CHAPTER XIV

INVASION TILL THE CLOSE OF 1801

AUTHORITIES.—As before.

The retreat of Bruix from the Mediterranean and the return of Napoleon were followed by a pause in the naval war. The French fleet was exhausted by the effort it had made, and its return to Brest was followed by an outbreak of discontent, mutiny, and desertion among the crews. The Spaniards they had brought with them, sixteen sail, were politically useful to France as hostages, but were of no military value. The Spanish Ferrol squadron, which was to have joined Bruix when on his way to the Mediterranean in April, had missed him, perhaps deliberately, had then gone on to Aix roads, where they were attacked to no purpose by the frigates and bomb-vessels of an English squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Pole on the 2nd July. They returned home in the course of September, after an attempt to enter Brest. While the French naval forces were thus exhausted, Napoleon was absorbed in the discharge of obligations which were preliminary to the renewal of an attack on England. He had first to make himself master of France by the _coup d’état_ of the 18th Brumaire VIII (9th November 1799). Then he had to beat the Austrians who were pressing on the south-eastern frontier of France, and to bring about a separation between them and the Russians, with whom they were on very bad terms. In the interval the French could do nothing to help the army Napoleon had left behind him in Egypt, except endeavour to send blockade runners with news and stores. It became continually more difficult for them to do even this. They were excluded from Italy, and Corfu had surrendered on the 3rd March 1799 to the Turks and Russians.

When Keith left the Mediterranean in pursuit of Bruix, Nelson remained in temporary command, but in the absence of an enemy he had nothing to do save to tighten the blockade of Malta and keep an eye on Minorca, which continued to be a burden and a cause of division of forces. He did not cease to be absorbed in schemes for the promotion of the interests of Their Sicilian Majesties—schemes which were superfluous if the French were beaten in Northern Italy, and were certain to be blown into space so soon as they were victorious. The English Government being well aware by this time that Nelson had “Sicilified” his conscience, decided to send Lord Keith back to his post as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. It was his due, for he had been sent out to be second in command to St. Vincent, and the duty had been handed over to him by his chief. Keith was not a genius, but he had common sense, he had not forgotten that he was the servant of King George III., and he was impervious to the fascinations of the court of Naples.

Keith sailed on the 20th November 1799 to resume the command, and reached Gibraltar on the 6th December. In the absence of a French fleet he had no duty to discharge except to superintend the blockade of Malta and help our Austrian allies as far as he could. Malta had long been cut off from communication with home. An attempt was made to relieve the garrison on the 18th February. A small convoy was sent under the protection of the _Généreux_, which had escaped from Corfu. The convoy was commanded by the Rear-Admiral, Perrée, who had been taken by Lord Keith in the previous year. The convoy was scattered, Perrée was killed, and the _Généreux_ was taken by a number of vessels immediately commanded by Nelson in his flagship the =Foudroyant=. On the 30th February the _Guillaume Tell_, the last survivor of the French fleet of the battle of the Nile, which was lying in Malta, made an attempt to escape. She was sighted, pursued, surrounded by a swarm of enemies, and was surrendered, after a most magnificent defence, by Admiral Decrès, who held the superior command in her, and who was to be Napoleon’s Minister of Marine. The fate of the garrison was now certain, but General Vaubois held out till English troops had been landed to reinforce the islanders, and till hunger compelled him to surrender on the 5th September 1800.

The occupation of Malta was timely, for it coincided with the collapse of the allies in Italy, and made us independent of ports on the mainland. In spring the Austrians seemed to be making themselves masters of Northern Italy, and the English Government appeared to be about to support them with decision. Troops were sent to Minorca under command of General Fox. Others followed, and were ordered to follow, under the commandership-in-chief of Sir Ralph Abercromby, an old officer who at least knew his business in the field, and had done promising service in the West Indies and the Low Countries. But Austria and England were preparing victory for France under a vain show of energy. The Austrians had got rid of their Russian ally, the great Suvarof, a real captain, whose habit of concentrating his men, striking at the heart of his enemy, and wringing the last drop of gain out of every success, shocked their pedantry. Moreover, it was their intention to deliver Italy from French oppression and revolutionary principles for the purpose of putting it into their own pockets. Therefore they had no wish for the help of an associate who would cry halves. They were going to work by the book of arithmetic, sagaciously besieging and taking post after post, and thereby they allowed Napoleon ample time to organise the army which was to wrench all their conquests from them in one day of battle. The English Government was disposed to help by sending soldiers to fight a little and then come away. Sir Charles Pasley, author of a treatise on _The Military Policy of the British Empire_, which appeared in 1808 and produced a great impression, said epigrammatically that we worked with our navy and played with our army. The operations before 1800, and on too many occasions afterwards, till Spain gave us a safe footing in 1808, justify his scoff. It was too much the custom of the English Government to overcrowd soldiers into leaky transports where they were plagued by scurvy, and to keep them hanging round the outskirts of the European conflict. Like an immortal personage in a great English classic, our army was always making the gesture of taking its coat off. When it was allowed to land, the generals were carefully instructed to go no farther than they could go back easily. They were to advance with their eyes over their shoulders. In the autumn of 1799 we had made an inroad of this half-hearted kind into Holland in co-operation with the Russians. It was badly led, for the Duke of York, an excellent commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards but a deplorable general in the field, was the leader. But the forces employed were insufficient. We gained a naval advantage. The remains of the Dutch fleet fell into our hands at the Nieuwe Diep, partly through the bad management of their admiral, Storij, but mainly because the Dutch sailors would not fight. They had an hereditary loyalty to the house of Orange, and they were discontented with a life of unpaid idleness under the Batavian Republic. And here it is not irrelevant to record that the Dutch sailors were already swarming into our navy and merchant ships. It was calculated that in 1800 as many as 20,000 Dutchmen were sailing under our flag. As the predominance of France grew more and more oppressive, as she dragged one country after another into her struggle with England, ever increasing numbers of foreign sailors sought a refuge from ruin at home in our ports. They were invited by the English law, which gave naturalisation and with it the right to command a merchant ship to any foreigner who had served for two years in our navy. Northern seamen were preferred, both because they were hardier men, and because coming from kindred races Jansen easily became Johnson, and Pieterzoon Peterson. Therefore it was that we were able to man both our navy and our merchant service, which doubled during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

Our share in the resistance to France in Northern Italy during the command of Lord Keith was quite on the then prevailing model. It was efficient in so far as it was naval, and in so far as it was military it was pitiful. Abercromby came to Minorca in May, and we made the gesture of taking off our coat to help the Austrians at the siege of Genoa, where Massena was tenaciously holding out with the last French army in Italy. But the coat was not taken off. The navy blockaded vigilantly, helped to capture small French posts, and did some gallant cutting out. The cutting out of the _Prima_ galley from the mole of Genoa by Captain Beaver was as dashing a piece of work of that kind as was done in the war. The galley slaves, of whom some were criminals, but some were prisoners of war, rowed the galley out with alacrity when Beaver had loosened the chains which bound her to the mole. The story had a sickening sequel. It seems incredible that Keith, a man of honour and humanity, should have sent the greater part of these poor wretches back to Genoa, where they were butchered by Massena. But “such things were,” to use a favourite phrase of Nelson’s. The incident was typical, for at that time we were much in the habit of landing against the French, inviting the help of the people, and then leaving them in the lurch. “Such things” went far to put a meaning into Napoleon’s abuse of Perfidious Albion, which used all men for her own advantage, and left them to suffer for trusting to her word.

Massena was starved out by the 4th June, and next day the town was occupied by the allies—Austrian soldiers and English ships. English soldiers were going to come from Minorca, but did not. It was perhaps fortunate they did not, for nine days after our vessels anchored at the mole, Napoleon’s army smashed the Austrians at Marengo. A beating usually extorted an armistice and large surrenders from Austria. So it did now. An armistice was signed at Alessandria two days after the defeat. The Austrians surrendered their conquests in Piedmont wholesale, and on the 23rd Massena reoccupied Genoa with such promptitude that the =Minotaur= was hardly able to warp out of the port in time to escape capture.

Political necessities made it incumbent on Napoleon to return to Paris, and the full harvest of Marengo was not gathered till the close of 1800. But a great wind of terror began to blow all along the Italian Peninsula. The Queen of Naples went off to implore the Czar Paul to save her dominions. Nelson went with her, and the English Minister at Naples, Sir William Hamilton, who had been superseded after many and flagrant proofs of dotage. Naples may be dismissed for the present with a brief notice that the king continued to attempt to play a part, and gain an increase of territory in Central Italy—at least to enrich his collections of pictures and statues by the plunder of Rome. He had an army, and it was handsomely tailored. But as King Ferdinand’s cynical son and successor remarked when he was asked to approve of a new uniform for his army, “You may dress them as you please, they will always run away.” When war was resumed in the autumn, the Neapolitan army bolted at the mere sight of a small French force, the cavalry riding in panic over the panic-stricken foot at a slashing pace—and King Ferdinand went down on all fours. It was a relief to be rid of Naples, but the occupation of Malta in September had been timely.

After the return of Napoleon to Paris, there took place one of those delusive negotiations in which he not uncommonly sought a military advantage. He tried to turn the armistice with Austria into a naval armistice with England. But as usual with him, the terms he offered were excessively favourable to himself. He wished to retain the right to send six frigates armed _en flûte_ to Malta and Egypt, and to obtain security that they would not be examined or stopped. His intention was to fill them with soldiers and stores to reinforce the garrison and the army of occupation. The English Government would have been guilty of incredible folly if it had accepted such a proposal. It refused, and Napoleon resumed hostilities in October. On sea there had been no suspension. We had taken Malta, and had defended Elba, and we were at last preparing to intervene with vigour in Egypt. It was a consideration of the first importance that the French should not be in actual possession of the country when serious negotiations for peace were begun.

Egypt would have been evacuated in January 1800 but for want of good management on our part. On the 24th of that month Kléber signed a convention with the Grand Vizier by which he undertook to evacuate the country if his army was allowed to return home. Sidney Smith, who commanded on the coast, did not sign the convention, but he agreed to allow the Frenchmen to pass. When, however, he referred to Keith, who had just returned from England, the admiral who had general orders not to allow the French to go except as prisoners, refused his consent. His refusal was notified to Kléber, who considered himself cheated, and took his revenge not on us, whom he could not reach, but on the unhappy Turks, who were perfectly innocent of any breach of faith. He fell upon them, and defeated them with enormous slaughter at Heliopolis. When the English Government heard the facts, it gave its consent to the free return of the French army. But it was now too late. Kléber had been murdered by a Mahometan fanatic. His successor, Menou, would not confirm the convention, and nothing remained to be done but to send an army and turn him out. It is customary to speak of the convention of El Arish as a foolish business. Yet the Turks had a fair right to recover their province when they could, and some ground to complain of us for spoiling their chance. The British army would have lost one of the most honourable passages in its history if the convention had been carried out. But politically we had everything to gain by the evacuation of the country. Kléber’s twenty thousand men were a chip in the porridge of the half-million soldiers of France. Marengo and Hohenlinden were won without them. Napoleon’s position would have been notably weaker after Marengo if Egypt had been already lost. This was an advantage which was ill replaced by the honour of the thing, and the feather in our cap. Moreover, we could not know that Kléber would be murdered, and that Menou would show military ineptitude.

The autumn of 1800 was rich in examples of the two ways of making war, the right and the wrong. Napoleon left the command in the field to his generals. On the 3rd December the defeat of the Archduke John by Moreau at Hohenlinden brought Austria to the ground. She made peace for herself, though bound by treaty and subsidies not to act apart from us. Brune and Murat completed the subjugation of Italy. Naples became a mere appendage of France by the treaty of Foligno, and the treaty of Lunéville, signed by France and Austria on the 9th February 1801, left England without an ally on the Continent. When he was rid of Austria and dominator of Italy, Napoleon was free to concentrate his attention on the war with England. As England had no sufficient army with which to attack him at home, she was everywhere on the defensive—on the superior defensive, no doubt, but on the defensive—except where it was possible to assail an isolated body of French troops—to wit in Egypt. Our utter inability to attack the bulk of Napoleon’s power was well shown in June 1800. St. Vincent, who had hoisted his flag as commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet on the 26th April, detached Sir Edward Pellew with seven sail of the line on the 1st June to escort 5000 troops under General Maitland. They were to seize Quiberon, and to revive the Royalists of Brittany and La Vendée to activity. St. Vincent acted, of course, by orders of the Government, which was much inclined to such expeditions, and had hopes of success in an attack on Brest, which came to nothing. The expedition of Pellew and Maitland came to as good as nothing. A small fort was taken, a number of small vessels were captured or destroyed, a brilliant piece of cutting-out work was done by Jeremiah Coghlan, a favourite and follower of Pellew. But as the west of France was occupied by a strong army under Bernadotte, General Maitland could make no impression, and could only re-embark in haste. Pellew was eager to attack Belleisle, but as the island was held by 7000 men and was powerfully fortified, a landing would have been a costly folly. General Maitland very rightly refused to lead his men to destruction. They were landed on the island of Houat, where they remained till they were picked up at the end of July by Sir J. B. Warren, who brought other troops with him under General Pulteney. The whole force went south at the beginning of August to join Keith and Abercromby, and to make up an army which was to be employed in Egypt, the only field in which such a military force as we could then muster could be used with effect. It was hoped that a stroke might be delivered at the Spaniards on the way. The squadron of Admiral Malgarejo, which had returned from the coast of France in the previous September, was at Ferrol, the great Spanish arsenal in Galicia. Ferrol, which lies on the north side of a land-locked harbour, is approached by a fortified channel a mile and a half long. The navy did not force the passage. It landed Pulteney’s soldiers and a naval brigade under Pellew on Doniños beach to the north of the passage between Gabeiras and Serantes or Golfin Points. Doniños is directly to the west of Ferrol, and is separated from it by some miles of hilly country. The soldiers drove back a small force of Spanish militia and advanced to heights from which they had a clear view of Ferrol. Pulteney had a walled town before him, and he knew that it was occupied by a garrison. He appears to have exaggerated the numbers of the Spaniards. But there was a garrison, and there were walls. As the navy had not forced the passage, it could give him no help in attacking the town. He had no battering-train, but only a few light field pieces which the sailors had landed and dragged up for him. He came to the conclusion that time and men must be spent to take Ferrol—and he had neither to spare. He therefore re-embarked, and it is hard to say that he was wrong. His failure has been much derided, and it has been usual to say that the navy did its part. But the navy did not do its part, which would have been to force an entrance to the harbour of Ferrol, and bring the water front of the town under its guns. It asked the army to storm unbreached fortifications.

After this futility, and another at Vigo, the combined expedition went on to Gibraltar, and there joined Keith and Abercromby. Before it went on its proper work, it made another such demonstration as that at Ferrol. On the 4th of October the whole force was brought round to Cadiz. The customary version of the story is that the Spanish governor, Morla, appealed to the English commanders to spare the town, which was suffering from a great epidemic of yellow fever, and that the gallant Englishmen, ever generous to a suppliant foe, sailed away. This is poetry. The prose of the story is well told by Keith’s captain of the fleet, Philip Beaver. “Independent of the objection which a dreadful malady, called by some the plague and by others the yellow fever, opposed to our disembarking, the late season of the year, the danger of the coast, and the difficulty of communication between the soldiers and sailors were deemed sufficient by the two commanders-in-chief to relinquish the attempt.” Abercromby had orders not to land unless he was sure of being able to embark immediately in case of need. The naval officers would not promise to be able to re-embark his men at all times. Moreover, confusion had arisen when an attempt was made to get the soldiers into the boats, and they were suffering severely from scurvy after months of detention in wet and overcrowded transports, on a diet of salt meat, and sleeping on dripping decks in their clothes and blankets. But now at least the time of fumbling and pottering was over. On the 5th November, Keith and Abercromby sailed for Malta, leaving Warren with six sail of the line to watch the Straits. They collected their command at Malta, and on the 20th December they sailed to the Levant with resources sanely adapted to an attainable end.

Napoleon was well aware of the value of Egypt as an asset when the time came for making peace. He strove hard to relieve the army of occupation. He drew up elaborate schemes for reinforcing it by squadrons of French and Spanish which were to combine by complicated movements. What was more to the purpose was that he sent out frigate after frigate crowded with men and stores from Toulon and the western ports. When he heard of the concentration of Abercromby’s force at Malta, he redoubled his efforts. Some of the vessels he sent reached their destination. The _Egyptienne_ and _Justice_ frigates anchored at Alexandria on the 3rd February 1801—four days after Abercromby, who sailed from Malta on the 20th December 1800, had anchored in Marmorice Bay, in Caramania, on the 31st January. The fleet of seven sail of the line, frigates, and from 60 to 70 transports turned with relief from a stormy sea to the land-locked harbour. Keith owed his knowledge of its existence to Sidney Smith, so ill was the Levant known at the time. As the leading vessel turned into the entrance between towering headlands she seemed to the ships behind to be steered against a precipice. Here the fleet lay recruiting the health of the soldiers, practising them in landing, collecting stores, listening to the fluent and unfulfilled promises of the Turk, till the 22nd February, when it sailed for Egypt. It sighted the coast on the 1st March. On that day the last relief from France reached Egypt. The _Régénérée_ frigate and _Lodi_ brig ran into Alexandria parallel with Keith’s convoy. The _Régénérée_ had sailed on the 13th February with the _Africaine_ from Rochefort. The history of the _Africaine_ shows at what a cost this work of reinforcing an isolated force oversea in face of a superior enemy had to be done. She separated from the _Régénérée_, and on the 18th February, being then near Ceuta, was sighted, chased, and overtaken by the =Phœbe=, Captain Barlow. The _Africaine_ had in her 400 soldiers and officials in addition to her crew of 350. Her captain, Saulnier, who had commanded the _Guillaume Tell_ under Decrès, made a gallant attempt to resist capture, and fell in the action. She could make no effectual resistance, and when Saulnier’s successor, Magendie, struck his flag, there were 343 dead and wounded out of 715 men packed into her. The loss of the =Phœbe= was—1 man killed, 2 officers and 10 men wounded.

The history of the expedition to Egypt belongs to the army from the 8th March when it was landed by three detachments and in beautiful order. The bad generalship of Menou aiding, our soldiers showed that they could look the best soldiers of France (who yet fought valiantly) in the face, and in the back too. In June Sir Home Popham, coming from India, landed an Indian contingent at Kosseir on the Red Sea, which crossed the desert to Cairo in June. The ships in the Mediterranean rendered help and stood on guard. Their last service was to drive off the belated squadron of Honoré Ganteaume which arrived on the coast on the 7th June.

The doings of that squadron touch our own naval history closely. Ganteaume was ordered to sail from Brest with three 80-gun ships and four 74’s. Five thousand soldiers and officials were crowded into his vessels. It was given out that they were bound for San Domingo. This was done to spread a false impression, and not without effect. Ganteaume went through the Raz du Sein on the 8th January, but, finding his way barred by an English squadron, came back. St. Vincent had now established his close blockade in the face of some sulky opposition from officers accustomed to the easier ways of Bridport. He applied his rule “always close up to Brest in the easterly winds.” It is therefore a useful corrective to much we are told of the merits of that blockade, to note that while a heavy gale was blowing from the N.E. on the 23rd January, Ganteaume made a dash through the Iroise and got away clear to the south. When St. Vincent heard of the escape of the French squadron he was deceived as to its destination. Our numerous and capable spies had no doubt reported the rumour that San Domingo was the aim, and St. Vincent sent seven ships of the line to the West Indies. Ganteaume bore on for the Mediterranean, much tried by the gale, and for a time separated in his flagship, the _Indivisible_, from the rest of his squadron. But he reunited them on the 1st February, and on the 9th he ran through the Straits. On the 13th he captured the =Success=, and learnt from her that Keith must by this time be close to Egypt. He considered his mission hopeless, and steered for Toulon, very full of complaints as to the damage done to his ships and other obstructions. Warren, who could not stop him in the Straits, hurried to Minorca to protect that perpetual clog and nuisance to the fleet. At Minorca he heard that our late ally of Naples was being bullied into joining the French against us, and sailed to Sicily to protect our interests. He reduced his squadron, leaving one of his six liners to protect Minorca. Such is the value of a basis of operations which the forces based upon it dare not leave to its own resources. Ganteaume reached Toulon on the 18th February, two days before Warren reached Minorca, and on the 19th March sailed again. On the 25th he sighted Warren coming back from Sicily by the east side of Sardinia, and turned back to Toulon. He had seven sail to five, and a fine chance to win honour. But he had his mission to fulfil, and though he believed it to be incapable of fulfilment, he was prepared to make it an excuse for avoiding action. Warren, having lost sight of him, went hunting for him to south and east. On the 5th April Ganteaume was back in Toulon. On the 25th he was hounded out by Napoleon. He went down the coast of Italy, gave some help to the French forces then endeavouring to drive out the Anglo-Tuscan garrison which held Elba, left the three slowest ships of his squadron at Leghorn, pushed, driven by the anger of the First Consul to unwonted daring, through the Straits of Messina, and actually sighted the coast of Egypt 210 miles west of Alexandria on the 7th June. He detached the _Heliopolis_ brig to Alexandria, where the French troops were still holding out, and waited for news. As none came as soon as he expected, he concluded that the _Heliopolis_ was taken, and so went next to Bengasi in Tripoli intending to land troops there on a hopeful mission to march by the desert to Egypt. As a matter of fact the _Heliopolis_ found the coast clear and got safely into Alexandria. Keith, who had warning by the =Pique= frigate that Ganteaume was not far off, had gone in pursuit of him. The Frenchman was actually sighted, but cut his cables, and went off to Toulon. It is a tell-tale comment on his incessant complaints of the state of his squadron that he not only out-sailed Keith, but on the 24th sighted the =Swiftsure=, Captain Keats, on his way from Egypt to Gibraltar near Cape Dernah, overtook her, captured her, and carried her with him to Toulon, where he dropped anchor on the 22nd July. The French ships were indifferently fitted, the crews unpaid for a year, ill-rationed, and in rags. Yet here we see one of their squadrons, timidly commanded, elude the vaunted St. Vincent blockade, pass an English squadron unhindered in the Straits of Gibraltar, range the whole length of the Mediterranean, and end without disaster after capturing a line-of-battle ship and a frigate, to say nothing of small craft destroyed. How would it have been if the equipment had been better, and the chief had been Suffren or Duguay Trouin?

The frigates and the cruise of Ganteaume’s squadron, were not the only nor the most formidable efforts Napoleon made to preserve his hold on Egypt. The formation of the Northern Coalition was in fact a part of his policy, which aimed at securing her conquests for France. In theory the coalition was an alliance signed on the 15th December 1800, by Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, to restrict England’s exercise of her belligerent rights at sea. The immediate pretext was the capture of the Danish frigate _Freya_, whose captain refused to allow merchant ships under his protection to be searched, on the 25th July 1800. There was much hypocrisy in the outcry over the alleged wrongs of neutrals. No doubt they were annoyed, and to some extent injured, by England’s assertion of her claim to capture her enemy’s goods in their ships. But Sweden, in a recent war with Russia, had gone as far as England in the exercise of belligerent rights. Russia had urged England to go to all lengths against the shipping of revolutionary France, and Denmark had profited largely by her position as a neutral. The real author of the coalition was Napoleon, who worked on the admiration felt for him by the erratic (perhaps the mad) Czar, Paul. Paul put pressure on the northern powers, who dared not offend him. He was annoyed by the occupation of Malta by England, for he had taken the island under his own protection. As the coalition depended on him it was weak, for Paul had made himself an object of hate and fear to all about him. His war with England inflicted heavy loss on the wealthier classes in Russia. A plot, of which the English Government was certainly not entirely ignorant, was being laid against him. The English Government could not, however, afford to wait till the Russians had rid themselves of their mischievous ruler by the use of the so-called “Asiatic Remedy,” which was in vulgar English, murder.

Therefore on the 12th March, Sir Hyde Parker, who had with him Nelson as second in command, sailed from Yarmouth with fifteen sail of the line, afterwards raised to eighteen. His mission was to coerce Denmark and Sweden into leaving the coalition, if they could not be persuaded to retire by Mr. Vansittart, afterwards Lord Bexley, who was sent to Copenhagen on a diplomatic mission. The naval forces of the allies may have amounted to forty-one sail of the line, but the Russians, who had the most numerous fleet, were still shut up in the ice in Revel.

The English fleet was off the Naze of Norway by the 18th March. On the 23rd Mr. Vansittart, who had gone to Copenhagen, returned with the news that the Danes would not surrender. On the 30th the fleet passed the Sound, giving the Danish coast a wide berth, and not encountering any opposition from the forts on the Swedish side. It anchored at Hveen, an island in the Sound, about fifteen miles above Copenhagen. Parker, Nelson, Rear-Admiral Graves, Domett the captain of the Fleet, and Stewart, who commanded a contingent of soldiers carried by the warships, reconnoitred the enemy’s position on the same day in the lugger =Lark=. They soon saw that the Danes had not been negligent in preparing to resist attack. The position to be assailed was a strong one by nature. Copenhagen stands at the east end of the island of Zeeland, on both sides of a narrow inlet running from N.E. to S.W. The entrance to this inlet was (and is) covered by the Trekroner forts, then mounting 68 guns. From the south side of the inlet the coast runs to the south. The Danes had drawn up their floating defences, line-of-battle ships without masts, frames and other vessels to the number of thirty-seven, carrying 628 guns, along this bit of coast. They were supported by batteries on shore, but as the sea is shallow near the land the support was not very close. In front of the line was the water of the King’s Deep (Konge-dyb) and beyond that the shoal called the Middle Ground. On the eastern side of the Middle Ground is the Hollander’s Deep (Hollaender-dyb). In the King’s Deep the water is shallower on the eastern than on the western side. The admirals were ignorant of this fact, for their pilots served them ill. These so-called pilots were in fact mostly mates of merchant ships who had traded to the Baltic. They knew just as much as was needed for their trade, and proved both timid and untrustworthy. To fall on from Hveen at the north end of the Danish line would have been to take the bull by the horns, for the fleet must have begun by meeting the fire of the Trekroner and of the heavy ships the Danes had placed close by the forts. If the southern end was to be attacked then the fleet must first go down the Hollander’s Deep, turn the end of the Middle Ground, and work up the King’s Deep, where the navigable passage is barely three-quarters of a mile wide. The waters were so little known that our officers had no security that the thing could be done, and in any case it was absolutely necessary to have the aid of a south-easterly wind. The obstacles were so serious that when a council of war held in Parker’s flagship, the =London=, on the night of the 30th, some voices were for abstaining from attack. But Nelson was strong for energetic action. He offered to give battle to the Danes, attacking by the south end himself with ten ships. Sir Hyde Parker was persuaded by his energy, gave his consent, and added two ships to the ten sail asked for by Nelson. He did well to give them, but the naval position of England would not be what it is if many of her admirals had been so poor of spirit as to be ready to leave the peril and glory of battle to subordinates.

On the 31st Nelson reconnoitred the Hollander’s Deep. On the 1st April, the fleet weighed and anchored to the N.W. of the Middle Ground. In the afternoon Nelson took the ships assigned to the south end of the Ground and anchored for the night. His squadron was composed of the =Elephant=, 74, Captain Foley, the flagship; =Defiance=, flagship of Rear-Admiral Graves, whose captain was R. Retalick; =Edgar=, 74, Captain Murray; =Monarch=, 74, Captain Mosse; =Bellona=, 74, Sir. T. B. Thompson; =Ganges=, 74, Captain Fremantle; =Russell=, 74, Captain Cuming; =Agamemnon=, 64, Captain Fancourt; =Ardent=, 64, Captain Bertie; =Polyphemus=, 64, Captain Lawford; =Glatton=, 54, Captain Bligh; and =Isis=, 50, Captain Walker. There were also eighteen frigates, sloops, bombs, and fireships. The Danes, counting them from south to north, were the _Prövesteen_, 56, a three-decker cut down without masts; _Valkyrien_, 48, two-decker without masts; _Rendsborg_, 20, transport; _Nyborg_, 20, transport; _Jylland_, 48, two-decker, without masts; _Suœrdfisken_, 20, floating battery, masted; _Kronborg_, 22, frigate, without masts; _Elven_, 6, sloop rigged; _Gerner_, 24, battery, mastless; _Aggershuus_, 20, transport, mastless; _Sjcelland_, 7, two-decker, unrigged, _Charlotte Amalie_, 26, Indiaman; _Söhesten_, 18, masted, battery; _Holsteen_, 60, rigged line-of-battle ship; _Infödstretten_, 64, two-decker, masted; _Hjeelperen_, 6, rigged frigate; _Elephantin_, 70, line-of-battle ship without masts; _Maro_, 74, line-of-battle ship, mastless; _Denmark_, 74, rigged line-of-battle ship; _Trekroner_, 74, ditto; _Iris_, 40, rigged frigate; _Tarpen_, 18, rigged brig; _Nidelven_, 8, ditto; and ten small craft of four guns each. A glance at these lists is enough to show which of these two forces was the more powerful. Even putting aside the ordnance carried—which was 1014 pieces for the English, and 696 for the Danes, including the Trekroner forts—our opponent marshalled a number of weak little vessels quite unfit to meet the shock of the broadside of a line-of-battle ship.

The night before the battle was spent by the English fleet in further soundings in the unknown waters about it, and by Nelson in drawing up his final dispositions. It was his intention to enter the King’s Deep from the south, and advance as far as the Trekroner battery. It was very naturally understood that Sir Hyde Parker should give his support by attacking the north end of the Danish line with the ships which remained with him. They were the =London=, 98, W. Domett, 1st captain, Captain R. W. Otway, 2nd captain; and =St. George=, 98, Captain Hardy. She was, properly speaking, Nelson’s flagship, but he left her for the more handy =Elephant=, and Hardy accompanied on the day of battle. The others were the =Warrior=, 74, Captain Tyler; =Defence=, 74, Captain Lord Henry Paulet; =Saturn=, 74, Captain Lambert; =Ramillies=, 74, Captain Dixon; =Raisonable=, 64, Captain Dilkes; and =Veteran=, 64, Captain Dickson.

The wind blew fair from the S.E. on the morning of the 2nd April, and the signal to attack was given at 9.30. The ships stood in with various fortunes. The =Agamemnon=, which was to have led, had anchored on the east of the Middle Ground, and was not able to round the point. Her place as leader was taken by the =Edgar= which advanced till she was abreast of the _Nyborg_, the fourth ship in the Danish line, and then anchored by the stern. Then the =Polyphemus= anchored on the port bow of the first Dane, the _Prövesteen_. The =Isis= passed the =Polyphemus= and anchored on the quarter of the _Prövesteen_. The two vessels which followed, the =Bellona= and the =Russell=, misled by the mistaken belief that the water was deepest on the side of the Middle Ground, went too near the shoal water and grounded. Their misfortune, like the similar bad luck of the =Culloden= at the battle of the Nile, acted as a warning to those behind. The first of these, the =Elephant=, starboarded her helm, avoided the shallows, and took her station opposite the centre of the Danish line, where she had only the _Elven_ and the _Dannebrog_ opposed to her. The =Glatton= and =Ardent= anchored between the =Elephant= and the =Edgar=. The =Ganges=, =Monarch=, and =Defiance= went ahead of the =Elephant=. The =Defiance=, the furthest to the north of our ships, did not reach the northernmost point of the Danish line. The English bombs were stationed behind the centre of the line. Thus the Trekroner forts and the heavy ships near them were attacked only by the frigates under Captain Riou, which suffered severely. Parker detached three of the ships he had retained, the =Veteran=, =Ramillies=, and the =Defence= to assail the Trekroner from the north, but they had to tack against the S.E. wind, and could not reach a position in which they could be of service in time. The action began at 10 a.m. All the English ships were in position by 11.30, and the action was of the hottest till about one o’clock. The Danes fought very stoutly, and as men fell their places were taken by volunteers from the shore.

Colonel Stewart has left a most lively account of the bearing of Nelson in the midst of the conflict. In his narrative we see the small and alert figure of the admiral pacing his quarter-deck, the stump of his right arm leaping with a nervous movement, and his whole being uplifted with exultation. The work was hot, he said, but not for the world would he be elsewhere. It was the unaffected expression of the true nature of a man to whom the _gaudia certaminis_ was no idle phrase. Yet the =Elephant= had but feeble adversaries, and was among the least severely tried ships in the line. Her 10 killed and 13 wounded was a trifling loss beside the 24 killed and 51 wounded of the =Defiance=, the 31 killed and 111 wounded of the =Edgar=, the 30 killed and 64 wounded of the =Ardent=, the 33 killed and 88 wounded of the =Isis=, an enormous proportion for a 50-gun ship. All were surpassed by the casualty list of the =Monarch=, the heaviest suffered by any of our line-of-battle ships in the war, 56, including her captain, Mosse, killed, and 164 wounded, a full third of her crew. Seen from the deck of the =London=, the position of the squadron looked more perilous even than it was. Sir Hyde Parker, influenced perhaps by Captain Domett was early inclined to hoist a signal of recall. There was a discussion between Kim, Domett, and the captain of the =London=, Waller Otway. Finally it was decided that Domett should go to the =Elephant= with a message to Nelson telling him that he was free to obey the signal to retire or to disregard it, as he judged fit. Domett did not go, for while he was changing his dress Captain Otway, who is our authority for the story, jumped into a passing boat to carry the message. He reached the =Elephant= through many perils, but before he was alongside, the signal had been hoisted and disregarded. Nelson, whose bearing shows that he regarded the signal as an order and not as a permission, did not repeat it. He gave expression to his derision by putting his telescope to his blind eye and declaring that he could not see the signal.

The order was in fact foolish in the extreme, for the squadron could only retire before the south-east wind through the narrow passage in front of the Trekroner forts. The signal was disregarded by Rear-Admiral Graves, and obeyed only by Riou’s frigates, which were getting the worst of it in their engagement with the forts. They retired, and Riou was killed in the retreat. Moreover, the fire in the southern end of the Danish line was slackening. Vessels were silenced and driven out of the line. In some cases the overpowered ships were remanned from the shore and the fire resumed. There was nothing irregular in this action of the Danes. They were perfectly entitled to retake prizes if they could, and a ship was not even a prize till possession was taken by the captors. But Nelson seized the opportunity to bring the action to an end. He sent his letter to the Prince Regent of Denmark, claiming a right to take undisturbed possession of the vessels which had struck, and calling the Danes brothers. The Prince Regent might well have treated the letter as a cry of distress. But he had good reason to avail himself of the opportunity to put a stop to the battle with credit. He knew that the Northern Coalition was in fact dissolved before the battle began. He had been informed on the eve of the 2nd April that the Czar, Paul, had been murdered in the night of the 24th March, and he was well aware that the new Czar, Alexander I., would not be allowed to follow his father’s policy. Therefore he agreed to arrange an armistice, and consented to stop his fire. Nelson took possession of his prizes and hastened to evacuate the field of battle he had won. The =Elephant= and =Defiance= grounded on their way out, a pretty clear indication of what must have happened if Parker’s signal had been obeyed under the fire of the forts. Nelson’s qualities as a fighter of battles were never more conspicuously shown than in this

## action, and they are not discredited in the least by the fact that,

as many great captains have done (and will do to the end of time), he pieced out the hide of the lion by the skin of the fox.

The rest of the operations in the Baltic were of the nature of formalities. The Swedes would not risk the six liners they had in commission. While the fleet was in Kjöge Bay the Russians made proposals for an armistice which it was much our interest to accept. Sir Hyde Parker was recalled on the 5th May. Nelson, to whom the command came, hurried to Revel in the hope of catching the Russian squadron. He arrived on the 14th, eleven days after the Russians had cut their way through the ice and had sailed to Cronstadt. The polite letter he wrote to the Russian Government and his offer of a visit to St. Petersburg, were met with the dry comment that his words were not consistent with his actions, and a firm intimation that he must go away. He growled, but he went, and on the 19th June he left the Baltic at his own request.

The collapse of the Northern Coalition threw Napoleon into one of those fits of convulsive fury in which he stormed with all the epileptic rage of an Italian plebeian. He found what consolation he could in accusing the English Government of having paid for the murder of the Czar. But he still persevered in his efforts to send direct help to his army in Egypt. As we have seen, he was driving Ganteaume hard all through the spring. And he had another scheme on hand—a scheme which was the forerunner of larger plans to be laid in the course of the next few years. The French Government had purchased six Spanish ships of the line then lying at Cadiz. They were to be manned by French crews and commanded by Dumanoir Lepelley. The three French liners of Ganteaume’s squadron, discarded by him at Leghorn, the _Indomptable_ and _Formidable_ of 80, and the _Desaix_, 74, were to sail from Toulon to Cadiz. The nine were then to be joined by six Spaniards under Don Juan Joaquin Moreno, and the fifteen were to sail for Egypt, picking up soldiers in Italy on their way. It would be rash to say that Napoleon would not have made movements corresponding to these with his armies. He did many rash things with his armies, and while he was aided by fortune and the timidity of his opponents his audacity was successful. But on land his armies were handled by himself, were superior in quality, and his opponents were nervous. At sea such daring was too bold, for the superiority lay with the English. They knew it and were confident. In this case the plan was particularly wild, because Sir James Saumarez, an excellent officer, was cruising in the Straits, with seven sail of the line, and was therefore at the very meeting-place of these forces.

On the 13th June the three French ships named above, together with the _Muiron_, 38, a frigate taken from the Venetians, left Toulon under Rear-Admiral Durand Linois, carrying a detachment of troops, under General Devaux. Ganteaume was in the midst of his rush to Egypt and back. Warren, whose station was the Gulf of Lyons, was away looking for him. Linois was able to leave the Gulf unopposed, but not unobserved by the frigates Warren had left behind him. Those, and they are apparently many, who suppose that a port can “command” a sea may observe that Minorca proved no obstacle to Linois. His voyage was slow, and it was not till the 1st July that he passed Gibraltar. He was informed that there were only two English ships off Cadiz. On the 3rd July he captured the brig =Speedy=, commanded by Lord Cochrane, afterwards the famous Earl Dundonald, and learnt that there were in fact seven, and that they were across his road. Napoleon had spoilt, or had materially helped to spoil, his own plan for the relief of Egypt by his cunning. He had spread a story that the united French and Spanish ships were to attack Lisbon. His purpose was to draw the attention of the English Government from the Levant. What he did was to convince his enemy that Cadiz must be closely watched, for Lisbon was not only the capital of our most trustworthy ally in Europe, but was a most important depôt of English trade. Therefore Saumarez had been sent from England on the 15th June with the =Cæsar=, 80, =Pompée=, 74, =Spencer=, 74, =Hannibal=, 74, =Audacious=, 74, =Thames=, =Phæton=, frigates, and the =Plymouth= lugger. He was joined in the Straits by the =Venerable=, 74, and =Superb=, 74.

Here then was a warning example of what was likely to be the end of all schemes for uniting squadrons which started from far distant ports, and in the face of an alert enemy who operated on interior lines. They could only succeed if these squadrons to be thus united had been efficient. And then all this ingenuity would have been superfluous. Saumarez could not have kept his station outside of Cadiz for twenty-four hours if the thirteen Spaniards, then in the port, had been more than the vain show of a squadron.

When he discovered what was in front of him Linois turned into Algeciras Bay and anchored on the west side. On the south he was covered by the Isla Verde, where there was a Spanish fort. On the north he was supported by the battery Santiago. The shore is foul with rocks. There were fifteen Spanish gunboats to give him help. He anchored the _Formidable_ at the north end, opposite the Santiago fort; south of her was the _Desaix_, and next to her the _Indomptable_. The _Muiron_ was placed north-west of the Isla Verde. On the 5th July Saumarez, acting on the established rule of the navy, attacked. He had with him six of his seven liners, for Captain Keats of the =Superb=, who had just been detached to the mouth of the Guadalquivir, was unable to rejoin in time. The English squadron rounded Cabrita point at about eight a.m., and fell on as well as they could. For fortune helped the French greatly. The wind was light and erratic. The English ships could not come into action either when or where they wished. Linois landed soldiers to fight the ill-manned Spanish forts. The English ships at the mercy of alternate puffs of wind and calms, could not come into

## action together, and were badly mauled. The =Cæsar=, which engaged the

_Formidable_ and the _Desaix_, was nearly beaten to pieces. But the worst fate befell the =Hannibal=, Captain Ferris, for she grounded, was shattered thoroughly, and compelled to surrender. The French ships had cut their cables and had beached themselves. Saumarez too had drawn off, finding it impossible to press his attack thoroughly home.

The check was a shrewd one, for nothing could hide the fact that six English ships of the line had attacked three French, supported by batteries and gunboats it is true, and had drawn off with the loss of one of their number. We had 121 killed and 240 wounded. The =Hannibal= contributed 74 to the list of killed, and the survivors were prisoners. The French confessed to 306 killed, and the wounded must have been more numerous, but there is a doubt as to the numbers. The Spaniards too lost men. Yet the allies could claim a success, though after all it only helped to prove the essential weakness of Napoleon’s plan. Linois was sure that he would be attacked by fireships, and appealed to his friends at Cadiz for help. On the 9th the Spanish admiral, Moreno, came round with six sail of the line to escort Linois. On the 12th the nine, having their prize the =Hannibal= in tow, sailed for Cadiz. Their fortunes before they got there showed how unfit they were to contend with English squadrons at sea. Saumarez’ squadron had been refitted with energy. The =Cæsar= was got ready by miracles of hard work on the part of her crew and of seamanship on the part of her captain, Jahleel Brenton. The =Superb=, at once rejoined, and the six followed the nine allies, who went off in flight. During the night the pursuing English squadron forced on an action. The enemy, going off in what was to have been a line abreast, but rapidly became a confused huddle, could only fight feebly in retreat. Two of the Spanish ships, the mighty three-deckers, _San Hermenegildo_ and _Real Carlos_, caught fire and blew up, with the loss of nearly all the 2000 men they carried. The rest of the allies hurried as best they could to Cadiz, followed by the English. Luck again helped the French, for the =Venerable= grounded on the San Pedro rock while tackling the _Formidable_. But the combination scheme had broken down, and Saumarez, in spite of the check in Algeciras Bay, had, said St. Vincent, “put us on velvet.”

Turning movements, evasions, combinations, and coalitions had all failed. The threat of direct attack was kept up till the armistice, which was the preliminary to the Peace of Amiens, was signed on the 1st October. Napoleon persevered in collecting small craft to be used for the purpose of carrying an army to the shore of England. The scheme was as old as the reign of Louis XV., and, as we have seen, had been revived by the Directory in a feeble way. The invasion flotilla was to be taken up again by Napoleon himself on a far larger scale two years after 1801. It will be most appropriately discussed under the later date. The policy of the First Consul in 1801 cannot be taken as indicating a serious intention to attempt the invasion of England at that time and with the resources then at his disposal. He brought troops to the coast, and collected small transports, in order to inspire fear in England, and thereby put pressure on her Government to make the peace which was greatly desired by the country, tired as it was by the strain of a long and laborious war. His aim was attained to some extent. The seamen indeed treated the flotilla with contempt for substantial reasons, which were excellently stated by Captain Beaver in a paper which the reader will find printed as an appendix to his life by Admiral Smyth. He pointed out that a swarm of small craft built flat, so that they could work in shallow water and be beached, and therefore leewardly, would be swept hither and thither in the currents of the Channel. But the seamen failed to persuade their countrymen. It has also been at all times impossible to convince soldiers that the Channel and the North Sea cannot be crossed by an army as if they were rivers. All the persons rudely described by St. Vincent as the “old women” in and out of Parliament were greatly disturbed by the invasion flotilla.

The Government was manifestly under an obligation to act against the flotilla with vigour. It took the very best course it could find both to quiet the mind of the country and to make sure that its directness would be vigorously applied. It put Nelson in command of what may be called a counter flotilla, operating from the coast between Orfordness and Beachy Head, against the French flotilla, which was being concentrated for the threatened dash at Boulogne. He hoisted his flag in the =Medusa= frigate in the Downs on the 30th July, and went instantly to work like the born fighter he was. The effectual course would have been to land soldiers, take Boulogne, and burn the flotilla. But our small army was quite unable to provide the 80,000 or 100,000 men needed for an offensive movement against the numerous troops of Napoleon. There was nothing for it but to hit at his naval forces with naval forces. The result of the manful efforts we made was no surprise to the seamen. It was found to be impossible to prevent small flat-bottomed craft, which could take the ground at low tide, and hug the shore at high tide, from creeping along from creek to creek, and shore battery to shore battery. The large vessels could not get near enough to them on the shallow coast to do harm with the artillery of the time, which had an effective range of about 1200 yards. With the help of support from the shore they could generally deal with small craft and boats. Therefore they could be concentrated at Boulogne. When there they were collected at that point, and they could be protected. The Boulogne flotilla was bombarded with some, but not much, effect at its anchorage on the 4th August. We could not bring a sufficiently heavy force near enough to do serious harm. But to bring the flotilla to Boulogne was a useless preliminary to real work unless it could get out. Its inability to make a sortie in open daylight, and with a good wind, was confessed. What chance it had of succeeding in the venture, in calm, fog, or long winter night, was shown on the 15th August.

A quadruple cutting-out expedition on a large scale was then despatched by Nelson. It consisted of four divisions of armed boats, commanded respectively by Captain E. T. Parker, Captain P. Somerville, Captain Cotgrave, and Captain R. Jones. Parker reached the flotilla with his division about midnight, but found that vessels swarming with men, barricaded and swathed in boarding nettings, anchored head and stern, fastened to one another by chains, constituted a floating fortress too strong for his boats. He was himself mortally wounded, and his boats repulsed with a loss of 21 killed and 42 wounded. The divisions of Captain Cotgrave and Captain Somerville were more affected by the tide than Parker’s. They reached the French anchorage later than he, and not with their boats together. They too were repulsed with loss. Captain Jones’ boats were swept to the eastward and failed to reach the enemy. If this happened to the active, well-manned men-of-war boats, what must have been the helplessness of the flat-bottomed craft of the flotilla in the Channel currents. Our total loss was 44 killed and 126 wounded, who all fell victims to the necessity for quieting the fears of the “old women.”

The longing of both countries for peace could no longer be disregarded by their Governments. An armistice was signed on the 1st October, and a so-called peace was signed at Amiens on the 27th March 1802, though Napoleon most assuredly did not mean it to endure, and no wise man in England believed that it could last.

##