CHAPTER 8

The Marine Advisory Effort

_The Political Climate--The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations--Accomplishments_

_The Political Climate_

A sudden rupture occurred in South Vietnam’s internal political situation during 1963 which largely determined the course of the war as well as the nation’s future. Following the sect uprising of 1955–1956, the Diem government had experienced a three-year period of relative political tranquility. Beginning in 1959, however, political dissent had begun to re-emerge from several influential segments of South Vietnamese society. The results of the August 1959 national elections, in which pro-Diem candidates captured every seat in the National Assembly, served to stimulate political opposition which had lain dormant for nearly four years. Opposition to the government mounted steadily in the months following the elections within military as well as political circles as some South Vietnamese officers began privately expressing disenchantment with Diem’s management of the war. Then came the abortive coup in November 1960. The regime’s popularity diminished in the wake of this crisis as Diem tightened his control on the war-torn nation.

Another problem--religious unrest--which was to play a key role in determining South Vietnam’s political direction as the decade unfolded, also emerged during this period. Buddhist leaders throughout South Vietnam began protesting against various policies enacted by the Catholic-controlled government. The tensions gradually mounted, and by early 1963 the protests were highlighted by spectacular and highly publicized self-immolations by Buddhist monks. Finally, in May, the religious problem erupted into violence when the Vietnamese police and military forces killed 12 Buddhist demonstrators while suppressing a religious demonstration at Hue. This action triggered a protracted crisis of public confidence in the Diem government which deepened as the summer wore on. Then, on 21 August, Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s closest political advisor, ordered the national police to raid key Buddhist pagodas throughout the nation. Following the raids, which uncovered some weapons, Nhu attempted to blame the attacks on several key South Vietnamese generals. His effort to shift the responsibility for the police raids served only to alienate some of the nation’s most powerful military leaders.

On 1 November, a junta of South Vietnamese generals led by Major General Duong Van Minh reacted to the deepening political crisis by deposing President Diem and seizing control of the Government of Vietnam. Both the president and his brother were murdered by an ARVN officer the following day. The U.S. government, which had advance knowledge of the coup and was in contact with the plotting generals, publically declared its intention to remain neutral. General Harkins ordered USMACV to cease all activities and to withdraw its advisors from South Vietnamese units pending the outcome of the power struggle.

The overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem stirred fresh hope among many Americans and South Vietnamese that the new government could attract the solid public support of the Vietnamese people, and thereby wage a more effective war against the Communists. South Vietnam’s new leaders immediately focused their attention upon healing the nation’s deep political divisions and securing continued U.S. assistance for the war effort. They pledged to respect religious freedom, to return the government to civilian control, and to continue the struggle against the Viet Cong. Appreciating the interrelationship of these assurances, the United States officially recognized the new government on 7 November, whereupon ComUSMACV lifted the temporary ban on military assistance.

The American hopes that the new political climate in the Republic of Vietnam would stimulate a more effective military effort, however, proved to be shortlived. Confusion reminiscent of the sect uprising in 1955 spread throughout the government following Diem’s death. The dismissal of more than 30 high-ranking military officers for actively supporting the former president during the coup typified the new regime’s campaign to realign top personnel in all governmental agencies. Far from enhancing the efficiency of the Vietnamese military, the power struggle and the chaos which prevailed in its wake dragged the war effort to its most ineffective level since before the U.S. stepped-up its military assistance program in early 1962. It was on this unfortunate note that the year 1963 ended.

_The Advisory Division and VNMC Operations_

At the beginning of 1963, the Marine Advisory Division, still headed by Lieutenant Colonel Moody, consisted of eight Marine officers and 10 noncommissioned officers. In April, however, the table of organization was adjusted slightly when the first sergeant and four assistant infantry advisor (noncommissioned officers) billets were eliminated. Another small unit training advisor was added to the organization, changing the strength of Lieutenant Colonel Moody’s command to eight officers and six noncommissioned officers. Men from the 3d Marine Division continued to augment the advisory effort and gain combat experience while serving in Vietnam on temporary assignments.

Like the U.S. organization which advised and assisted it, the Vietnamese Marine Corps began the new year at the same strength that it had achieved when it had been expanded to brigade size in early 1962. Still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade continued to operate as part of the nation’s general reserve under the direct control of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff.

As the year opened three of the four VNMC infantry battalions were garrisoned separately in small, crude, self-sustaining camps around Thu Duc on the northern outskirts of Saigon. The 4th Battalion maintained its camp at Vung Tau on the coast. The newly formed artillery battalion, which became fully operational in mid-January when B and C Batteries passed their final gunnery examinations, was garrisoned near Thu Duc. While the Marine units spent little time in their base camps, being deployed almost continuously in combat, the Joint General Staff normally kept one battalion at Thu Duc to enable it to respond to any emergency which might develop.

For the Vietnamese Marine Corps, 1963 was to be highlighted by innovations in the important areas of training and operations. Prior to Lieutenant Colonel Moody’s arrival in Vietnam, all Vietnamese Marine recruits had received basic training at ARVN installations, an arrangement tolerated but never appreciated by the U.S. Marine advisors. Before his departure in the fall of 1963, Moody was able to convince Khang that he should push for the authority to establish a separate Marine training center. In late 1963 the JGS approved this proposal, whereupon the Vietnamese Marine engineers, advised by Captain Robert C. Jones, began building a small training facility at Thu Duc. In a related action Moody set in motion plans to have a small number of specially selected Vietnamese Marine noncommissioned officers sent to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at San Diego for training as drill instructors. Although these plans would not come to fruition during Moody’s assignment, the concept of a separate recruit training center promised to permit the Vietnamese Marine Corps to establish and maintain its own standards for basic training.

Another change to occur in 1963, this one in the area of tactical operations, was the reinstitution of multi-battalion combat operations under the control of provisional Marine Brigade headquarters.[8-A] Although the VNMC had performed such operations in 1960, they had been abandoned in the ensuing years in favor of battalion-sized deployments to the various provinces and corps tactical zones. Moody, however, prevailed upon Khang to alter this pattern by seeking assignments that would enable the brigade headquarters to exercise tactical control of its battalions.

[8-A] Such task-organized Marine forces were usually called either provisional brigades or provisional regiments but on at least one occasion the organization was designated a Marine Task Force. In each case the composition was similar--two or three infantry battalions, an artillery unit, an engineer or reconnaissance company, and a command element.

[Illustration: _Lieutenant General Carson A. Roberts, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (right center), inspects an honor guard of Vietnamese Marines in Saigon. With him, from left, are Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps; Major General Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; and Lieutenant Colonel Clarence G. Moody, Jr., Senior USMC Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (Official USA Photo)._]

The first such operation was launched in the first week of the new year. On 1 January a provisional brigade headquarters, commanded by Khang and advised by Moody, embarked on board a Vietnamese Navy LST (landing ship, tank) at Saigon along with the 2d VNMC battalion. The 4th VNMC Battalion, advised by Captain Don R. Christensen, embarked on board two Vietnamese LSMs (landing ship, medium) at the same time. The mission of the provisional brigade was to conduct an amphibious landing near the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula and clear Viet Cong units from a series of villages in conjunction with the Strategic Hamlet Program. Subsequent to the clearing operations, VNMC engineers were to construct a fortified hamlet. The entire operation was to extend until mid-April.

Elaborate precautions were taken not to disclose the location of the objective area. The small flotilla sailed beyond sight of land and remained afloat for two days before moving into position off Ca Mau. On 3 January the two LSMs proceeded to the coast, moved up a river lined with thick mangrove vegetation, and landed the 4th Battalion. The 2d Battalion, accompanied by Captain Richard B. Taylor, came ashore from the LST in Dong Nai boats, small styrofoam craft specifically designed for use in swampy terrain. The provisional brigade headquarters remained on board the LST as the designated operations area did not extend far inland.

[Illustration: _U.S. Marine-trained drill instructor with Vietnamese recruits. (USMC Photo A183561)._]

To their surprise the VNMC assault elements found the first objective, a large village, completely deserted. As Lieutenant Colonel Moody later recalled, “They had removed everything, even the cattle and other livestock.”[8-1] At the second objective, a nearby village, the Marines found definite evidence of recent Viet Cong activity but no enemy troops. There they captured a handful of rifles, carbines, and light mortars along with a printed document that contained detailed excerpts of the Marine operations plan. Quite obviously the operation had been compromised in Saigon during the planning stages. In any case, this discovery explained the evacuation of the initial objective as well as the relative dearth of action during the remainder of the operation.

The provisional headquarters and the 4th Battalion returned to Saigon after the initial phases of the operation had been executed, leaving the 2d Battalion and an engineer platoon to continue security operations in the area and build the strategic hamlet.[8-B] When the operation finally ended on 11 April, the Vietnamese Marines had lost a total of five men killed and 14 wounded. Mines and snipers had produced most of these casualties. The Marines accounted for 11 Viet Cong killed and 14 wounded.

[8-B] Lieutenant Colonel Moody noted that the Vietnamese Marines seldom were involved in the actual construction of strategic hamlets. This task was normally left to the civil authorities in the area who more often than not used the local population as a labor force. (_Moody Comments._)

In the closing days of April, the JGS ordered Lieutenant Colonel Khang to form two infantry battalions and an artillery element into a provisional brigade for immediate assignment to II Corps. There the Vietnamese Marines were to join elements of the 2d and 25th ARVN Divisions for a multi-regiment thrust into the rugged mountains just south of the I Corps-II Corps border. Code named BACH PHOUNG XI, this offensive was to penetrate the Do Xa, a Viet Cong base area never before entered by government forces. Centered in that portion of the Annamite Mountains where the borders of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Kontum Provinces converged, the Do Xa had been under Communist control since the early stages of the French-Indochina War. In this remote, inaccessible mountainous zone the Viet Cong reportedly had built-up extensive staging areas and training camps. Prisoner interrogations obtained throughout the early 1960s revealed that many North Vietnamese soldiers entering the South’s northern provinces had infiltrated the Do Xa before moving into the densely populated coastal lowlands of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. Additionally, the area was thought to contain the Communist military headquarters for Military Region 5 (MR-5).

After alerting his 2d and 4th Battalions, a pack howitzer battery, a reconnaissance platoon, and a headquarters element, Khang flew with Lieutenant Colonel Moody to Pleiku for planning conferences with Major General Nguyen Khanh and his II Corps staff. The concept of BACH PHOUNG XI, Khang and Moody learned, called for U.S. Marine and Army helicopters to lift ARVN infantry and artillery elements into positions which would form a loose ring around the suspected center of the Do Xa base area. The ARVN units would then begin contracting this ring in stages, whereupon the provisional Marine brigade would be helilifted into its center, the heart of the Do Xa, to search for Communist camps. To control the entire operation General Khanh would establish a corps headquarters forward at Plateau Gi, a Montagnard village located on the southern edge of the operations area, about 25 miles northeast of Kontum.

On 1 May, U.S. Air Force C-123 transports airlifted Khang and the 2,000-man provisional Marine brigade from the capital to Quang Ngai. Both Lieutenant Colonel Moody and Major Croft, the Assistant Senior Marine Advisor and artillery advisor, accompanied the Marine force. The next day an ARVN truck convoy transported the Marines from Quang Ngai some 40 miles north to Tam Ky, the roadside town which served as the capital of Quang Tin Province. The 2d Battalion, advised by Captain Taylor, dismounted from the trucks and assembled at Tam Ky air strip while the remainder of the convoy turned west onto a narrow dirt road which curved through the foothills and deep into the jungle-covered Annamite Chain. Meanwhile, Army H-21s from Pleiku landed at Tam Ky, loaded assault elements of the 2d Battalion, and began helilifting them into a stream-side landing zone some 30 miles southwest of the provincial capital. The convoy carrying the balance of the Marine force continued its southwest motor march until it reached the small ARVN-held town of Tra My. There, some 24 miles southwest of Tam Ky, Khang established his command post in a school house adjacent to a crude little dirt airstrip. The 75mm pack howitzer battery, advised by Major Croft, set up its weapons nearby while the reconnaissance platoon and elements of the 4th Battalion, advised by Captain Christensen, established security. When these units were in place U.S. Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang lifted a TAFDS fuel bladder and pump to the airfield. Once the helilift of the 2d Battalion was completed, the Army H-21s, refueling from the TAFDS bladder, began lifting the 4th Battalion into the 2d Battalion’s landing zone, which was located several miles south of Tra My.

With the initial movement into the operations area accomplished and the brigade command post functioning, the two infantry battalions began combing a deep valley and the adjacent mountains for Communist base camps. After several days Khang’s Marines located one rather complete camp but encountered no resistance upon entering the position. Once again the occupants, probably forewarned by the initial movement of the ARVN units into the area, had withdrawn ahead of the Marines. The only people found in the camp were a North Vietnamese doctor and nurse. A subsequent search of the bamboo huts and the underlying tunnel complex did produce a supply cache. The Vietnamese Marines discovered several rifles, six typewriters, three sewing machines, a radio, 44 maps, a French artillery computing board, and scores of flashlight batteries.

[Illustration:

LOCATION OF DO XA BASE AREA ]

ARVN and Marine operations in the area during the next two weeks failed to locate any large Viet Cong elements. For the most part the Marines busied themselves by destroying a few abandoned camps and some cultivated crops. ARVN units operating around the Marines reported scattered action as they engaged small groups of Viet Cong attempting to escape from the center of the Do Xa. BACH PHOUNG XI concluded in mid-May when U.S. Marine UH-34Ds lifted the VNMC battalions back to Tra My. From there the Marines returned by convoy to Quang Ngai where they staged for the airlift back to Saigon. The statistics for the Marine portion of the operation revealed that only two Viet Cong soldiers had been killed. Khang’s force suffered 36 wounded, most as a result of encounters with booby traps constructed from sharpened bamboo spikes. ARVN forces fared only slightly better, having killed barely a score of Communists. Except for the fact that they had demonstrated their ability to penetrate the most difficult Viet Cong sanctuary, the two week offensive into the Do Xa base area had little impact on the war effort. From the standpoint of training and experience, however, the operation was beneficial. The Vietnamese Marines and their advisors learned a great deal about construction of landing zones and about directing helicopters, fields in which they had received little previous training.[8-C]

[8-C] An interesting sidelight to this operation was that it stimulated somewhat of a fad in the offices at MACV and the JGS. Military officials from Saigon who visited the brigade command post, including General Weede, took back large water-smoothed rocks as souvenirs of their trip to the infamous Viet Cong stronghold. Printed on the side of these ornate stones were the words “Do Xa, May 1963.” (_Moody Comments._)

In early September Lieutenant Colonel Wesley C. Noren, recently transferred from the 2d Marine Division where he had served as Assistant G-3, arrived in Saigon to replace Lieutenant Colonel Moody as the Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Already selected for promotion to colonel, Noren would become the seventh Senior Marine Advisor when Moody left Vietnam in October.

In mid-October the Vietnamese Marine commanders formed a provisional regiment for Operation PHI-HOA 5, which was to be conducted in III Corps Tactical Zone.[8-D] The 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions, supported by a composite artillery battery and the reconnaissance company, joined ARVN, VNAF, and Vietnamese Navy units in a major search and clear campaign in the northwest corner of Gia Dinh Province, only about 20 miles southeast of Saigon. Like many other large government military operations undertaken in 1963, this one failed to uncover any major enemy forces. The Communist soldiers again managed to elude government forces. An extensive tunnel and cave network, which the Marines systematically destroyed with demolitions, was discovered under the entire area. Still, the Marines managed to kill only six Viet Cong and capture 10. Two Vietnamese Marines were killed and 36 others wounded before the operation terminated on 1 November.

[8-D] After the realignment of the CTZs the previous December, III Corps included a 200-mile-long section of Vietnam which encompassed the southern one third of the Central Highlands and the area south to the boundary of the Capital Military District near Saigon.

[Illustration: _General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley G. Noren, Senior Marine Advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, confer with Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (USMC Photo A420917)._]

The coup d’etat which toppled President Diem from power began the same day that Operation PHI-HOA 5 concluded. Instead of returning to their base camps, the 1st and 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalions, accompanied by the composite battery, moved into the capital to participate in the power struggle. These units actually launched the coup by seizing key installations in the heart of the city while the 2d VNMC Battalion blocked the highway to Bien Hoa, thus preventing loyalist intervention. Sporadic fighting against troops loyal to Diem continued until the early morning of 2 November when the 4th Battalion finally stormed and captured the presidental palace. Four Vietnamese Marines were killed and 12 wounded during the battles in Saigon. No U.S. Marines were involved in the fighting as Lieutenant Colonel Noren directed his subordinate advisors to remain in their quarters. When the situation stabilized, the advisors rejoined their units and resumed their normal duties.

[Illustration:

CORPS TACTICAL ZONES 1963–1964 ]

Combat operations against the Communist guerrillas resumed for the Vietnamese Marine Brigade in the second week of November. Accompanied by its U.S. Marine advisor, Captain James P. McWilliams, the 3d Battalion initiated a search and clear operation in III Corps in conjunction with the 11th ARVN Regiment on 10 November. The next day the Vietnamese Marines clashed sharply with a substantial Viet Cong force west of My Tho and suffered six killed and 21 wounded. Nineteen enemy bodies were found on the battlefield along with four weapons, several grenades, and some documents. McWilliams, respected by his fellow advisors for his candid and forthright assessments, later recalled that such encounters were the exception rather than the rule. “While the Vietnamese Marines were individually good fighters and showed tenacity in most cases against forces that would stand and fight, this was not the nature of the conflict,” he lamented. More often than not, McWilliams went on to explain, the highly mobile Viet Cong could elude the larger, more cumbersome government units.[8-2]

On 14 November, the same day that the combined Marine-ARVN operation in III Corps terminated, the Vietnamese Marine command formed a provisional regiment to control operations DAI-PHONG 28 and 29, which were to be conducted concurrently in the same general area. Composed of the 1st and 3d Battalions, and a 75mm pack howitzer platoon, the Marine force searched until 21 November for Viet Cong units thought to be in Binh Duong Province but with discouraging results. Only one enemy was killed, two prisoners taken, and three weapons captured at the expense of five dead and 13 wounded Marines.

A week later the 2d Battalion, now advised by Captain Joseph N. Smith, fought a more typical action while participating in Operation DAI-PHONG 30. The battalion commander, Captain Nguyen Thanh Yen, received orders for the operation during the early morning hours of 25 November. Shortly after daybreak nearly 550 Vietnamese Marines boarded trucks at their camp near Thu Duc for the trip to Bien Hoa airfield. Upon arrival, officers from III Corps headquarters informed Captain Yen that his battalion was to conduct a heliborne assault against Hoi Dong Sam, a Viet Cong-held village in western Hau Nghia Province just west of Saigon. The purpose of the operation was to intercept a guerrilla force which had overrun the nearby Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp the previous day and had taken several American prisoners. The enemy unit was believed to be using Hoi Dong Sam as a way station while attempting to escape across the Cambodian border.[8-3]

The operation began at about 0800 when eight U.S. Army H-21 “Flying Bananas” from the 145th Aviation Battalion helilifted Captain Smith, a Vietnamese company commander, and his 90-man assault force from Bien Hoa. Eight Army UH-1B gunships and a U.S. Air Force O-1B Bird Dog observation aircraft escorted the transport helicopters on the 20-minute flight to the objective area. The gunships were put to use almost immediately when Communist .50 caliber machine gun fire erupted from a treeline at the eastern edge of the village. Under the suppressive fire of the UH-1Bs, the first wave of H-21s landed the assault force in some partially flooded rice paddies about 700 meters east of the Viet Cong positions. The Marine assault force quickly deployed into a treeline on the western edge of the landing zone. From this position the company began returning fire with rifles and .30 caliber machine guns. The Air Force forward air controller (FAC) overhead in the O-1B and the Army gunships prevented the enemy from withdrawing across the open rice paddies which surrounded the objective on the north, south, and west.

The distance between the assembly area at Bien Hoa and the landing zone combined with the scarcity of transport helicopters to slow the progress of the helilift. The landings continued at 40-minute intervals while the UH-1B gunships teamed with the Vietnamese Marine assault force to suppress the enemy’s fire. The last elements of the battalion were finally landed about two hours after the initial assault. Largely because of the effective suppressive fires from the air and ground, no aircraft were hit during the helilift.

[Illustration:

2d VNMC BATTALION ATTACK ON HOI DONG SAM 25 NOV 1963 ]

Once the entire battalion was on the ground, the assault company, augmented by a pair of 60mm mortars and two 57mm recoilless rifles, provided a base of fire to protect the movement of its sister companies. Captain Yen maneuvered his three remaining rifle companies and a battalion command group north to a position from which they could launch an envelopment on the fortified village. Using a treeline which bordered an irrigation canal as cover, the force hooked westward until it was directly north of the Viet Cong position. Meanwhile, a FARM GATE twin-engine B-26 relieved the UH-1B gunships on station. At this point in the action the Air Force FAC observed a group of 30–40 enemy attempting to flee from the northwest corner of Hoi Dong Sam. After clearing the target with the Marine battalion, he directed the B-26 to attack the target with its 250-pound bombs. The aircraft made several bombing passes and dispersed the Viet Cong. When the air strike ended the enveloping force began its assault against the northern edge of the village with two companies abreast and one following in reserve several hundred meters to the rear. Once the assault force was in motion the base of fire displaced forward, firing as they moved, to a small canal about 120 meters in front of the .50 caliber positions in the treeline. The two assault companies, followed closely by Yen, Smith, and the battalion command group, penetrated the northern end of the village and swept through to its southern periphery. The commander of the company on the east (or left) flank, deployed elements into the treeline where the Viet Cong automatic weapons had been active. Following a sharp but brief exchange of gunfire, the Marines cleared the position. They found eight enemy dead and three .50 caliber machine guns.

By noon the 2d Battalion had secured the entire village. Captain Yen ordered his assault companies to establish a perimeter defense and the reserve company to begin a systematic search of the position. His Marines uncovered a number of well-camouflaged bunkers and fighting positions. In a small canal just east of the village the Marines found the mount for another heavy caliber automatic weapon. They also discovered eight Viet Cong suspects and detained them for questioning. One rifle company moved to investigate the area where the B-26 had attacked the fleeing enemy earlier in the morning but found no evidence of additional casualties. Following the capture of Hoi Dong Sam, Yen’s battalion conducted patrols for several days in search of the Viet Cong force that had attacked the Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp on the 25th. The enemy force, however, eluded the Marines by gaining refuge in Cambodia. The battalion returned to garrison at Thu Duc on 28 November.

In many ways the results of DAI-PHONG 30 pointed up the problems which frequently frustrated GVN military forces and their American advisors. The 2d Battalion had seized its objective and in so doing had killed a handful of Viet Cong and detained a number of suspects. The Marines had captured three heavy caliber automatic weapons and an assortment of small arms--all without suffering a single casualty of their own. Still, it was difficult to translate the action into victory. The Marines, along with the other government forces involved in the operation, had failed to intercept the Viet Cong raiding force in its flight toward the international boundary. Moreover, most of the occupants of Hoi Dong Sam had made good their escape despite the presence of observation and attack aircraft. Like many other government military operations undertaken during the 1961–1964 period, DAI-PHONG 30 was successful from a statistical standpoint but did little to wrest the tactical initiative from the guerrillas.

In the first week of December, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff ordered VNMC units to conduct an extended search in the jungles of western Tay Ninh Province in III Corps. A special Marine Task Force composed of the 1st and 3d Battalions was helilifted into the area on 3 December to begin Operation DAI-PHONG 31. This operation was punctuated by two major engagements and frequent enemy harassment. In one particularly vicious clash, the Vietnamese Marines incurred heavy casualties while attempting to fight out of a skillfully executed Viet Cong ambush. When the operation concluded on 9 December, the Vietnamese Marines had suffered 11 men killed, 58 wounded, and 1 captured. Nine Viet Cong bodies were found and another Communist soldier was captured. The enemy left four individual weapons on the battlefield.

In mid-December, South Vietnam’s new leaders removed Lieutenant Colonel Khang from his position as Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Although he had not participated in the November coup, Khang had been a political appointee of President Diem and as such was viewed as a potential threat to the new regime. After being promoted to colonel, he was assigned to the Philippines as the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed Forces Attache. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, who had been serving as Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff of the VNMC, was appointed as Khang’s successor. He assumed command of the Vietnamese Marine Corps on 16 December.

Vietnamese Marine Brigade units continued operations against the Viet Cong following Khang’s relief but fought no major engagements. Near the end of December, with the nation drifting into political uncertainty and its own top leadership changed, the morale of the Vietnamese Marine Corps plummeted. Lieutenant Colonel Noren saw this unfortunate trend as a by-product of the general political instability which was beginning to grip the country rather than a reflection of Lien’s leadership. Indeed, Noren thought the new VNMC commandant to be an extraordinarily capable officer.[8-4] In any case, as 1963 ended the U.S. Marine advisors were reporting climbing desertion rates in almost every battalion.

_Accomplishments_

Even though 1963 closed upon a discouraging note, the Marine Advisory Division could report positively on its own activities. At the urging of the Senior Marine Advisor, the Vietnamese Marine Corps had reinstituted multi-battalion combat operations. Steps had also been taken to cut the VNMC’s last formal ties to the ARVN by creating a separate Marine Corps recruit training facility. When activated this training center was expected to provide VNMC battalions with a stream of enlisted men who would possess a background of higher quality basic training.

As for personal achievements, the U.S. Marine advisors had accompanied their units in every combat operation during 1963 except the November coup. No advisors had been killed in the 12-month period and only four (two of whom were on temporary assignment from the 3d Marine Division) had been wounded. The first combat decorations other than Purple Heart Medals for wounds were also approved and awarded to the advisors during the year. On 13 December, Captains Don Christensen and Frank Zimolzak, former advisors to the 4th and 3d Battalions respectively, were awarded the Bronze Star Medals with the Combat “V” for meritorious service. Captain Richard Taylor, an advisor with the 2d Battalion, earned the first Silver Star Medal during the same period for “conspicuous gallantry” between November 1962 and October 1963. Captain Joseph N. Smith, advisor to the 2d and 4th VNMC Battalions, earned the second Silver Star for gallantry displayed between October 1963 and April 1964.[8-E]

[8-E] Both Silver Star Medals were awarded during 1964.