CHAPTER VIII

THE AMERICAN WAR TILL THE FALL OF YORKTOWN

AUTHORITIES.—As before.

The course of the war in 1780 was dictated by the political conditions. France, disappointed by the futile end of the great demonstration in the Channel in 1779, did not renounce naval warfare in European waters, but was turning her attention towards giving more effectual aid to the Americans, and to efforts in combination with the Spaniards for the entire expulsion of England from the West Indies. Spain watching Minorca, and blocking Gibraltar, was prepared to co-operate with France in Europe and the Antilles, while making an effort to recover Florida. Don Bernardo de Galves, sailing from Havana, did achieve success in this minor and isolated operation. The most effectual defence for us would have been to blockade Brest, Ferrol, Cadiz, and Toulon. But with an equality of numbers against us and the peremptory obligation to give naval support to the army in America—the cancer which drained our strength in all these years—the high line could not be taken. Moreover, the rigid enforcement of our belligerent rights against neutrals at sea was steadily bringing us into collision with Holland, to the verge of a conflict with the Northern Powers, Russia, Prussia, and the Scandinavian States, and this would have been sheer ruin; for the revolt of the plantations had cut us off from the supply of American naval stores, and we were dependent on the Baltic for timber, pitch, and hemp, without which our fleets could not have been fitted for sea.

D’Orvilliers and Luis de Córdoba having shrunk away from the Channel in September 1779, we were at liberty to set about defending our remoter interests, the relief of Minorca and Gibraltar, and the strengthening of our naval position in the New World. Mention has been made of the sailing of Arbuthnot in June. He had with him a convoy of 400 merchant-ships with stores for General Clinton at New York. Having turned aside to defend the Channel Islands, he sent his convoy into port to wait for him. A shift in the wind delayed his departure from the Channel, and though he got away safe under the wing of Hardy’s grand fleet, he did not reach New York till August. Here he took over the command from Sir John Collier, who had superseded Gambier, and he co-operated in December 1779 with Cornwallis in the taking of Charlestown, in Carolina, after the retreat of D’Estaign from before Savannah. In the West Indies Hyde Parker had a superiority of force over D’Estaign’s successors, the Comte de Grasse and La Motte Picquet, and was able to confine them to Fort Royal.

At the close of 1779 measures were taken to relieve Minorca and Gibraltar and to reinforce the West Indies. A great convoy was collected to carry stores and soldiers to the Mediterranean fortresses. It sailed under the guard of twenty-two line-of-battle ships and many frigates. The command was given to Rodney, who after relieving the fortresses was to go on with part of the fleet to the West Indies, and there supersede Parker. With Rodney a new spirit entered into the conduct of the naval war. He was the ablest officer, except Howe, who had yet hoisted his flag, and was indeed a man of quite another stamp from Keppel, Byron, Parker, Hardy, or Arbuthnot. In the Austrian Succession and Seven Years’ Wars he had gained a reputation in the service for ability and zeal, had been captain under Mathews and Hawke, had commanded in the Leeward Islands, and had been bitterly disappointed when he was superseded by Pocock during the capture of Havana. He was eager, was not satisfied with the prevailing formal application of the Fighting Orders, and had turned his intellect to the conduct of war. His defects were that he was no longer young, and that his health was ruined by diseases which were, at least in part, the result of early dissipation. It was his misfortune to be too deeply conscious of the fact that he represented an ancient family of Somersetshire gentry and was closely connected with the ducal house of Chandos. His brother-officers appeared to him in the light of middle-class persons of inferior breeding who lived mostly in the ports when on shore. The naval habits of the time kept the captain and admiral in great seclusion, since it was hardly thought consistent with their dignity to speak with subordinates except on matters of duty. Under the influence of pain and social arrogance, Rodney carried this isolation to an extreme. He had ruined himself by gambling and bribery at elections, and had taken refuge from his creditors in Paris when the American War began. A loan from the French Marshal Biron saved him from imprisonment as a debtor in the Bastille. On his return to London he sought for employment, and the refusal of other admirals to serve opened the way for him to his great but tardy opportunity. The jobbery and favouritism of the age had by no means left him untouched. During his famous command in the West Indies he made his own son a post-captain at the age of seventeen, and he drove his subordinate, Isaac Coffin, into flat revolt by forcing mere lads on him as lieutenants. When he sailed for Gibraltar in December 1779, two influences were at work in his mind, a noble and ignoble. He burned to gain glory for himself and victory for his country by vigorous conduct of the war, and he was deeply concerned to repair his shattered fortune by prize money.

Rodney sailed on the 27th December 1779, taking with him both the reliefs for Minorca and Gibraltar, and a convoy of merchant-ships bound for the West Indies. The trade was seen clear of the Channel, and sent on its way on the 7th January 1780. The main fleet now went on to Gibraltar with the stores and reliefs, and on the 8th, when 300 miles E.N.E. of Finisterre, fell in with and captured a Spanish convoy of one 64-gun ship, seven frigates and sloops, and fifteen merchant-ships, bound for South America. This prosperous beginning of the service was soon followed by a more signal success. Storms in the Straits had distressed the awkward Spanish blockading fleet, and the greater part of it had been forced to take refuge in harbour. But a squadron of eleven ships of the line under the command of Don Juan de Lángara was stationed off Cape St. Vincent to intercept the relieving force which the Spanish Government was convinced would not exceed ten liners. On the 16th January Rodney swept down on this inferior force, in a brisk breeze rising to a gale from the west. He steered between them and the land as they endeavoured to escape, overtook them in the night, and destroyed them completely. Six were taken, one of the prizes being Lángara’s flagship, and a seventh blew up with the loss of all hands. Two of the prizes were recaptured by their Spanish crews during the storm following the action, but as Barceló, the Spanish admiral, did not venture to leave the protection of the forts at Algeciras, there was no further opposition to the relief of Gibraltar. Rodney’s subordinate, Digby, went up the Mediterranean to Minorca with stores. On the 14th the admiral left for the West Indies with six sail of the line, and four days later Digby, leaving four ships to aid in the defence of the fortress, took the others, and the empty storeships, back to the Channel unopposed by Frenchman or Spaniard. This handsome success, the just reward of intelligent measures vigorously executed, raised the spirit of the nation, and Rodney sprang at once from comparative obscurity, outside his own profession, into universal popularity.

I will again treat the operations in West Indies and on the coast of North America as the main stream of the war, and therefore follow Rodney’s flag for the present. He reached Santa Lucia on the 27th March to find Sir Hyde Parker anchored at Gros Islet Bay, and menaced in his turn by a superior French force. Until the middle of the month, Sir Hyde had been engaged in watching La Motte Picquet and the Comte de Grasse at Fort Royal, and in covering the arrivals and departures of the merchant-ship convoys. In common with all other naval commanders on the West Indian stations, he looked forward to taking a share in the recapture of our lost islands and in the conquest of the French possessions. About the middle of March he was expecting to be joined by transports conveying troops under General Vaughan from North America, and therefore took port to windward—which is to eastward—of Martinique to meet and protect them. On the 21st the junction was effected, and at the same time Parker heard that the French were expecting reinforcements from Europe. He left Commodore Collingwood with four sail of the line to look out for them, and returned to Santa Lucia with the other twelve of his command, and General Vaughan’s troops. The French at Fort Royal had in the meantime divided. Part had gone to San Domingo with La Motte Picquet. The Comte de Grasse remained with the others to wait for the fleet coming from France. Immediately after Parker anchored at Choque Bay, in Santa Lucia, his look-out ships reported that they had seen a great French convoy entering Fort Royal. On the top of this report Commodore Collingwood ran into Choque Bay with his detached squadron, and the news that he had been chased by sixteen French sail of the line, had escaped them, had met four sail of Rodney’s squadron which that officer had sent on, and had sent them back to their admiral with the information that the French were in force.

The newcomers were the powerful fleet fitted out at Brest, and they came under the command of Luc Urbain de Bouëxic, Comte de Guichen, a man of sixty-two, and one of the most interesting figures in the French Navy of the day. He represented at once all that was best in the French _noblesse_ of his generation, its virtues of good breeding, high personal honour, and loyalty—all that was most accomplished in the scientific training of the French naval officer of the eighteenth century, and all that was most fatal in their theories of the conduct of war. No man handled a fleet with more precision or with greater elegance, and no man manœuvred with more dexterity not to injure his opponent, but to baffle that opponent’s attempts to injure him. We shall see why he fairly divided the honours of the coming encounter with Rodney, but it was characteristic of his school, and was its condemnation, that his active career was to end in the Bay of Biscay two years later in failure and discredit, simply through the breakdown of the manœuvring he loved under the direct thrust of Kempenfelt. On the 23rd March he joined Grasse at sea to windward of Martinique. Having now twenty-four sail of the line to Parker’s sixteen, he prepared for the reconquest of Santa Lucia, and appeared to leeward of the island on the 24th. He was not quick or energetic enough to prevent Parker from covering the entry of another convoy of troops from Barbadoes, which came in round the north end of the island, on that day; nor did he intercept Rodney, who joined Parker on the 27th, raising the total British force to twenty-two of the line, and taking up the command.

On the 2nd April Rodney put to sea in search of Guichen. The French admiral followed the usual course of officers of his service. Though equal in number to his opponents, he declined battle, remained at anchor under the guns of Fort Royal, and waited till the absence of the British fleet should offer him an opportunity to strike at one of the British Antilles. Rodney returned to Gros Islet, leaving frigates to watch. On the 15th April, Guichen came out, having with him a detachment of troops commanded by Bouillé. Rodney was instantly informed of his movements, and started in pursuit. On the 16th April he sighted the French twenty-four miles west of the Pearl Rock, a little island outside Fort Royal. On the following morning he was to windward of his enemy, having twenty sail of the line to Guichen’s twenty-two. The French had stood off to the N.W. when sighted, and had been followed by the British. Both fleets were to leeward of Martinique. At 6.45 a.m. Rodney signalled that he intended to attack the enemy’s rear, and at 7 a.m. ordered his line to close till the ships were at one cable’s length from one another. The order to bear down was given at 8.30. Both fleets were heading to the N.W., and the French were very much extended. There was a gap between their rear and their centre. Guichen seeing that his rear division was in peril, at once reversed the order of his van and centre, and stood to the south to its assistance. He thereby closed the gap, and as his rear turned also to the south, it became the van. Rodney was thus baffled, and drew off, resuming his course to the north. Guichen then turned his fleet in the same direction, and the two again stood to the northward side by side out of gun-shot. At 11 a.m. Rodney hoisted the signal to engage. It was his intention that his fleet should steer for the enemy’s rear with the ships at a cable’s length apart. His captains unfortunately understood the signal to attack the rear as applying only to the first movement. Brought up in the old faith of the Fighting Instructions, they fought as they had been trained to fight—steering van to van, centre to centre, and rear to rear. Rodney’s plan to concentrate his whole force on a part of the enemy was spoilt, and the battle to leeward of Martinique ended as many others had done, with a great deal of damage to the spars of the British ships and the retreat of the French little hurt.

This failure remained a subject of bitter regret to Rodney. At the time and afterwards he attributed it to the deliberate misconduct of his captains, who, he said, let the French escape in a factious spirit of opposition to the king’s Government. More credible explanations are: the influence of unintelligent rules of tactics; and his own partly valetudinarian and partly arrogant solitude. If he had explained to his captains the principles on which he meant to fight, his orders would not have been misunderstood, and it would have been impossible that they should have been disobeyed. The merit of his proposed plan is manifest when it is compared with the mechanical rules of the Fighting Orders. Yet that merit may be, and has been, exaggerated. Such a concentration as he designed could always be answered by an enemy who was prompt to reverse his order and to close his line, as Guichen showed in the early hours of the day. So long as the British fleet engaged to windward, there could be but indifferent security that the enemy would not cripple its rigging and slip away. Rodney, in short, set the example of innovating on the formal tactics of the time, but before great results could be obtained much more had to be done than he showed himself prepared to do on the 17th April 1780.

The operations following the battle were marked by no decisive event. Rodney, after keeping for a few days between Guichen and Fort Royal, returned to Choque Bay to refit. Several of his ships, and the flagship among them, the =Sandwich=, had been severely damaged. Guichen, after visiting the Dutch island of St. Eustatius to procure stores, stationed himself to windward—that is, to the west of Martinique. His object was to effect a junction with a Spanish squadron under Admiral Solano, which was known to be on its way from Europe. Rodney followed him. Exasperated by the want of support he had suffered from in the last

## action, he put his fleet through a severe course of manœuvres, and drew

the reins of discipline tight with a severity which aroused the wrath of his subordinate, Sir Hyde Parker, who on his return home was with difficulty restrained by the advice of Sandwich from creating another naval scandal. Twice Rodney came close enough to Guichen to bring on partial actions—on the 15th and 19th May. But the Frenchman was resolved not to be brought to close action. He had the weather-gage, and kept it so carefully that only the van ships of the British line came into action with the rear of the French as the two fleets passed on opposite tacks. It was characteristic of the spirit and principles of the French Navy of the time that Guichen was much praised for, and was visibly proud of, his success in baffling Rodney’s attempts to bring him to battle. Rodney, who might have cut off two or three of the rearmost French ships if he had ordered his van to steer into the enemy’s line, was not prepared to depart wholly from the old methods. On the 21st May, Guichen, whose ships were in want of repairs, went off to the northward, and Rodney lost sight of him. The French returned to Fort Royal, and the English to Barbadoes.

At Carlisle Bay, in that island, on the 22nd May, Rodney was joined by the =Cerberus= frigate. Her captain, Mann, brought news that when cruising off Cadiz he had sighted a Spanish squadron of twelve sail of the line on the 2nd May, with a convoy of merchant-ships. He had followed it for days, had convinced himself that it was bound for the West, and had left his station to warn Rodney. Sir George, who received further information from Lisbon, put to sea to intercept the Spaniard, who he concluded was bound for Martinique. But Don José Solano steered a more northerly course, and on the 10th June effected a junction with Guichen at Guadaloupe. Rodney had been reinforced by five ships of the line while to windward of Martinique, but was now so much outnumbered by the united Spaniards and French that he returned to Gros Islet Bay and stood on his guard. Nothing was attempted by the enemy. The Spaniards were horribly sickly and in no condition for service, while several French ships were worn out. On the 5th July the allies separated, Solano going to Havana, and Guichen to Cape François, in San Domingo, from whence on the 16th August he sailed for Europe. Rodney was joined at Santa Lucia by reinforcements under Commodore Walsingham on the 12th July, but no opportunity for action was presented by the enemy. The hurricane season, during which the West Indies are dangerous, had begun, and the trade had to be seen safe to Europe. Rodney sent off the merchant-ships convoyed by Sir Hyde Parker, detached ten of the line under Rowley and Walsingham to Jamaica, and sailed himself with ten ships of the line to North America.

On the North American station the British squadron had been commanded since the latter part of 1779 by Rear-Admiral Marriott Arbuthnot, a somewhat dull man of impracticable temper. During May he had co-operated with Sir Henry Clinton in the occupation of Charlestown, but during the rest of the year he had been checked by the appearance on the coast of a French squadron of nine sail of the line under the Chef d’escadre D’Arzac de Ternay. Ternay had sailed from Brest on the 2nd May, escorting 9000 troops under Rochambeau. On the 20th June, near Bermuda, he fell in with four British sail of the line under Cornwallis, who was escorting a flock of merchant-ships homeward bound through the Florida Straits. The two squadrons cannonaded one another feebly. Ternay having “his mission to fulfil,” would not stop to crush Cornwallis, and went on to Rhode Island, which he reached on the 11th July. Arbuthnot, who was reinforced by Graves on the 13th July, made preparations to co-operate with the army in an attack on the French; but delays followed one another, and no attack was made. The brief stay of Rodney on the station was not marked by any active operation. Arbuthnot looked upon him chiefly as a competitor for shares of prize money, and was angry at his intrusion. Sir George, whose health suffered in the keen air of a northern autumn, reached New York on the 22nd September, and was back in the West Indies on the 12th December.

In home waters the war was conducted with languor on both sides after Rodney’s relief of Gibraltar. The British Government having to meet calls all over the world, could only collect some thirty sail of the line in the Channel, which were successively led by Admiral Geary, a worn-out veteran, and Admiral Darby. Geary, after a cruise in June and July, during which he made a few prizes of merchant-ships, resigned in August. One object of his cruise was to see a large convoy of ships bound to the East and West Indies safe out of reach of the French and Spanish fleets. It was to be guarded when clear of European waters by Captain Moutray in the =Ramillies=, 74, with the =Thetis= and =Southampton= frigates. The convoy consisted of five East India Company’s ships, of eighteen transports carrying a regiment to the West Indies, and of forty West Indian merchant-ships. Moutray left Spithead on the 29th July. He was allowed two other line-of-battle ships till he was 300 miles beyond the Scilly Isles. He met Geary at sea, and was escorted by the grand fleet till he was some 340 miles west. Then he was left, the admiral thinking that he was now safe. But he was running into extreme peril. The French had sent the Chef d’escadre Bausset with seven of the line and the Spanish ships at Brest to join Don Luis de Córdoba at Cadiz. While they were there, secret information of the sailing of the convoy and of the weakness of Moutray is said, by Spanish historians, to have reached the Prime Minister of Spain, the Count of Floridablanca. He at once ordered Córdoba and Bausset to sail and intercept the prize. They were right across Moutray’s route when, on the 8th August, in Lat. 36° 40 N. and Lon. 15° W., their sails were seen on the horizon at sundown from the masthead of Moutray’s advance ship. Thinking the sails belonged to neutral ships, he held on till night. Then the number of lights reported as seen ahead made him alter his mind. He signalled to his convoy by gun-fire to lie to with their heads to the west, and then, again by gun-fire, ordered them to continue their course. It was his meaning that they should go as they were then pointing. The captains of the Indiamen, transports, and merchant-ships understood that they were to resume the course they were on before they lay to, which was to the south. His signals had been heard by the allies, who steered for the sound of the guns. So when the sun rose on the 9th August, Moutray with his solitary 74 and frigates was well out to the west and to windward. The sixty-three ships under his charge were sailing right into the arms of a big French and Spanish fleet, which closed on them, and carried them all into Cadiz. It was the greatest disaster suffered by British commerce since Tourville had scattered the Smyrna convoy. The necessity for satisfying the public by making an example led to Moutray’s trial by a court martial, and he was reprimanded. In truth, nothing he could have done would have saved his convoy when once it was close to so great a force. He lived to be appointed as Commissioner of the Dockyard at Antigua, and to have some difficulties with Nelson.

The allies returned in triumph to Cadiz, and their success encouraged the Spaniards to persevere in the war. A great fleet collected in the port in October,—Spanish ships, Frenchmen from Brest and from Toulon, and Guichen with a worn-out squadron from the West Indies; but it did nothing, and scattered to winter quarters.

In 1781 the war grew in intensity. Disputes arising partly out of the exercise by the British Government of its claim to take an enemy’s goods out of a neutral ship, and partly out of the encouragement given to the Americans by the city of Amsterdam, led to a declaration of war on the Dutch Republic by Great Britain in December 1780. To guard against an attack by the Dutch on the trade with the Baltic, from whence our naval stores were mainly drawn, it was necessary to station a squadron in the North Sea, which threw an additional burden on the already heavily taxed navy. Every ship which could be patched up for service had to be put into commission. The number of vessels in “full sea pay” was 398, and 90,000 men, including 20,000 marines, were voted to form the crews.

So many were the calls on the navy that it was not possible to collect sufficient line-of-battle ships for service in home waters. The nominal superiority of the allies was overwhelming, but the difference between paper and real strength has rarely been better shown than in this year. The Dutch were not ready. The French, though incomparably the most formidable of our enemies, could not man and officer all their ships effectively. The Spaniards were miserably inefficient. France and Spain alike were intent on pushing the war in America, or in endeavouring to recover Minorca and Gibraltar. Both dreaded the dangers of the Channel. Thus no resolute effort was made to assail Great Britain itself. In America our enemies gained, by the intelligent use of their fleets, the success which established the independence of the United States. In European waters the British Government was compelled to leave the garrison of Minorca to its fate. After a siege begun on the 18th August 1781, it surrendered on the 4th February 1782. Yet the foundations of our power were not only not shaken, but were not seriously menaced.

Before taking up the story of the war in American waters, it will be convenient to show how the heart of the empire was guarded, and how the forces on both sides started for operations in distant seas. The British Government had to provide first of all for the free movement of its trade—a task greatly complicated by the war with Holland. Then it had to reinforce its squadrons in America, to endeavour to strengthen its general position by seizing the Dutch possessions at the Cape, and by providing for the safety of Gibraltar. The great fortress was on a superficial view a mere burden on the fleet throughout the war. Three great armaments had to be sent for its relief first and last. Two of them were provided only by leaving the Channel with small or no protection. Some English public men were of opinion that it might be profitably exchanged for an island in the West Indies. Yet it attracted a large part of the enemy’s forces which might have been employed with more damaging results to us elsewhere. It is true that for this we have to thank the want of intelligence of our opponents. To recover Gibraltar was an object for which the King of Spain was prepared to make every effort, and he could think of no other way of taking it than by direct siege. His Ambassador in Paris, the Count of Aranda, had sagacity enough to see that it might be recovered “in the heart of Jamaica.” Aranda could, however, secure no hearing. So long as our opponents were intent on mastering Gibraltar by bombardment and blockade, the obvious interest of England was to keep it from capture. Nor could the pride of the nation be reconciled to the surrender of this trophy of former wars. Its importance to the ultimate interests of the naval power of Great Britain was to be amply proved in the next war.

To provide for the free movement of the trade a small squadron of one line-of-battle ship and a few frigates was stationed early in the year on the east coast of Scotland. Privateers, American and French, had already been active in those waters, and were now to be reinforced by the Dutch, who, when once at war, set vigorously to work to make up for the neglect of their fleet in previous years. Commodore Keith Stuart, who was in command of the small protecting force, found it insufficient. The history of the war in the North Sea during 1781 shows with what difficulty and at what a cost trade is carried on when the command of the sea is disputed. The =Artois= frigate was appointed to protect the merchant-ships bound to the Baltic. During the spring 200 merchant-vessels collected in the Firth of Forth. They were detained at first by weather, and then by orders from the Admiralty, which feared that they would be captured by Dutch frigates. Their provisions were consumed and heavy expenses incurred. In the meantime another flock of trading-ships had been collected on the east coast, and was sent to the Firth of Forth under the protection of a squadron commanded by the Vice-Admiral Parker whose services in the West Indies have been mentioned. He came up from the Downs collecting the traders on his way. On the 10th June he had collected his charge, 500 merchant-ships in all, at Leith. Before he could see them on their way, the homeward-bound convoy from Jamaica came in—seventy trading-craft under the protection of four sail of the line, one 50-gun and one 44-gun ship—much battered by storms, and infested with scurvy after a long voyage. The West Indiamen stopped only to obtain fresh vegetables, and then continued their voyage to the South. On the 27th June Parker sailed, saw his convoy safe to the Baltic, and then cruised in the North Sea, waiting for the homeward-bound ships.

The condition of Parker’s squadron shows that the Admiralty had indeed been driven to sore straits to provide protection for the North Sea trade. After he had been joined by Stuart with the =Berwick=, 74, he was able to make up a line of seven vessels in all, but it was only by including two which were not line-of-battle ships—the =Preston=, 50, and the =Dolphin=, 44. The =Princess Amelia=, 80, was nominally a strong ship, but she was so crazy with age that it had been found necessary to reduce her armament. She carried only 24-pounders on the lower deck instead of 32-pounders, and the rest of her guns were 18-pounders and 9-pounders. Parker’s flagship, the =Fortitude=, 74, and the =Berwick= represented the solid part of his command. If the Dutch had been able to send an equal squadron of strong ships, it would have gone hard with “Vinegar” Parker. Happily for him and for the interests of British trade, the Dutch had to make shift with the old and weak when they needed the new and strong. On the 20th July a squadron of seven ships, to form the line, and a number of frigates sailed from the Texel with a large fleet of merchant-ships under their protection. The admiral in command was the Schout-bij-nacht Johan Arnold Zoutman, an elderly officer, of the same stamp as his English opponent, an excellent practical seaman beyond doubt, and a stout-hearted man, but nothing more. His line of seven was made by including three ships of 54 guns and one of 40. The largest of his ships was the _Admiral Generaal_, 74, commanded by Captain Kinsbergen. Zoutman’s flag was in the _Admiraal de Ruiter_, 68, and one 64-gun ship, the _Holland_, made up the tale. Other two ships were sent out to accompany the convoy, but were not available for an action with the British squadron.

Contrary winds and the usual obstructions inseparable from the task of convoying a swarm of clumsy merchant-ships delayed Zoutman’s movements. It was not till the first days of August that he was clear of the shallows of the Dutch coast. In the meantime, the British trade homeward bound from the Baltic had collected behind Parker. On the 5th August the Dutchman bound northward, and the Englishman southward, sighted one another on the Dogger Bank, in a north-westerly wind—Parker being to the windward and westward. Each admiral sent his convoy on its way, and both prepared for a fair trial of strength.

The battle which followed has an almost pathetic interest. It was one of the last fought on the old traditional rules, and it was fought by men who played the game with a single heart. Therefore it showed what was best in those rules, their downright manhood, and what was weakest, their hidebound pedantry. Zoutman seeing that Parker had the weather-gage and the option of battle, lay to on the port tack, heading to the north. Sir Hyde Parker bore down to engage from van to rear, every man to take his bird. His flagship was in her orthodox place, the middle, which in a line of seven was the fourth. Zoutman was the fifth in his line. Now the proper opponent for an admiral is an admiral. Parker therefore laid the =Fortitude= alongside the _Admiraal de Ruiter_. But as there were three ships ahead of him and three astern, while there were four ships ahead and two astern of Zoutman, it followed that there were three English to four Dutch in the van, and three to two in the rear. The last ship of Parker’s line had consequently no opponent. In the van the =Berwick=, 74, was very rightly laid alongside the leading Dutchman, the _Erzprinz_, 54. The second English ship tackled the third Dutchman, and the third the fourth. Therefore the second Dutchman had no opponent. Yet every ship was kept in its position, since the signal for the line was flying. Not a shot was fired by the Dutch as their enemies came down to the attack. They lay quiet, with their marines admirably pipeclayed drawn up on their poops. When the other sportsman was comfortably in his place, Zoutman opened fire. English and Dutch pounded one another with stolid resolution. The loyalty of the seamen of the time to the superstition of the line of battle was wonderfully shown in the van. Commodore Stuart had rightly closed with the leading Dutch ship to prevent her from getting to windward and doubling on the head of our line. The =Berwick= being a far heavier ship than the _Erzprinz_, was able to drive her to leeward. In following up the attack the =Berwick= fell to leeward, and then finding herself out of her proper place, tacked back to resume her station. The battle was a cannonade of three hours and a half. At the end of that time the Dutch drew off, and Parker did not pursue. His ships were severely damaged, and his casualty list, 111 killed and 318 wounded, was a more severe loss than any suffered in action with the French in this war, in proportion to the number engaged. Zoutman returned to port, and Parker continued his voyage home. The safe arrival of the Baltic convoy was a subject of very natural rejoicing, and much was made of Parker’s “victory,” though victory there was none. He for his part was discontented, and resigned his command, saying, we are told, that he wished the king younger admirals and better ships. At a later period he was chosen to command in the East Indies. He sailed in the =Cato=, 50, for his station. His fate is unknown, for he never reached his destination, and no trace of him was left, save a vague story that a great ship, which may have been his, had been wrecked on the coast of Malabar, and that the survivors of the crew had been massacred by the natives.

While these operations were running their indecisive course in the North Sea, two great armaments had sailed from Spithead and from Brest, each on a distant mission, and each carrying with it subordinate squadrons to be detached for still more remote destinations. On the 13th March Admiral Darby sailed from Spithead with twenty-eight line-of-battle ships. Some were to be detached to the West Indies, and others to sail for the Cape of Good Hope and take it from the Dutch, when Darby’s immediate service was performed. He had also with him the outward-bound East Indiamen. His orders were to collect the vessels laden with provisions in Irish ports for the use of the garrisons of Gibraltar and Mahon, to convoy them to the fortresses, to detach the reinforcements for the West Indies, and the squadron destined to the Cape with the East Indiamen under its charge, and to return to the Channel. To meet the victuallers, he steered for the south coast of Ireland, and was there delayed till they joined him from Cork. While Darby was waiting on the south coast of Ireland the Comte de Grasse left Brest on the 22nd March, with twenty sail of the line, bound for the West Indies, and having with him a small squadron to be detached for an attack on the British settlements in the East Indies. Darby, having collected his victuallers, went on his way, and Grasse on his without a meeting. The strenuous futility which is conspicuous in the operations of all parties in this war was never more visible than in this misuse of two great fleets. If Darby had fallen on Grasse and had driven him back to Brest, the Americans would have been deprived of the aid which enabled them to take Yorktown at the close of the year. If Grasse had been joined by even six or eight Spanish ships in an efficient state, and had fought a whole-hearted battle with Darby off the Old Head of Kinsale, it is possible that the entire naval defence of Great Britain might have been ruined, and it is eminently probable that the relief of Gibraltar would have been stopped—in which case the fortress must have fallen for it was at the end of its resources. But the rulers in London and Paris had their eyes on the end of the earth and could not see that victory at home would mean success all over the world.

The web of naval warfare covered the North Atlantic, the threads crossed, the shuttle flew to and fro. All were players in the same game and each acted on the other. The squadrons detached to the Cape and the Indian Ocean by Darby and Grasse went into a wider field and acted apart. The North Sea was a field by itself, but the other fleets and squadrons from Newport in Rhode Island, down the East Coast of America to the West Indies, across the Atlantic to the Straits of Gibraltar, and north to the Channel, worked together, and on one another in harmony or in conflict. Let us see how the players stood when Darby sailed from the south of Ireland for Gibraltar, and Grasse steered from Brest for the West Indies.

When the year began the French squadron of seven sail of the line and two frigates lay at Newport. It was commanded by Chevalier Destouches, who succeeded to the command on the death of Ternay, on the 15th December 1780. Arbuthnot was in command of the British squadron of eight ships of the line, two 50-gun ships, and twenty-three frigates, with his headquarters at Long Island. His ships had to patrol the coast and to co-operate with the British forces acting in the southern Colonies. In January he sailed to reconnoitre the French, but on the 23rd his squadron was beaten back by a violent gale. The =Culloden=, 74, was lost on the end of Long Island, and the =Bedford=, 74, dismasted. The =America=, 74, was driven out to sea, and did not rejoin his flag for weeks. Washington throughout the year was striving to bring about a concentration of French and American forces on either the northern or southern parts of the divided British. He urged Destouches to put to sea while Arbuthnot was disabled. But the Frenchman was oppressed by anxiety lest the stormy weather should be as fatal to him as to his opponent. He sent Le Gardeur de Tilly with one 64 and two frigates to fall on the British transports of Arnold’s force in Virginia. The French officer found that they had taken refuge in Elizabeth River, and returned. On his way to Rhode Island he captured the =Romulus=, 44, and a number of prizes. Meanwhile Arbuthnot lay at Gardiner Bay in Long Island. Under the steady driving of Washington, Destouches got to sea on the 8th March, with seven of the line and two frigates—one of them the captured =Romulus=, and 1500 French soldiers under Viomesnil, to reinforce the Americans in Virginia. On the 10th Arbuthnot followed him with eight ships of the line and two frigates. The two steered for the Chesapeake in squally weather, mists, and driving rain. The English squadron was the quicker of the two. On the 16th March it overtook the French between forty and fifty miles N.E. by E. of Cape Henry. It was in the power of Arbuthnot to put himself to leeward of Destouches, and between him and the coast in the north-easterly wind. But faithful to tradition he let the Frenchman run to leeward of him, and then made two rushes at him in the old style. The Frenchman as usual fired to dismast and slipped away. Yet Arbuthnot was the more pertinacious of the two. After an inconclusive action he anchored at Lynn Haven in the Chesapeake, and Destouches, finding the road still barred, went back to Rhode Island. Arbuthnot came back to Long Island, having at least baffled the enemy’s attempt to carry reinforcements to Virginia, so that at the close of March both were again “as they were” at Long Island and at Newport.

Meanwhile events of no very honourable character had occurred in the West Indies. Rodney had returned to his station, the Leeward Islands, from North America on the 12th of December 1780. He was soon joined by Samuel Hood with reinforcements from Europe. Hood, when the war began, had been commissioner of the dockyard at Portsmouth. The acceptance of this post was by custom held to mark an officer’s final retirement from active sea service. But the Admiralty wished to supply Rodney with a second in command who would work more harmoniously with him than Parker. Hood had served under Rodney’s eye at the beginning of his career. He had been captain of the =Vestal=, from which Rodney directed an attack on a French flotilla in 1759. The refusal of many flag officers to take commands while Sandwich remained First Lord supplied another reason for departing from usage. Hood, who was no political

## partisan, or who at least was no Whig, was included in a promotion

of flag officers, and was sent with reinforcements and a large trade convoy to the West Indies. Soon after he joined, the =Childers= sloop brought news of the outbreak of the war with Holland.

No more welcome message could have reached the ear of Sir George, for it brought to a very embarrassed man the hope of infinite prize money. The Dutch Island of St. Eustatius, lying high up in the Lesser Antilles, had been used for the purpose to which the British port of Nassau in the Bahamas was put in the American Civil War. It had become a great dépôt of contraband, by which the French profited largely. It was also the seat of an unwonted trade of more legitimate character. The West Indian planters were under the necessity of buying all the food for their slaves in the North American colonies. As the supply could not be stopped without producing ruin to the British Islands, Government was compelled to relax the rigour of its navigation laws, and permit the planters to obtain supplies through neutral ports. This authorised trade concentrated at St. Eustatius. Maize and pork were brought from America, and British goods were brought to pay for them. Long rows of warehouses sprang up on the usually empty shore of the one landing place of the Dutch island.

The news that St. Eustatius was fair prize reached Rodney on the 27th January. On the 3rd February he seized the island. The neighbouring port of Saba was taken at the same time, and a Dutch convoy was followed and captured. From that moment and for the ensuing weeks Rodney became blind to the interest of his country and to his own honour in the contemplation of the stupendous mass of booty which was at last to make him a rich man. A part of his force was to have sailed to seize the Dutch possessions on the mainland of South America. The admiral would not part with a ship. Essequibo and Surinam were left to be taken by a swarm of privateers. There was no French force in the Leeward Islands except four of the line at Fort Royal. Lest they should come to molest him at St. Eustatius Rodney stationed the bulk of his fleet outside that port. In vain did Hood, who was detached for the blockade, point out that the belt of calm under the land of Martinique, the fitful breezes, and the westerly set of the current in the Caribbean Sea made it impossible to lie close up to the land and intercept reinforcements coming to the French from Europe. In vain did he ask leave to cruise to windward of Martinique on the track of any French force which might be coming. Rodney, reduced to the moral level of a buccaneer, would think of nothing except that if Hood were to windward of the island, the French at Fort Royal might slip out and recapture the booty at St. Eustatius. There he himself remained superintending the sorting and packing of the spoil. In that position they were at the end of April when Grasse was seen coming round the south end of Martinique on the 28th April.

While the French admiral was crossing the Atlantic Darby had carried out the relief of Gibraltar. He saw the ships ordered to the East Indies safe on their way, and on the 11th April was off Cadiz. His look-out frigates counted thirty-six Spanish sail of the line at anchor in the port. They had grown foul while blockading the fortress, and had run out of stores. They were in fact “wanting in everything at the critical moment,” as Wellington was to find the Spanish armies at no distant day. Córdoba, their admiral, was a man of childlike faith and piety. When a French officer came to expostulate on the scandalous spectacle presented by a fleet of thirty-six sail which allowed a weaker force to relieve the fortress under its eyes, he left his cabin with his rosary in his hand. He listened to the carnal arguments of the Frenchman, and then replied with saintly unction, that it had pleased God to make the English stronger on the present occasion, but that he would doubtless give the superiority to the Spaniards in his own good time. He then went back to his prayers. Darby was allowed to carry his convoy into Gibraltar, and to despatch others to Mahon not yet besieged. He met no opposition from the Spaniards except from a few rowing gunboats, which fired at him from a respectful distance, when the breeze had fallen. On the 19th April he sailed for home—his work done. He swept close by Cadiz, “lifting his leg on the Spaniards” as Horace Walpole puts it, but they would not come out.

On his way back he missed a piece of service which would have given him a well-earned reward. While he was to the south the convoy which Rodney had taken from the Dutch, together with much of his booty, was on its way home. Another rich convoy was due from Jamaica. The French Government had news of them, and sent six sail of the line and four frigates and sloops to intercept them. La Motte Picquet fell in with Rodney’s prize convoy about sixty miles to the west of the Scilly Isles. They were under the protection of Commodore Hotham with two line-of-battle ships and three frigates. Seeing the superiority of the French, Hotham ordered his convoy to disperse, and drew his warships into a line. But the Frenchman followed the booty and Hotham was not alert enough to molest him. Twenty of the convoy were taken. La Motte Picquet, satisfied with his gains, now turned home to Brest. It was well for him that he did. Darby was informed of the capture of Hotham’s convoy, and at once sent Rear-Admiral Digby with a squadron to effect its recapture. But Digby never sighted the chase. The look-out ship of the main force with Darby, the =Nonsuch=, 64, commanded by Captain Sir James Wallace, fell in with one of La Motte Picquet’s ships, the _Actif_, 74, commanded by M. de Boades, and the two fought a desperate

## action, which lasted through hours of the night of the 14th May.

Both were severely mauled. The =Nonsuch= lost twenty-six men killed, and sixty-four wounded; the _Actif_ fifteen killed and thirty-eight wounded. The action may be quoted to prove that there was at this time no difference in efficiency between the best ships in the French navy and our own. La Motte Picquet took his prizes into Brest, and with them the fortune of Rodney. Little was left to the admiral except a ruinous series of lawsuits, brought against him by British merchants engaged in the authorised trade at St. Eustatius, whose goods he had impounded without discrimination. The Jamaica convoy got safe to port. Darby anchored at Spithead on the 22nd May.

On that very day Rodney was hurrying from Antigua to Barbadoes to make good the consequences of his mismanagement in March and April. On the 28th April the Comte de Grasse was seen coming round the southern end of Martinique, and now began a series of operations in which all the movements of the British fleet were dictated by the French admiral, and all led up to loss. Hood, held back to leeward by Rodney’s orders, the wind, the calm, and the current, could do nothing to prevent his opponent from hugging the shore and reaching Fort Royal with his warships and convoy. On the 29th Grasse was joined by the four line-of-battle ships in the fort. On that day, on the 30th and on the 1st May, encounters took place between the two fleets. Grasse, having ulterior objects to achieve, would not allow himself to be drawn into close action. The well-trained French captains of guns made excellent practice. Several of Hood’s ships suffered severe damage in their spars, and one, the =Russell=, 74, was badly injured on the water-line. All of course were proportionately disabled for working to windward. Hood, finding himself outmatched in force and his fleet diminished by damage, drew off to the north and sent the injured =Russell= into St. Eustatius. She reached it on the 4th May, and brought Rodney the first news that Grasse had reached Martinique. He sailed to join Hood on the 6th with the two ships of the line he had kept with him, and on the 9th joined his subordinate between Montserrat and Antigua. Injuries to ships and want of stores made it necessary for him to take the whole fleet to the dockyard at Antigua.

Grasse, having the Caribbean Sea open before him, free to go where he pleased and strike where he chose, left Fort Royal on the 9th May to retake Santa Lucia. The attack was made on the 11th and 12th without success. The strength of the British posts on Pigeon Island, the Morne Fortuné, and the Vigil enabled General St. Leger to hold out. He was aided by a small squadron under Commodore Linzee. The discovery that the British posts were strong, and apprehension that Rodney might appear, induced the French admiral to embark the soldiers he had landed and return to Fort Royal. Rodney was indeed at sea, and had steered to assist Santa Lucia. He received news of the retreat of the enemy when near Barbadoes on the 23rd May. As that island was ill prepared for an attack, and his fleet still in need of stores with many sick in the crews, Rodney anchored in Carlisle Bay. Grasse had decided to fly at lesser game, and was content to retake Tobago. An advance squadron of his fleet first appeared off the island. It had been detached before the attack—which the French historians, with some economy of truth, call a false attack—on Santa Lucia. Colonel Ferguson, the Governor of Tobago, appealed for help to Rodney, and the admiral, who received the message on the 27th May, sent Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Drake on the 29th with three ships of the line, three frigates, and three sloops to his assistance. Hardly was Drake out of sight before news came that Grasse had sailed on the 22nd from Fort Royal apparently bound for Tobago. Rodney was in no small anxiety for his subordinate, but Drake, who sighted the whole French fleet off Tobago on the 30th, retreated in time. The French had landed at Great Courland Bay on the 24th, and Ferguson, who had but four hundred men and some armed blacks, retreated into the hills, hoping to hold out till Rodney could come. But Bouillé arrived on the 31st May. He was ever a partisan of “thorough,” and well knew there was no time to waste. By his orders two plantations were fired _in terrorem_, and the clamours of the planters, who formed a large part of his force, compelled the governor to surrender on the 2nd June. When Rodney came from Barbadoes on the 3rd the mischief was done. Until the 9th both fleets manœuvred along the string of small islands called the Grenadines, till Rodney, finding that he could not bring his enemy to close action, returned to Barbadoes, and Grasse went north to Fort Royal.

Strenuous futility continued to be the note of the operations on both sides. The end of all this display of force by Grasse had been the transfer of a small island from England to France. In Paris there was indeed a very general belief that Grasse had not done enough. His nephew, who carried home his despatches reporting the operations off Fort Royal from the 29th April to 1st May, had a very cold reception from the king. The admiral’s excuse that the British ships were all coppered and sailed better than his own was grimly received. If we are to accept it the French officer deserved high credit for baffling Rodney’s efforts to bring him to battle between the 3rd and 9th June—credit, that is, for skill if not for high spirit. The English reader may be excused for not accepting it at once, for, if it is well founded, Rodney was grievously to blame for allowing himself to be baffled. But this lament of want of speed is heard on both sides, till we are almost forced to regard it as a standing excuse. Sir George’s failure can be sufficiently explained by the fact that his mind had been clouded by a passion of avarice at St. Eustatius, and that his health was breaking down. He was not free either in body or mind to give minute attention to his command. His solitary habits grew on him, and his second in command, Hood, angered by the distant hauteur of his chief, paid sullen and exact obedience to orders and held his peace. In his letters he repaid himself by scornful invective.

On his return to Fort Royal Grasse prepared for the vigorous campaign which was to redeem his reputation and to decide the war in North America. All through the war Washington had been eagerly pressing for a combined attack on the British forces either in New York or in the South, and Grasse had orders to co-operate. Washington would have preferred the first, but when he found that the French preferred the second he accepted the alternative. Grasse left Fort Royal on the 5th July for Cape Français (now Cape Haytien) in San Domingo, taking with him a convoy of 200 merchant ships. At Cape Français he received the pressing appeals of Washington and the French authorities to come on to North America with ships, troops, and bullion. The ships he had, and he increased them by taking the vessels already at Cape Français which were destined to convoy the trade home. The merchant ships were ordered to remain in the colony till the next season—a bold measure, which would probably have been beyond the courage of a British admiral who served a commercial state. Three thousand two hundred troops with ten field pieces and a siege train were lent him by M. de Lillancourt, governor of Saint Domingo. Bullion he could not obtain in the French colony. An appeal to the Spaniards at Havana produced about £60,000. On the 28th July Grasse sent the _Concorde_ frigate with the announcement that he was coming, and on the 5th August he sailed through the Bahama Channel for the Chesapeake, carrying the troops in his warships so as not to be hampered by transports.

Rodney was informed by Captain Forde of =La Nymphe=, who had seen the French at sea on the 5th July, that Grasse had sailed. He at once concluded that the French admiral was bound to the coast of America, and he prepared to reinforce the British squadron on the station. For himself he could not go. His health had broken down, and it was impossible for him to face an autumn campaign in the searching cold of the North. He handed over his command to Hood with orders to take fourteen sail of the line to America, and then on the 1st August sailed with a convoy for Europe.

All now began to move to the decisive point at Yorktown. Arbuthnot had resigned his command and had gone home on the 2nd July. His successor, Rear-Admiral Graves, began by sending information to Rodney that the French fleet was believed to be coming from the West Indies. Then leaving Captain Edmond Affleck at New York he went to sea himself with six ships of the line, to intercept reinforcements from Europe for the enemy, to cover the movements of our own convoys, to watch Boston, and, if possible, to meet whatever ships Rodney might send him from the West Indies. Sir George had acted, as we have seen, on his own initiative, and had sent the sloop =Swallow= to report the approaching arrival of Hood. The =Swallow= reached New York on the 27th July, and was sent on by Affleck to meet Graves at sea. She unhappily fell in with two privateers, by whom she was driven on shore and destroyed. The =Active=, sent by Hood to report that he was coming, was also taken, and neither message reached Graves. Hearing nothing, and being in want of stores, the admiral returned to Sandy Hook on the 16th August. Hood in the meantime had sailed from Antigua on the 10th August, and on the 27th he was off the Chesapeake. Finding no British force there he went on to Sandy Hook on the 28th. Forty-eight hours after he had gone Grasse arrived with twenty-eight sail of the line, and two 50-gun ships. He anchored at Lynn Haven. Thus Lord Cornwallis, who had been compelled to evacuate the Carolinas, and had marched through Virginia to Yorktown, where all his troops were collected by the 22nd August, was cut off from communication with New York by sea, while Washington, with the American troops, and Rochambeau, with the French, were gathering round him by land.

Whether he could have been saved from the superior forces collecting about him is perhaps doubtful. Whatever chance he had was lost through want of aid from General Clinton in New York, who continued to believe that he, and not Cornwallis, would be attacked. The violent controversy between the generals does not require to be dealt with here. On the return of Graves, Clinton urged him to attack the French squadron at Newport. The admiral had, however, to reprovision his ships, and he received two pieces of information in quick succession which disposed of any plan for an attack on Newport. On the 16th August =La Nymphe= joined him with the report that Hood was on his way, and a few days later he learnt that the French squadron, commanded since the 6th May by the Chef d’escadre Barras de San Laurent who had superseded Destouches, had sailed to the southward. When Hood appeared off the bar of Sandy Hook, Graves came out to join him on the 1st September, and their united forces steered for the Chesapeake to intercept Barras. On the 5th September the British fleet of twenty-one sail of the line was off Cape Henry, and the advance ship, the =Solebay=, signalled the presence of a French fleet in Lynn Haven. Admiral Graves formed his line of battle and stood on. Grasse shipped his cables and stood out with twenty-four of the line, forming his array as he went. When the two were nearly opposite one another, the British to windward in a fine breeze from the N.N.E., Graves wore his fleet together, and bore down on the enemy, both lines being on the port tack and heading to sea. A sudden shift of the wind and a shoal called the Middle Ground hampered the movements of the fleets. The British line was not all brought into

## action, for it struck on the enemy at an angle, thus only the van under

Rear-Admiral Drake was closely engaged. The rear under Hood might have brought the enemy to close action if it had been allowed to break the line. But Graves adhered to the old rule which prescribes the maintenance of the same formation throughout a battle. So the French were once more allowed to slip away after crippling several ships of the British van, and damaging one, the =Terrible=, 74, so severely that it was found necessary to take her men and stores out, and set her on fire on the 11th. Both fleets remained out for some days without again coming to action. On the 9th Grasse returned to Lynn Haven. During his absence Barras had slipped in with six sail of the line, bringing with him the battering train about to be used against Cornwallis at Yorktown. He found two British frigates, detached by Graves to cut away the buoys left by Grasse on his anchors, and captured them both. After destroying the =Terrible=, Graves looked into the Chesapeake again, and finding the enemy too strong to be attacked, sailed away to Sandy Hook, which he reached on the 19th September. Cornwallis was left to his fate. Graves was joined on the 24th by Rear-Admiral Digby with three sail of the line, and the news of his appointment to the Jamaica station, and a few days later by two other ships from the West Indies. He sailed on the 17th October on a forlorn effort to save Cornwallis, who had been forced to surrender on that very day. The British fleet looked again into the Chesapeake, saw that all was over, and returned to Sandy Hook. Graves then handed over the command to his successor, Digby, and left for his new station.

The fall of Yorktown was the practical end of the war in North America. While Cornwallis’s army was undergoing its fate, the allies had made another idle demonstration at the mouth of the Channel. Thirty-six sail of the line, under Don Luis de Córdoba, appeared at its entrance early in August, while thirteen others cruised on the coast of Ireland to intercept trade. Darby, weakened by the departure of Digby for America, was with difficulty reinforced to thirty sail, and had to lie at anchor in Torbay. The allies, who had come on the very tardy reflection that the best way to prevent relief to Gibraltar or Minorca was to watch the mouth of the Channel, did not dare to attack him. They feared to be crushed in detail if they attacked in line ahead, and were persuaded they had no room (they might have been persuaded that they had no seamanship), to attack in line abreast. On the 14th September Darby put to sea to make an effort, and found the enemy gone. They had in fact separated on the 5th September in wretched health. The French went home to Brest, the Spaniards to Cadiz, whence eighteen of the least inefficient of them sailed under Don Miguel Gaston to escort the treasure ships from America. In the absence of an enemy the service was successfully performed. Darby remained at sea till November to protect trade.

##