Part 24

Each infantry brigade had 2 regiments, and each regiment 3 battalions,—(save in the Guards, which had 2 battalions to a regiment)—a battalion at war strength averaging 800 rifles. The weapon was the Murata rifle of the 1889 pattern (embodying the improvements effected in the original type which was the invention of Captain Murata, as he was then, of the Japanese army, in the early years of the Meiji era,—he is now General Murata) the rifle being a single-loading breech-loader of 8 millimetres calibre. Each man carried 100 rounds of ammunition, and there were 80 rounds per man in the battalion transport and ammunition column. A new magazine rifle—since brought to great perfection—had then just been issued to the Guards and to the Osaka (4th) division. An artillery regiment comprised 6 batteries of 6 guns each, and a cavalry battalion consisted of 2 squadrons of 100 sabres each. The engineer battalion had 2 field companies of about 200 combatants each, and also furnished the bridging and telegraph sections. The train battalion supplied the personnel, ponies, and so forth for all regimental and divisional transport, a pack pony being able to carry about 250 lbs., but during the campaign great use was made of hand-carts, each drawn by 3 coolies, and conveying about 350 lbs. Each division had 3 supply columns and 5 ammunition columns, and in all 8 days’ rations were carried. The medical corps formed 2 bearer companies and 6 field hospitals. The men of the First Reserve formed depots for each corps and augmented the units from peace to war strength, whereas the Second Reserve, on territorial mobilisation, formed additional units for garrison work, and for the preservation of the lines of communication for the army in the field.

It is needful to supply these details in order to show how Marshal Yamagata had taken cognisance, in his scheme, of the requirements of modern warfare, and that the confidence with which Japan entered on the contest with China was thoroughly well based. By Yamagata’s efforts the army of Japan had already been brought to a high standard of efficiency, and it more than fulfilled the expectations that he had been led to form of its capabilities in the field. Its discipline was from the first perfect. Had they been needed, there was a vast reserve of men in Japan who, given medical fitness, were liable to be called out, if between the ages of seventeen and forty, for service in the National Army, but up to that period no demand had ever been made on them, and they had not been organised into a fighting force.

The Japanese headquarter staff, at the beginning of the war, removed from Tokio to Hiroshima, in the south-west, and thence directed operations. The Emperor went likewise to Hiroshima and took up his residence in the barracks without the ancient castle of the former _daimio_ of Aki province, as Dai-Gen-Sui, or Supreme Commander-in-chief of Army and Navy. At his Majesty’s side were Prince Komatsu, Chief of Staff for the army, with General Kawakami, as his assistant, and Admiral Kabayama, as Chief of Staff for the Navy.

It was noted by military critics of the campaign that “the conduct of the war by the Japanese was marked by a very complete decentralisation.” The commanders of armies or detached forces were given definite objectives (one at a time), and then allowed a free hand in carrying out their work, the same system being followed within the armies or their divisions.

The telegraph, of which Japan had learned the value during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, was turned to the best account in the war of 1894-5, for orders were sent by cable from Japan to Fusan, and thence by telegraph through Korea to Marshal Yamagata, and for the Second army they were sent by wire to Ping-Yang and thence by steamer to the Liao-Tung peninsula. After the end of December 1894 the line of telegraph was built around the coast to the vicinity of Port Arthur, so that Marshal Oyama was also in direct touch with the imperial headquarters at Hiroshima.

The approximate strength of the Chinese army when it took its stand at Kiu-lien-cheng, on the west bank of the Yalu, was 20,000, and there was a further contingent of 4500 men, who had come south from Tsi-tsi-har, posted ten miles upstream. The advanced guard of Marshal Yamagata’s army arrived at Wiju, on the south side of the river, on the 10th October, and the main body on the 23rd. Just above Kiu-lien-cheng the Yalu is joined by the Ai-ho, and in the angle formed by the two rivers stands a prominent hill called Hu-shan, or Tiger Mount. The Chinese held this as an advanced position in front of their left flank, their main position extending along the right bank of the Yalu as far south as An-Tung-hsien. In front of this main Chinese position the river was broad and deep, and the country on the opposite bank was flat and open, so Marshal Yamagata, realising the difficulty of making a direct attack, determined to capture Hushan first, and then by fording the tributary stream to turn the Chinese left. The attack was planned to take place at daylight on the 25th October. The main obstacle to the advance of the Japanese forces was the principal channel of the Yalu, which at that time of the year was 11 feet deep and about 200 yards wide. The bridge had to be constructed by night, the pontoon equipment at that time with the army was not sufficient, and the water was so ice-cold that the men could only work in very short reliefs. By dawn however, the principal work had been done, and, the attack was delivered, the Chinese abandoning their Hushan positions before 8 A.M., though the main position continued to give trouble. The Japanese bivouacked on the right bank of the Ai-ho above Kiu-lien-cheng, and next morning it was found that their foes had evacuated both that city and An-Tung during the dark hours, and had fallen back, part in the direction of Feng-hwang-cheng, and part towards Siu-Yen.

The maxim that history repeats itself was so accurately borne out in the events of a decade later at Kiu-lien-cheng that the temptation to allude briefly to them at this point becomes irresistible. In the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 the Japanese commander General Kuroki had to force the passage of the Yalu in a precisely similar fashion, the attack being commenced by the crossing of the twelfth division at dawn on the 30th of April, and the Russians vainly attempting to hold the heights facing Hushan against assault. General Sassulitch fell back on the 1st of May, on Feng-hwang-cheng, which the Japanese occupied five days afterwards. In 1894 the troops under Marshal Yamagata entered Feng-hwang-cheng on the 29th October, the fifth day after the commencement of the attack on Hushan, the Chinese having retreated to the Mo-tien pass, thirty-eight miles to the north-west. Two columns were sent by different roads towards Taku-shan, afterwards meeting at Siu-Yen, and General Nodzu executed a brilliant combined movement against Sai-ma-tsui and defeated the Chinese at Tsao-ho-kao, on the 30th of November. Meanwhile General Sung, taking with him Ma Yu-kun as his chief of staff, had gone south by way of Kai-ping to attack the Japanese Second Army, which was reported to be marching on Port Arthur. At this time the Chinese opposing Marshal Yamagata in Manchuria numbered approximately 22,000 men.

After the capture of Port Arthur by the Second Army on the 21st of November, Marshal Yamagata was directed to proceed to the taking of Hai-cheng, which the Chinese were then holding in considerable strength, but his health, which had never been good during his stay in that region, quite broke down, and he was invalided home, his place in the field being taken by General Nodzu. At this period the marshal was so feeble that he could only with difficulty mount his charger, but he held on until the Emperor’s own physician, who had been sent with him to Manchuria, made a resolute appeal to him to desist. Very reluctantly Yamagata returned to Japan, abandoning the hope of winning glory on the field of battle, almost at the moment when fame seemed to be within his grasp.

The end of the war came in April 1895, and Marshal Yamagata had recovered sufficiently to be able to resume his place at the War Office, and even to journey to Europe, to attend the coronation of the Tsar Nicholas II. at Moscow, as the delegate of the Japanese Emperor. He did not succeed in getting as far as London, for he was obliged by illness to return direct to Japan from Russia, after concluding the Treaty of 9th June 1896.

On resuming his duties some months later at Tokio a scheme of expansion of the military forces was elaborated under his supervision which promised to confer upon Japan by the year 1902 a military power just double that which she possessed in the summer of 1895, and providing for an army of not less than 500,000 men, at an annual cost of 26,000,000 _Yen_ (roughly £2,654,000).

In January 1898 the Emperor decreed the formation of a Supreme Military Advisory Council, consisting of four members—viz. Marquis Yamagata, holding the position at that time of Inspector-General of the Army,—Prince Komatsu, Chief of the Staff,—Marshal Oyama,—and Marquis Saigo (since deceased). On the failure of the attempt to form a Party Government, which ended in the resignation of the Cabinet in November 1898, Marquis Yamagata was once more commanded by the Emperor to form a Ministry, and he became Minister-president with Marquis Saigo as Home Minister, Count Katsura as Minister for War, Count Matsukata at the Finance Department, and Baron Aoki at the Foreign Office. The Cabinet so constituted remained in office until September 1900, when Marshal Yamagata made way for Marquis Ito, who, as the retiring Minister-president declared, was far more skilled than himself in matters concerning China, and Chinese questions were then becoming exceptionally prominent.

Marquis Yamagata held during 1904 and 1905 the position at headquarters of Chief of the General Army Staff, and politically he is one of the Gen-Ro, or Elder Statesmen, to whom Japan looks for counsel and guidance in the hour of trial. During the recent war with Russia he was ever at the helm at Tokio, silently arranging and directing everything pertaining to the conduct of the campaign in Manchuria, while his colleague Marshal Oyama was active in the field.

Ten years ago Marshal Yamagata realised to his intense mortification not only that the Government of St Petersburg wished to deprive Japan of the legitimate fruits of her successes in the war with China, but that Russia intended to appropriate Manchuria herself. From that time his thoughts were occupied with the development of his country’s military strength, that at least she might not again be subject to the indignity which she had to suffer in 1895. It has already been shown how he gradually and surely raised the total of Japan’s resources in men and material until she was in possession of an army that would enable her to challenge with success the further advance towards her own shores of a power whose progress southward had ever constituted,—and as Minister Okubo had declared thirty years before,—a grave peril for Japan.

The disposition of Western observers had always been to accept the published figures of the standing army as indicative of the Empire’s military power. Never, perhaps, were figures so altogether deceptive, for the nominal muster of the regular forces bears but little comparison with the real strength which the nation is capable of putting forth in time of war.

Japan’s army is based on conscription, and all male subjects of the Ten-shi become liable when full seventeen, and remain liable until full forty years of age. In actual practice they are never called on until they are twenty, but even then their term of service may extend over twenty years, only three of which it is compulsory that they shall spend with the colours. We have in the Japanese system, therefore, a short service with the colours, but followed by a prolonged liability to be called out in emergencies and annually for practice, and its effects in relation to the military power of a nation are conveniently to be studied in the history of Japan since about the year 1890 when its possibilities first began to be realised by the people at large. At the end of his third year the Japanese soldier of the first selection—which is of men of superior physique—passes into the First Reserve, to which he is attached for four years and four months. But as there is a superabundance of men who are physically fully qualified for the Active army, the conscripts have to draw lots for the three years’ service with the colours, and when one of them is unlucky enough to be debarred from the active service—(this is the view which, as is, of course, only natural, the Japanese youth’s patriotism induces him to take of the fact that he has drawn a blank)—he is commiserated by his friends, and passes to the depot, where he will serve seven years and four months, and thus equal in the duration of his term his more fortunate comrade on whom the lot fell for active service at the outset. At the expiration of their term of seven years and four months the men of both classes are passed into the territorial army for ten years, and thence to the territorial reserve until they reach the age of forty. Up to a certain point the same course is followed with those who were at first rejected as being of inferior physique,—they serve seven years and four months in depot, but they then pass to the Territorial Reserve direct until they are forty years old. One-year volunteers are accepted, as in Germany, provided they are youths of the prescribed educational attainments and undertake to maintain themselves (and to mount themselves in mounted branches of the service) during their term. They then pass for six years and four months into the Active Reserve Army, and next for ten years into the Territorial Army as usual, completing their term in the Territorial Reserve until forty. There is a special plan of service in force in the island of Tsu-shima owing to its strategical position, whereby all the male population may be mobilised, but with the changed circumstances resultant on the altered status of Korea it seems possible that Tsushima may eventually be brought under the operation of the ordinary regulations.

The general effect of the provisions for service was to equip Japan down to the end of 1904 with an army on a peace footing of 8000 officers and 152,000 men, which was capable of being raised on a war footing to 14,000 officers and 630,000 men, but that was before the law increasing the term of service in the Territorial Army to ten years, promulgated in September 1904, came into operation. The term had previously been five years only. The lengthening of the term will have had the result of vastly adding to the possibilities of the army in numbers on a war footing. The budget appropriation for this large army was for the fiscal year ending with March 1906 as nearly as possible £4,000,000.

It may be useful to insert here for the sake of comparison the cost of some other armies to their respective countries:—

Russia £38,330,000 Germany 31,674,000 Great Britain 28,600,000 France 27,000,000 Austro-Hungary 13,150,000 Italy 11,160,000

In Japan the service is universal and compulsory, with exemption only for physical disability. At a rough estimate 410,000 youths reach the prescribed age annually, but less than one-third of this number are selected for the maintenance of the standing army, as men of superior physique, a term which palpably is elastic enough to admit of the choice of precisely the number required from the vast assemblage of youths presenting themselves every year for enrolment.

To judge of Japan’s strength, then, by her standing army would be a huge mistake, or even to wholly estimate it from the figures given as that of her army on a war footing, as was proved by the last campaign, for there were vast numbers of men who had completed their twelve (now 17) years and four months’ service in the active army, the first reserve, and territorial army, who were still liable until they became full forty. Moreover, the territorial army and its reserves are composed of men who are as a rule in good marching condition, for they are in the majority of cases engaged in normal times in agriculture or other industries, and physically equal to any tasks they may be called on to undertake. Conscription has made of Japan the great military power that she may, with strict justice, claim to be, but owing to the light in which military service is there regarded it is never a burden on the population. On the contrary, the system is really a voluntary one, since it is every youth’s hope and ambition to be among those first chosen to enter the ranks of the active army and a source of grief to him when he is drafted into the depot corps.

It was, then, not simply with a nation possessing a powerful army but with veritably a nation in arms that Russia had to contend when the war was begun in February 1904, and no more definite, straightforward history of that mighty contest has been given to the world than the brief account of its origin, progress, and conclusion which, according to a journal published in the Far East, fell from Marshal Yamagata’s own lips not long ago. Referring to the events of the spring of 1904, he said:—

“Russian aggression in the Far East became so notorious, and took on such serious dimensions after Russia obtained the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan that it was felt that a conflict of the interests of Japan and Russia was imminent. I considered most carefully measures to counteract this aggression, and took counsel with all my colleagues and friends. We came to the decision to forestall Russia in Korea, as the historical and geographical relations of Korea with our Empire demanded that we should have the peninsula in our power, rather than it should fall into that of Russia. To attain this object we decided to construct the Seoul-Fusan railway, and did not neglect to elaborate any other necessary measures, as circumstances required, to oppose Russia. In the meantime Russia steadily augmented her naval strength in the Far East, and by about March 1903 her naval force here was almost equal to our own. Russia failed to fulfil her promise to evacuate Manchuria, and by steadily reinforcing her army and navy her designs came to be generally acknowledged. The Japanese Government, therefore, decided to protest against these designs, and entered upon negotiations in July 1903, with a view to arriving at an arrangement diplomatically. These negotiations proved very difficult, and towards the end of November the situation became desperate. By this time we were determined that Korea should under no circumstances be left in the hands of Russia. Frankly I may say that we were not confident of defeating Russia, for she was considered to be one of the greatest powers of the world. We had some hope, however, in our navy. The naval forces of the two countries were almost equally balanced, but fortunately our navy had had experience in fighting in the past ten years, while Russia had had none. As to the strength of the army, there was great disparity, the Russians having 4,000,000 men and Japan only 500,000. There was certainly a limit in the strength of the army that could be sent by Russia’s one line of railway, but the Russian equipment in arms was in no way inferior, even if it was not superior, to that of our army, and the education of the officers was almost equal. We had, therefore, no advantage over the Russian army, with the exception, as we thought, of the skill of our troops in fighting in such hilly country as Korea and Manchuria. Thus we had very little prospect of success in land fighting, it having been altogether impossible to assure ourselves of success in the way that the lay mind is apt to think. It was a critical and anxious time when hostilities were commenced, but the army was determined, we knew, to fight to a man in defence of the Empire. On the campaign being opened, however, we were able to obtain a success far beyond that which we had hoped for. This was to be ascribed to the virtue of the Emperor and to the valour of the officers and men, and the army and navy are to be congratulated thereon.

From about the time of the great victory at Mukden a suggestion was made in Europe and America that for the sake of humanity peace should be restored, and shortly after the defeat of the Russian fleet in the battle of the Sea of Japan, President Roosevelt, acting from humanitarian motives, advised the two belligerents to make peace, with the result already known.

Some of the people appear to be strongly opposed to the terms. Each man has a right to his own opinion, and it is only natural that opinion should be divided upon so momentous a question. In deciding to conclude peace the Government carefully investigated the present financial capacity of the Empire,—the plans made for its future development,—the general political situation of the world,—as well as the fact that Russia was constantly aggressive and warlike. After full consideration the Government then came to the conclusion that if hostilities were continued any longer it would hardly be possible to obtain compensation for the vast expenditure involved, and no better result could be secured than was to be obtained by concluding peace there and then. The continuation of the war, it was thought, would require a further heavy sacrifice and the only result would be to exhaust the funds required for the promotion of works in Korea and Manchuria. Thereupon the members of the Government agreed without a dissenting voice to conclude peace without delay. There was no difference, as alleged, among the members of the Government—no ‘strong party.’ If the peace be condemned by some people, I am for my part quite willing to accept the name of being a member of the ‘weak’ party, and all the other Elder Statesmen and Cabinet Ministers will share my view.”

Marshal Yamagata emphatically repudiated the allegation that he had advocated peace on the ground of the difficulty of further continuing the war because of the inadequacy of the country’s military strength. “The assertion,” he said, “reflects upon the prestige of the army and cannot be passed over unnoticed. The Government prosecuted the war with the greatest determination, and is still competent to carry it on. I have been in the military service over forty years, and have been through several wars. We have experienced greater difficulties in other wars than in the one with Russia, though the wars of the past were of less magnitude. We have always managed to overcome difficulties.”

It will be admitted that this speech was not conceived in any spirit of boastfulness, but that it was a plain unvarnished statement of fact. Japan was by no means exhausted by the struggle with Russia,—on the other hand, nothing was to be gained by prolonging it to exhaustion point.