CHAPTER 7

The Laotian Crisis, 1962

_Genesis of the Problem--The American Response--The Marine Corps Role--Marine Participation: A Summary_

_Genesis of the Problem_

Almost simultaneous with SHUFLY’s deployment to Soc Trang in April 1962, U.S. Marine combat forces were ordered to Thailand in response to the growing crisis in Laos. Inhabited for the most part by peaceful hill tribes, the small, landlocked Kingdom of Laos seemed an unlikely setting for any significant military confrontation. Even more improbable was the possibility that a serious international crisis could stem from what had begun as a political rivalry among relatively obscure princes.

To be certain, the context of what should have been a rather meaningless political feud had been altered substantively by North Vietnam’s drive to extend its control over the Republic of Vietnam. Recognizing Laos as a strategic stepping stone for their southward thrust, the North Vietnamese, joined by the Soviet Union, had begun providing military aid to the Pathet Lao army of the leftist prince, Souphanauvong, in the late 1950s. To counter these Communist activities, the United States had extended military assistance to the anti-Communist government of Prince Boun Oum. In the resultant struggle, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who previously had proclaimed neutrality, sided with the Pathet Lao. With the lines drawn and the contenders now reinforced by powerful allies, the conflict naturally escalated. Laos, like South Vietnam, had become a pawn in the Cold War.

Administered through a small USMAAG, the American military assistance to Boun Oum, however, did little to slow the advances of the Pathet Lao. Early in 1960, they had joined forces with North Vietnamese units to seize control of the eastern portion of the country’s long, southward extending panhandle. In early 1961, again backed by North Vietnamese forces, the Pathet Lao had opened an offensive on the Plain of Jars in central Laos. Boun Oum’s units, commanded by General Phoumi Nosavan, proved unable to contain this push into central Laos.

By March 1961 the situation had become critical enough for President Kennedy to direct that CinCPac alert U.S. military units for possible deployment. In response, Admiral Felt activated a task force headquarters and assigned Major General Donald M. Weller, who was then serving as Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, as its commander. Designated Joint Task Force 116 in accordance with existing CinCPac contingency plans, Weller’s command was to consist predominantly of Marine air and ground forces with Army and Air Force units making up the balance. Simultaneous with the activation of Weller’s headquarters on Okinawa, CinCPac alerted the scattered forces earmarked for assignment to the joint task force.

Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration managed to defuse the situation somewhat by securing Soviet assistance in arranging a cease-fire in Laos. The crisis cooled further when 14 governments, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Vietnam, agreed to reconvene the Geneva Conference to consider neutralization of the Kingdom of Laos. This conference convened on 16 May 1961, and together with the shaky cease-fire, brought a modicum of stability to Laos. With international tensions eased, the alert of U.S. forces in the Pacific ended. Subsequently, General Weller’s JTF 116 headquarters was deactivated.

[Illustration:

MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA ]

The negotiations in Geneva proved to be long and tedious. In Laos, frequent fighting, usually of a localized nature, punctuated the cease-fire almost from the day it was effected. Finally, in the first weeks of 1962 heavy fighting broke out anew, this time on a general scale, and precipitated a new and more intense crisis. For U.S. observers the situation seemed to reach its critical point in early May when Pathet Lao forces, backed by North Vietnamese formations, routed a major element of Phouma’s army from Nam Tha, a town located east of the Mekong River in extreme northwestern Laos. Following this action, Phoumi’s forces retreated southwestward across the Mekong into northern Thailand. Now in full control of the east bank of the Mekong, the Communists appeared poised for a drive into Thailand, a full-fledged member of SEATO. The collapse of Phoumi’s military forces, moreover, seriously threatened the U.S. bargaining position at the ongoing Geneva talks.

_The American Response_

In the face of the situation along the Laotian-Thai border, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed CinCPac to upgrade the readiness of Joint Task Force 116 for possible deployment. Accordingly, on 10 May Admiral Felt directed Major General John Condon, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, to activate the joint task force headquarters, assemble its staff, and refine its deployment plans. The Amphibious Ready Group of the Seventh Fleet, carrying the Special Landing Force, promptly sailed into the Gulf of Siam.

Both to reassure Thailand of the U.S. commitment to its defense and to discourage further Communist advances on the Southeast Asian Peninsula, President Kennedy ordered U.S. forces deployed to Thailand on 15 May. Admiral Felt moved immediately to execute this decision. In simultaneous actions CinCPac designated Army Lieutenant General John L. Richardson, then serving as Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, to replace Major General Condon as Commander, JTF 116 and instructed Richardson to execute CinCPac Operations Plan 32-59, Phase II (Laos). Felt’s instructions to the new Commander, JTF 116 were explicit. General Richardson’s command was to act in such a way that would leave no doubt as to American intentions to defend Thailand. Through these same actions JTF 116 was to exert a “precautionary impact” on the situation in Laos. Furthermore, the Commander, JTF 116 was directed to position his forces in a manner so that they could respond to any armed Communist threat to Thailand.[7-1]

Concurrently with the order to deploy JTF 116, CinCPac instructed the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Harkins, to establish and assume command of a U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACThai). Thus Harkins, in a dual role as ComUSMACV and ComUSMACThai, was to be responsible to CinCPac for all U.S. military activities and operations in both Thailand and South Vietnam. Once it became operational in Thailand, JTF 116 plus the already existing Joint U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group, Thailand (JUSMAAG), were to come under Harkins’ purview. Until USMACThai and the JTF staffs could become operational, however, the various task force components were to report to the Chief JUSMAAG, Thailand, Major General J. F. Conway, U.S. Army.

One element of the joint task force was already in Thailand when President Kennedy issued the order to commit U.S. forces--the Army’s 1st Brigade, 27th Infantry. At the time this infantry brigade was participating in a SEATO exercise near Korat, a town located about 130 miles northeast of Bangkok in the central portion of the country. In response to CinCPac orders it promptly moved into bivouac at a position 40 miles west of Korat.

_The Marine Corps Role_

Operations Plan 32-59, Phase II (Laos), called for a U.S. Marine expeditionary brigade composed of a regimental landing team (three reinforced infantry battalions), a jet attack squadron, a helicopter transport squadron, and supporting units, to operate from Udorn, a provincial capital located nearly 350 miles northeast of Bangkok. Strategically situated only 35 miles south of Vientiane, the political capital of Laos, Udorn was the site of a 7,000-foot concrete runway. A 300-man Marine aviation support unit, Marine Air Base Squadron 16, had actually been positioned at this airstrip for over six months during 1961. While at Udorn the MABS-16 Marines had provided maintenance support for helicopters which were assisting General Phoumi’s forces in Laos. A Royal Thai regiment had provided security for the base during this unit’s deployment and was still in the area in 1962 when the decision was made to commit JTF 116 to Thailand.

[Illustration: _Aerial view of Udorn airstrip. (USMC Photo A182977)._]

Lieutenant Colonel Harvey M. Patton’s VMA-332, an A-4C (Skyhawk) jet attack squadron, claimed the distinction of being the first Marine unit to arrive in Thailand in response to the 1962 Laotian crisis. The 20 single-placed Skyhawks departed the Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the Philippines on the morning of 18 May, were refueled in flight by aircraft from VMA-211, another Marine A-4 squadron, and landed at Udorn around noon. The bulk of the Marine units began arriving in Thailand the following day. At Bangkok the Special Landing Force, composed of Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Adams’ 1,500-man Battalion Landing Team 3/9 and Lieutenant Colonel Fred A. Steele’s HMM-261, an HUS-1 helicopter squadron, disembarked from the ships of the Amphibious Ready Group.[7-A] That same day Marine GV-1 refueler-transports began airlifting additional aviation support detachments from Okinawa to Udorn. These included detachments of Marine Air Control Squadrons 2 and 4 (MACS-2 and -4), Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12), and a Provisional Marine Aircraft Group (ProvMAG) headquarters. Upon landing Colonel Ross S. Mickey, the commander of the ProvMAG, established his headquarters at the airfield and assumed operational control of all USMC aviation elements at Udorn. On the 18th, HMM-261’s helicopters began arriving at the now busy airfield, having flown from the Amphibious Ready Group with a refueling stop at Korat. Lieutenant Colonel Steele reported to the newly activated ProvMAG.

[7-A] A Marine battalion landing team derives its designation from the infantry battalion around which it is built, in this case the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. In 1962, the BLT included a howitzer battery, a tank platoon, an amphibious tractor platoon, a pioneer platoon, a motor transport platoon, an anti-tank platoon, and air and naval gunfire liaison teams.

Following the commitment of the SLF on 19 May, another BLT and helicopter squadron from Okinawa reconstituted the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force.

On 19 May Brigadier General Ormand B. Simpson arrived at Udorn with the staff and communications personnel of the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3d MEB) headquarters. Simpson, a Texan who had been serving as Assistant Division Commander, 3d Marine Division, had assembled and activated this headquarters on Okinawa shortly after CinCPac’s activation of JTF 116. As Commanding General, 3d MEB, Simpson was to assume command of all Marine elements, air and ground, deployed to Udorn. In addition to being the CG 3d MEB, General Simpson carried the designation, Naval Component Commander, a title which gave him responsibility for all Navy as well as Marine forces operating at Udorn under JTF 116.

Concurrent with General Simpson’s arrival, U.S. Air Force C-130 and C-123 transports were ferrying Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ Battalion Landing Team from Bangkok to Udorn. The BLT had placed its supplies and trucks, along with HMM-261’s heavier equipment, on rail cars for transport to Udorn. Because the Thai flat cars were too small to accommodate such massive vehicles, Adams ordered his tank and amphibious tractor platoons to re-embark on board the USS _Point Defiance_ (LSD-31). Once on the ground at Udorn the battalion and its remaining reinforcements assembled alongside the airstrip. From there the Leathernecks were transported by Thai Army trucks some eight miles south to Nong Ta Kai, a small town situated astride the main service road. Adams’ battalion established a temporary camp on some high ground just beyond the town. With the BLT’s arrival, the initial Marine combat forces assigned to JTF 116 were in position. The next day, 20 May, General Simpson assumed command of all U.S. Marine and Navy units at Udorn and the 3d MEB, a complete air-ground team, was in being.

Elsewhere in Thailand the U.S. military build-up was continuing apace. A squadron of 20 U.S. Air Force F-100 Super Sabre tactical fighter bombers and a detachment of three refueler aircraft had deployed to Takhli airfield from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Two USAF transport squadrons had also begun operations from this base. At Korat, the 1st Brigade, 27th Infantry was being reinforced with Army units from Hawaii. Another Army unit, a logistics support command, was being activated near Bangkok.

To command this growing assortment of military units, General Richardson established the JTF 116 headquarters at Korat. Major General Donald M. Weller, who had been serving as Deputy Commanding General, FMFPac, since leaving the 3d Marine Division in 1961, joined Richardson’s headquarters as chief of staff. General Weller’s offices were located at Korat initially. Later he relocated at Bangkok where he headed a rear echelon responsible for coordination with the JUSMAAG, ComUSMACThai, and the American representatives to SEATO. While in the capital Weller was also responsible for implementing a logistic plan, the objective of which was to upgrade lines of communication being used by JTF-116 elements.

It is of interest to note that Colonel Croizat, who had been the first U.S. Marine advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, was serving at this time as the senior U.S. military representative on the SEATO planning staff in Bangkok. Both Weller, who had commanded JTF 116 for a period during early 1961, and Croizat who had served as its chief of staff during that interval, were intimately familiar with the JTF’s structure, capabilities, and functions. In fact, the operations plan being executed had been developed in large part under their guidance.[7-2]

[Illustration: _Marines disembark from attack transports at Bangkok, Thailand. (USMC Photo A182785)._]

Another facet of this particular situation was that portions of Operations Plan 32-59 Phase II, (Laos) were to exert a profound influence on later U.S. Marine operations in the Republic of Vietnam. A key provision of this particular document outlined the command relationships which would govern Marine and Air Force tactical air support in the event JTF 116 actually became involved in combat. This provision designated the Commander JTF 116 as the “coordinating authority” responsible for synchronizing all JTF tactical air support. But at the same time it assigned the CG, 3d MEB, operational control of all Marine tactical aircraft, thereby insuring that the Marine air-ground team would not be fractured. Later, in the mid-1960s when American tactical jet squadrons would be called upon to support U.S. and RVNAF ground forces in South Vietnam, the CinCPac staff would borrow heavily from this arrangement to define the relationships of Marine and Air Force tactical aviation assets.

[Illustration: _Major General Donald M. Weller, Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force-116. (USMC Photo A407463)._]

Training began almost immediately after the Marine units were in position at Udorn and Nong Ta Kai. Generally the MEB adhered to a training program designed to help fulfill three requirements: to make its presence known and thereby enhance its credibility as a “show of force”; to acclimatize the individual Marines to the hot, humid, tropical climate; and finally, to familiarize the operational elements and their commanders with the surrounding terrain. The primary objective of this program, of course, was to prepare the brigade for combat should that contingency arise out of the troubled situation in Laos. Coordinated air-ground exercises conducted around Udorn enabled General Simpson’s command to publicize its presence in the area while concurrently refining its heliborne and close air support capabilities.[7-B] In addition to air-ground exercises, Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ infantry companies sharpened their skills in patrolling of all types and made frequent use of nearby Thai Army firing ranges to maintain their weapons proficiency. All field training was conducted in an unpopulated area defined by the Thai government and every precaution was taken so as not to disturb the local population. The Marine units utilized blank ammunition exclusively in training except for the closely supervised live fire exercises.

[7-B] The MEB’s after action report pointed out one flaw in the composition of the Provisional MAG. There had been no provision made to include light observation aircraft in its organization. As a result, aerial reconnaissance had to be accomplished from either A-4Cs or HUS-1s, neither of which was configured for such a mission. The A-4C, which could carry only the pilot, and the HUS-1 proved equally unsuited for reconnaissance missions. The 3d MEB report specifically recommended that future composite aviation packages of this nature should include a detachment of OEs with pilots and trained aerial observers.

[Illustration: _Brigadier General Ormond R. Simpson and Brigadier General John F. Dobbin confer at Udorn, Thailand. (USMC Photo A182779)._]

Realizing that the ultimate success or failure of the American commitment in Thailand might hinge on the relationships U.S. military men established with the Thai populace, General Simpson ordered his command to initiate a civic action program. The day after his arrival at Udorn, Simpson met with local civilian officials and established the basis for a people-to-people program similar to the one instituted by SHUFLY Marines at Soc Trang. Thereafter, the MEB’s goal in this area was to foster among the Thai a favorable impression of the individual Marine, his commanders, and his unit. The people-to-people program which followed was, in all respects, a concerted and integrated effort. Officers taught conversational English classes to interested civilians both at Udorn and at Nong Ta Kai, while Leatherneck engineers and Navy Seabees (who arrived near the end of May) helped repair public buildings. Navy medical and dental personnel attached to Colonel Mickey’s ProvMAG and Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT joined the effort by administering almost daily to the physical ailments of the local populace and occasionally visiting the more remote villages by helicopter. In an action intended to help prevent friction between Marines and Thai townspeople, General Simpson directed that MEB units disembark from trucks as they approached towns, march through the population centers at sling arms, and re-embark aboard their trucks at the opposite end of the town. Relying on this broad array of simple but effective programs, the 3d MEB was able to impress upon the civilian population that its mission was one of assistance and good will rather than occupation.

This crisis in Laos eased somewhat after the U.S. joint task force established its presence in northeastern Thailand, and Communist forces halted their advance short of the international border. With these two developments there was no requirement for additional Marine infantry battalions. Accordingly, General Simpson redesignated his force the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit (3d MEU), even though other reinforcements continued to arrive at Udorn throughout May and most of June. Near the end of May, a 70-man Seabee detachment from Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 10 was airlifted to the position. This detachment, the initial increment of a larger Logistics Support Group (LSG), moved to Nong Ta Kai where it helped the BLT’s pioneer platoon complete a more permanent camp designed to withstand the approaching monsoon season. In mid-June, with no end to the MEU’s assignment in sight, the remainder of the 500-man LSG deployed from Okinawa to Udorn. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Hudson, this group included a motor transport detachment, a medical detachment, a supply unit, and an engineer detachment.[7-C] These reinforcements brought the number of Marines, Seabees, and Navy medical and dental personnel under General Simpson’s command to its highest level--3,426 officers and men. A final change in the composition of the 3d MEU occurred in the final week of June when HMM-162, an HUS-1 squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, replaced HMM-261 as the helicopter element.

[7-C] Lieutenant Colonel Hudson was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Angus J. Cronin on 22 July.

While General Simpson’s MEU was strengthening its posture in northeastern Thailand, U.S. officials were reporting definite progress in the negotiations being held in Geneva and Vientiane. Encouraged by these signs and hoping to influence the Geneva talks even further, President Kennedy ordered major elements of the U.S. combat forces withdrawn from Thailand on 29 June, just four days after HMM-162’s arrival at Udorn. In response General Richardson directed General Simpson to prepare for the immediate withdrawal of the ProvMAG and one infantry company. Two days later, on the morning of 1 July, VMA-332’s Skyhawks launched for Cubi Point in the Philippines. Subsequently, HMM-162’s helicopters departed for Bangkok where they re-embarked on board the USS _Valley Forge_. Okinawa-based GV-1s airlifted one of BLT 3/9’s companies to the Philippines while elements of the Marine air control squadrons traveled by rail to Bangkok for embarkation on board ships of the Seventh Fleet. By 6 July General Simpson’s 3d MEU had been reduced by just over 1,000 men.

At Geneva, the first weeks of July were marked by steady progress toward a diplomatic solution to the long-standing Laotian problem. By the 20th it was evident that a formal agreement would soon be forthcoming. With these encouraging developments, General Richardson was directed to prepare for the withdrawal of the remainder of his forces from Thailand. In Laos, the quarreling political factions had already agreed to participate in a coalition government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma which would serve as the basis for a neutral state. At Geneva on the 23d, the United States, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Burma, Great Britain, France, Canada, India, Communist China, Thailand, Poland, the Kingdom of Laos, and Cambodia finally signed the Declaration of Neutrality of Laos and an attached protocol. In so doing the 14 signatories agreed to recognize and respect the sovereignty, independence, and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos. Under the terms of this agreement, foreign troops were prohibited from entering or operating within the borders of Laos. Had it been adhered to, this provision would have denied North Vietnam the use of the corridor down the length of eastern Laos, altering the scope and nature of the conflict in the Republic of Vietnam.

[Illustration: _Marines of BLT 3/9 assemble before being airlifted to the Philippines. (USMC Photo A182883)._]

Following the signing of this declaration in Geneva, CinCPac directed General Richardson to effect the withdrawal of the remainder of his joint task force. General Simpson’s 3d MEU began executing these instructions on the 28th when Marine GV-1s and Air Force C-130s began airlifting Lieutenant Colonel Adams’ BLT 3/9 to Okinawa. By the 31st no Marine combat units were left at Udorn. General Simpson and his staff departed the airfield a few days later, and shortly thereafter the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit was deactivated.

_Marine Participation: A Summary_

The deactivation of the 3d MEU marked the end of the first deployment of a Marine air-ground combat team to mainland Southeast Asia. Since the decision to commit American forces to Thailand in mid-May, the Marine units assigned to General Simpson had demonstrated anew the value of their service as a force capable of supporting U.S. foreign policy on short notice. Within the period of a few days, the various FMFPac commands had assembled a complete air-ground-support team, and, assisted by the Seventh Fleet, had deployed the affected units to a position over 1,800 miles from the nearest major Marine base. Located far inland from the seacoast, a Marine unit’s normal habitat, the 3d MEU had been sustained solely by air while maintaining its combat readiness in a difficult tropical environment.

In so doing the Marines had shown that a substantial American combat force could be brought to bear quickly in the remote areas chosen by the Communists as targets for their so-called “wars of national liberation.” Furthermore, the MEU by relying on a vigorous civic action program, had established that a sizable Marine command could maintain its combat readiness almost indefinitely without eroding the respect of the indigenous population. Thus, General Simpson’s Marines had created a solid foundation of mutual respect and confidence with the Thai people. This accomplishment alone would prove valuable when American military forces would be required to return to northern Thailand later in the decade. Against the backdrop of these accomplishments, the 3d Marine Expeditionary Unit’s operations in Thailand could be assessed as having extended the tradition of the U.S. Marine Corps as an effective instrument of American diplomacy.

PART III

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES, 1963