Chapter XII

., and _La Jonquière Expedition d’Egypte_.

The failure of Hoche, the defeat of the proposed combination with the Spaniards by the battle of St. Vincent, the shattering of the Dutch fleet at Camperdown, had proved that an invasion of the British Isles was a venture only to be achieved by such a combination of good fortune for the French, and bad management on our part, as no sane ruler of men could expect. Yet during eight years, including the short fallacious Peace of Amiens, the successive Governments of France, the Directory, the Consulate, and the Empire continued to make the attempt. All their efforts at sea and some of their enterprises on land were directed to that end. The expedition to Egypt in 1798 was as much a part of the invasion scheme as the raid of Humbert. It was meant to turn the flank of England by assailing her in India. The Northern Coalition of 1801 was but another plot to turn England’s flank—promoted by the French, and made possible by the help of her erratic ally, the Czar Paul. The Boulogne flotilla was to have made the direct attack. It was all one undivided story which ended in 1805—leaving behind it a heritage of madness in the shape of Napoleon’s maniacal determination to conquer England on the Continent—in other words, to make the independence and well-being of Europe incompatible with the existence of his own government. The army of England was not dissolved. It remained rather a paper than an effective force, but still in existence as a possibility and a threat. As if to emphasise their determination to strike at the heart of England, the Directory appointed Napoleon himself as general of the Army of England on the 26th October 1797. The nomination was little more than a formality. Napoleon did not even visit his command till early in February 1798, and then only in passing and on his way to Belgium. The conqueror of Italy did not need his great sagacity to see that the venture was insane with such resources as the Directory could command. In the month of May their coast defence forces led by Muskeyn were beaten in an effort to retake the Marcouf islands, off La Hougue, where England had an advance post of observation held by bluejackets and marines. Napoleon, who knew well enough that the Directory feared him as a possible military despot, was no more disposed than Hoche to play Don Quixote on the sea to please men who would gladly have seen him at the bottom of it. He turned to the great flanking movement which was to destroy England through India, leaving lesser, and less fortunate, men to tilt at windmills.

The turning movement was essentially no less a delusion than the direct attack, but it looked feasible, it offered promising vistas of glory and adventure in the East, and it gave Napoleon a field wherein he might do showy things to fascinate the French imagination, and withal bide his time. It was indeed feasible up to a certain point, because the British Mediterranean fleet was tied down to blockade Cadiz. Jervis, content with heading off and driving back the Spaniards, had retired first to Lagos, and then to Lisbon, carrying with him his four prizes, the cherished reward of the toils and perils of officers and men, to be divided in becoming proportions. What those proportions were we can learn pleasantly from the estimate made by Nelson in a letter to Lord Spencer dated 7th September, of what the shares due for three French prizes he caused to be destroyed would have come to, if he had ordered their preservation:—to the commander-in-chief £3750; to the junior admirals each £1625; to captains each £1000; to the lieutenants class each £75; to warrant officers each £50; to petty officers each £11; to seamen and marines each £2, 4s. 1d. The men had their share to a penny, and we can understand the jest of the Irish sailor who was seen saying his prayers before Trafalgar. When asked by a lieutenant if he was afraid, he answered that he was not, but was only praying that the enemy’s bullets might be distributed on the same scale as the prize money—the lion’s share to the officers. St. Vincent, as he must now be called, did not leave Lisbon till the 31st March, and then applied himself to watching the twenty-six or twenty-eight Spanish ships in the port and to that repression of the spirit of mutiny described in the previous chapter.

Cadiz was twice bombarded at night. On the 3rd and the 5th July some damage was done to shipping and to houses. Some conflicts took place with Spanish guard-boats and galleys, in one of which Nelson was in great peril. News came that a Spanish treasure-ship had taken refuge at Santa Cruz de Tenerife, and on the 15th July Nelson was detached to seize it. He had with him his flagship the =Theseus=, 74, the =Culloden=, 74, the =Zealous=, 74, and the =Leander=, 50, with the =Seahorse=, =Emerald=, and =Terpsichore=, 32-gun frigates, and the cutter =Fox=. But he was not provided with the detachment of troops he thought necessary. Mainly for want of them, the attack failed disastrously. On the 22nd July an attempt was made to occupy a height overhanging the town, but the post was too strongly held to be carried by a mere landing party. On the evening of the 24th and in the small hours of the 25th, a double direct attack on the mole, and by the Citadel, was made with the =Fox= and boats. The =Fox= was sunk by cannon-shot off the mole, and so were some of the boats with her. Nelson lost his right arm. A few officers and men struggled on to the mole only to be shot down by musketry. The attack near the Citadel was no more fortunate. Troubridge, who commanded, succeeded in landing through the surf which stove his boats, but only to find he was helpless and to be compelled to purchase leave to return to the ships by promising that no further attack should be made on the islands. We lost in all 141 men and officers shot or drowned, and 105 wounded. Nelson was compelled to return home to months of suffering. From April 1797 to May 1798 the Mediterranean was unvisited by an English naval force, the French were free to cross it in every direction to fix their grip on the Ionian Islands, their share of the plunder of Venice, and to prepare for their great venture. Jervis, who spent much of his time at Lisbon, was joined by a Portuguese squadron, but the necessity for watching the Spaniards kept him to the west of the Straits.

Therefore did it seem feasible to the French to apply themselves to the profitable task of turning the Mediterranean into “a French lake,” by seizing Egypt, and then to revenge themselves on England by making Egypt the starting place for an attack on India. Preparations were made all through the earlier part of the year, and the expedition might have sailed before it did if an alarm of renewed war with Austria had not turned the attention of the French Government to another direction. The English ministers knew that preparations were being made, but did not know for what particular purpose. It seemed not improbable, though it surely ought to have appeared unthinkable, that the fleet at Toulon was going to try to run past Jervis and make for Ireland, where rebellion had broken out. There were from thirty to forty French ships of the line at Brest and other ocean ports, and the Army of England was still in being, at least on paper. To go to see what was being done at Toulon was the obvious course.

Nelson returned from home to the fleet off Cadiz on the 29th April 1798. Lord Spencer, the First Lord of the Admiralty, guided by his own good sense and the advice of Sir Gilbert Elliot, Lord Minto, had already selected him as the officer to be entrusted with the duty of intercepting the Toulon armament. His judgment coincided with the opinion of Jervis, who spontaneously detached Nelson on a reconnaissance into the Mediterranean on the 2nd May. Nelson sailed in his flagship, the =Vanguard=, 74, and on the 4th he picked up, at Gibraltar, the =Alexander=, 74, the =Orion=, 74, the =Emerald= and =Terpsichore=, and the =Bonne Citoyenne= sloop. On the 9th he sailed for Toulon. On the 19th St. Vincent received orders from home to send twelve line-of-battle ships into the Mediterranean to destroy the French armament, and he was recommended to give the command to Nelson. He was promised reinforcements to replace the ships he detached. They reached him on the 24th, under command of Sir R. Curtis, and that night the inshore squadron watching Cadiz, was replaced, under cover of the dark, by the newcomers, and was detached up the Mediterranean so that the Spaniards should see nothing to excite their suspicions and give them news to report to the French.

In the meantime Nelson had gone ahead and had been off Cape Sicié on the 17th. He learnt from a captured privateer that a great armament was indeed in preparation, but could learn nothing of its destination. On the 21st the =Vanguard= was dismasted in a north-westerly gale, which had begun to blow on the 19th, and was compelled to anchor to refit at San Pietro in Sardinia. His ships had been seen at a distance by the French in Toulon, but they put to sea on the 19th by favour of the north-west wind which drove him off. The armament consisted of twelve sail of the line under Admiral Brueys d’Aigalliers, an officer of the old French royal corps. The warships were crowded with Napoleon’s troops, and accompanied by transports. The French warships as usual had been manned with difficulty, and were short-handed. Though three months’ provisions were carried for the soldiers, only two months’ were carried for the crews, a fact which had an influence on the movements of Brueys later on. Immediately after leaving Toulon the armament was joined by a convoy from Genoa on the 21st May. The north-westerly gale blew it on its course, and as it went down the eastern side of Corsica and Sardinia it was sheltered from the violence of the storm. On the 27th it was joined at the mouth of the Straits of Bonifacio by another convoy from Ajaccio, while a third from Civita Vecchia, followed a parallel course, and joined the main body off Malta on the 9th June. If the fleet of Jervis had not been tied down to watch Cadiz, it would have been easy to prevent the army for the invasion of Egypt from ever coming together. The possession of Malta, in the opinion of the French, who share the common belief of mankind that whoever holds a port commands the sea about it, would have gone far to forward their scheme for making the Mediterranean a French lake. The Order of St. John of Jerusalem, to which it belonged, had been nearly ruined by the loss of its estates in France during the Revolution, and was too poor to maintain troops. The French army took possession on the 13th June, and on the 18th sailed on its way to Egypt, leaving a garrison in the island.

While the French were profiting by the delay of the English to take early measures to intercept them, Nelson was refitting at San Pietro. On the 27th May, the day on which the Ajaccio Convoy joined Brueys and Napoleon, he left San Pietro to resume his watch off Toulon. He was back on his cruising ground on the 31st to learn that the armament was gone to a destination he could not discover. On the 5th Captain Hardy, of the =Mutine= brig, brought him the news that Troubridge was coming with reinforcements, which would raise his command to fourteen sail. On the 7th they joined him. In a time when the movements of ships were controlled by the wind the seaman had certainties on which to calculate. Nelson knew that a fleet hampered by a swarm of transports could not have gone westward in the late north-westerly gale. Therefore he sought them on the east of Corsica and Sardinia. When off Gianute he was misinformed by a Moorish vessel, which told him that the French were at Syracuse. At Naples, on the 17th June—four days after the French had taken Malta—he learnt that the enemy had gone south past Sardinia. At Messina, on the 20th, he heard of the capture of Malta and Gozo. On the 22nd he was twelve leagues to the S.W. of Cape Passaro in Sicily, and was there told by a neutral, who had seen them at sea, that the French had left Malta on the 18th and were going to the east. Napoleon was as little a friend to delay as Nelson. He knew since the 1st June of the presence of English ships at San Pietro, and that he was liable to interruption. Knowing that he pressed on, but did not take the normal course from Malta to Alexandria. He followed a route to the north of it along the southern shore of Crete. When therefore Nelson, concluding most justly that the French would not go east except to attack Egypt, pressed on in pursuit along the shortest line, he crossed the route of his enemy, and they sailed in parallel lines. On the 25th, when the French were off Gozo di Candia, Nelson was directly to the south of them, barely sixty miles away, near Cape Dernah, in Africa. As he was not weighted by transports and was sailing on the more direct route he headed his opponent, and reached Alexandria on the 28th June to find the port empty, and the Turks wholly ignorant that they were menaced by any danger. He was in a fever of excitement. Of eager, vehement temperament, and by nature a striker of fierce strokes, he had overshot the mark, and his blow had been wasted in the air. His frigates had parted from him in the gale which dismasted the =Vanguard=, and had not rejoined. He was groping for his foe in the dark, and had missed him. His mind was agitated by his imagination. He saw himself, in his first important command, chosen over the heads of his seniors to meet a great crisis, and it seemed as if he had failed. He already heard in fancy the howl of disappointment which would go up in England, worded with all the ruffian fluency of the newspapers; and he loved honour—he loved popularity. Agitation clouded his sagacity. He could not consider how probable it was that his unhampered squadron had passed the enemy, how unlikely it was that they were heading for any other point than Egypt, an old object of French ambition, a post from which India could be menaced. On the 29th he hurried away to the coast of Anatolia, from the place where British interests could be injured, to one where the French could have gone only in a fit of childish folly. Forty-eight hours after he had left, and when his topsails were hardly over the horizon to the north-east, the French were seen in the west, and the invasion of Egypt began.

It was allowed to go on for a month undisturbed, and Napoleon was at liberty to gain the victories which prepared the way for his rise to despotic power in France. Nelson, meanwhile, had reached the coast of Anatolia on the 4th July, had battled his way back against head winds to Cape Passaro by the 18th, had obtained water and stores at Syracuse by the connivance of the Neapolitan Government and in defiance of its treaty with France, and had gone to sea again by the 25th, still ignorant of the whereabouts of his enemies save that they were somewhere in the Levant. On the 28th the Turkish Pasha at Coron, in the Morea, told him that they had been seen four weeks before to the south of Crete, heading to the south-east. That they had gone to Egypt did not admit of a doubt. Nelson steered once more for Alexandria, and on the 1st August the =Zealous= signalled that the French were at anchor in Aboukir Bay to the west of the Rosetta mouth of the Nile.

Napoleon had preferred to keep the squadron on the coast to co-operate with his army, though he gave the admiral conditional leave to sail for Corfu, if he could not take his fleet into the old harbour of Alexandria or find a safe anchorage elsewhere on the coast. Brueys could not leave for Corfu even if the general had been honest in giving him leave to go, for he was short of water and provisions, and most of what the shore could supply was taken for the army. To get into the old harbour was difficult. To get out of it in the face of a blockading force would have been impossible. A squadron once shut in it might be destroyed by bombs. So he sought for a safe anchorage and thought he found it at Aboukir, to the N.E. of Alexandria. Aboukir, the ancient Canopus, is the western point of the bay which lies west of the Rosetta branch of the Nile, and it has a shallow harbour stretching from N.W. to S.E. with an island at the N.W. point. Brueys, as an officer of the old royal corps, serving revolutionary France from necessity, disliked his captains as members of the class which had ruined and degraded his own. He thought them boors, and knew them to be ignorant. He had no confidence in his command, for his ships were all short-handed, and several lacked a fourth or even a third of their complement. The proportion of genuine seamen was small and the discipline bad. No practice could be given while the ships were crowded with soldiers and military stores. When the ships were cleared of the army there had been little time to drill the men, and little will on their part to be drilled, for the anarchical spirit of the Revolution was strong among them, and it was difficult to secure obedience. Therefore Brueys was justified in believing that his squadron was unequal to an encounter with an English force of approximately the same strength. His wisest course was to meet battle, if meet it he must, in conditions which would put the least possible strain on its weakness. The measures he took say little for the military intelligence of the famous royal corps. He might have placed his ships at the N.W. corner of the bay, close to the bank which lines the shore, and where the English could not place ships on both sides of his. He did anchor them so far from the bank that there was room for an enemy to pass between them and the land, and he arranged them in a very obtuse angle, with its apex pointing to the N.E. If an attack was made at either end, the other would not be able to support the part assailed. The history of war contains no more tragic example of a force weak in itself and so handled that all the causes of defeat were heaped upon its weakness. And this was done in the face of an English squadron trained in a fine school of discipline, rendered confident by long success, perfected by practice in nerve and judgment, led by that man of all men who was best qualified to give its strength free play. One of the most idle of idle discussions has chattered round the imaginary problem whether the course of doubling on the head of the French line, actually adopted by the English fleet, was taken by Nelson’s order or inspired by the example of Captain Foley of the =Goliath=. It was perhaps the greatest of Nelson’s great qualities, his truest claim to be a consummate leader of men, that he lived in genial harmony with his subordinates, discussing all possible contingencies with them, laying down the principles, and leaving to every man the inspiring freedom to co-operate within the just bounds of his duty, to act as circumstances served in the spirit of his orders, as a free man, and not as one bound to follow the letter like a mere instrument. Whether the French line would be doubled on must depend on its position at the moment of battle. The advantage of doubling and putting an opponent between two fires had been obvious to average human intelligence from of old. On a previous page of this book it has been shown how Tourville did it at the battle of Beachy Head. The manœuvre, like all the work of man, fell short of perfection. There was a risk that when two ships were firing into a third placed between them they would fire into one another. It was a risk which weighed with good officers, notably with Captain Saumarez of the =Orion=. He thought that, given the superiority of our gunnery, we developed a superior force whenever an English ship came into action with a French ship of the same rate or one not greatly superior in armament. It is possible that part of the loss suffered by the English squadron was inflicted by English hands. It is a not incredible might-have-been, that if our ships had stretched along the outside of the French line, each anchoring as she came up and covering the passage of the comrade behind, we might have reached their rear ships before they got away, and so have taken them all. But the advantages of the course followed were palpable. It was certain that the French ships, attacked on both sides, would be rapidly crushed, for their insufficient crews were overtaxed when compelled to fight both broadsides. The nominal strength of the crews of the French ships was 11,000 men. Their actual force was 7850. Twenty-five men per ship were absent guarding the watering place on shore, and many were away in the boats engaged in bringing off water when the English appeared.

They had sighted the coast of Egypt about Alexandria on the morning of the 1st August. The =Alexander=, 74, Captain Ball, and =Swiftsure=, 74, Captain Hallowell, were sent in to reconnoitre, and reported at 10 a.m. that they saw the harbour full of vessels, but that the French squadron was not there. At 1 p.m. the =Zealous=, 74, Captain Samuel Hood, signalled that the enemy was at anchor in Aboukir. The =Swiftsure= and =Alexander= were recalled, and the squadron headed for the enemy. By about 5.30 it was to the north of Aboukir Island, which, from the battle of the night, was to receive the name of Nelson Island. The Mediterranean charts of the time were generally untrustworthy, and seamen had to rely on their own observation to learn the depths of water. Nelson hailed the =Zealous= to ask of Captain Hood if he thought the ships could turn with the security that they would clear the shoal. Hood replied that he did not know, but would stand in and try. The orders were to attack the enemy’s van and centre, and to anchor. It was at six o’clock that the order was given to stand in, and the squadron which had come from the west turned to the south to throw itself on the French van. At that moment eleven ship were in line. The =Goliath=, 74, Captain Foley; =Zealous=, 74, Captain Samuel Hood; =Orion=, 74, Captain Sir James Saumarez; =Audacious=, 74, Captain Davidge Gould; =Theseus=, 74, Captain Miller; =Vanguard=, 74, Nelson’s flagship, of which Edward Berry was captain; =Minotaur=, 74, Captain Louis; =Defence=, 74, Captain Peyton; =Bellerophon=, 74, Captain Darby; =Majestic=, 74, Captain Westcott; and the =Leander=, 50, Captain Thompson. The =Culloden=, 74, Captain Troubridge, always an unlucky ship, was outsailed and was behind, and the =Alexander= and =Swiftsure= were still further off.

The French squadron consisted of thirteen vessels and was anchored as follows:—The _Guerrier_, 74, a very old ship, Captain Trullet, was at the head, and lay nearly two miles to the south-east of Aboukir island. Behind her and stretching to the south-east lay the _Conquerant_, 74, Captain Dalbarade, a vessel so rotten with age that her armament had been reduced, and manned by a crew of only four hundred. The _Spartiate_, 74, Captain Eimeriau; the _Aquilon_, 74, Captain Thevenard; and the _Peuple Souverain_, 74, Captain Raccord, which was as much worn out as the _Conquerant_. The _Franklin_, 80, Captain Gillet, the flagship of Rear-Admiral Blanquet Duchayla, and the _Orient_, 110, the flagship of Admiral Brueys, whose flag-captain was Casabianca, and who had with him Ganteaume as captain of the fleet. The line turned to the south beyond the _Orient_, and consisted of the _Tonnant_, 80, Captain Dupetit Thouard; the _Heureux_, 74, Captain Etienne; the _Mercure_, 74, Captain Cambon; the _Guillaume Tell_, 80, flagship of Rear-Admiral Villeneuve, whose flag-captain was Saunier; the _Généreux_, 74, Captain Lejoille; and the _Timoléon_, 74, Captain Léonce Trullet. Four frigates of forty guns were anchored inside the line, and one of them carried the flag of Rear-Admiral Decrès. When Nelson was sighted by the French at 2 p.m. a hasty council of war was held in the _Orient_. There was discussion what ought to be done, though lack of means and of time forbade the doing of anything save one thing—that was to lie and wait for the English attack in the hope that it would not be made till next morning, and with the expectation that it would not be made on the van, though that, as being the windward end of the squadron, was precisely the point at which attack would be most effective, and least liable to interruption by the French ships to leeward.

The attack was made that night, and was made on the van. At six o’clock, just as the sun was touching the horizon, the =Goliath= crossed the bow of the _Guerrier_, pouring in her fire with such effect that the Frenchman’s foremast came down. The men on the deck of the =Goliath=, who could see that they had drawn the first blood, cheered the happy omen, and the cheer was taken up by the crews at the guns below. The =Goliath= was to have been anchored with a spring at her cable, abreast of the _Guerrier_, but the anchor did not hold, and she was brought up abreast of the _Conquerant_. The =Zealous= followed in her wake and took the place she had failed to hold abreast of the _Guerrier_. The =Orion= followed, and, passing inside of the =Goliath= and =Zealous= (so wide was the space between the French ships and the shoal water), anchored by the _Spartiate_. The =Audacious= came along the same track and anchored by the _Peuple Souverain_. The =Theseus= passed astern of the _Guerrier_, through the overwide interval of 150 metres between the French ships, and ahead of the _Conquerant_, then swept inside of her comrades and assailed the _Aquilon_. Nelson came into action behind the =Theseus=, but passed outside the French line, and, neglecting the already overpowered _Guerrier_ and _Conquerant_, anchored on the starboard side of the _Spartiate_ which was already attacked on the port side by the =Orion=. The =Minotaur= passed outside the =Vanguard= and joined the =Theseus= in firing into the _Aquilon_. The =Defence= came on behind the =Minotaur= and assailed the _Peuple Souverain_. She had no colleague, but the French ship was so weak as to be hardly able to fire her guns without danger to herself and was no formidable antagonist. Thus eight English ships were in action with five French, of which three were more or less unfit to be in a line of battle. So the French van was rapidly crushed and the victory was won.

The destruction of the French squadron was not to be completed with the same ease. The next in order to the _Peuple Souverain_ in the French line was the _Franklin_, 80, next to her came the _Orient_, 110, and the _Tonnant_, 80. These three powerful ships formed, as it were, a central citadel to the French line, and our most severe loss was suffered in action with them. The =Bellerophon=, which followed the =Vanguard=, passed the _Franklin_, and came under the broadside of the _Orient_. The =Majestic= went beyond the =Bellerophon= and came into

## action with the _Tonnant_. Both were severely mauled. The =Bellerophon=

was shattered by the fire of the _Orient_, and drifted off down the bay. The =Majestic= was fiercely dealt with by the _Tonnant_, fell away from her, and became entangled with the next in the line, the _Heureux_. The _Heureux’s_ captain, Etienne, had called up his men to repel boarders, or to board, when the =Majestic= broke away and was brought up beside the _Mercure_. These two ships suffered far more severely than any of the others engaged. The =Bellerophon= lost 49 men killed and 148 wounded. The =Majestic=, 50, killed, including her captain Westcott, and 143 wounded. Between them they suffered a greater loss than all the ships of Jervis’s squadron at the battle of Cape St. Vincent. But now the vessels which had not been near enough to take

## part in the first attack began to come in. The =Swiftsure= attacked the

_Franklin_ and the =Alexander=, _L’Orient_. They were joined by the little =Leander= which had been delayed by her efforts to drag off the ever unlucky =Culloden=, which had grounded on the Aboukir shoal. The =Leander= anchored ahead of the _Franklin_ and raked both her and the _Orient_. As the fire in the French van ceased by the surrender of the overpowered ships, our vessels dropped down and helped to crush the enemy’s centre. They were aided by the frightful disaster which befell the _Orient_. She caught fire and blew up. The French ships beyond her cut their cables and drifted away. The isolated _Franklin_ fought long and gallantly but was overpowered at last. In the French rear Villeneuve, hesitating, contemplating difficulties, thinking of safety and seeking it not by grasping the nettle, but by evasion, as he was to do seven years later, did nothing to help his comrades. He thought it much that he could escape next morning with his flagship the _Guillaume Tell_, the _Généreux_ and two frigates. Nelson, who had been wounded in the head by a langrage shot while engaged with the _Aquilon_, thought, that if he had not been disabled, even they would have been taken. But the case was indeed one for saying they had done very well. During the night and the following morning all the French ships, except Villeneuve’s four, were taken or destroyed. Brueys fell on the deck of his flagship. The total loss of the French is difficult to estimate. It has been put by themselves at 1451 killed and 1479 wounded. The loss in Nelson’s squadron was 218 killed and 678 wounded, and to that total of 896, the =Bellerophon= and the =Majestic= contributed 390. Of the ships which were active in crushing the van the =Zealous= lost only 1 killed and 7 wounded, the =Theseus= 4 killed and 7 wounded, the =Defence= 4 killed and 11 wounded, while the =Leander= had only 14 men wounded and none killed.

Six days after the great turning movement had been wrecked in Aboukir Bay, the attack on England from the ocean ports of France began to be put into execution. It was to be directed through Ireland, and was to be double. One squadron under Savary was ordered to carry troops from Rochefort, while another and stronger squadron was to carry a division from Brest. Combined operations are liable to fail from obstacles which upset the most promising combination, and this was no exception to a common experience. Savary did indeed sail unseen from Rochefort on the 6th of August. He reached Killala Bay, between Sligo and Mayo, on the 21st. He had with him the _Concorde_, 40, the _Franchise_, 36, the _Medée_, 36, and the _Venus_, 28, and they carried General Humbert, an officer of much spirit and ingenuity, and 1150 soldiers. Now, as for the raid Humbert made, the victory he won at Castlebar, his surrender at Ballinamuck, and the difficulty he said he found in discovering a real general among the many English officers of that title he heard of, are they not written in the books of the chronicles of Ireland? The story inspires a profound gratitude to the Providence which confined the invasion to Humbert and 1150 men, and spared us Hoche with ten times (or more) that number. Having landed his charge, Savary was quickly away on the 23rd and anchored safely at Royan, in the Gironde, on the 9th September, from whence he returned to Rochefort on the 20th.

Bompard, who was to sail from Brest, was not so fortunate. His start was delayed first by want of money, for the finances of France were still in such a distressed state that the Government could not send him so small a sum as £6000 to pay the soldiers, and the men refused to sail without an advance. Then there was an alarm of an English inroad into Holland, and troops were held back to meet that danger. But the worst obstacle was the watch of the English blockading fleet. Its frigates cruised in the Iroise, and the line-of-battle ships were at hand. Bompard made one attempt to get away by the passage between the Black Rocks and Ushant, saw Bridport ahead of him, and went back. During the night of the 16th September he did get away, for though the wind blew strongly from the N.E. off shore, Bridport had taken his ships away to the northward of Ushant. So Bompard was free to sail out through the Raz du Sein to the southward, under cover of the dark. Next morning he was clear of the land in hazy weather, but he saw, and was seen, by the =Ethalion= frigate, Captain Countess, who had with him the =Boadicea= frigate, Captain R. Keats, and the brig =Sylph=, Captain White. They were between him and the Bee du Raz. Captain Countess attached himself to the French squadron, which consisted of the _Hoche_, 74 (the old Pégase), the _Immortalité_, _Romaine_, _Loire_, _Bellone_, _Coquille_, _Embuscade_, _Resolue_, and _Semillante_ frigates and a schooner. The squadron carried 3000 troops under Generals Hardy and Ménage. Captain Countess despatched the =Boadicea= to warn Bridport, who, after looking into the Iroise to obtain the evidence of his own eyes, sent warning home that a French squadron had escaped what a very polite fiction would call his vigilance.

The =Ethalion= followed Bompard, retiring when menaced, and coming back again when the French went on. Bompard took the seeming cautious, but in reality very rash, course of endeavouring to shake off his pursuer by steering wide out to the south. He could hardly have provided more effectually for his own defeat. His one chance of success (and it was a poor one now that Savary’s success had aroused his enemy’s vigilance and had turned his attention to the Irish Coast) was to head an intercepting force. Every hour he added to his voyage increased the danger that he would be intercepted, and he was. When Bridport’s message reached England Sir J. B. Warren was sent from Cawsand Bay to the west coast of Ireland to bar the road. He sailed on the 23rd September, and on the 10th October was off Achill Head. If Bompard had gone direct to his destination, Killala Bay, trusting, as from the nature of his task he had to trust, to fortune, he would have been off Tory Island some days before Warren was in a position to attack him, and might have landed Hardy in Killala Bay. As he preferred to try artful management, where speed and boldness were wanted, he was sighted on the 11th October, near the Island, by Warren, who then had with him the =Canada=, 74, =Robust=, 74, =Foudroyant=, 80, =Magnanime=, =Ethalion=, =Anson=, =Melampus=, and =Amelia= frigates. The English officer pursued and overtook his enemy on the following day. The _Hoche_, Bompard’s one line-of-battle ship, was easily overpowered, and six of the frigates with her were captured in a succession of fights off the west coast of Ireland. The utmost audacity could have brought no worse fate on Bompard and his command.

Isolated French ships reached the Irish coast—as, for instance, the brig _Anacreon_, which in September visited the coast of Donegal, went back on hearing of the surrender of Humbert, and returned to her starting-point, Dunkirk, bringing a valuable prize with her. On the 12th October Savary sailed again from Rochefort with a larger squadron and 1090 soldiers. He looked into Killala, found that a landing was hopeless, and went back to Rochefort. He was chased and had to throw guns overboard to lighten his vessels, but he got back safe.

The direct invasion scheme had broken down. Yet the whole story puts these two questions—Did it break down because of the strength of our guard? What does the failure teach us to expect in the future? No fair-minded man can assert that fortune had no share in our success. Hoche’s expedition would have succeeded as fully as the expedition of Savary and Humbert, but for some measure of bad management on the part of Morard de Galle, and the persistence of bad weather. Of the expeditions of 1798, both of Savary’s reached the coast of Ireland and returned in safety. So did the _Anacreon_. Bompard alone was defeated at sea. The most obvious lesson of it all is of course that better management than Bridport’s will always be needed, and the better the enemy the greater the want. Other nations study these stories. We must not take it for granted that a French Revolution will help us by disorganising our foes.

The double failure in Egypt and on the coast of Ireland suspended all schemes of invasion for a time. France and England alike had their eyes fixed on Napoleon’s army in Egypt. The news of the disaster in Aboukir Bay produced a profound effect throughout Europe. A storm broke out in France against the Directory, who were accused of having “deported” the best general and the best army of the Republic. Public men who had been loud in promoting the expedition began to throw the blame for it on one another. Public excitement and anger were aggravated by the speedy discovery that a new coalition was forming, and that France would again be called upon to fight for her very existence, at least for all she had gained by the Revolution. To recover Napoleon and his army became a leading object with the French. To keep them in Egypt was no less the object of England. The best that could have happened would have been that Napoleon should have made a serious attempt to carry out his grand scheme of marching on the footsteps of Alexander the Great, through Persia and Afghanistan to India. He would have perished on his march, and Europe would have escaped years of misery. But to keep him away from the battlefields of Europe was a real gain. The most effectual of all ways of doing this would have been to retain a large force on the coast of Egypt, and send out troops. It was not the course taken. Nelson sent the =Leander= home with his despatches carried by Captain Berry. She fell in with the _Généreux_ on the 18th August, and was captured. On the 14th August Sir James Saumarez sailed with the =Orion=, =Bellerophon=, =Minotaur=, =Defence=, =Audacious=, =Theseus=, and =Majestic=, to escort the French prizes the _Franklin_, _Tonnant_, _Aquilon_, _Conquérant_, and _Peuple Souverain_. Three of the prizes were destroyed, and it would have been better that all should have been burnt. But the just reward of the toils and dangers of officers and men, and more especially of commanders-in-chief, junior admirals, and captains, was not to be thrown away. So Saumarez made a slow, painful voyage westward with his convoy of battered hulks. He summoned Malta, was defied by the French general, and gave arms to the islanders who had risen against the French, driven to desperation by pillage and the violation of their women. Malta was blockaded by the Portuguese ships which had served with Jervis, and the =Lion=, 64. On the 19th Nelson sailed with the =Vanguard=, =Culloden=, and =Alexander= for Naples. He left the =Zealous=, =Goliath=, and =Swiftsure=, the =Seahorse=, =Emerald=, and =Alcmene= frigates, and the =Bonne Citoyene= sloop to watch the coast of Egypt. He himself, in an evil hour, sailed for Naples. It is not superfluous to point out that though Nelson was ardently desirous to weaken the French in Egypt he landed his prisoners, for whom he could with difficulty provide, and they afforded Napoleon a welcome reinforcement for his army. If the prizes had all been burnt after whatever stores were of use had been taken out of them, if Nelson had sought a basis of operations in some Turkish port in Crete or Cyprus, the prisoners could have been kept in one of those islands and Egypt better watched.

Our ships would at least have been better employed than many of them were destined to be on the coast of Naples. The operations in which he was engaged till he left the Mediterranean occupy a justly promoted place in the biography of Nelson. They need few words here, and those few only to show that they were a pure waste of force. The kingdom of Naples on the mainland was indefensible against a French army in central Italy by naval force. The Government was rotten and the troops were worthless. The obvious deduction from these facts was that we ought to have confined ourselves to blockading Malta, and ought to have warned the king of Naples that he was not to expect any help from us if he plunged into adventures. What happened was that Nelson, acting under influences which must be looked for in his biographies, egged on the king of Naples to make an attack on the French force occupying Rome, which brought on him an ignominious thrashing, and drove him to abject flight to Sicily in November and December of 1798. Henceforth a British squadron reinforced to eight sail of the line and four Portuguese were employed looking on idly at the occupation of Naples, till the advance of the Austrian and Russian armies in Northern Italy compelled the French to retreat. Then they rendered superfluous assistance to the Neapolitan Government to recover what could not be defended against it. While they were so employed their separation from other English forces in the Mediterranean helped to create a position of very serious danger. Meanwhile, an English squadron, under Rear-Admiral Duckworth, carrying troops under General Stuart, took possession of Minorca. The Turks took up arms against the French, and Russia intervened. The Ionian Isles, except Corfu, were regained from the French. The Government at Paris was driven to see that an effort must be made in the Mediterranean.

Lord Palmerston is credited with the shrewd saying that whenever a man is heard to say that “something must be done,” it is safe to calculate on his doing something foolish. To strike out with no definite aim is rarely the way to deliver an effective stroke, though it may at times, and with help from fortune, be a more hopeful course than lying still. Whether the French Government matured any coherent scheme during the last months of 1798 and the first of 1799 is highly doubtful. We can only be sure as to what was actually done by them and for them. It was in substance this, that their fleet at Brest was sent into the Mediterranean, if not to do some definite thing, at least to see what could be done. The Minister of Marine, Eustache Bruix, came down from Paris to take command himself. He was well supplied with money, and it was in his power to pay the sailors and dockyard hands. Great and ardent exertions were made. The ships were better appointed and far better manned than any French fleet had been during the war. The admiral was popular with the men, and he had cause to look with confidence on the force which he had equipped by the middle of April. It consisted of the following ships of the line. The _Ocean_, _Invincible_, _Républicain_, _Terrible_ of 110 guns; the _Formidable_ and _Indomptable_ of 84; the _Jemmapes_, _Montblanc_, _Tyrannicide_, _Batave_, _Constitution_, _Révolution_, _Fongueux_, _Censeur_, _Zélé_, _Redoutable_, _Wattignies_, _Tourville_, _Cisalpin_, _Jean Bart_, _Gaulois_, _Convention_, _Duquesne_, _J. J. Rousseau_, _Dix Août_ of 74, together with ten frigates, sloops, and ships armed _en flûte_ as store ships.

Bridport had joined the small squadron which was watching Brest in April, and had with him sixteen sail of the line. He had looked into the Iroise, and knew that the French were preparing for sea, but according to his usual practice he cruised at some distance to the W.S.W. of Ushant. On the very day on which he took up his position—the 25th April—Bruix sailed through the Raz du Sein. He was sighted by the =Nymphe= frigate, Captain Fraser, who at once reported to Bridport. The English admiral, punctual as ever in his own fashion, looked into Brest once more on the 26th, and then went off to Cape Clear. He was convinced that the enemy were bound for Ireland, and they confirmed his belief by putting a small vessel carrying an officer entrusted with a misleading dispatch in his way, an old but well-preserved stratagem. Bridport sent warnings to Cadiz and to England, and Bruix was left at liberty to go south.

The situation in front of him was nearly all he could wish. There was indeed no French force he could join. The _Généreux_ was at Corfu, and the _Guillaume Tell_ at Malta. Nine vessels taken from the Venetians were scattered between Alexandria, Ancona, and Toulon, but they were of no value. On the other hand, the Spaniards had a squadron of uncertain number and certain inefficiency at Cadiz, which had to be watched by the English, and was therefore of indirect help to Bruix. Nothing need be said of the Russians and Turks, save that they were moving in the Mediterranean. Bruix’ real opponents were the English, and they were scattered. Fifteen sail of the line under Lord Keith were blockading Cadiz. One was at Tetuan. Four were with Duckworth at Minorca. Nelson had eight English sail of the line and four Portuguese, divided between the blockade of Malta, the harbour of Palermo, where he himself lay at the urgent prayer of King Ferdinand to calm the nerves of the old women of both sexes in the runaway Neapolitan Court, and the coast of Southern Italy, where the Royalists were gaining ground against the Republic set up by the French. As the French troops had been called off to meet the allies in Northern Italy, the Republic was collapsing from internal weakness. Minorca was of real value as a basis for a strong fleet blockading Toulon. As an isolated post hastily occupied by a handful of soldiers, it was a mere burden. The whole disposition of our forces was as unintelligent and as vicious as it well could have been. Our naval forces in the Levant engaged in watching the coasts of Egypt and Syria may be left aside as not being immediately affected, and as being too far off to render prompt help.

On the 3rd May, Keith was told by the =Success= frigate that she had sighted the French off Oporto coming south. With a big fleet coming against him from the Ocean, and nineteen, or so, Spaniards more or less ready for sea in Cadiz, his position looked hazardous. He had need for steady nerve, but the admiral though not a brilliant nor quick-witted man possessed that solid virtue in a useful degree. He waited, ready for fight or retreat, till he saw what was going to happen. On the 4th, in the morning, the French were sighted, thirty-three sail of them, in the W.N.W. The wind was blowing hard from the west, rising to a storm, and it drove curtains of confusing sea fog before it. As it blew right into Cadiz Bay, the Spaniards could not move. Keith kept between them and the French. His expert ships maintained their formation and lost no spars in the stormy weather, which threw the French into confusion and caused them much minor damage. The fleets lost sight of one another in the fog, and on the 5th Bruix ran through the Straits before the gale. Two or three of his liners had suffered damage by collision and loss of spars, but he might have sent all three into Carthagena and still have had twenty-two for a bold stroke. It was not till the 12th that Nelson at Palermo heard of the inroad of the Brest fleet into the Mediterranean. If Bruix had employed those seven days in steering for Southern Italy, he had ninety-nine chances out of a hundred to souse down on the vessels blockading Malta before they knew of his approach, to capture them, to cut off Nelson at Palermo, leaving him to rage single-handed with the =Vanguard= among the old women of both sexes of the Neapolitan Court, to fall on the ships on the coast of Naples, capturing, driving ashore, or driving off every one of them. Then he might have gone on to the Riviera and Toulon by the east of Sardinia and Corsica, after doing his cause a substantial service. He knew the divided state of the English forces. He had laid some such plan as this. But like his brother French admirals in this war, he was chilled by the first check. The damage suffered by his ships on the 4th and 5th froze his ardour, and he steered piteously for Toulon, where he anchored on the 14th May with his two crippled ships, the _Batàve_ and the _Fougueux_. And now for two months these numerous fleets, French and English, were engaged in missing one another in a game of blind man’s buff.

St. Vincent saw the French pass the Straits on the 5th, and at once summoned the =Edgar= from Tetuan, and Keith from his cruising ground between Cadiz and Cape Spartel. On the 12th he followed Bruix—or rather, he steered for Minorca to join Duckworth, who was in danger of being cut off, and to cover the island, which in the absence of a covering naval force might have been retaken by the Spaniards. He joined Duckworth on the 20th, and had twenty sail of the line on hand. On that day Nelson had concentrated his ships at Maritimo. On that day, too, the Spaniards, who on finding the blockade of Cadiz raised by the withdrawal of Keith, had come to sea hoping to be able to retake Minorca, staggered into Carthagena half dismasted by the gale. On the 22nd, St. Vincent left Minorca for Toulon, but hearing that the Spaniards were coming round, put himself on their road to Toulon at Cape San Sebastian on the 26th. On that day Bruix left Toulon for the Riviera with twenty-two sail to co-operate with the French armies now fighting in retreat before the allies. On the 30th May, St. Vincent was joined by Rear-Admiral Whitshed with five sail of the line sent out from home to reinforce him. On the same day he sent Duckworth with four ships to join Nelson. He now moved up the coast towards Toulon, but on the 2nd June he found his health unequal to the strain of service at sea, and left the fleet for Minorca in his flagship the =Ville de Paris=, 100—for he would not go, so he said, in a frigate “like a convict,” and his regard for his dignity was strong enough to make him weaken his successor by the loss of a very powerful ship. Keith, to whom the command now fell, went towards Toulon, while Bruix after convoying a fleet of transports with provisions to the French garrison of Genoa, went to Vado, and anchored there on the 4th. His movement to the east was revealed to Keith by the crew of a prize, and he went in pursuit on the 5th. When off Cape Delle Melle, he received orders from St. Vincent to detach two more ships to Nelson, and to cruise off Rosas to intercept Bruix, who was, rightly enough, supposed to be bound for Carthagena. If the commander-in-chief had abstained from meddling, Keith would probably have met Bruix with twenty ships against the Frenchman’s twenty-two. On the 8th June, Bruix left Vado for Carthagena, which was what St. Vincent calculated he would do. If he were bound in that direction, what need was there to reinforce the distant squadron of Nelson at the expense of the immediately threatened fleet of Keith, which was reduced by the detachment to eighteen sail of the line? If to divide your forces in the presence of an enemy is a blunder, and what Napoleon when criticising Cornwallis called an “_insigne bêtise_” then St. Vincent committed that blunder, that _insigne bêtise_. If Keith had obeyed his orders precisely, he would in all probability have met Bruix with eighteen ships to twenty-two. But Keith was aware of his inferiority in numbers, and he came to Minorca to pick up the =Ville de Paris=. The Frenchman slipped through the gap he left, and reached Carthagena on the 22nd June. While he was going on his way, and the _Batàve_ and _Fougueux_, repaired at Toulon, followed and joined him, Keith first picked up the =Ville de Paris= on the 15th June, and went back to watch Toulon. On the 19th he secured more reward for toils and dangers by capturing a small French squadron of three frigates and two brigs under Rear-Admiral Perrée, who had escaped from Syria and was on his way home. He cruised off Toulon from the 20th to the 23rd, while Bruix was anchoring at Carthagena, while Nelson was still watching for him, and while the Royalist forces were completing the ruin of the Republicans at Naples. On the 24th he went to Vado, just as Nelson, relieved from anxiety about Bruix, came into the Bay of Naples in time to secure his dear King and Queen of Naples a fine feast of hangings and torturings to console them for their spasms of terror during the last few months. The Republicans had been beaten without need of our help, but if Nelson had not been at hand to see that due vengeance was taken on Jacobins, they would have saved their lives by capitulation. On the 25th, Bruix sailed from Carthagena with the refitted Spanish ships. Next day Keith went to Vado, and from thence to the east end of Minorca. On the 27th June he wrote to Nelson asking him to send such ships as he could spare to assist in defending Minorca, and Nelson refused on the ground that the safety of His Sicilian Majesty’s dominions must be secured. Bruix, the only enemy who could have assailed either, was then on his way from Carthagena to Cadiz, which he reached on the 11th July. On the 8th, Keith had been joined near Minorca by Sir Charles Cotton, who brought twelve sail of the line from home. On the 10th he left in pursuit of the French, of whose presence at Carthagena he had been informed. On the 21st July, Bruix sailed from Cadiz, dragging with him a reluctant Spanish squadron which was forced to accompany him by its intimidated Government. When Keith sailed from Gibraltar on the 30th July the Frenchman had a long start, and it was lucky for him that he had. The French sailed ill, and the Spaniards still more badly, so that when Bruix and his Spanish colleague, Mazaredo, anchored in the roadstead of Brest they were just ahead of Keith, who sailed a greater distance and started nine days behind them.

Such was the famous cruise of Bruix—one of the passages of the great Revolutionary war which best deserves study. The French gained a material advantage, for they carried off a Spanish squadron, and so secured a hostage for the obedience of the Spanish Government and people, who were becoming restive under the disasters brought on them by the Alliance. But what is to be said of the English officers who allowed them to gain this advantage, such as it was? Bridport, who was negligent, and was befooled, is defended by nobody. Can anything be said for St. Vincent? for Nelson? even for Keith, the least responsible of the three? St. Vincent made it inevitable that he would be weak in the Straits of Gibraltar when he allowed so large a proportion of his fleet to be detached to Naples. Nelson intensified the bad consequences of the initial mistake when he egged the Neapolitan Government on to make its silly attack on the French, thereby bringing down a torrent of disasters. Two English liners and the Portuguese could have blockaded Malta in the then prostrate state of the French. If six of the eight ships of the line with Nelson had been in the Straits on the 5th May, they with the sixteen already there would have been in a position to give battle to Bruix at once, and thereby to give the best possible protection both to Minorca and to Naples. When the French did appear, St. Vincent divided his fleet by sending Duckworth to Naples, and then weakened Keith by forcing him to detach two other vessels. And that he did just when he was doing all that lay in his power to bring about a battle with forces which he knew to be superior. The conduct of Nelson can be explained, but is a commander to be held excused when we say that he was but a fallible man, liable to be besotted by erotic delusion and megalomania? We suffered no disaster. We only failed, and for that escape from the natural consequences of our acts we have to thank the Providence which had served us already by blowing Hoche and Morard de Galle away from the coast of Ireland.

The escape of Bruix was followed within a month and a few days by the escape of Napoleon from Egypt. As war, according to his own maxim, is an affair not of men but of a man, this was a disaster of the first magnitude for the enemies of France. Hood, who had been left to watch the coast of Egypt in August, was superseded on the 2nd of February 1799 by Troubridge with the =Culloden= and =Theseus=. A month later—on the 3rd March—Troubridge was in turn superseded by Sir Sidney Smith, who brought with him the =Tigre=, 74, and some small craft. By a piece of most eccentric management, Smith had been appointed Envoy Plenipotentiary to the Porte in combination with his brother, Spencer Smith, who already held the post. Being what our ancestors called a “bold undertaking fellow” and we call a “very pushing man,” Smith gave himself the airs of a commander-in-chief, to the extreme exasperation of Nelson, who snubbed him with emphasis. All these officers successively, or in combination, contrived almost, but not quite, to cut off Napoleon from communication with France. They bombarded the ships in Alexandria repeatedly with no great effect. From March to the 21st of June, Smith was busily engaged in helping the Pasha of Acre, Djezzar (the Butcher), to repel the attack of Napoleon, who had marched out of Egypt to follow on the footsteps of Alexander the Great. After his return to Egypt, Smith helped a Turkish army to land at Aboukir—an adventure comparable with the Neapolitan advance on Rome, and similar in its results. The Turks were cut to pieces on the 25th July. Napoleon, who was informed of the renewal of the war on land in Europe, was preparing to escape before the Turks landed at Aboukir. As the vital work of confining him to Egypt had been subordinated to the security of His Sicilian Majesty’s dominions, the blockading squadron was small. The two liners, the =Tigre= and =Theseus=, Sidney Smith had with him, were taken by him to Cyprus for stores on the 9th August. On the 23rd Napoleon sailed from Alexandria, the coast being clear, and got away. On the 1st October he touched at Ajaccio, and on the 9th he landed at Fréjus. His return marks an epoch in the history of the war, of Europe, and of mankind. It was followed by the overthrow of the Directory and his assumption of despotic power as First Consul. From that day all the power of France was directed by his great and maleficent genius. He might have escaped in any case, but he was helped to escape by the British Government and its admirals. They were loud in proclaiming the necessity of imprisoning him in Egypt, but they kept an insufficient force to blockade him, because they preferred to employ their ships to peddle in the Bay of Naples, or to patrol round the island of Minorca.

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