chapter IV

,[C6-450] as well as Oswald’s known political views,[C6-451] his asserted attendance at the political rally at which General Walker spoke may have been induced by many possible motives. However, there is no evidence that Oswald attended any other rightist meetings or was associated with any politically conservative organizations.

While the black-bordered “Welcome Mr. Kennedy” advertisement in the November 22 Dallas Morning News, which addressed a series of critical questions to the President, probably did not come to Oswald’s attention, it was of interest to the Commission because of its appearance on the day of the assassination and because of an allegation made before the Commission concerning the person whose name appeared as the chairman of the committee sponsoring the advertisement. The black-bordered advertisement was purported to be sponsored by “The American Fact-Finding Committee,” which was described as “An unaffiliated and nonpartisan group of citizens who wish truth.” Bernard Weissman was listed as “Chairman” and a post office box in Dallas was the only address. (See Commission Exhibit No. 1031, p. 294.)

[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 1031]

The Commission has conducted a full investigation into the genesis of this advertisement and the background of those responsible for it. Three of the four men chiefly responsible, Bernard W. Weissman, William B. Burley III, and Larrie H. Schmidt, had served together in the U.S. Army in Munich, Germany, in 1962. During that time they had with others devised plans to develop two conservative organizations, one political and the other business. The political entity was to be named Conservatism--USA, or CUSA, and the business entity was to be named American Business, or AMBUS.[C6-452] While in Munich, according to Weissman, they attempted to develop in their “own minds * * * ways to build up various businesses that would support us and at the same time support our political activities.”[C6-453] According to a subsequent letter from Schmidt to Weissman, “Cusa was founded for patriotic reasons rather than for personal gain--even though, as a side effect, Ambus was to have brought great return, as any business endeavor should.”[C6-454] To establish their organizations, Weissman testified that they:

* * * had planned while in Munich that in order to accomplish our goals, to try to do it from scratch would be almost impossible, because it would be years before we could even get the funds to develop a powerful organization. So we had planned to infiltrate various rightwing organizations and by our own efforts become involved in the hierarchy of these various organizations and eventually get ourselves elected or appointed to various higher offices in these organizations, and by doing this bring in some of our own people, and eventually take over the leadership of these organizations, and at that time having our people in these various organizations, we would then, you might say, call a conference and have them unite, and while no one knew of the existence of CUSA aside from us, we would then bring them all together, unite them, and arrange to have it called CUSA.[C6-455]

Schmidt was the first to leave the service; settling in Dallas in October 1962, he became a life insurance salesman and quickly engaged in numerous political activities in pursuit of the objectives devised in Munich.[C6-456] He became affiliated with several organizations and prepared various political writings.[C6-457]

Upon their release from the military, Weissman and Burley did not immediately move to Dallas, though repeatedly urged to do so by Schmidt.[C6-458] On October 1, 1963, Schmidt wrote Weissman: “Adlai Stevenson is scheduled here on the 24th on UN Day. Kennedy is scheduled in Dallas on Nov. 24th. There are to be protests. All the big things are happening _now_--if we don’t get in right now we may as well forget it.”[C6-459] The day of the Stevenson demonstration, Schmidt telephoned Weissman, again urging him to move to Dallas. Recalling that conversation with Schmidt, Weissman testified:

And he said, “If we are going to take advantage of the situation * * * you better hurry down here and take advantage of the publicity, and at least become known among these various right-wingers, because this is the chance we have been looking for to infiltrate some of these organizations and become known,” in other words, go along with the philosophy we had developed in Munich.[C6-460]

Five days later he wrote to Weissman and Burley to report that as the “only organizer of the demonstration to have publicly identified himself,” he had “become, overnight, a ‘fearless spokesman’ and ‘leader’ of the rightwing in Dallas. What I worked so hard for in one year--and nearly failed--finally came through one incident in one night!” He ended, “Politically, CUSA is set. It is now up to you to get Ambus going.”[C6-461]

Weissman and Burley accepted Schmidt’s prompting and traveled to Dallas, arriving on November 4, 1963.[C6-462] Both obtained employment as carpet salesmen. At Schmidt’s solicitation they took steps to join the John Birch Society, and through Schmidt they met the fourth person involved in placing the November 22 advertisement, Joseph P. Grinnan, Dallas independent oil operator and a John Birch Society coordinator in the Dallas area.[C6-463]

Within a week to 10 days after Weissman and Burley had arrived in Dallas, the four men began to consider plans regarding President Kennedy’s planned visit to Dallas.[C6-464] Weissman explained the reason for which it was decided that the ad should be placed:

* * * after the Stevenson incident, it was felt that a demonstration would be entirely out of order, because we didn’t want anything to happen in the way of physical violence to President Kennedy when he came to Dallas. But we thought that the conservatives in Dallas--I was told--were a pretty downtrodden lot after that, because they were being oppressed by the local liberals, because of the Stevenson incident. We felt we had to do something to build up the morale of the conservative element, in Dallas. So we hit upon the idea of the ad.[C6-465]

Weissman, Schmidt, and Grinnan worked on the text for the advertisement.[C6-466] A pamphlet containing 50 questions critical of American policy was employed for this purpose, and was the source of the militant questions contained in the ad attacking President Kennedy’s administration.[C6-467] Grinnan undertook to raise the $1,465 needed to pay for the ad.[C6-468] He employed a typed draft of the advertisement to support his funds solicitation.[C6-469] Grinnan raised the needed money from three wealthy Dallas businessmen: Edgar R. Crissey, Nelson Bunker Hunt, and H. R. Bright, some of whom in turn collected contributions from others.[C6-470] At least one of the contributors would not make a contribution unless a question he suggested was inserted.[C6-471] Weissman, believing that Schmidt, Grinnan, and the contributors were active members of the John Birch Society, and that Grinnan eventually took charge of the project, expressed the opinion that the advertisement was the creation of the John Birch Society,[C6-472] though Schmidt and Grinnan have maintained that they were acting “solely as individuals.”[C6-473]

A fictitious sponsoring organization was invented out of whole cloth.[C6-474] The name chosen for the supposed organization was The American Fact-Finding Committee.[C6-475] This was “Solely a name,” Weissman testified; “* * * As a matter of fact, when I went to place the ad, I could not remember the name * * * I had to refer to a piece of paper for the name.”[C6-476] Weissman’s own name was used on the ad in part to counter charges of anti-Semitism which had been leveled against conservative groups in Dallas.[C6-477] Weissman conceived the idea of using a black border,[C6-478] and testified he intended it to serve the function of stimulating reader attention.[C6-479] Before accepting the advertisement, the Dallas Morning News apparently submitted it to its attorneys for their opinion as to whether its publication might subject them to liability.[C6-480]

Weissman testified that the advertisement drew 50 or 60 mailed responses.[C6-481] He took them from the post office box early on Sunday morning, November 24.[C6-482] He said that those postmarked before the attack on President Kennedy were “favorable” in tone;[C6-483] those of later postmark were violently unfavorable, nasty, and threatening;[C6-484] and, according to a report from Schmidt, those postmarked some weeks later were again of favorable tone.[C6-485]

The four promoters of the ad deny that they had any knowledge of or familiarity with Lee Harvey Oswald prior to November 22, or Jack Ruby prior to November 24.[C6-486] Each has provided a statement of his role in connection with the placement of the November 22 advertisement and other matters, and investigation has revealed no deception. The Commission has found no evidence that any of these persons was connected with Oswald or Ruby, or was linked to a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

The advertisement, however, did give rise to one allegation concerning Bernard Weissman which required additional investigation. On March 4, 1964, Mark Lane, a New York attorney, testified before the Commission that an undisclosed informant had told him that Weissman had met with Jack Ruby and Patrolman J. D. Tippit at Ruby’s Carousel Club on November 14, 1963. Lane declined to state the name of his informant but said that he would attempt to obtain his informant’s permission to reveal his name.[C6-487] On July 2, 1964, after repeated requests by the Commission that he disclose the name of his informant, Lane testified a second time concerning this matter, but declined to reveal the information, stating as his reason that he had promised the individual that his name would not be revealed without his permission.[C6-488] Lane also made this allegation during a radio appearance, whereupon Weissman twice demanded that Lane reveal the name of the informant.[C6-489] As of the date of this report Lane has failed to reveal the name of his informant and has offered no evidence to support his allegation. The Commission has investigated the allegation of a Weissman-Ruby-Tippit meeting and has found no evidence that such a meeting took place anywhere at any time. The investigation into this matter is discussed in a later section of this chapter dealing with possible conspiracies involving Jack Ruby.

A comparable incident was the appearance of the “Wanted for Treason” handbill on the streets of Dallas 1 to 2 days before President Kennedy’s arrival. These handbills bore a reproduction of a front and profile photograph of the President and set forth a series of inflammatory charges against him.[C6-490] Efforts to locate the author and the lithography printer of the handbill at first met with evasive responses[C6-491] and refusals to furnish information.[C6-492] Robert A. Surrey was eventually identified as the author of the handbill.[C6-493] Surrey, a 38-year-old printing salesman employed by Johnson Printing Co. of Dallas, Tex., has been closely associated with General Walker for several years in his political and business

## activities.[C6-494] He is president of American Eagle Publishing Co.

of Dallas, in which he is a partner with General Walker.[C6-495] Its office and address is the post office box of Johnson Printing Co. Its assets consist of cash and various printed materials composed chiefly of General Walker’s political and promotional literature,[C6-496] all of which is stored at General Walker’s headquarters.[C6-497]

Surrey prepared the text for the handbill and apparently used Johnson Printing Co. facilities to set the type and print a proof.[C6-498] Surrey induced Klause, a salesman employed by Lettercraft Printing Co. of Dallas,[C6-499] whom Surrey had met when both were employed at Johnson Printing Co.,[C6-500] to print the handbill “on the side.”[C6-501] According to Klause, Surrey contacted him initially approximately 2 or 2½ weeks prior to November 22.[C6-502] About a week prior to November 22, Surrey delivered to Klause two slick paper magazine prints of photographs of a front view and profile of President Kennedy,[C6-503] together with the textual page proof.[C6-504] Klause was unable to make the photographic negative of the prints needed to prepare the photographic printing plate,[C6-505] so that he had this feature of the job done at a local shop.[C6-506] Klause then arranged the halftone front and profile representations of President Kennedy at the top of the textual material he had received from Surrey so as to simulate a “man wanted” police placard. He then made a photographic printing plate of the picture.[C6-507] During the night, he and his wife surreptitiously printed approximately 5,000 copies on Lettercraft Printing Co. offset printing equipment without the knowledge of his employers.[C6-508] The next day he arranged with Surrey a meeting place, and delivered the handbills.[C6-509] Klause’s charge for the printing of the handbills was, including expenses, $60.[C6-510]

At the outset of the investigation Klause stated to Federal agents that he did not know the name of his customer, whom he incorrectly described;[C6-511] he did say, however, that the customer did not resemble either Oswald or Ruby.[C6-512] Shortly before he appeared before the Commission, Klause disclosed Surrey’s identity.[C6-513] He explained that no record of the transaction had been made because “he saw a chance to make a few dollars on the side.”[C6-514]

Klause’s testimony receives some corroboration from Bernard Weissman’s testimony that he saw a copy of one of the “Wanted for Treason” handbills on the floor of General Walker’s station wagon shortly after November 22.[C6-515] Other details of the manner in which the handbills were printed have also been verified.[C6-516] Moreover, Weissman testified that neither he nor any of his associates had anything to do with the handbill or were acquainted with Surrey, Klause, Lettercraft Printing Co., or Johnson Printing Co.[C6-517] Klause and Surrey, as well as General Walker, testified that they were unacquainted with Lee Harvey Oswald and had not heard of him prior to the afternoon of November 22.[C6-518] The Commission has found no evidence of any connection between those responsible for the handbill and Lee Harvey Oswald or the assassination.

Contacts With the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City and the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.

Eight weeks before the assassination, Oswald traveled to Mexico City where he visited both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies.[D] Oswald’s wife knew of this trip before he went,[C6-519] but she denied such knowledge until she testified before the Commission.[C6-520] The Commission undertook an intensive investigation to determine Oswald’s purpose and

## activities on this journey, with specific reference to reports that

Oswald was an agent of the Cuban or Soviet Governments. As a result of its investigation, the Commission believes that it has been able to reconstruct and explain most of Oswald’s actions during this time. A detailed chronological account of this trip appears in appendix XIII.

[D] The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City includes consular as well as diplomatic personnel in a single building. The Cuban Embassy and Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, though in separate buildings, are in the same compound. Both the Soviet and the Cuban establishments will be referred to throughout the report simply as Embassies.

_Trip to Mexico._--Oswald was in Mexico from September 26, 1963, until October 3, 1963.[C6-521] (See Commission Exhibits Nos. 2478, 2481, p. 300.) Marina Oswald testified that Oswald had told her that the purpose of the trip was to evade the American prohibition on travel to Cuba and to reach that country.[C6-522] He cautioned her that the trip and its purpose were to be kept strictly secret.[C6-523] She testified that he had earlier laid plans to reach Cuba by hijacking an airliner flying out of New Orleans, but she refused to cooperate and urged him to give it up, which he finally did.[C6-524] Witnesses who spoke with Oswald while he was on a bus going to Mexico City also testified that Oswald told them he intended to reach Cuba by way of Mexico, and that he hoped to meet Fidel Castro after he arrived.[C6-525] When Oswald spoke to the Cuban and Soviet consular officials in Mexico City, he represented that he intended to travel to the Soviet Union and requested an “in-transit” Cuban visa to permit him to enter Cuba on September 30 on the way to the Soviet Union. Marina Oswald has testified that these statements were deceptions designed to get him to Cuba.[C6-526] Thus, although it is possible that Oswald intended to continue on to Russia from Cuba, the evidence makes it more likely that he intended to remain in Cuba.[C6-527]

[Illustration: OSWALD’S MEXICAN TOURIST CARD AND APPLICATION

(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2481)

APPLICATION FOR TOURIST CARD

(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2478)

TOURIST CARD]

Oswald departed from New Orleans probably about noon on September 25 and arrived in Mexico City at about 10 a.m. on September 27.[C6-528] In Mexico City he embarked on a series of visits to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies, which occupied most of his time during the first 2 days of his visit. At the Cuban Embassy, he requested an “in-transit” visa to permit him to visit Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union.[C6-529] Oswald was informed that he could not obtain a visa for entry into Cuba unless he first obtained a visa to enter the U.S.S.R.,[C6-530] and the Soviet Embassy told him that he could not expect an answer on his application for a visa for the Soviet Union for about 4 months.[C6-531] Oswald carried with him newspaper clippings, letters and various documents, some of them forged or containing false information, purporting to show that he was a “friend” of Cuba.[C6-532] With these papers and his record of previous residence in the Soviet Union and marriage to a Soviet national, he tried to curry favor with both Embassies.[C6-533] Indeed, his wife testified that in her opinion Oswald’s primary purpose in having engaged in Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities was to create a public record that he was a “friend” of Cuba.[C6-534] He made himself especially unpopular at the Cuban Embassy by persisting in his demands that as a sympathizer in Cuban objectives he ought to be given a visa. This resulted in a sharp argument with the consul, Eusebio Azque.[C6-535]

By Saturday, September 28, 1963, Oswald had failed to obtain visas at both Embassies.[C6-536] From Sunday, September 29, through Wednesday morning, October 2, when he left Mexico City on a bus bound for the United States, Oswald spent considerable time making his travel arrangements, sightseeing and checking again with the Soviet Embassy to learn whether anything had happened on his visa application.[C6-537] Marina Oswald testified that when she first saw him after his return to the United States he was disappointed and discouraged at his failure to reach Cuba.[C6-538]

The general outlines of Oswald’s activities in Mexico, particularly the nature and extent of his contacts at the Cuban Embassy, were learned very early in the investigation. An important source of information relating to his business at the Cuban Embassy was Senora Silvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican national employed in the visa section of the Cuban Embassy, who was questioned intensively by Mexican authorities soon after the assassination.[C6-539] An excerpt from the report of the Mexican Government summarized the crucial portion of Senora Duran’s recollection of Oswald. In translation it reads as follows:

* * * she remembered * * * [that Lee Harvey Oswald] was the name of an American who had come to the Cuban Consulate to obtain a visa to travel to Cuba in transit to Russia, the latter part of September or the early part of October of this year, and in support of his application had shown his passport, in which it was noted that he had lived in that country for a period of three years; his labor card from the same country written in the Russian language; and letters in that same language. He had presented evidence that he was married to a Russian woman, and also that he was apparently the leader of an organization in the city of New Orleans called “Fair * * * [Play] for Cuba,” claiming that he should be accepted as a “friend” of the Cuban Revolution. Accordingly, the declarant, complying with her duties, took down all of the information and completed the appropriate application form; and the declarant, admittedly exceeding her responsibilities, informally telephoned the Russian consulate, with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of the Russian visa to Lee Harvey Oswald. However, they told her that there would be a delay of about four months in processing the case, which annoyed the applicant since, according to his statement, he was in a great hurry to obtain visas that would enable him to travel to Russia, insisting on his right to do so in view of his background and his loyalty and his activities in behalf of the Cuban movement. The declarant was unable to recall accurately whether or not the applicant told her he was a member of the Communist Party, but he did say that his wife * * * was then in New York City, and would follow him, * * * [Senora Duran stated] that when Oswald understood that it was not possible to give him a Cuban visa without his first having obtained the Russian visa, * * * he became very excited or angry, and accordingly, the affiant called Consul Ascue [sic], * * * [who] came out and began a heated discussion in English with Oswald, that concluded by Ascue telling him that “if it were up to him, he would not give him the visa,” and “a person of his type was harming the Cuban Revolution rather than helping it,” it being understood that in their conversation they were talking about the Russian Socialist Revolution and not the Cuban. Oswald maintained that he had two reasons for requesting that his visa be issued promptly, and they were: one, that his tourist permit in Mexico was about to expire; and the other, that he had to get to Russia as quickly as possible. Despite her annoyance, the declarant gave Oswald a paper * * * in which she put down her name, “Silvia Durán,” and the number of the telephone at the consulate, which is “11-28-47” and the visa application was processed anyway. It was sent to the Ministry of [Foreign] Relations of Cuba, from which a routine reply was received some fifteen to thirty days later, approving the visa, but on the condition that the Russian visa be obtained first, although she does not recall whether or not Oswald later telephoned her at the Consulate number that she gave him.[C6-540]

[Illustration: OSWALD’S APPLICATION FOR A VISA FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA AND THE REPLY OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT

(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2564)

OSWALD’S APPLICATION ——> TRANSLATION

CUBAN REPLY ——> TRANSLATION

BOTH DOCUMENTS FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA.]

With the dates of Oswald’s entry into and departure from Mexico, which had been obtained from the records of the Mexican Immigration Service very shortly after the assassination, the Government of Mexico initiated a thorough investigation to uncover as much information as possible on Oswald’s trip.[C6-541] Representatives of U.S. agencies worked in close liaison with the Mexican law enforcement authorities. The result of this investigative effort was to corroborate the statements of Senora Duran and to verify the essentials of Oswald’s

## activities in Mexico as outlined above.

Senora Duran is a well-educated native of Mexico, who was 26 years old at the time of her interrogation. She is married to Senor Horacio Duran Navarro, a 40-year-old industrial designer, and has a young child. Although Senora Duran denies being a member of the Communist Party or otherwise connected with it, both Durans have been active in far left political affairs in Mexico, believe in Marxist ideology, and sympathize with the government of Fidel Castro,[C6-542] and Senor Duran has written articles for El Dia, a pro-Communist newspaper in Mexico City.[C6-543] The Commission has reliable evidence from a confidential source that Senora Duran as well as other personnel at the Cuban Embassy were genuinely upset upon receiving news of President Kennedy’s death. Senora Duran’s statements were made to Mexican officials soon after the assassination,[C6-544] and no significant inaccuracies in them have been detected. Documents fitting the description given by Senora Duran of the documents Oswald had shown her, plus a notation which she said she had given him, were found among his possessions after his arrest.[C6-545]

The Cuban Government was asked to document and confirm the essentials of Senora Duran’s testimony. Its response, which has been included in its entirety in this Report, included a summary statement of Oswald’s activities at the Cuban Embassy;[C6-546] a photograph of the application for a visa he completed there,[C6-547] and a photograph of the communication from Havana rejecting the application unless he could first present a Soviet visa.[C6-548] (See Commission Exhibit No. 2564, p. 306.) The information on these documents concerning Oswald’s date of birth, American passport number and activities and statements at the Embassy is consistent with other information available to the Commission.[C6-549] CIA experts have given their opinion that the handwriting on the visa application which purports to be Oswald’s is in fact his and that, although the handwritten notations on the bottom of the document are too brief and faint to permit a conclusive determination, they are probably Senora Duran’s.[C6-550] The clothes which Oswald was wearing in the photograph which appears on the application appear to be the same as some of those found among his effects after the assassination, and the photograph itself appears to be from the same negative as a photograph found among his effects.[C6-551] Nothing on any of the documents raises a suspicion that they might not be authentic.

By far the most important confirmation of Senora Duran’s testimony, however, has been supplied by confidential sources of extremely high reliability available to the United States in Mexico. The information from these sources establishes that her testimony was truthful and accurate in all material respects. The identities of these sources cannot be disclosed without destroying their future usefulness to the United States.

The investigation of the Commission has produced considerable testimonial and documentary evidence establishing the precise time of Oswald’s journey, his means of transportation, the hotel at which he stayed in Mexico City, and a restaurant at which he often ate. All known persons whom Oswald may have met while in Mexico, including passengers on the buses he rode,[C6-552] and the employees and guests of the hotel where he stayed,[C6-553] were interviewed. No credible witness has been located who saw Oswald with any unidentified person while in Mexico City; to the contrary, he was observed traveling alone to and from Mexico City,[C6-554] at his hotel,[C6-555] and at the nearby restaurant where he frequently ate.[C6-556] A hotel guest stated that on one occasion he sat down at a table with Oswald at the restaurant because no empty table was available, but that neither spoke to the other because of the language barrier.[C6-557] Two Australian girls who saw Oswald on the bus to Mexico City relate that he occupied a seat next to a man who has been identified as Albert Osborne, an elderly itinerant preacher.[C6-558] Osborne denies that Oswald was beside him on the bus.[C6-559] To the other passengers on the bus it appeared that Osborne and Oswald had not previously met,[C6-560] and extensive investigation of Osborne has revealed no further contact between him and Oswald. Osborne’s responses to Federal investigators on matters unrelated to Oswald have proved inconsistent and unreliable, and, therefore, based on the contrary evidence and Osborne’s lack of reliability, the Commission has attached no credence to his denial that Oswald was beside him on the bus. Investigation of his background and activities, however, disclose no basis for suspecting him of any involvement in the assassination.[C6-561]

Investigation of the hotel at which Oswald stayed has failed to uncover any evidence that the hotel is unusual in any way that could relate to Oswald’s visit. It is not especially popular among Cubans, and there is no indication that it is used as a meeting place for extremist or revolutionary organizations.[C6-562] Investigation of other guests of the hotel who were there when Oswald was has failed to uncover anything creating suspicion.[C6-563] Oswald’s notebook which he carried with him to Mexico City contained the telephone number of the Cuban Airlines Office in Mexico City;[C6-564] however, a Cuban visa is required by Mexican authorities before an individual may enplane for Cuba,[C6-565] and a confidential check of the Cuban Airlines Office uncovered no evidence that Oswald visited their offices while in the city.[C6-566]

_Allegations of conspiracy._--Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between Oswald and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated by the Commission. Among the claims made were allegations that Oswald had made a previous trip to Mexico City in early September to receive money and orders for the assassination,[C6-567] that he had been flown to a secret airfield somewhere in or near the Yucatan Peninsula,[C6-568] that he might have made contacts in Mexico City with a Communist from the United States shortly before the assassination,[C6-569] and that Oswald assassinated the President at the direction of a particular Cuban agent who met with him in the United States and paid him $7,000.[C6-570] A letter was received from someone in Cuba alleging the writer had attended a meeting where the assassination had been discussed as part of a plan which would soon include the death of other non-Communist leaders in the Americas.[C6-571] The charge was made in a Cuban expatriate publication that in a speech he delivered 5 days after the assassination, while he was under the influence of liquor, Fidel Castro made a slip of the tongue and said, “The first time Oswald was in Cuba,” thereby giving away the fact that Oswald had made one or more surreptitious trips to that country.[C6-572]

[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 1400

LEE HARVEY OSWALD’S MOVEMENTS IN MEXICO CITY]

Some stories linked the assassination to anti-Castro groups who allegedly were engaged in obtaining illicit firearms in the United States, one such claim being that these groups killed the President as part of a bargain with some illicit organizations who would then supply them with firearms as payment.[C6-573] Other rumors placed Oswald in Miami, Fla., at various times, allegedly in pro-Cuban activities there.[C6-574] The assassination was claimed to have been carried out by Chinese Communists operating jointly with the Cubans.[C6-575] Oswald was also alleged to have met with the Cuban Ambassador in a Mexico City restaurant and to have driven off in the Ambassador’s car for a private talk.[C6-576] Castro himself, it was alleged, 2 days after the assassination called for the files relating to Oswald’s dealings with two members of the Cuban diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union; the inference drawn was that the “dealings” had occurred and had established a secret subversive relationship which continued through Oswald’s life.[C6-577] Without exception, the rumors and allegations of a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis, in some cases the product of mistaken identification.

Illustrative of the attention given to the most serious allegations is the case of “D,” a young Latin American secret agent who approached U.S. authorities in Mexico shortly after the assassination and declared that he saw Lee Harvey Oswald receiving $6,500 to kill the President. Among other details, “D” said that at about noon on September 18, waiting to conduct some business at the Cuban consulate, he saw a group of three persons conversing in a patio a few feet away. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously dyed, who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English, and another was a man he said was Lee Harvey Oswald. A tall Cuban joined the group momentarily and passed some currency to the Negro. The Negro then allegedly said to Oswald in English, “I want to kill the man.” Oswald replied, “You’re not man enough, I can do it.” The Negro then said in Spanish, “I can’t go with you, I have a lot to do.” Oswald replied, “The people are waiting for me back there.” The Negro then gave Oswald $6,500 in large-denomination American bills, saying, “This isn’t much.” After hearing this conversation, “D” said that he telephoned the American Embassy in Mexico City several times prior to the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that someone important in the United States was to be killed, but was finally told by someone at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

“D” and his allegations were immediately subjected to intensive investigation. His former employment as an agent for a Latin American country was confirmed, although his superiors had no knowledge of his presence in Mexico or the assignment described by “D.” Four days after “D” first appeared the U.S. Government was informed by the Mexican authorities that “D” had admitted in writing that his whole narrative about Oswald was false. He said that he had never seen Oswald anyplace, and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted that he never tried to telephone the American Embassy in September and that his first call to the Embassy was after the assassination. “D” said that his motive in fabricating the story was to help get himself admitted into the United States so that he could there participate in action against Fidel Castro. He said that he hated Castro and hoped that the story he made up would be believed and would cause the United States to “take action” against him.

Still later, when questioned by American authorities, “D” claimed that he had been pressured into retracting his statement by the Mexican police and that the retraction, rather than his first statement, was false. A portion of the American questioning was carried on with the use of a polygraph machine, with the consent of “D.” When told that the machine indicated that he was probably lying, “D” said words to the effect that he “must be mistaken.” Investigation in the meantime had disclosed that the Embassy extension number “D” said he had called would not have given him the person he said he spoke to, and that no one at the Embassy--clerks, secretaries, or officers--had any recollection of his calls. In addition, Oswald spoke little, if any, Spanish. That he could have carried on the alleged conversation with the red-headed Negro in the Cuban Embassy, part of which was supposed to have been in Spanish, was therefore doubtful. “D” now said that he was uncertain as to the date when he saw “someone who looked like Oswald” at the Cuban Embassy, and upon reconsideration, he now thought it was on a Tuesday, September 17, rather than September 18. On September 17, however, Oswald visited the Louisiana State Unemployment Commission in New Orleans and also cashed a check from the Texas Employment Commission at the Winn-Dixie Store No. 1425 in New Orleans. On the basis of the retractions made by “D” when he heard the results of the polygraph examination, and on the basis of discrepancies which appeared in his story, it was concluded that “D” was lying.[C6-578]

The investigation of the Commission has thus produced no evidence that Oswald’s trip to Mexico was in any way connected with the assassination of President Kennedy, nor has it uncovered evidence that the Cuban Government had any involvement in the assassination. To the contrary, the Commission has been advised by the CIA and FBI that secret and reliable sources corroborate the statements of Senora Duran in all material respects, and that the Cuban Government had no relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald other than that described by Senora Duran. Secretary of State Rusk also testified that after the assassination “there was very considerable concern in Cuba as to whether they would be held responsible and what the effect of that might be on their own position and their own safety.”[C6-579]

_Contacts with the Soviet Embassy in the United States._--Soon after the Oswalds reached the United States in June 1962 they wrote to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. Oswald requested information about subscriptions to Russian newspapers and magazines and ultimately did subscribe to several Russian journals. Soviet law required Marina Oswald, as a Soviet citizen living abroad, to remain in contact with her nation’s Embassy and to file various papers occasionally.[C6-580] In 1963, after Oswald had experienced repeated employment difficulties, there were further letters when the Oswalds sought permission to return to the Soviet Union. The first such request was a letter written by Marina Oswald on February 17, 1963. She wrote that she wished to return to Russia but that her husband would stay in the United States because “he is an American by nationality.”[C6-581] She was informed on March 8, 1963, that it would take from 5 to 6 months to process the application.[C6-582] The Soviet Union made available to the Commission what purports to be the entire correspondence between the Oswalds and the Russian Embassy in the United States.[C6-583] This material has been checked for codes and none has been detected.[C6-584] With the possible exception of a letter which Oswald wrote to the Soviet Embassy after his return from Mexico City, discussed below, there is no material which gives any reason for suspicion. The implications of all of this correspondence for an understanding of Lee Harvey Oswald’s personality and motivation is discussed in the following chapter.

Oswald’s last letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., dated November 9, 1963, began by stating that it was written “to inform you of recent events since my meetings with Comrade Kostin in the Embassy of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico.”[C6-585] The envelope bears a postmark which appears to be November 12, 1963.[C6-586] Ruth Paine has testified that Oswald spent the weekend at her home working on the letter and that she observed one preliminary draft.[C6-587] A piece of paper which was identified as one of these drafts was found among Oswald’s effects after the assassination. (See Commission Exhibits Nos. 15, 103, p. 311.) According to Marina Oswald, her husband retyped the envelope 10 times.[C6-588]

Information produced for the Commission by the CIA is to the effect that the person referred to in the letter as “comrade Kostin” was probably Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov, a member of the consular staff of the Soviet Union in Mexico City. He is also one of the KGB officers stationed at the Embassy.[C6-589] It is standard Soviet procedure for KGB officers stationed in embassies and in consulates to carry on the normal duties of such a position in addition to the undercover

## activities.[C6-590] The Commission has identified the Cuban consul

referred to in Oswald’s letter as Senor Eusebio Azque (also “Ascue”), the man with whom Oswald argued at the Cuban Embassy, who was in fact replaced. The CIA advised the Commission:

We surmise that the references in Oswald’s 9 November letter to a man who had since been replaced must refer to Cuban Consul Eusebio Azque, who left Mexico for Cuba on permanent transfer on 18 November 1963, four days before the assassination. Azque had been in Mexico for 18 years and it was known as early as September 1963 that Azque was to be replaced. His replacement did arrive in September. Azque was scheduled to leave in October but did not leave until 18 November.

We do not know who might have told Oswald that Azque or any other Cuban had been or was to be replaced, but we speculate that Silvia Duran or some Soviet official might have mentioned it if Oswald complained about Azque’s altercation with him.[C6-591]

When asked to explain the letter, Marina Oswald was unable to add anything to an understanding of its contents.[C6-592] Some light on its possible meaning can be shed by comparing it with the early draft. When the differences between the draft and the final document are studied, and especially when crossed-out words are taken into account, it becomes apparent that Oswald was intentionally beclouding the true state of affairs in order to make his trip to Mexico sound as mysterious and important as possible.

For example, the first sentence in the second paragraph of the letter reads, “I was unable to remain in Mexico indefinily because of my mexican visa restrictions which was for 15 days only.” The same sentence in the draft begins, before the words are crossed out, “I was unable to remain in Mexico City because I considered useless * * *” As already mentioned, the Commission has good evidence that Oswald’s trip to Mexico was indeed “useless” and that he returned to Texas with that conviction. The first draft, therefore, spoke the truth; but Oswald rewrote the sentence to imply that he had to leave because his visa was about to expire. This is false; Oswald’s tourist card still had a full week to run when he departed from Mexico on October 3.[C6-593]

The next sentence in the letter reads, “I could not take a chance on reqesting a new visa unless I used my real name, so I returned to the United States.” The fact is that he did use his real name for his tourist card, and in all dealings with the Cuban Embassy, the Russian Embassy and elsewhere. Oswald did use the name of “Lee” on the trip, but as indicated below, he did so only sporadically and probably as the result of a clerical error. In the opinion of the Commission, based upon its knowledge of Oswald, the letter constitutes no more than a clumsy effort to ingratiate himself with the Soviet Embassy.

[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT 15

OSWALD’S LETTER TO THE EMBASSY U. S. S. R., WASHINGTON, D. C.

(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 103)

PRELIMINARY DRAFT]

Investigation of Other Activities

_Oswald’s use of post office boxes and false names._--After his return from the Soviet Union, Lee Harvey Oswald is known to have received his mail at post office boxes and to have used different aliases on numerous occasions. Since either practice is susceptible of use for clandestine purposes, the Commission has directed attention to both for signs that Oswald at some point made undercover contact with other persons who might have been connected with the assassination.

Oswald is known to have opened three post office boxes during 1962 and 1963. On October 9, 1962, the same day that he arrived in Dallas from Fort Worth, and before establishing a residence there, he opened box No. 2915 at the Dallas General Post Office. This box was closed on May 14, 1963, shortly after Oswald had moved to New Orleans.[C6-594] That portion of the post office box application listing the names of those persons other than the applicant entitled to receive mail at the box was discarded in accordance with postal regulations after the box was closed; hence, it is not known what names other than Oswald’s were listed on that form.[C6-595] However, as discussed in