CHAPTER XXV

1856

_Queen Victoria to Lord Panmure._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _5th January 1856_.

The Queen returns the drawings for the "Victoria Cross." She has marked the one she approves with an X; she thinks, however, that it might be a trifle smaller. The motto would be better "For Valour" than "For the Brave," as this would lead to the inference that only those are deemed brave who have got the Victoria Cross.

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _7th January 1856_.

The Queen has received Lord Clarendon's letter, and in answer to his question expresses her opinion that Lord Cowley's presence at the Council of War will be absolutely necessary.[1] She believes Lord Clarendon to be agreed with her, that the value of a plan of military campaign is entirely dependent upon the _general policy_ which the Government intends to pursue. As none of our Commissioners at the Council of War are in the least acquainted with the latter, they might be drawn into plans which would not at all agree with it. Lord Cowley would take that part of the question into his own hands, in which it will be quite safe. The Queen thinks that it is of secondary importance whether Count Walewski attends or not, but that the Emperor cannot have the same need of his presence which we have of that of our Ambassador.

[Footnote 1: A satisfactory and speedy conclusion of hostilities appearing at this time far from probable, a Council of War to settle the course of operations was, at the Emperor's suggestion, summoned to meet at Paris. Lord Cowley, Count Walewski, Prince Jerome Bonaparte, and others, were present, besides Naval and Military representatives of the Allies, among whom was the Duke of Cambridge.]

[Pageheading: POLICY OF CAVOUR]

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _9th January 1856_.

The Queen has read Sir J. Hudson's[2] letter with much interest. There is much truth in what Count Cavour says, and it must ever be our object and our interest to see Sardinia independent and strong; as a Liberal constitutional country, opposing a barrier alike to unenlightened and absolute as well as revolutionary principles--and this she has a right to expect us to support her in.

But _what_ she wants to obtain from Austria is not clear. She has no right, however, to expect further assurances from us on wishes which she seems even to be afraid to state distinctly.

It is clearly impossible to ask Austria to give up a portion of Italy to her, if nothing has occurred to make this necessary to Austria. At any rate Sardinia can have lost nothing, but on the contrary must have gained by the position which she is placed in as an ally of the Western Powers.

[Footnote 2: British Minister at Turin, and an enthusiastic sympathiser with Cavour. The latter had complained to him that if the Austrian proposals were accepted, and peace were made, Sardinia could expect no realisation of her cherished hopes, viz. Anglo-French support against Austria and against Papal aggression, increased political consideration in Europe, and the development of Constitutional Government.]

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _11th January 1856_.

The Queen now returns the draft[3] to Lord Bloomfield, which she could only write about in haste yesterday, as being of a nature not to be sanctioned by her. It is quite natural and excusable that our patience should at last be worn out by the miserable policy which Prussia is pursuing, but it can never be our interest openly to quarrel with her. This would be simply playing the game of Russia, who would thus be relieved from all attacks upon her and see the theatre of the war transferred to Germany; all other complications (which would arise therefrom)--ruinous to the best interests of the Western Powers as they would be--the Queen need not refer to. But when the draft concludes with a declaration to Prussia that England "_considers her neutrality as now at an end_," this is tantamount to a declaration of _war!_ The late articles in our newspapers, and the language of Count Walewski to Lord Cowley, make the Queen doubly anxious to warn the Government not to let themselves be drawn on to such a policy.

[Footnote 3: The draft expressed disapproval of the silence maintained by the Prussian Government towards England with regard to the Austrian proposals, of the active measures adopted to induce the German Powers not to take part with Austria, as well as of the extended facilities afforded by Prussia to Russia for carrying on the war.]

[Pageheading: LETTER FROM NAPOLEON III]

[Pageheading: THE EMPEROR AND PEACE]

_The Emperor of the French to Queen Victoria._

TUILERIES, _le 14 Janvier 1856_.

MADAME ET CHERE S[OE]UR,--Votre Majeste m'ayant permis de lui parler a c[oe]ur ouvert toutes les fois que des circonstances graves se presenteraient, je viens aujourd'hui profiter de la faveur qu'elle a bien voulu m'accorder.

Je viens de recevoir aujourd'hui la nouvelle de la reponse de la Russie a l'Ultimatum de Vienne, et avant d'avoir manifeste mon impression a qui que ce soit, pas meme a Walewski, je viens la communiquer a votre Majeste pour avoir son avis.

Je resume la question: La Russie accepte tout l'Ultimatum autrichien sauf la rectification de frontiere de la Bessarabie, et sauf le paragraphe relatif aux conditions _particulieres_ qu'elle declare ne pas connaitre. De plus, profitant du succes de Kars, elle s'engage a rendre cette forteresse et le territoire occupe en echange des points que nous possedons en Crimee et ailleurs.

Dans quelle position allons-nous nous trouver? D'apres la convention, l'Autriche est obligee de retirer son ambassadeur, et nous, nous poursuivons la guerre! Mais dans quel but allons-nous demander a nos deux pays de nouveaux sacrifices d'hommes et d'argent? Pour un interet purement autrichien et pour une question qui ne consolide en rien l'empire ottoman.

Cependant nous y sommes obliges et nous ne devons pas avoir l'air de manquer a nos engagements. Nous serions donc places dans une alternative bien triste si l'Autriche elle-meme ne semblait pas deja nous inviter de ne point rompre toute negociation. Or en reflechissant aujourd'hui a cette situation, je me disais: ne pourrait-on pas repondre a l'Autriche ceci: La prise de Kars a tant soit peu change nos situations; puisque la Russie consent a evacuer toute l'Asie Mineure nous nous bornons a demander pour la Turquie, au lieu de la rectification de frontiere, les places fortes formant _tete de pont_ sur le Danube, tels que Ismail et Kilia. Pour nous, nous demandons en fait de conditions particulieres, l'engagement de ne point retablir les forts des iles d'Aland et une amnistie pour les Tartares. Mon sentiment est qu'a ces conditions-la la paix serait tres desirable; car sans cela je ne puis pas m'empecher de redouter l'opinion publique quand elle me dira: "Vous aviez obtenu le but reel de la guerre, Aland etait tombe et ne pouvait plus se relever, Sebastopol avait eu le meme sort, la flotte Russe etait aneantie, et la Russie promettait non seulement de ne plus la faire reparaitre dans la Mer Noire, mais meme de ne plus avoir d'arsenaux maritimes sur toutes ses rives; la Russie abandonnait ses conquetes dans l'Asie Mineure, elle abandonnait son protectorat dans les principautes, son action sur le cours du Danube, son influence sur ces correligionnaires sujets du Sultan, etc., etc. Vous aviez obtenu tout cela non sans d'immenses sacrifices et cependant vous allez les continuer, compromettre les finances de la France, repandre ses tresors et son sang et pourquoi: pour obtenir quelques landes de la Bessarabie!!!"

Voila, Madame, les reflexions qui me preoccupent; car autant je me sens de force quand je crois etre dans le vrai pour inculquer mes idees a mon pays et pour lui faire partager ma persuasion, autant je me sentirais faible si je n'etais pas sur d'avoir raison ni de faire mon devoir.

Mais ainsi que je l'ai dit en commencant a votre Majeste je n'ai communique ma premiere impression qu'au Duc de Cambridge, et autour de moi au contraire j'ai dit qu'il fallait continuer la guerre. J'espere que votre Majeste accueillera avec bonte cette lettre ecrite a la hate et qu'elle y verra une nouvelle preuve de mon desir de m'entendre toujours avec elle avant de prendre une resolution. En remerciant votre Majeste de l'aimable lettre que S.A.R. le Duc de Cambridge m'a remise de sa part, je la prie de recevoir la nouvelle assurance de mes sentiments de tendre et respectueux attachement avec lesquels je suis de votre Majeste, le bon frere et ami,

NAPOLEON.

Je remercie bien le Prince Arthur de son bon souvenir.

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _15th January 1856_.

... The Queen will send her letter to the Emperor this evening for transmission to Paris. She will enclose it _open_ to Lord Clarendon, who will seal and send it after having read it.

The Queen cannot conceal from Lord Clarendon what _her own_ feelings and wishes at this moment are. They _cannot_ be for peace _now_, for she is _convinced_ that this country would _not_ stand in the eyes of Europe as she _ought_, and as the Queen is convinced she _would_ after _this_ year's campaign. The honour and glory of her dear Army is as _near_ her heart as almost anything, and she cannot _bear_ the thought that "the failure on the Redan" should be our _last fait d'Armes_, and it would cost her more than words can express to conclude a peace with _this_ as the end. However, what is best and wisest must be done.

The Queen cannot yet bring herself to believe that the Russians are at all sincere, or that it will _now_ end in peace.

[Pageheading: THE QUEEN'S REPLY]

_Queen Victoria to the Emperor of the French._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _le 15 Janvier 1856_.

SIRE ET CHER FRERE,--La bonne et aimable lettre que je viens de recevoir de la main de votre Majeste m'a cause un tres-vif plaisir. J'y vois une preuve bien satisfaisante pour moi que vous avez apprecie tous les avantages de ces epanchements sans reserve, et que votre Majeste en sent comme moi le besoin dans les circonstances graves ou nous sommes. Je sens aussi toute la responsabilite que votre confiance m'impose, et c'est dans la crainte qu'une opinion formee et exprimee par moi trop a la hate pourrait nuire a la decision finale a prendre que je me vois obligee de differer pour le moment la reponse plus detaillee sur les considerations que vous avez si clairement et si consciencieusement developpees. Cependant, je ne veux point tarder de vous remercier de votre lettre, et de vous soumettre de mon cote les reflexions qui me sont venues en la lisant. La Reponse Russe ne nous est pas encore arrivee; nous n'en connaissons pas exactement les termes; par consequent, il serait imprudent de former une opinion definitive sur la maniere d'y repondre, surtout comme le Prince Gortschakoff parait avoir demande un nouveau delai du Gouvernement Autrichien et de nouvelles instructions de St Petersbourg, et comme M. de Bourqueney parait penser que la Russie n'a pas dit son dernier mot. Nous pourrions donc perdre une chance d'avoir de meilleures conditions, en montrant trop d'empressement a accueillir celles offertes dans ce moment. Celles-ci arriveront peut-etre dans le courant de la journee, ou demain, quand mon Cabinet sera reuni pour les examiner. Nous sommes au 15; le 18 les relations diplomatiques entre l'Autriche et la Russie doivent etre rompues; je crois que notre position vis-a-vis de la Russie sera meilleure en discutant ses propositions apres la rupture et apres en avoir vu les effets. En attendant, rien ne sera plus utile a la cause de la paix que la resolution que vous avez si sagement prise de dire a tous ceux qui vous approchent qu'il faut continuer la guerre. Soyez bien sur que dans l'opinion finale que je me formerai, votre position et votre persuasion personnelle seront toujours presentes a mon esprit et auront le plus grand poids.

[Pageheading: THE BRITISH ARMY]

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _17th January 1856_.

The Queen returns the Duke of Cambridge's and Lord Cowley's letters, which together with the account which Lord Clarendon gives of his interview with M. de Persigny causes the Queen no little anxiety. If negotiations on a vague basis are allowed to be begun, the Russian negotiator is sure to find out that the French are ready to grant anything....

However, whatever happens, one consolation the Queen ever will have, which is--that with the one exception of that failure on the _Redan_, her noble Army--in spite of every possible disadvantage which any army could labour under, _has_ invariably been victorious, and the Russians have always and everywhere been beaten excepting at Kars, where _famine_ alone enabled them to succeed.

Let us therefore not be (as alas! we have often been) its detractors by our croaking.

[Pageheading: POSITION OF THE EMPEROR]

_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._

PICCADILLY, _17th January 1856_.

Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and concludes that Lord Lansdowne informed your Majesty that the Cabinet, after hearing from Lord Clarendon a statement of the course of the recent negotiations as explained by the despatches which Lord Clarendon read, came to the decision that no further step should be taken, and no further communication should be made to the Government of France on the matters at issue, until the final decision of the Russian Government on the pure and simple adoption of the Austrian ultimatum[4] should be known. Viscount Palmerston begs to congratulate your Majesty upon the telegraphic message received this morning from Sir Hamilton Seymour, announcing that the Russian Government has adopted that Austrian ultimatum. So far so well, and the success which has attended firmness and steadiness of purpose in regard to those conditions may be looked upon as a tolerably sure indication that a perseverance in the same course will bring the Russian Government to consent to those remaining conditions which the Austrian Government has not yet (as it says) made known to the Cabinet of Petersburg.

With regard to the letter of the Emperor of the French to your Majesty, and the statements made to Lord Clarendon by the Count de Persigny as to the difficulties of the Emperor's internal position with respect to finance, and a general desire for peace throughout the Nation, Viscount Palmerston expressed his opinion to the Cabinet yesterday that all those representations were greatly exaggerated. He is convinced that the Emperor of the French is perfectly master of his own position, and that he can as to peace or war take the course which he may determine to adopt.

The cabal of stock-jobbing politicians, by whom he is surrounded, _must_ give way to him if he is firm. They have no standing place in the confidence and respect of their fellow-countrymen, they represent nothing but the Stock Exchange speculations in which they are engaged, and the Emperor's throne would probably be stronger, rather than weaker, if they were swept away, and better men put in their places. And it is a very remarkable circumstance that at the very moment when your Majesty and your Majesty's Government were being told that the Emperor would be unable to go on with the war on account of the difficulty of finding money, the French Government was putting forth in the _Moniteur_ an official statement showing that they have a reserve surplus of twenty-one millions sterling for defraying the expenses of a campaign in the ensuing spring, without the necessity of raising any fresh loan.

Viscount Palmerston fully concurs in the sentiment of regret expressed by your Majesty to Lord Clarendon that the last action of the war in which your Majesty's troops have been engaged, should, if peace be now concluded, have been the repulse at the Redan; but however it may suit national jealousy, which will always be found to exist on the other side of the Channel, to dwell upon that check, yet your Majesty may rely upon it that the Alma and Inkerman have left recollections which will dwell in the memory of the living and not be forgotten in the page of history; and although it would no doubt have been gratifying to your Majesty and to the Nation that another summer should have witnessed the destruction of Cronstadt by your Majesty's gallant Navy, and the expulsion of the Russians from the countries south of the Caucasus by your Majesty's brave Army, yet if peace _can_ now be concluded on conditions honourable and secure, it would, as your Majesty justly observes, not be right to continue the war for the mere purpose of prospective victories. It will, however, be obviously necessary to continue active preparations for war up to the moment when a definite Treaty of Peace is signed, in order that the Russians may not find it for their interest to break off negotiations when the season for operations shall approach, emboldened by any relaxation on the part of the Allies induced by too ready confidence in the good faith of their adversary....

[Footnote 4: See _ante_, 19th November, 1855, note 91.]

[Pageheading: DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE AT PARIS]

_The Duke of Cambridge to Queen Victoria._

TUILERIES, _20th January 1856_.

MY DEAR COUSIN,--Your letters of the 14th and 18th have reached me, and I am happy to find by them that you approve in conjunction with the Government with what has been done by me and my colleagues whilst at Paris.[5] I have given all the messages and carried out all the instructions as contained in your letters, and I trust as far as possible I have been enabled to do some good. On the other hand, I cannot deny that the feelings universally expressed here as to the prospects of a speedy peace are so different from those felt in England, that it is extremely difficult to produce any impression in the sense that we could wish it. France wishes for peace more than anything else on earth, and this feeling does not confine itself to Walewski or the Ministers--it extends itself to all classes. The Emperor alone is reasonable and sensible in this respect, but his position is a most painful one, and he feels it very much. The fact is that public opinion is much more felt and more loudly expressed in this country than anybody in England at all imagines. No doubt the Emperor can do much that he wishes, but still he cannot go altogether against a feeling which so loudly expresses itself on all occasions, without thereby injuring his own position most seriously. I have written to Clarendon very fully on this subject, and have explained to him my reasons for wishing to return to England as soon as possible, now that our military mission is concluded. It is essential that I should see the members of the Government, and that I should communicate to them the exact state of feeling here and the views of the Emperor as to the mode of smoothing down all difficulties. This can only be done by a personal interview on the part of somebody thoroughly aware of the present position of affairs. Probably at this moment I am in a better position to do this than anybody else, from the peculiar circumstances in which I have been placed while here, and it is this feeling which makes me desirous to return to England with the least possible delay. It is my intention therefore to start with my colleagues to-morrow, Monday night, for England, to which arrangement the Emperor has given his sanction, and by which time he will be prepared to tell me what he thinks had best be done, from his view of the question. I think it my duty to communicate this to you, and hope that you will give my resolution your sanction. I beg to remain, my dear Cousin, your most dutiful Cousin,

GEORGE.

[Footnote 5: At the Council of War. See _ante_, 7th January, 1856, note 1.]

[Pageheading: ENGLAND AND FRANCE]

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _28th January 1856_.

The Queen sends a letter which she wishes Lord Clarendon to give to General La Marmora.[6] We have been extremely pleased with him (indeed he is a universal favourite) and found him so sensible, mild, and right-minded, in all he says--and a valuable adviser to the King. The Queen wishes _just_ to mention to Lord Clarendon that the Duke of Cambridge told her that the Emperor had spoken to _him_ about what the King of Sardinia had said relative to _Austria and France_, asking the Duke whether such a thing had been said.[7] The Duke seems to have answered as we could wish, and the Queen pretended _never_ to have _heard_ the report, merely saying that as the proposed ultimatum was then much talked of, it was very possible the King might unintentionally have mistaken the observations of the Ministers and ourselves as to our being _unable_ to _agree_, without great caution, to what appeared to be _agreed_ on beforehand between _France_ and _Austria_, and possibly _might_ have in his blunt way stated something which alarmed the Emperor--but that she could not imagine it could be anything else. There seems, however, really no _end_ to _cancans_ at _Paris_; for the Duke of Cambridge seems to have shared the same fate. The two atmospheres of France and England, as well as the Society, are so different that people get to talk differently. It seems also that the King got frightened lest he should at Paris be thought too liberal in his _religious_ views (having been complimented for it) which he was very proud of--and thought it necessary to tell the _Emperor_ he was a _good Catholic_. This is not unnatural in his peculiar position. When Lord Clarendon goes to Paris, he will be able to _silence_ any further allusion to these idle stories which only lead to mischief, and which even Lord Cowley seems to have made more of (as to his own feelings upon them) than was necessary, but that is equally natural. Speaking of his King--General La Marmora said: "Il ne dira jamais ce qu'il ne pense pas, mais il dit quelquefois ce qui serait mieux qu'il ne dit pas." He more than any other regrets the King's not having seen more of the world, and says his journey had done him a _great_ deal of good.

[Footnote 6: The Sardinian Commander had been attending the Council of War at Paris.]

[Footnote 7: The King of Sardinia was reported to have told the Emperor that the latter's loyalty to the Alliance was questioned by Great Britain, and that it was conjectured in London that he was in favour of co-operation with Austria instead.]

[Pageheading: THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE]

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

_28th January 1856._

The Queen returns to Lord Palmerston the draft of the speech, which she thinks _extremely well_ worded, and which she therefore trusts will be (with the exception of those passages marked) as little altered as possible. Lord John Russell used to say that as soon as a speech was discussed in the Cabinet, it was so much _pruned_ and altered as to lose all its force. The Queen must own that she is _much_ alarmed at hearing that the _papers_ of the War Council were to be printed and circulated amongst the Cabinet, as she fears that the secrecy, which is so necessary, upon which the Emperor laid so _much stress_, will be very difficult to be maintained. The Emperor's opinion at least, the Queen hopes, will _not_ be printed or generally circulated?

The Queen must again press for a very early decision on the subject. If this is allowed to _drag_, it will appear, particularly to the _Emperor_, as if we were not really in earnest, though we stickled so much for our additional conditions, which might lessen the hopes of peace. Of course the Government must not give any answer on this subject--should Parliament be so indiscreet as to ask _what_ the result of the deliberations of the Council of War has been.

_Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians._

Windsor Castle, _29th January 1856_.

MY DEAREST UNCLE,--You will kindly forgive my letter being short, but we are going to be present this morning at the wedding of Phipps's daughter[8] with that handsome lame young officer whom you remember at Osborne. It is quite an event at Windsor, and takes place in St George's Chapel, which is very seldom the case.

Many thanks for your kind letter of the 25th, by which I am glad to see that dear good Philip has arrived safe and well and brought back _de bons souvenirs_. We shall always be _happy_ to see him.

The _peace negotiations_ occupy every one; _if_ Russia is _sincere_, they will end most probably in peace; but _if_ she is _not_, the war will be _carried_ on with _renewed vigour_. The recollection of last year makes one _very distrustful_.

England's policy throughout has been the _same_, _singularly unselfish_, and _solely_ actuated by the _desire_ of _seeing Europe saved_ from the _arrogant_ and _dangerous pretensions_ of that _barbarous power_ Russia--and of having _such safeguards_ established for the _future_, which may ensure us against a _repetition_ of similar _untoward events_.

I repeat now, what we have said from the beginning, and what I have _repeated_ a _hundred_ times, _if Prussia_ and _Austria_ had held _strong and decided_ language to _Russia in_ '53, we should _never_ have had _this war!_

Now I must conclude. With Albert's best love, ever your devoted Niece,

VICTORIA R.

[Footnote 8: Maria Henrietta Sophia, daughter of Sir Charles Beaumont Phipps, K.C.B., Keeper of the Privy Purse, married Captain Frederick Sayer, 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers.]

[Pageheading: MISS NIGHTINGALE]

_Queen Victoria to Miss Florence Nightingale._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _[January] 1856_.

DEAR MISS NIGHTINGALE,--You are, I know, well aware of the high sense I entertain of the Christian devotion which you have displayed during this great and bloody war, and I need hardly repeat to you how warm my admiration is for your services, which are fully equal to those of my dear and brave soldiers, whose sufferings you have had the _privilege_ of alleviating in so merciful a manner. I am, however, anxious of marking my feelings in a manner which I trust will be agreeable to you, and therefore send you with this letter a brooch, the form and emblems of which commemorate your great and blessed work, and which, I hope, you will wear as a mark of the high approbation of your Sovereign![9]

It will be a very great satisfaction to me, when you return at last to these shores, to make the acquaintance of one who has set so bright an example to our sex. And with every prayer for the preservation of your valuable health, believe me, always, yours sincerely,

VICTORIA R.

[Footnote 9: The presentation took place on the 29th of January. The jewel resembled a badge rather than a brooch, bearing a St George's Cross in red enamel, and the Royal cypher surmounted by a crown in diamonds. The inscription "Blessed are the Merciful" encircled the badge which also bore the word "Crimea."]

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _7th February 1856_.

With respect to Lord Clarendon's observation that he hopes that the Queen "will approve of his upholding the Sardinians in the Conference and in all other respects," she can only assure him that she is _most sincerely_ anxious that he should do so, as the Queen has the greatest respect for that noble little country, which, since it has possessed an honest, straightforward as well as courageous King, has been a bright example to all Continental States.

The Queen rejoices to hear that Count Cavour is coming to Paris. The Queen hopes that the determination not to admit Prussia will be adhered to.[10] She hears that Baron Beust[11] means to go to Paris to represent the German Confederation; this should be prevented by all means.

[Footnote 10: Prussia was not admitted to the sitting of the Conference until a later stage.]

[Footnote 11: Prime Minister of Saxony.]

[Pageheading: BELGIAN NEUTRALITY]

_Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians._

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _13th February 1856_.

MY DEAREST UNCLE,--I had the happiness of receiving your kind letter of the 8th on Saturday, and thank you much for it. I gave your kind message to Colonel Phipps, who was much gratified by it. We came here in wretched weather yesterday, leaving Mamma _still_ at Frogmore.

The Conferences will begin very shortly; Lord Clarendon starts for Paris on Friday. _No_ one but him could undertake these difficult negotiations. _No_ one can tell _what_ the result will be--and I will say nothing, for I have _too strong_ personal feelings to speak upon the subject.

With respect to your answer respecting your _neutrality_, and the possibility of your being obliged to break it, I must repeat that I see _no possibility_ or _eventuality_ that _could oblige_ you to do so. _Belgium_ of its own accord bound itself to remain neutral, and its very existence is _based_ upon that neutrality, which the other Powers have guaranteed and are bound to maintain _if Belgium keeps_ her engagements. I cannot at all see HOW you could _even_ entertain the question, for, as I just said, the _basis_ of the _existence_ of Belgium is her _neutrality_.

The weather is so mild that we should almost hope Stockmar would start soon. If _he_ can't come himself, he should send his son for a few days, who could bring us any confidential communication from his father, and could be the bearer of any from us. Something of this kind is most necessary, for it is overwhelming to write to one another upon so many details which require immediate answer....

With Albert's love, and ours to your young people, believe me, always, your devoted Niece,

VICTORIA R.

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

_14th February 1856._

The Queen has seen in the reports of the House of Commons that a return has been moved for of all the decorations of the Bath given since the war. The Queen hopes the Government will not allow the House of Commons so much further to trespass upon the prerogatives of the Crown as now _virtually_ to take also the control over the distribution of honours and rewards into their hands.

[Pageheading: TERMS OF PEACE]

_The King of the Belgians to Queen Victoria._

LAEKEN, _15th February 1856_.

MY DEAREST VICTORIA,--I have to thank you for your dear kind letter of the 12th. Madame de Sevigne says, with great truth, that a letter to be a good letter ought to be as if one heard the person speak; your dear letters are always so, and you would therefore be praised by Madame de Sevigne, and that very deservedly. Lord Clarendon is, Heaven be praised, well calculated to bring matters to a happy conclusion. I will try to make some impression on the mind of the Emperor Alexander, his best policy will be the most honest. By all I can learn they wish most sincerely the conclusion of this war. If on the side of the Allies only the things which really protect the territories of the present Turkish Empire are asked, the Russians ought not to man[oe]uvre, but grant it, and the Allies also ought to be moderate. You are very properly never to be contradicted, but there are a few things to be remarked. This neutrality was in the real interest of this country, but our good Congress here did _not_ wish it, and even opposed it; it was _impose_ upon them. A neutrality to be respected must be _protected_. France at all time in cases of general war can put an end to it, by declaring to us _Vous devez etre avec nous ou contre nous_. If we answer _Nous sommes neutres_, they will certainly try to occupy us; then the case of self-defence arises and the claim to be protected by the other powers....

My beloved Victoria, your devoted Uncle,

LEOPOLD R.

[Pageheading: THE CONFERENCE]

_Queen Victoria to the Emperor of the French._

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _le 15 Fevrier 1856_.

SIRE ET CHER FRERE,--Mes Commissaires pour le Conseil de Guerre sont a peine revenus de Paris et notre plan de campagne est a peine arrete, que mes Plenipotentiaires pour la Conference de paix se mettent en route pour assister sous les yeux de V.M. a l'[oe]uvre de la pacification. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous recommander Lord Clarendon, mais je ne veux pas le laisser partir sans le rendre porteur de quelques mots de ma part.

Quoique bien convaincue qu'il ne pourra dans les discussions prochaines s'elever de questions sur lesquelles il y aurait divergence d'opinions entre nos deux Gouvernements, j'attache toutefois le plus haut prix a ce que l'accord le plus parfait soit etabli avant que les conferences ne soient ouvertes; et c'est dans ce but que j'ai charge Lord Clarendon de se rendre a Paris quelques jours avant, afin qu'il put rendre un compte exact des opinions de mon Gouvernement, et jouir de l'avantage de connaitre _a fond_ la pensee de V.M.

J'eprouverai un sentiment d'intime satisfaction dans ce moment critique, et je le regarderai comme une preuve toute particuliere de votre amitie, si vous voulez permettre a Lord Clarendon de vous exposer personnellement mes vues et d'entendre les Votres de Votre proper bouche.

Les operations de nos armees et de nos flottes combinees, sous un commandement divise, ont ete sujettes a d'enormes difficultes; mais ces difficultes ont ete heureusement vaincues. Dans la Diplomatie comme a la guerre, les Russes auront sur Nous le grand avantage de l'unite de plan et d'action, et je les crois plus forts sur ce terrain que sur le champ de bataille; mais a coup sur, nous y resterons egalement victorieux, si nous reussissons a empecher l'ennemi de diviser nos forces et de nous battre en detail.

Sans vouloir jeter un doute sur la sincerite de la Russie en acceptant nos propositions, il est impossible d'avoir a ce sujet une conviction pleine et entiere. J'ai tout lieu de croire cependant que nul effort et nul stratageme ne seront negliges pour rompre, s'il etait possible, ou au moins pour affaiblir notre alliance. Mais je repose a cet egard dans la fermete de V.M. la meme confiance qui saura detruire toutes ces esperances, que j'ai dans la mienne et dans celle de mes Ministres. Cependant, on ne saurait attacher trop d'importance a ce que cette commune fermete soit reconnue et appreciee des le commencement des negociations, car de la dependra, j'en ai la conviction, la solution, si nous devons obtenir une paix dont les termes pourront etre consideres comme satisfaisants pour l'honneur de la France et de l'Angleterre, et comme donnant une juste compensation pour les enormes sacrifices que les deux pays ont faits. Une autre consideration encore me porte a attacher le plus haut prix a cet accord parfait, c'est que si, par son absence, nous etions entraines dans une paix qui ne satisferait point la juste attente de nos peuples, cela donnerait lieu a des plaintes et a des recriminations qui ne pourraient manquer de fausser les relations amicales des deux pays au lieu de les cimenter davantage comme mon c[oe]ur le desire ardemment.

D'ailleurs, je ne doute pas un moment qu'une paix telle que la France et l'Angleterre ont le droit de la demander sera bien certainement obtenue par une determination inebranlable de ne point rabaisser les demandes moderees que nous avons faites.

Vous excuserez, Sire, la longueur de cette lettre, mais il m'est si doux de pouvoir epancher mes sentiments sur toutes ces questions si importantes et si difficiles, avec une personne que je considere non seulement comme un Allie fidele, mais comme un ami sur lequel je puis compter en toute occasion, et qui, j'en suis sure, est anime envers nous des memes sentiments.

Le Prince me charge de vous offrir ses hommages les plus affectueux, et moi je me dis pour toujours, Sire et cher Frere, de V.M.I., la tres affectionnee S[oe]ur et Amie,

VICTORIA R.

[Pageheading: THE CRIMEAN ENQUIRY]

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _16th February 1856_.

The subject to which Lord Palmerston refers in his letter of last night, and upon which the Cabinet is going to deliberate to-day, has also caused the Queen much anxiety.

A Civil Commission is sent out by the Government to enquire into the conduct of the officers in command in the Crimea; this is done without any consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. They report to the Government, inculpating several general officers and others in high command; this report is not communicated to the military authorities, nor to the persons affected by it, but is laid on the table of both Houses of Parliament.[12] These officers then for the first time find themselves accused under the authority of Government, and that accusation communicated to the Legislature without ever having been heard in answer or allowed an opportunity to defend themselves. It is stated in both Houses by the Government that the officers may send papers in reply if they choose! But who is to be the Judge on the trial? The Press, of course, and the _Times_ at the head, have already judged and condemned, and the House of Commons is now moving _in default of another Judge_ to constitute its tribunal by a Committee of Enquiry.

It is quite evident if matters are left so, and military officers of the Queen's Army are to be judged as to the manner in which they have discharged their military duties before an enemy by a Committee of the House of Commons, the command of the Army is at once transferred from the Crown to that Assembly.

This result is quite inevitable if the Government appear as accusers, as they do by the report of their Commission, and then submit the accusation for Parliament to deal with, without taking any steps of their own!

The course suggested by Sir James Graham and alluded to by Lord Palmerston, of following the precedent of the enquiry into the Convention of Cintra,[13] appears therefore to the Queen to be the only prudent one.

The Queen thinks it most unfair to the officers to publish their statements beforehand, as these will not go before judges feeling the weight of their responsibility, but before the newspapers who are their sworn enemies and determined to effect their ruin, for which they possess unlimited means.

The Queen wishes Lord Palmerston to read this letter to the Cabinet.

[Footnote 12: Sir John MacNeill and Colonel Tulloch had been sent out to the Crimea early in 1855 to investigate the breakdown of various military departments. They had issued a preliminary report in the summer of 1855, and a final one in January 1856, which was presented to Parliament. The officers specially censured were Lord Lucan (who had been given the command of a Regiment), Lord Cardigan, Inspector of Cavalry, Sir Richard Airey, Quartermaster-General, and Colonel Gordon, Deputy Quartermaster-General. Lord Panmure wrote on the 17th of February that the Government recommended the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry, consisting of General Sir Howard Douglas and six other high military officers. The Commission sat at Chelsea, and made its report in July, exonerating the officers censured.]

[Footnote 13: The Convention of Cintra was concluded on the 30th of August 1808. It was founded on the basis of an armistice agreed upon between Sir Arthur Wellesley and General Kellerman, on the day after the battle of Vimiera, and some of its provisions were considered too favourable to the French. A Board of Enquiry, under the presidency of Sir David Dundas, in the first instance exculpated the British officers; but the Government having instructed the members of the Board to give their opinions individually, four were found to approve and three to disapprove the armistice and convention.]

[Pageheading: THE EMPEROR'S CORDIALITY]

_The Earl of Clarendon to Queen Victoria._

PARIS, _18th February 1856_.

Lord Clarendon presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and humbly begs to say that he dined last night at the Tuileries, and had a conversation of two hours with the Emperor, which was in all respects satisfactory. On no occasion has Lord Clarendon heard the Emperor express himself more warmly or with greater determination in favour of the Alliance, and H.M. entirely concurred with Lord Clarendon, that upon the perfect understanding between the two Governments, and the conviction on the part of others that the Alliance was not to be shaken, depended the facility with which negotiations might be conducted, and the terms on which peace would be made. Lord Clarendon spoke with the utmost frankness about the flattery that had been and would continue to be addressed to His Majesty, and the contrast perpetually drawn between England and France, to the disparagement of the former, for the purpose of disturbing the relations between them; but that your Majesty and your Majesty's Government had always treated these tricks with contempt, because the confidence in the Emperor's honour and loyalty was complete. Lord Clarendon dwelt particularly upon the feelings of your Majesty and of the Prince on this subject, and the pleasure it gave the Emperor was evident; and he desired Lord Clarendon to say that your Majesty should never find such confidence misplaced.

He promised Lord Clarendon that he would give Baron Brunnow and Count Buol to understand that if they thought the Alliance could be disturbed by them they would find themselves grievously mistaken, and that it would be waste of time to try and alter any conditions upon which he had agreed with the English Government.

The Emperor appeared to be much gratified by your Majesty's letter, for the first thing he said to Lord Clarendon on coming into the room before dinner was "_quelle charmante lettre vous m'avez apportee de la Reine_," and then began upon the extraordinary clearness with which your Majesty treated all matters of business, and the pleasure he derived from every discussion of them with your Majesty....

The Empress was looking in great health and beauty. She was in the highest spirits, and full of affectionate enquiry for your Majesty.

[Pageheading: OUDH]

[Pageheading: THE KING'S APPEAL]

_The Marquis of Dalhousie to Queen Victoria._

CALCUTTA, _19th February 1856_.

The Governor-General presents his most humble duty to your Majesty, and has the honour of submitting to your Majesty a copy of a Proclamation, whereby the Kingdom of Oudh has been placed exclusively and permanently under the authority of your Majesty's Government.[14]

The various considerations, and the course of public events, which led to this necessity, have long since been laid before your Majesty's Government in great detail.

The Governor-General during the past summer communicated to the Home Authorities his readiness to remain in India as long as he dared, namely, for one additional month, until the 1st of March, for the purpose of carrying into effect the proposed policy regarding Oudh--if it was desired that he should do so.

The orders from the Home Government reached the Governor-General only upon the 2nd of January, leaving barely two months for the assembling of the military force which was necessary to provide against all risks--for the negotiations with the King--and for the organisation of the future Civil and Military Administration of Oudh.

Every preparation having been completed, the Resident at Lucknow waited upon the King in person--communicated to him the resolution which the British Government had taken--and tendered for his acceptance a new Treaty, whereby the transfer of the Government of Oudh would have been made a matter of amicable agreement.

The King wholly refused to sign any Treaty. He declared himself ready to submit to the will of the British Government in all things. He bade the Resident observe that every mark of power had already been laid down by His Majesty's own orders--the guns at the palace gates were dismounted, the guards bore no arms, and, though drawn up as usual in the Court, they saluted the Resident with their hands only; while not a weapon was worn by any officer in the Palace.

The King gave way to passionate bursts of grief and anger--implored the intercession of the Resident in his behalf--and finally, uncovering his head, he placed his turban in the Resident's hands. This act--the deepest mark of humiliation and helplessness which a native of the East can exhibit--became doubly touching and significant when the head thus bared in supplication was one that had worn a royal crown.

The Government, however, had already borne too long with the wrongs inflicted by the sovereigns of Oudh upon their unhappy subjects. The clamorous grief of the King could not be allowed to shut out the cry of his people's misery. The King's appeal, therefore, could not be listened to; and as His Majesty, at the end of the three days' space which was allowed him for deliberation, still resolutely refused to sign a Treaty, the territory of Oudh was taken possession of, by the issue of the Proclamation which has now been respectfully submitted to your Majesty.

It is the fourth kingdom in India which has passed under your Majesty's sceptre during the last eight years.[15]

Perfect tranquillity has prevailed in Oudh since the event which has just been narrated. General Outram writes that the populace of Lucknow, more interested than any other community in the maintenance of the native dynasty, already "appear to have forgotten they ever had a King." In the districts the Proclamation has been heartily welcomed by the middle and lower classes; while even the higher orders, who of course lose much in a native state by the cessation of corruption and tyranny, have shown no symptoms of dissatisfaction.

There seems every reason to hope and expect that the same complete tranquillity will attend the further progress of our arrangements for the future administration of Oudh....

The Governor-General has only further to report to your Majesty that Lord Canning arrived at Madras on the 14th inst., and that he will assume the Government of India on the last day of this month.

The Governor-General will report hereafter Lord Canning's arrival at Fort William; and he has now the honour to subscribe himself, your Majesty's most obedient, most humble and devoted Subject and Servant,

DALHOUSIE.

[Footnote 14: In a letter of the 13th, Mr Vernon Smith had told the Queen that the Press rumours of "annexation" were premature, and that the use of the word itself had been avoided in Lord Canning's correspondence with the Court of Directors.]

[Footnote 15: The earlier annexations were those of the Punjab (1849), Pegu (1852), and Nagpur (1853); some minor additions were also made under what was called the "doctrine of lapse."]

[Pageheading: PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE]

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _27th February 1856_.

The Queen returns Lord Clarendon's letter.

The matter becomes very serious, and it would be a bad position for us to be left quite alone in the Conference, which the Russians, the Queen has every reason to believe, are anxiously striving to bring about. In fact, well-informed persons pretend that this was the main aim of Russia in accepting the Austrian ultimatum and going to Paris.

Would it not answer to take this line: to say to Russia, "You have accepted the ultimatum, _pur et simple_, and have now again recognised its stipulations as preliminaries of peace. You will, therefore, first of all, have to execute them; you may then come to the question of Kars and say you mean to keep it--then you will see that Europe, bound to maintain the integrity of Turkey, will be obliged to go on with the war, and it will be for you to consider whether you mean to go on fighting for Kars; but at present this is not in question, as you are only called upon to fulfil the engagements to which you have solemnly pledged yourself"?

Perhaps Lord Palmerston will discuss this suggestion with his colleagues to-night.

_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._

PICCADILLY, _27th February 1856_.

Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to state that as the result of the deliberations of the Cabinet this evening, the accompanying telegraphic message is proposed to be sent to-morrow morning to Lord Clarendon. It is founded upon the substance of your Majesty's memorandum of this afternoon. Viscount Palmerston has taken another copy of this draft.

_Telegram to the Earl of Clarendon._

_28th February 1856_.

[_Enclosure._]

Your letter has been considered by the Cabinet.

Russia should be told that she cannot recede from the conditions which she deliberately agreed to by a _pur et simple_ acceptance at Petersburg, which she afterwards formally recorded in a protocol at Vienna, and which she has within a few days solemnly converted into preliminaries of peace.

Those engagements must be fulfilled, and those conditions must be carried into execution.

As to Kars, Austria, France, and Great Britain have undertaken to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and that integrity must be maintained.

Russia received no equivalent for giving up the principalities which she had occupied as a material pledge. She can receive none for giving up Kars.

If Russia determines to carry on the war, rather than give up Kars, things must take their course.

[Pageheading: TRANQUILLITY OF INDIA]

_The Marquis of Dalhousie to Queen Victoria._

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, _29th February 1856_.

Lord Dalhousie presents his most humble duty to your Majesty.

The guns are announcing from the ramparts of Fort William that Lord Canning has arrived. In an hour's time he will have assumed the Government of India. Lord Dalhousie will transfer it to him in a state of perfect tranquillity. There is peace, within and without. And although no prudent man will ever venture to predict the certainty of continued peace in India, yet Lord Dalhousie is able to declare, within reservation, that he knows of no quarter in which it is probable that trouble will arise.[16]

Lord Dalhousie desires that his very last act, as Governor-General, should be to submit to your Majesty a respectful expression of the deep sense he entertains of your Majesty's constant approbation of his public conduct while he has held the office of Governor-General of India; together with a humble assurance of the heartfelt gratitude with which he shall ever remember your Majesty's gracious favour towards him through the eight long years during which he has borne the ponderous burden he lays down to-day.

Lord Dalhousie begs permission to take leave of your Majesty, and has the honour to subscribe himself, with deep devotion, your Majesty's most obedient, most humble and faithful Subject and Servant,

DALHOUSIE.

[Footnote 16: It has been, however, freely alleged that the failure to repress acts of insubordination in the administration of Lord Dalhousie was a contributory, if not the direct, cause of the events of 1857. See _post_, Introductory Note to