, permitted to stay.
B. Can you tell us what the normal procedures are under similar circumstances?
_Answer_--It is impossible for us to state any “normal” procedures. The Soviet Government never publicizes the proceedings in these cases or the reasons for its action. Furthermore, it is, of course, extremely unusual for an American citizen to defect.[C6-195]
The information relating to Oswald’s suicide attempt indicates that his application to remain in the Soviet Union was probably rejected about 6 days after his arrival in Moscow. Since the KGB is the Soviet agency responsible for the initial handling of all defectors,[C6-196] it seems likely that the original decision not to accept Oswald was made by the KGB. That Oswald was permitted to remain in Moscow after his release from the hospital suggests that another ministry of the Soviet Government may have intervened on his behalf. This hypothesis is consistent with entries in the “Historic Diary” commenting that the officials Oswald met after his hospital treatment were different from those with whom he had dealt before.[C6-197] The most plausible reason for any such intervention may well have been apprehension over the publicity that would follow the rejection of a devout convert to the Communist cause.
_Oswald’s Life in Minsk._--According to the “Historic Diary”[C6-198] and documents received from the Soviet Government,[C6-199] Oswald resided in the city of Minsk from January 1960 until June 1962. Oswald’s life in Minsk is the portion of his life concerning which the least is known. The primary sources of information are Oswald’s own writings and the testimony of Marina Oswald. Other evidence, however, establishes beyond doubt that Oswald was in fact located in Minsk on at least two occasions. The Commission has obtained two photographs which were taken by American tourists in Minsk in August 1961 in which Oswald appears.[C6-200] The tourists did not know Oswald, nor did they speak with him; they remembered only that several men gathered near their car.[C6-201] (See Kramer Exhibit 1, p. 268.) In addition, Oswald was noticed in Minsk by a student who was traveling with the University of Michigan band on a tour of Russia in the spring of 1961.[C6-202] Oswald corresponded with the American Embassy in Moscow from Minsk,[C6-203] and wrote letters from Minsk to his family in the United States.[C6-204] Oswald and his wife have many photographs taken of themselves which show Minsk backgrounds and persons who are identifiable as residents of Minsk.[C6-205] After he returned to the United States, Oswald conversed about the city with Russian-born American citizens who were familiar with it.[C6-206] Marina Oswald is also familiar with the city.[C6-207] The Commission has also been able independently to verify the existence in Minsk of many of the acquaintances of Oswald and his wife whom they said they knew there.[C6-208] (See Commission Exhibits Nos. 1392, 1395, 2606, 2609, 2612 and 2623, pp. 270-271.)
[Illustration: OSWALD, MAN STANDING ON RIGHT IN FIGURED SHIRT.
PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN MINSK, U.S.S.R. BY AN AMERICAN TOURIST IN AUGUST, 1961.
(KRAMER DEPOSITION 1)]
Once he was accepted as a resident alien in the Soviet Union, Oswald was given considerable benefits which ordinary Soviet citizens in his position in society did not have. The “Historic Diary” recites that after Oswald was informed that he could remain in the Soviet Union and was being sent to Minsk he was given 5,000 rubles[C] ($500) by the “Red Cross, * * * for expenses.” He used 2,200 rubles to pay his hotel bill, and another 150 rubles to purchase a train ticket. With the balance of slightly over 2,500 rubles, Oswald felt, according to the diary, like a rich man.[C6-209] Oswald did not receive free living quarters, as the diary indicates the “Mayor” of Minsk promised him,[C6-210] but about 6 weeks after his arrival he did receive an apartment, very pleasant by Soviet standards, for which he was required to pay only 60 rubles ($6.00) a month. Oswald considered the apartment “almost rent free.”[C6-211] Oswald was given a job in the “Byelorussian Radio and Television Factory,” where his pay on a per piece basis ranged from 700 to 900 rubles ($70-$90) a month.[C6-212] According to his wife, this rate of pay was average for people in his occupation but good by Soviet standards generally.[C6-213] She explained that piecework rates throughout the Soviet Union have generally grown out of line with compensation for other jobs.[C6-214] The CIA has confirmed that this condition exists in many areas and occupations in the Soviet Union.[C6-215] In addition to his salary, Oswald regularly received 700 rubles ($70) per month from the Soviet “Red Cross.”[C6-216] The well-paying job, the monthly subsidy, and the “almost rent-free” apartment combined to give Oswald more money than he needed. The only complaint recorded in the “Historic Diary” is that there was “no place to spend the money.”[C6-217]
[C] About a year after Oswald received this money, the ruble was revalued to about 10 times its earlier value.
The Commission has found no basis for associating Oswald’s preferred income with Soviet undercover activity. Marina Oswald testified that foreign nationals are commonly given special treatment in the Soviet Union,[C6-218] and the Central Intelligence Agency has confirmed that it is standard practice in the Soviet Union for Americans and other foreign defectors from countries with high standards of living to be “subsidized.”[C6-219] Apparently it is Soviet practice to attempt to make life sufficiently pleasant for a foreign defector so that he will not become disillusioned and return to his native country. The Commission has also assumed that it is customary for Soviet intelligence agencies to keep defectors under surveillance during their residence in the Soviet Union, through periodic interviews of neighbors and associates of the defector.[C6-220] Oswald once mentioned that the Soviet police questioned his neighbors occasionally.[C6-221]
[Illustration: PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE OSWALDS IN MINSK, U.S.S.R.
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 1392)
OSWALD AND MARINA ON A BRIDGE IN MINSK
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2623)
UNCLE VASILY AKSIONOV AND AUNT LUBOVA AKSIONOVA, WITH THE OSWALDS
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 1395)
MARINA WAITING FOR BUS]
[Illustration: PHOTOGRAPHS OF OSWALDS IN U. S. S. R.
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2609)
ROSA KUZNETSOVA, ELLA GERMAN, LEE HARVEY OSWALD, AND PAVEL GOLOVACHEV
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2612)
OSWALD AND ALFRED (LAST NAME UNKNOWN), A HUNGARIAN FRIEND OF ANITA ZIGER
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2606)
VIEW OVERLOOKING THE SYISLOCH RIVER FROM THE BALCONY OF THE OSWALDS’ APARTMENT IN MINSK]
Moreover, it is from Oswald’s personal writings alone that the Commission has learned that he received supplementary funds from the Soviet “Red Cross.” In the notes he made during the return trip to the United States Oswald recognized that the “Red Cross” subsidy had nothing to do with the well-known International Red Cross. He frankly stated that the money was paid to him for having “denounced” the United States and that it had come from the “MVD.”[C6-222] Oswald’s papers reveal that the “Red Cross” subsidy was terminated as soon as he wrote the American Embassy in Moscow in February 1961 asking that he be permitted to return.[C6-223] (See Commission Exhibit No. 25, p. 273.) Marina Oswald’s testimony confirmed this; she said that when she knew Oswald he no longer was receiving the monthly grant but still retained some of the savings accumulated in the months when he had been receiving it.[C6-224] Since she met Oswald in March and married him in April of 1961, her testimony was consistent with his records.
The nature of Oswald’s employment while in Minsk has been examined by the Commission. The factory in which he worked was a large plant manufacturing electronic parts and radio and television sets. Marina Oswald has testified that he was an “apprentice machinist” and “ground small metallic parts for radio receivers, on a lathe.”[C6-225] So far as can be determined, Oswald never straightforwardly described to anyone else in the United States exactly what his job was in the Soviet Union.[C6-226] Some of his acquaintances in Dallas and Fort Worth had the impression that he was disappointed in having been given a menial job and not assigned to an institution of higher learning in the Soviet Union.[C6-227] Marina Oswald confirmed this and also testified that her husband was not interested in his work and not regarded at the factory as a very good worker.[C6-228] The documents furnished to the Commission by the Soviet government were consistent with her testimony on this point, since they included a report from Oswald’s superior at the factory which is critical of his performance on the job.[C6-229] Oswald’s employment and his job performance are thus consistent with his known occupational habits in this country and otherwise afford no ground for suspicion.
Oswald’s membership in a hunting club while he was in the Soviet Union has been a matter of special interest to the Commission. One Russian emigre testified that this was a suspicious circumstance because no one in the Soviet Union is permitted to own a gun for pleasure.[C6-230] The Commission’s investigation, however, has established that this is not so. The Central Intelligence Agency has advised the Commission that hunting societies such as the one to which Oswald belonged are very popular in the Soviet Union.[C6-231] They are frequently sponsored by factories for their employees, as was Oswald’s.[C6-232] Moreover, Soviet citizens (or foreigners residing in the Soviet Union) are permitted to own shotguns, but not rifles, without joining a society; all that is necessary is that the gun be registered at the local militia office immediately after it has been purchased.[C6-233] Experts from the Central Intelligence Agency have examined Oswald’s club membership certificate and gun permit and expressed the opinion that its terms and numbers are consistent with other information the CIA has about the Soviet Union.[C6-234]
[Illustration: (COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 25)
EXCERPTS FROM A SPEECH OSWALD NEVER DELIVERED, WHICH HE PROBABLY WROTE ABOARD THE SHIP WHILE RETURNING FROM THE U. S. S. R. WITH HIS FAMILY]
Marina Oswald testified that her husband went hunting only on one occasion during the time of their marriage.[C6-235] However, Oswald apparently joined the Byelorussian Society of Hunters and Fishermen in the summer of 1960[C6-236] and did not marry until April 30, 1961,[C6-237] so he could have been more active while he was still a bachelor. Oswald made no secret of his membership in the hunting club. He mentioned it on occasion to friends after he returned to the United States;[C6-238] discussed it at some length in a speech at a Jesuit Seminary in Mobile, Ala., in the summer of 1962;[C6-239] included it in his correspondence with his brother Robert;[C6-240] and kept his membership certificate[C6-241] and gun permit[C6-242] until the day he was killed. In view of these facts, it is unlikely that Oswald’s membership in a hunting club was contrived to conceal some sort of secret training. Moreover, the CIA has informed the Commission that it is in possession of considerable information on the location of secret Soviet training institutions and that it knows of no such institution in or near Minsk during the time Oswald was there.[C6-243]
Oswald’s marriage to Marina Prusakova on April 30, 1961,[C6-244] is itself a fact meriting consideration. A foreigner living in Russia cannot marry without the permission of the Soviet Government.[C6-245] It seems unlikely that the Soviet authorities would have permitted Oswald to marry and to take his wife with him to the United States if they were contemplating using him alone as an agent. The fact that he had a Russian wife would be likely, in their view, to increase any surveillance under which he would be kept by American security agencies, would make him even more conspicuous to his neighbors as “an ex-Russian,” and would decrease his mobility. A wife’s presence in the United States would also constitute a continuing risk of disclosure. On the other hand, Marina Oswald’s lack of English training and her complete ignorance of the United States and its customs[C6-246] would scarcely recommend her to the Soviet authorities as one member of an “agent team” to be sent to the United States on a difficult and dangerous foreign enterprise.
_Oswald’s departure from the Soviet Union._--On February 13, 1961, the American Embassy in Moscow received a letter from Oswald postmarked Minsk, February 5, asking that he be readmitted to the United States.[C6-247] This was the first time that the Embassy had heard from or about Oswald since November 16, 1959.[C6-248] The end of the 15-month silence came only a few days after the Department of State in Washington had forwarded a request to the Moscow Embassy on February 1, 1961, informing the Embassy that Oswald’s mother was worried about him, and asking that he get in touch with her if possible.[C6-249] The simultaneity of the two events was apparently coincidental. The request from Marguerite Oswald went from Washington to Moscow by sealed diplomatic pouch and there was no evidence that the seal had been tampered with.[C6-250] The officer of the Department of State who carried the responsibility for such matters has testified that the message was not forwarded to the Russians after it arrived in Moscow.[C6-251]
Oswald’s letter does not seem to have been designed to ingratiate him with the Embassy officials. It starts by incorrectly implying that he had written an earlier letter that was not answered, states that he will return to the United States only if he can first “come to some agreement” on there being no legal charges brought against him, and ends with a reminder to the officials at the Embassy that they have a responsibility to do everything they can to help him, since he is an American citizen.[C6-252]
The Embassy’s response to this letter was to invite Oswald to come personally to Moscow to discuss the matter.[C6-253] Oswald at first protested because of the difficulty of obtaining Soviet permission.[C6-254] He wrote two more protesting letters during the following 4 months,[C6-255] but received no indication that the Embassy would allow him to handle the matter by mail.[C6-256] While the Department of State was clarifying its position on this matter,[C6-257] Oswald unexpectedly appeared in Moscow on Saturday, July 8, 1961.[C6-258] On Sunday, Marina Oswald flew to Moscow,[C6-259] and was interviewed by officials in the American Embassy on Tuesday.[C6-260]
The Commission asked the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency to comment on whether the Oswalds’ travel to Moscow without permission signified special treatment by the Soviet Union. From their responses, it appears that since Marina Oswald possessed a Soviet citizen’s internal passport, she did not require prior approval to make the trip.[C6-261] Although Soviet law did require her husband, as the holder of a “stateless passport,” to obtain advance permission for the trip, his failure to do so would not normally have been considered a serious violation. In this respect, the CIA has advised the Commission as follows:
OSWALD’S travel from Minsk to Moscow and return in July 1961 would normally have required prior authorization. Bearers of a Soviet “passport for foreigners” (_vid na zhitelstov v. SSSR dlya innostrantsa_) are required to obtain travel authorization from the Visa and Registration Department (OVIR) (or Passport Registration Department (PRO) in smaller towns) if they desire to leave the city (or oblast) where they are domiciled. This same requirement is believed to apply to persons, such as OSWALD, holding Soviet “stateless passports” (_vid na zhitelstvo_ v. _SSSR dlya lits bez grazhdanstva_).
The practicality of even “unauthorized” travel was demonstrated by events related by a United States citizen who defected in 1960, and subsequently was sent to Kiev to study. After repatriating this defector told U.S. authorities he had made a total of seven unauthorized trips from Kiev during his stay in the USSR. He was apprehended on two of his flights and was returned to Kiev each time, the second time under escort. On both occasions he was merely reprimanded by the deputy chief of the institute at which he was studying. Since Marina had a Soviet citizen’s internal passport there would have been no restrictions against her making the trip to Moscow.[C6-262]
The answers of the Department of State, together with the Commission’s specific questions, are as follows:
B. Could resident foreigners normally travel in this manner without first obtaining such permission?
_Answer_--There are only a few U.S. nationals now living in the Soviet Union. They include an American Roman Catholic priest, an American Protestant minister, a number of correspondents, some students and technical advisers to Soviet businesses. We know that the priest, the minister, the correspondents and the students must obtain permission from Soviet authorities before taking any trips. The technical advisers notify officials of their project before they travel and these officials personally inform the militia.
C. If travel of this type was not freely permitted, do you believe that Oswald normally would have been apprehended during the attempt or punished after the fact for traveling without permission?
_Answer_--Based on the information we have, we believe that if Oswald went to Moscow without permission, and this was known to the Soviet authorities, he would have been fined or reprimanded. Oswald was not, of course, an average foreign resident. He was a defector from a foreign country and the bearer of a Soviet internal “stateless” passport * * * during the time when he was contemplating the visit to Moscow to come to the Embassy * * *
The Soviet authorities probably knew about Oswald’s trip even if he did not obtain advance permission, since in most instances the Soviet militia guards at the Embassy ask for the documents of unidentified persons entering the Embassy grounds * * *
An American citizen who, with her American citizen husband, went to the Soviet Union to live permanently and is now trying to obtain permission to leave, informed the Embassy that she had been fined for not getting permission to go from Odessa to Moscow on a recent trip to visit the Embassy.
D. Even if such travel did not have to be authorized, do you have any information or observations regarding the practicality of such travel by Soviet citizens or persons in Oswald’s status?
_Answer_--It is impossible to generalize in this area. We understand from interrogations of former residents in the Soviet Union who were considered “stateless” by Soviet authorities that they were not permitted to leave the town where they resided without permission of the police. In requesting such permission they were required to fill out a questionnaire giving the reason for travel, length of stay, addresses of individuals to be visited, etc.
Notwithstanding these requirements, we know that at least one “stateless” person often traveled without permission of the authorities and stated that police stationed at railroad stations usually spotchecked the identification papers of every tenth traveler, but that it was an easy matter to avoid such checks. Finally, she stated that persons who were caught evading the registration requirements were returned to their home towns by the police and sentenced to short jail terms and fined. These sentences were more severe for repeated violations.[C6-263]
When Oswald arrived at the Embassy in Moscow, he met Richard E. Snyder, the same person with whom he had dealt in October of 1959.[C6-264] Primarily on the basis of Oswald’s interview with Snyder on Monday, July 10, 1961, the American Embassy concluded that Oswald had not expatriated himself.[C6-265] (See app. XV, pp. 752-760.) On the basis of this tentative decision, Oswald was given back his American passport, which he had surrendered in 1959.[C6-266] The document was due to expire in September 1961,[C6-267] however, and Oswald was informed that its renewal would depend upon the ultimate decision by the Department of State on his expatriation.[C6-268] On July 11, Marina Oswald was interviewed at the Embassy and the steps necessary for her to obtain an American visa were begun.[C6-269] In May 1962, after 15 months of dealings with the Embassy, Oswald’s passport was ultimately renewed and permission for his wife to enter the United States was granted.[C6-270]
The files on Oswald and his wife compiled by the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service contain no indication of any expert guidance by Soviet authorities in Oswald’s dealings with the Department or the Service. For example, the letters from Minsk to the Embassy in Moscow,[C6-271] which are in his handwriting,[C6-272] display the arrogant attitude which was characteristic of him both before and after he lived in Russia, and, when compared with other letters that were without doubt composed and written by him,[C6-273] show about the same low level of sophistication, fluency, and spelling. The Department officer who most frequently dealt with Oswald when he began negotiations to return to the United States, Richard E. Snyder, testified that he can recall nothing that indicated Oswald was being guided or assisted by a third party when he appeared at the Embassy in July 1961.[C6-274] On the contrary, the arrogant and presumptuous attitude which Oswald displayed in his correspondence with the Embassy from early 1961 until June 1962,[C6-275] when he finally departed from Russia, undoubtedly hindered his attempts to return to the United States. Snyder has testified that although he made a sincere effort to treat Oswald’s application objectively, Oswald’s attitude made this very difficult.[C6-276]
In order to leave Russia, it was also necessary for the Oswalds to obtain permission from the Soviet Government. The timing and circumstances under which the Oswalds obtained this permission have also been considered by the Commission. Marina Oswald, although her memory is not clear on the point, said that she and Oswald first made their intentions to go to the United States known to Soviet officials in Minsk in May, even before coming to Moscow in July for the conference at the American Embassy.[C6-277] The Oswalds’ correspondence with the Embassy and the documents furnished the Commission by the Soviet Government show that the Oswalds made a series of formal applications to the Soviets from July 15 to August 21.[C6-278] Presumably the most difficult question for the Soviet authorities was whether to allow Marina Oswald to accompany her husband. She was called to the local passport office in Minsk on December 25, 1961, and told that authority had been received to issue exit visas to her and Oswald.[C6-279] Obtaining the permission of the Soviet Government to leave may have been aided by a conference which Marina Oswald had, at her own request, with a local MVD official, Colonel Aksenov, sometime in late 1961. She testified that she applied for the conference at her husband’s urging, after he had tried unsuccessfully to arrange such a conference for himself.[C6-280] She believed that it may have been granted her because her uncle with whom she had lived in Minsk before her marriage was also an MVD official.[C6-281]
The correspondence with the American Embassy at this time reflected that the Oswalds did not pick up their exit visas immediately.[C6-282] On January 11, 1962, Marina Oswald was issued her Soviet exit visa. It was marked valid until December 1, 1962.[C6-283] The Oswalds did not leave Russia until June 1962, but the additional delay was caused by problems with the U.S. Government and by the birth of a child in February.[C6-284] Permission of the Soviet authorities to leave, once given, was never revoked. Oswald told the FBI in July 1962, shortly after he returned to the United States, that he had been interviewed by the MVD twice, once when he first came to the Soviet Union and once just before he departed.[C6-285] His wife testified that the second interview did not occur in Moscow but that she and her husband dealt with the MVD visa officials frequently in Minsk.[C6-286]
Investigation of the circumstances, including the timing, under which the Oswalds obtained permission from the Soviet Government to leave Russia for the United States show that they differed in no discernible manner from the normal. The Central Intelligence Agency has informed the Commission that normally a Soviet national would not be permitted to emigrate if he might endanger Soviet national security once he went abroad.[C6-287] Those persons in possession of confidential information, for example, would constitute an important category of such “security risks.” Apparently Oswald’s predeparture interview by the MVD was part of an attempt to ascertain whether he or his wife had access to any confidential information. Marina Oswald’s reported interview with the MVD in late 1961, which was arranged at her request, may have served the same purpose. The Commission’s awareness of both interviews derives entirely from Oswald’s and his wife’s statements and letters to the American Embassy, which afford additional evidence that the conferences carried no subversive significance.
It took the Soviet authorities at least 5½ months, from about July 15, 1961, until late December, to grant permission for the Oswalds to leave the country. When asked to comment upon the alleged rapidity of the Oswalds’ departure, the Department of State advised the Commission:
* * * In the immediate post-war period there were about fifteen marriages in which the wife had been waiting for many years for a Soviet exit permit. After the death of Stalin the Soviet Government showed a disposition to settle these cases. In the summer of 1953 permission was given for all of this group of Soviet citizen wives to accompany their American citizen husbands to the United States.
Since this group was given permission to leave the Soviet Union, there have been from time to time marriages in the Soviet Union of American citizens and Soviet citizens. With one exception, it is our understanding that all of the Soviet citizens involved have been given permission to emigrate to the United States after waiting periods which were, in some cases from three to six months and in others much longer.[C6-288]
Both the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency compiled data for the Commission on Soviet wives of American citizens who received exit visas to leave the Soviet Union, where the relevant information was available. In both cases the data were consistent with the above conclusion of the State Department. The Department of State had sufficient information to measure the timespan in 14 cases. The Department points out that it has information on the dates of application for and receipt of Soviet exit visas only on those cases that have been brought to its attention. A common reason for bringing a case to the attention of the Department is that the granting of the exit visa by the Soviet Union has been delayed, so that the American spouse seeks the assistance of his own government. It therefore appears that the sampling data carry a distinct bias toward lengthy waiting periods. Of the 14 cases tested, 6 involve women who applied for visas after 1953, when the liberalized post-Stalin policy was in effect. The approximate waiting periods for these wives were, in decreasing order, 13 months, 6 months, 3 months, 1 month, and 10 days.[C6-289] Of the 11 cases examined by the Central Intelligence Agency in which the time period is known or can be inferred, the Soviet wives had to wait from 5 months to a year to obtain exit visas.[C6-290]
In his correspondence with the American Embassy and his brother while he was in Russia,[C6-291] in his diary,[C6-292] and in his conversations with people in the United States after he returned,[C6-293] Oswald claimed that his wife had been subjected to pressure by the Soviet Government in an effort to induce her not to emigrate to the United States. In the Embassy correspondence, Oswald claimed that the pressure had been so intense that she had to be hospitalized for 5 days for “nervous exhaustion.”[C6-294] Marina Oswald testified that her husband exaggerated and that no such hospitalization or “nervous exhaustion” ever occurred.[C6-295] However, she did testify that she was questioned on the matter occasionally and given the impression that her government was not pleased with her decision.[C6-296] Her aunt and uncle in Minsk did not speak to her “for a long time”; she also stated that she was dropped from membership in the Communist Youth Organization (Komsomol) when the news of her visit to the American Embassy in Moscow reached that organization.[C6-297] A student who took Russian lessons from her in Texas testified that she once referred to the days when the pressure was applied as “a very horrible time.”[C6-298] Despite all this Marina Oswald testified that she was surprised that their visas were granted as soon as they were--and that hers was granted at all.[C6-299] This evidence thus indicates that the Soviet authorities, rather than facilitating the departure of the Oswalds, first tried to dissuade Marina Oswald from going to the United States and then, when she failed to respond to the pressure, permitted her to leave without undue delay. There are indications that the Soviet treatment of another recent defector who left the Soviet Union to return to the United States resembled that accorded to the Oswalds.[C6-300]
On the basis of all the foregoing evidence, the Commission concluded that there was no reason to believe that the Oswalds received unusually favorable treatment in being permitted to leave the Soviet Union.
Associations in the Dallas-Fort Worth Community
_The Russian-speaking community._--Shortly after his return from Russia in June 1962, Oswald and his family settled in Fort Worth, Tex., where they met a group of Russian-born or Russian-speaking persons in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.[C6-301] The members of this community were attracted to each other by common background, language, and culture. Many of them were well-educated, accomplished, and industrious people, several being connected with the oil exploration, production, and processing industry that flourishes in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.[C6-302] As described more fully in