Part 23

At the time that this nucleus of the modern Japanese army was formed the intrusion, as it was deemed, of foreigners was bitterly resented by the party of exclusion, which had its centre in the Court of Kioto; the Shogun, on the other hand, day by day became more convinced of the futility of such efforts as Japan could make in opposition to the fulfilment of the treaties. There remained to be considered the probable attitude of the great feudatories, who were almost independent of the Shogun though nominally his subordinates, and by whom it was to be anticipated, in not a few instances, that the occasion would be seized for divesting themselves of a yoke which had begun to be burdensome. This factor in the problem was at all events one which no one could with safety ignore. Affairs were further complicated by the circumstance that in 1860, when the discussion was at its height, the two strong chieftains of the south, Mori of Choshiu and Shimadzu of Satsuma, were at variance, and as a result when Mori advocated the out-and-out adoption of a policy of expulsion his powerful opponent in the extreme south of Kiushiu preferred to see an understanding arrived at between the Imperial party and the adherents of the Bakufu, which was responsible for the signature of the treaties with foreign powers. At this time the Shogun Iyemochi was but a youth and politically he was unable to render more than the minimum of service to his party, but it was hoped that a fusion of interests might be brought about by a marriage between his Highness and a sister of the reigning Emperor, which took place in the autumn of 1860. But the scheme conspicuously failed to bring the rival factions into line, and instead of presenting a united front against the “barbarians” the clan enmities and jealousies continued to thrive and in the views entertained on the subject of the admission of strangers there remained as complete a divergence as ever. And not only was there this conflict of opinion prevailing between two well-defined parties in the State but the Shogun’s side grew to be a house divided against itself, for dissensions arose within the Mito clan, thereunto the strongest pillar of the Tokugawa regime, and one of the branches of that family in which the office of Shogun was hereditary. One half of the Mito clan were for the expulsion of foreigners, the other half favoured the strict fulfilment of the Shogun’s bargains. Feeling on these matters at one time ran so high at Mito that the samurai of the clan fought desperately among themselves, and it is possible to trace the decline of the Shogunate’s power to this lamentable internecine strife which sapped the strength of the Tokugawa house and paved the way to its final fall. Another peril to the Shogunate was created by the antagonism of the Lord Mori of Choshiu. His uncompromising hostility to the treaties led him into a direct quarrel with the Bakufu, and he was directed to return to his own province from Kioto. His abrupt dismissal from Court was calculated to arouse the keenest antagonism to the Shogunate on the part of his followers, who carried the news to Hagi, his castle town in the west of Choshiu, and there was from that time war between the clan and the adherents of the Tokugawa house. Thus arose the anomaly that while the Choshiu clan had at that time in its ranks those very men by whose endeavours Japan was ultimately to be induced to abandon a policy of seclusion and to enter the comity of nations, their influence was insufficient to prevent, until a considerably later period, the adoption of an attitude by their feudal chief which was distinctly reactionary. And the reformers, finding themselves in a minority, were compelled to wait their time. The Choshiu men gathered in their strength and marched upon Kioto, resolved to wipe out the disgrace which they conceived attached to them through the unavenged insult to their lord, and as at that date the Choshiu troops were by far the better armed, victory would have rested with them in the battle which ensued within sound, and, indeed, within rifle shot, of the Imperial residence, but for the inadequacy of their numbers. Yamagata, Takasato, and many others who were presently to achieve distinction in their country’s cause, were engaged in this contest, and were ranged under the Jo-I banner, though their presence there as supporters of the principle of expulsion was due to their loyalty to their feudal lord, and in defence of his rights as opposed to the Shogun, rather than to any unwillingness that the country should be opened to international trade and the introduction of Western arts and sciences.

In writing of the pre-Restoration days himself, in 1887, Count Yamagata, as he was then, described the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate as that when, all foreign intercourse being limited to China and Holland, people in Japan knew little of the civilisation of other nations. “Peace,” he said, “universally reigned. The swords were kept in their sheaths, and the arrows lay untouched in their quivers. Luxury and effeminacy followed in the wake of peace. The sudden appearance of the problem of foreign intercourse in the sixth year of Ka-yei [1853] resulted in the universal cry for exclusion. The power of the Shogunate was gradually undermined by this event. It is not to be wondered at that this cry was raised on every side, for people were kept in ignorance of things outside of their own country. Their condition was that of the proverbial frog in the well.

I no naka no kawadzu Dai Kai wo shiradzu.

(The frog in the well Knows naught of the ocean.)

Things outside were completely shut off from their view. Along with this perplexity the advocates of the virtual authority of the Throne assailed the Shogunate. Baron Ii Naosuke was the person who had to face these great problems. Confident in the wisdom of his policy, he bravely opposed public opinion, and was hated even by his relations. The result was that he had to sacrifice his life for his perseverance in the policy that he followed. Yet this sad event not only saved our country from the misfortune that befell our neighbour, China, but opened the pathway of civilisation in our own land. The merit of this is attributable to no one but Baron Ii Naosuke.” This powerful championship of a nobleman to whom Japan owes much—further reference to the part which he took in connection with the foreign treaties and the manner of his death will be found in this volume in the chapter devoted to Prince Tokugawa Keiki—does justice to the memory of one whose fate it was to be much maligned during life, and also to Marshal Yamagata’s goodness of heart, and there must have been many of the former adherents of the _Tairo_ who read this eulogy of their murdered chieftain with genuine satisfaction.

It was on Yamagata’s return from France in 1871 that the reform and expansion of the military system were definitely taken in hand, the barons of Satsuma, Choshiu, and Tosa presenting their provincial armies to the Emperor, and it was then that four military centres were formed for the troops that likewise were drafted into the imperial service from the military establishments of the other feudal lords. In 1872 conscription became the law of the land. Six divisions of the army were formed, and regular drill and instruction were provided for. Several French officers were engaged to give tuition in military subjects. Yamagata himself occupied the post of Minister of War, and to the army he appointed as Commander-in-chief General Saigo Takamori. General Yamada ranked next, and other appointments to high command were those of Kirino, the close friend of Saigo in the events of 1877, General Tani, who in that year defended Kumamoto, and Generals Toriwo, Miura, Nodzu, Asa, Miyoshi, Nishi, Osawa, etc.: all capable men who in after years greatly distinguished themselves, some having taken part prominently in the war, now happily at an end, with Russia.

The first regulations promulgated remain in most of their essential features but little changed, notwithstanding the lapse of thirty-five years, and this is testimony in itself to the soundness of the system for which Marquis Yamagata was mainly responsible. All Japanese subjects on reaching the age of twenty were to be liable for three years’ active service in the army or the navy. The officers of the lower grades were to be chosen by the officers of the corps. Commissions were to be granted only after a course of instruction and rigid examination. After their three years’ term conscripts were to form a first reserve, assembling once a year for drill. On the expiration of two years in the first reserve they were to be placed in a second reserve, only liable to be called out in case of a levy _en masse_. The militia was to be formed of all males between the ages of seventeen and forty, who had been otherwise exempted from service, and these were to be formed into troops for district protection whenever a general levy might take place. The term in the first reserve has been extended far beyond that originally contemplated, but in practice the service in the first and second reserves is merely nominal, and in the militia or national army likewise, as the men are only called out once a year for manœuvres, save in case of war or emergency. The six provincial divisions, inclusive of the Imperial Guards, who were maintained at the capital, were stationed in the first place as under:—

Headquarters Brigade Headquarters Regiment Quarters

Provincial Division I. Tokio I. Tokio I. Tokio XV. Takasaki II. Sakura II. Sakura III. Tokio Do. II. Sendai III. Sendai IV. Sendai XVI. Shibata IV. Aomori V. Aomori XVII. Sendai Do. III. Nagoya V. Nagoya VI. Nagoya XVIII. Toyohashi VI. Kanazawa VII. Kanazawa XIX. Nagoya Do. IV. Osaka VII. Osaka VIII. Osaka IX. Otsu VIII. Himeji X. Himeji XX. Osaka Do. V. Hiroshima IX. Hiroshima XI. Hiroshima XXI. Hiroshima X. Matsuyama XXII. Matsuyama XII. Marugame Do. VI. Kumamoto XI. Kumamoto XIII. Kumamoto XXIII. Kumamoto XII. Kokura XIV. Kokura XXIV. Fukuoka

In addition to the six divisions detailed under the earlier scheme of military organisation—viz. those having their headquarters at Tokio, Sendai, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Kumamoto—divisions were subsequently established at Asahigawa in the island of Yeso, at Hirosaki in Northern Hondo, at Kanasawa on the west coast, at Himeji, near Kobé, close to the Inland Sea, at Kokura, facing Shimonoseki across the Straits, and at Marugame in the island of Shikoku.

All the divisional headquarters are now served by public or State railways, and practically the same may be said of the various Brigade headquarters, numbering twelve more.

The establishment comprised 36 regiments including artillery, 22 battalions, 20 companies, 12 corps (inclusive of colonial troops in Yeso, and the gendarmerie), 228 General and Field officers, 2267 officers, 484 cadets, 5835 sub-officers, and 54,555 rank and file. Total 63,369.

These were the figures of the standing army at the end of 1893, and at that time the nominal strength of the reserve rank and file was 193,949 of all arms, made up of 107,222 infantry, 1923 cavalry, 10,182 artillery, 4373 engineers, 2035 commissariat, and 68,214 miscellaneous, including transport-soldiers, firemen, ambulance attendants, etc.: all these passing into the “landsturm” or national army on the expiration of their 12 years with the colours or in the reserves.

By the ordinance of July 1894, a divisional regiment consists of 3 battalions or 12 companies, each company comprising 136 officers and men. A Bodyguard regiment has only 8 companies. The cavalry battalion is of 3 companies, each of 159 officers and men. A Field artillery regiment includes 693 officers and men in a division, or 465 if of the Bodyguard.

In time past only the “Samurai” of Japan were entitled to bear arms, and as the sum-total of these “Samurai” families was comparatively small, it was evidently impossible in 1871 to create a large army of this class alone. Thus it became needful as a first step to throw open the ranks of Japan’s new military organisation to “heimin” as well as to the “ancient warrior caste,” if what was in reality the knighthood of the realm may properly be so designated. The “heimin” were complimented by such a direct recognition of their ability to wield weapons of war, and flocked to the standards; the nucleus of a huge fighting machine was speedily formed, and the necessary steps were taken to provide tuition for its officers and competent instruction for the rank and file. At first the intention was to take France as the model, as it had already been determined to copy Britain in all matters naval. But France having come somewhat badly out of the war of 1870 it was in the end decided to base the system chiefly on that of Germany. The Household Troops were at first an exception to this rule and held more or less for a time to the French system.

Yamagata’s ambition did not extend very far at first, for the army was to consist of only 20,000 men, all told. But it was intended that these should be well drilled, with additions to their ranks later on, and in gaining proficiency in military exercises they served to leaven the whole mass of the male population, and imbue it with a notion of the high standard of efficiency which defenders of the realm were expected to attain. Not until after the war with China, however, which will be referred to in detail in its proper place, was the Japanese army really formidable in point of numbers. But under the plan for which Marshal Yamagata was directly responsible, there grew up an enormous reserve, far in excess of anything for which the rest of the world was prepared to give Japan credit. Parenthetically, it may be mentioned that even down to the end of 1904 the tremendous strength which Japan is able to put forth had not, save in a very limited circle, been in the faintest degree appreciated, and least of all, perhaps, in Russia.

At the time of the outbreak of war in the island of Kiushiu in 1877 General Yamagata was at headquarters in Tokio, and it may well be comprehended that there was some anxiety in his mind concerning the behaviour of the new army when confronted by the redoubtable swordsmen of the great southern clan. The heimin of whom the imperial army was largely composed were comparatively unaccustomed to the use of weapons of warfare, and it remained to be seen how they would comport themselves in the face of a peculiarly strong and agile foe. The Satsuma onslaught was famed for its irresistible vigour and determination. It was at least open to question if the men who had only recently begun to handle the bayonet would with it be a match for swordsmen whose tactics were to come to close quarters on every occasion and to some extent despised musketry as an art unworthy of their knightly training. But the outcome of the struggle justified the sanguine anticipations which the military authorities at Tokio had formed regarding the value of the new force, and increased confidence was felt in its future development. It was not the first trial that it had undergone in actual warfare, for some regiments had been through a rather severe campaign,—not in respect of the fighting that they had to do, but in regard to the climate and the character of the country—in the island of Formosa three years before the contest with Satsuma occurred, yet the civil war in Kiushiu was a test of a far more rigorous nature, and one on which the fate of the Government’s scheme of reform in no small degree depended. Suffice it to say that the confidence Yamagata had placed in his military system was amply warranted by events, and as references are to be found elsewhere to the incidents of the campaign it would be superfluous to enter into detail concerning them here.

By 1883 the available strength of the imperial army had risen to some 105,110 men, of all arms, not counting non-combatants, and at the end of the year 1888 there were 150,000 drilled men, with 120 guns, and a cavalry force of 500 sabres, ready for service at short notice, and a serviceable army of 25,000 troops could have been sent away to Korea or China at any time, on three days’ notice being given to the War Department.

In December 1889 Marshal Yamagata, as he had now become,—having previously held the office of Nai-mu-kio or Home Minister, in the Cabinet, was called upon, owing to the resignation of Count Okuma, to form a Ministry, and he continued to fill the post of Minister-President of State until April 1891, when he gave way to Count Matsukata, who had held under him the portfolio of Finance.

The following year, the Marquis Ito having meanwhile become head of the Ministry, a very extensive scheme of army extension and reorganisation was brought forward, encountering no inconsiderable opposition from the Radical party in the House of Representatives, and the year ended with stormy debates in Parliament on questions of military and naval expenditure. Marshal Yamagata was of course mainly responsible for the project as far as it related in detail to the enlargement of the nation’s military resources, but that it had the entire approval and support of the Crown was clear from the imperial rescript which appeared in 1893, when matters had reached a deadlock in the Diet owing to the obstacles placed in the Cabinet’s path by the irreconcilable elements of the Opposition. In the course of his message to the Diet the Emperor declared that “the progressive force of various countries of the world becomes more apparent day by day: at this period if time is squandered in disputes and ultimately the great objects in view become neglected, so that the opportunities of promoting the nation’s welfare and extending its influence are lost, the desire that we cherish in view of meeting the spirits of our ancestors will be frustrated, and the way to reap the fair result of constitutional government will be missed. The items of expenditure referred to in the 67th Article of the Constitution are already guaranteed by the terms of those articles, and therefore must not be a matter of dispute now. As to the military defences of the State, a single day’s neglect may result in a hundred years’ regret. We shall Ourselves economise in the expenditure of Our household, and We call on Our officers to do the same....” His Majesty’s efforts brought about a temporary understanding, and in the meantime affairs in Korea were assuming so threatening a shape that all the energies of the War Office were directed into the channel of urgent and complete preparation for what it was feared could not long be averted, namely, a desperate struggle with China, whose policy had been growing more and more inimical to Japan’s interests in the adjacent peninsula.

The culmination was reached when news arrived in Japan that a large reinforcement of the Chinese army in Korea was on the eve of being sent from Tientsin, and that foreign vessels had been chartered to convey the troops across the Yellow Sea to points on the Korean littoral. The bargain had been that neither Japan nor China was to increase its strength in the peninsula without giving due notice to the other interested power, for Korea, under the existing agreement, was independent, though China still insisted on claiming a rather shadowy suzerainty. Japan ordered her fleet to intercept the Chinese vessels, and hostilities began when the _Naniwa Kan_, a cruiser at that time commanded by the now famous Admiral Togo, fired upon and sank a British-owned steamer which had been chartered for the express purpose of carrying Chinese soldiers to the vicinity of the Korean port of Chemulpo. Admiral Togo’s orders were to prevent a landing, and when he had taken on board the _Naniwa Kan_ all the foreign officers of the transport, the Chinese on board refused to surrender, in spite of fair warning, so he considered that he had no alternative but to put an effectual stop to the vessel’s career. Already large numbers of Chinese had been thrown into Korea, and a first collision between the rival forces took place at Asan, a port to the south of Chemulpo, in the Nam-yang or Empress Gulf. The decisive battle of the 15th September 1894, at Ping-Yang, north of Seoul, at which spot Hideyoshi had fought the Chinese at the end of the sixteenth century, settled the question of the supremacy on Korean soil, and the Chinese withdrew in haste beyond the river Yalu frontier. Marshal Yamagata at this stage arrived from Japan to take command in person of the Japanese army in Manchuria, in the campaign on which it was now about to enter, and a second army, under the command of Marshal Oyama, was called out for the invasion of the peninsula known as the “Regent’s Sword,” at the extremity of which lay Port Arthur, for until this fortress should be captured the Chinese fleet could not be said to have been rendered absolutely useless, whilst its possession would give Japan the control of the Gulf of Pechili and enable her to interrupt communications with the Chinese ports in those waters.

At the end of 1893 the strength of the Japanese army was as follows:—

Peace Establishment 70,892 First Reserve 92,252 Second Reserve 106,020 Yeso colonists 4,104 ------- 273,268

The peace establishment and the First Reserve constitute the First Line on a war footing, so that the forces which Japan was able under Marshals Yamagata and Oyama to place in the field were 163,144 in all. Roughly the peace strength of a Japanese division is 9000, but in time of war its total rises to about 27,000 men, all told. In the Japan and China war, under the arrangements which Marshal Yamagata had made, each division was a complete unit in itself, and, comprised 2 infantry brigades, 1 artillery regiment, 1 engineer battalion, 1 cavalry battalion, 1 train battalion, a medical corps, and an intendant, accountant, veterinary and legal staff.