Chapter XXVIII
). But the French Emperor was beginning to think these successes too dearly purchased, at the expense of so many French lives, and, actuated either by this, or some similar motive, he attempted, on the 6th of July, to negotiate through the British Government with Austria. The attempt was a failure, but an armistice was signed on the 8th, and again the Emperor sought the moral support of England. The paper which Lord John Russell submitted was a rough memorandum of M. de Persigny's, proposing as a basis of negotiation the cession of Lombardy to Piedmont, the independence of Venetia, and the erection of an Italian Confederation.]
[Pageheading: FRANCE AND AUSTRIA]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
PAVILION, ALDERSHOT, _10th July 1859_.
The Queen has just received Lord John Russell's letter with the enclosure which she returns, and hastens to say in reply, that she does not consider the Emperor of the French or his Ambassador justified in asking the support of England to proposals he means to make to his antagonist to-morrow. He made war on Austria in order to wrest her two Italian kingdoms from her, which were assured to her by the treaties of 1815, to which England is a party; England declared her neutrality in the war. The Emperor succeeded in driving the Austrians out of one of these kingdoms after several bloody battles. He means to drive her out of the second by diplomacy, and neutral England is to join him with her moral support in this endeavour.
The Queen having declared her neutrality, to which her Parliament and people have given their unanimous assent, feels bound to adhere to it. She conceives Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston ought not to ask her to give her "moral support" to one of the belligerents. As for herself, she sees no distinction between moral and general support; the moral support of England _is_ her support, and she ought to be prepared to follow it up.
The Queen wishes this letter to be communicated to the Cabinet.[58]
[Footnote 58: The Queen not having been informed whether this instruction had been complied with, a correspondence took place on the subject between the Prince and Lord Granville. See the _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. i. chap. xiii.]
[Pageheading: END OF THE WAR]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
OSBORNE, _12th July 1859_.
The Queen has to acknowledge the receipt of Lord John Russell's letter reporting to her the result of the deliberations of the Cabinet, which has very much relieved her mind. Lord John does not say whether her letter was read to the Cabinet, but from his former letter she concludes it was. She is most anxious that there should exist no misapprehension on their part as to the Queen's views. Our position must be consistent and precisely defined. A negotiation to stop the effusion of blood, and to attain "a peace which would be for the interests of all belligerents," is a very vague term. Who is to judge of those interests? Is M. de Persigny or the Emperor Napoleon's opinion to be the guide, as they just now proposed to us? Austria must be considered the exponent of her own interests. Prussia has explained to us the interests of Germany in the maintenance of the line of the fortresses on the Mincio, and was answered; her views were entirely erroneous, and her apprehensions exaggerated. It will require the greatest caution on our part not to lose our neutral position, nor to be made the advocate of one side. Are the wishes of the Lombards, Tuscans, etc., really ascertainable, while their countries are occupied by French and Sardinian armies? The Queen encloses an extract of a letter from the first Napoleon to his son, Prince Eugene,[59] showing how the expression of a wish for annexation has already of old been used as a means for conquest.
[Footnote 59: Eugene de Beauharnais, Duke of Leuchtenberg, son of the Empress Josephine by her first marriage, and adopted son of Napoleon I.]
[Pageheading: ASCENDANCY OF FRANCE]
_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._
OSBORNE, _13th July 1859_.
The Queen has received the news of a concluded peace,[60] which Lord John Russell has sent to her yesterday, with as much surprise as it must have caused Lord John. It was a joyous intelligence, as far as the stopping of the further effusion of innocent blood and the security against further diplomatic complications is concerned, but it gives cause for serious reflection. The Emperor Napoleon, by his military successes, and great apparent moderation or prudence immediately after them, has created for himself a most formidable position of strength in Europe. It is remarkable that he has acted towards Austria now just as he did towards Russia after the fall of Sebastopol; and if it was our lot then to be left alone to act the part of the extortioner whilst he acted that of the generous victor, the Queen is doubly glad that we should not now have fallen into the trap, to ask Austria (as friends and neutrals) concessions which he was ready to waive. He will now probably omit no occasion to cajole Austria as he has done to Russia, and turn her spirit of revenge upon Prussia and Germany--the Emperor's probable next victims. Should he thus have rendered himself the master of the entire Continent, the time may come for us either to obey or to fight him with terrible odds against us. This has been the Queen's view from the beginning of this complication, and events have hitherto wonderfully supported them. How Italy is to prosper under the Pope's presidency, whose misgovernment of his own small portion of it was the ostensible cause of the war, the Queen is at a loss to conceive. But the Emperor will be able to do just as he pleases, being in military command of the country, and having Sardinia, the Pope, and Austria as his debtors.
The Queen would like this letter to be communicated to the Cabinet.
[Footnote 60: The armistice had arranged that the Emperors should meet at Villafranca, where peace was concluded. See _ante_, Introductory Note to