CHAPTER 9

SHUFLY Operations

_Development of the Compound Continues--Combat Support Operations--The Situation in Vietnam_

SHUFLY, the only U.S. Marine tactical command assigned to South Vietnam, continued its combat support operations in the semi-isolated northern provinces throughout 1963. Although the size of I Corps had been reduced in late 1962 when the Vietnamese Joint General Staff shifted Quang Ngai Province to II CTZ, the mission of the Marine task element remained essentially unchanged. As the new year opened Lieutenant Colonel McCully’s command was still responsible for providing direct helicopter support to the forces of the five northern provinces. Likewise, the government’s order of battle in the northern provinces had not changed to any great degree. The 1st ARVN Division still occupied the coastal plains south of the DMZ in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Headquartered at Da Nang, the 2d ARVN Division continued to carry the main burden of operations against the Viet Cong in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. Operating in Quang Ngai Province to the south of the new I Corps-II Corps border were elements of the 25th ARVN Division. Interspersed along the coastal lowlands among the various regular battalions of these three divisions were small paramilitary garrisons. In the mountains to the west, the scattered Special Forces outposts with their Montagnard defenders continued their struggle for survival while monitoring Communist infiltration.

_Development of the Compound Continues_

The first month of 1963 saw three important changes in the composition and leadership of Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6. On 11 January, HMM-162, a UH-34D squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, replaced Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s HMM-163 as the task element’s helicopter unit. Five days later, on the 16th, Lieutenant Colonel George H. Linnemeier, winner of four Distinguished Flying Crosses during World War II and Korea, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Davis as the MABS-16 sub unit commander. In the last week of January Lieutenant Colonel Harold F. Brown, a veteran aviator who had piloted scout-dive bombers during the Second World War, arrived at Da Nang and assumed command of the task element from Lieutenant Colonel McCully.

During McCully’s tour as the Commander, Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6, the Marine compound at Da Nang had begun to assume a quality of permanency which had never been evident at Soc Trang. The utilities section of the MABS-16 detachment was responsible for many of the more noticeable improvements. By the first of the new year they had constructed several shelters on the west side of the runway to cover the motor transport section’s working area. They also had replaced the electrical system and repaired some of the damaged plumbing in the living areas. The task element’s special services section had begun to provide the Da Nang Marines with entertainment by showing nightly movies, arranging fishing trips into Da Nang harbor, and issuing athletic equipment.

The monsoon season, which was characterized by cold rains, high winds, and deep mud, proved to be a source of much irritation to the Marines during the winter of 1962–1963. In addition to slowing flight operations and creating almost constant discomfort, the weather caused some unforeseen complications. In October 1962, heavy rainfall had combined with constant vehicle usage to turn the road between the living area and the flight line into a quagmire that was virtually impassable. At the time, Colonel Ireland, then the task unit commander, had responded by requesting equipment from Okinawa to improve the Marines’ only road link with their aircraft. Wing authorities promptly complied and a road grader was flown in by KC-130 (the new designation for the GV-1 Hercules). Within days a 700-foot section of the road was opened and a drainage ditch dug along its entire length.

This measure proved to be only temporary, however, for in January the mud again threatened to cut the Marine vehicles off from the east side of the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel McCully obtained a bulldozer from Okinawa to make more permanent repairs. With the help of this piece of equipment, the Marines constructed a new 400-foot section of road on an eight-inch rock base. These repairs proved to be satisfactory and the road caused no further problem during the remainder of the monsoon season.

Improvements in the compound continued to be made under the task element’s new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brown. In April action was taken on an earlier request for the assignment of a security detachment to guard the Marine area. A reconnaissance platoon of 47 Marines from the 3d Marine Division joined the task element, thus freeing the men of the helicopter squadron and the MABS-16 sub unit of the important secondary responsibility they had held since the task unit’s deployment to Soc Trang. The assignment of the ground Marines was timely in that it corresponded with a reduction by the ARVN of its forces guarding the perimeter of the Da Nang airbase. One Marine general later observed that with the arrival of the infantry unit, “the air-ground team was in being in Vietnam.”[9-1]

Other less obvious changes that contributed to the overall efficiency of the Marine task element also occurred during the early spring. In April, the task element commander was able to assign a better facility to medical and dental services. They had been crowded into one of the small structures along with other offices since the displacement from Soc Trang, but now were moved into a separate building in the living compound.

Another problem that plagued the Marines during their entire first year at Da Nang--inadequate water supply--was finally solved in late 1963. Originally the task unit had depended on a shallow well from which water was pumped and purified. The Marines nearly exhausted this source shortly after their arrival at Da Nang late in the dry season and their commanders were forced to impose strict water discipline. The monsoon rains eased the water crisis but by January production again dropped, this time as a result of the accumulation of heavy silt in the pumps. A Vietnamese contractor was engaged to clean and repair the pumping system but the problem soon recurred. In the early spring two new shallow wells were dug, one in the motor transport working area and the other in the living compound. With the onset of the dry season, however, the Marines again were forced to conserve water. This time the shortage became so acute that tank trucks were required to haul some 16,000 gallons of water a day from a nearby Air Force installation. Finally, in November, a detachment from a Navy construction battalion completed a well 450 feet deep and capped it with a high pressure pump. This proved to be the permanent solution to the long-standing water shortage.

Over the course of the year the Marines received several new vehicles which helped relieve the burden on the rebuilt buses which were beginning to falter under heavy use. Four 10-passenger, four-wheel-drive trucks and two M-442 “Mighty Mite” jeeps were flown in by KC-130s from Okinawa and assigned to the task element’s motor transport section. By summer, two of the old buses were replaced with tactical passenger vehicles which were better suited for transporting personnel between the barracks and work areas. The addition of the new vehicles also allowed the mess hall to begin transporting hot noon meals to the men working on the east side of the airstrip. A mess line set up in the hangar area fed those Marines who previously had lost time by travelling to the living compound for noon meals.

Two changes were made in the task element’s command structure in midyear. On 5 July Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Cassidy, a veteran aviator with 20 years service, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Linnemeier as commanding officer of the MABS-16 sub unit. Two weeks later, on the 18th, Colonel Andre D. Gomez, a Marine who had distinguished himself as an artillery officer during World War II before becoming a pilot, assumed command of Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6.

In summary, the improvements made in the task element’s compound during the course of 1963 helped insure the successful support of sustained combat helicopter operations. Although overshadowed by the publicity which the actual flight operations attracted, the continued improvement of the Da Nang base was vital to the overall effectiveness of the Marine combat support effort.

_Combat Support Operations_

Marine helicopter support for government forces in I Corps encountered a brief interruption shortly after the new year began when HMM-163 was replaced by a fresh UH-34D squadron. Marine KC-130s shuttled between Okinawa and Da Nang for several days during the second week of January bringing the officers and men of HMM-162 to Vietnam and returning with members of HMM-163. The change-over of units was completed on 11 January when Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun officially transferred his squadron’s aircraft and maintenance equipment to the newly-arrived unit.

In the five months and ten days since they initiated operations at Soc Trang, “Rathbun’s Ridge Runners” had amassed an enviable combat record. The squadron’s crews had flown a total of 10,869 hours, 15,200 sorties, and had lifted over 25,216 combat assault troops and 59,024 other passengers. In one month alone (August) they had established a Marine Corps record for medium helicopter squadrons by flying 2,543 helicopter hours. These records had not been set without risks, however. During the course of their operations in the Mekong Delta and in I Corps, helicopters operated by HMM-163’s crews had been hit on 32 occasions by Communist small arms fire.[9-2] Moreover, the squadron had become the first Marine unit to suffer combat casualties in the Vietnam conflict.

HMM-162, led by Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, the veteran Marine aviator who had commanded the squadron during the recent deployment to Thailand as part of the 3d MEU, began full-fledged combat support operations the same day that the last of Rathbun’s squadron departed Da Nang. HMM-162’s crews, many of whom had participated in similar operations around Udorn the previous summer, limited their early flights to routine resupply missions and a few medical evacuations. Such missions enabled the squadron’s personnel to become better acquainted with the terrain over which they would operate during the next six months.

The new squadron participated in its first major combat troop lift on January 19, when a break in the monsoon allowed the 2d ARVN Division to execute a heliborne operation into the mountains about 15 miles west of Da Nang. Eighteen Marine UH-34Ds lifted 300 ARVN troops into three separate landing zones near a suspected Communist base area. The squadron’s pilots and crews encountered their first Viet Cong opposition during this troop lift. Upright bamboo stakes obstructed one of the landing zones while at another the enemy fired at the Marine aircraft with small arms. Although two UH-34Ds were hit, none were shot down and the mission was completed successfully.

A month later, on 18 February, the Marine pilots experienced another of the hazards associated with flight operations in Vietnam while attempting to land troops from the 1st ARVN Division in a clearing about 18 miles southwest of Hue. Five helicopters sustained punctures in the bottoms of their fuselages when they accidentally landed on tree stumps concealed by high grass in the landing zone. One stump caused extensive damage to an aircraft when it ripped into its forward fuel cell. The crew was forced to leave the UH-34D in the field under ARVN protection overnight. The next morning Marine mechanics were flown in from Da Nang to repair the helicopter.

Despite several troop lifts involving a dozen or more aircraft, heliborne assault missions did not dominate HMM-162’s operations during the unit’s first three months in South Vietnam. Poor weather conditions over the northern provinces continued to restrict flight operations generally to resupply and medical evacuation missions. Statistics for the first quarter of 1963, for example, indicated that Marine helicopters conducted 6,537 logistics sorties as opposed to 1,181 tactical support sorties.

The single most significant incident during HMM-162’s initial three months in Vietnam took place in the second week of March when the squadron suffered its first aircraft losses and casualties. These were incurred during a salvage-rescue attempt in the mountains of northern II Corps. The incident began on 10 March as two Marine UH-34Ds attempted to insert a four-man American-Vietnamese ground rescue team into the jungle about 30 miles southwest of Quang Ngai. The team’s assignment was to locate a U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk (a twin-engine, turboprop, electronic reconnaissance aircraft manufactured by Grumman) which had crashed, and its pilot, who had parachuted into the jungle. The exact site of the accident had not been located but the general area was known to be a steep jungle-covered mountain, the elevation of which approached 5,000 feet. While attempting to lower search personnel into the jungle by means of a hoist, one of the helicopters lost power and crashed. The ARVN ranger who was on the hoist when the accident occurred was killed but the helicopter’s crew managed to climb from the wreckage shortly before it erupted in flames. The copilot, Captain David N. Webster, was severely burned in the explosion.

Other Marine UH-34Ds from Da Nang joined in the rescue operation, refueling from the TAFDS at Quang Ngai for the flight into the mountains. The situation was complicated further when a second Marine helicopter experienced a power loss and crashed near the burned-out UH-34D hulk while attempting to land a rescue team composed of MABS-16 Marines. Fortunately, the aircraft did not burn and the only injury incurred in the crash was a sprained ankle, but the extremely steep and densely jungled terrain kept the Marines from reaching the site of the other downed helicopter. Bad weather and darkness prevented further efforts to extricate the various American and South Vietnamese personnel from the jungle that day. During the night Captain Webster died of injuries.

The next day, the Marines stripped a UH-34D of some 700 pounds of equipment so as to enable it to operate more efficiently at the extreme elevations in the vicinity of the crash sites. After carefully maneuvering the helicopter into a hovering position, the pilot was able to extract the survivors and the dead copilot from the site where the first UH-34D had crashed and burned. The survivors were flown to Quang Ngai. There the wounded were treated and later evacuated by U.S. Air Force transport to an American hospital at Nha Trang.

While these events were taking place, the Marines from the second downed helicopter, guided by search aircraft operating over the area, located and recovered the injured Army Mohawk pilot. This accomplished, the Marines hacked out a small clearing from which they were evacuated by another Marine helicopter.

The episode was not yet over, however, as the crashed OV-1 and its payload of advanced electronics equipment still had not been secured. Finally, an ARVN ranger company, which had joined the search, reached the remnants of the Mohawk and established security around the site while U.S. Army technicians were helilifted in to examine the debris. The Marine UH-34D, which had crashed nearby without burning and was damaged beyond repair, was cannibalized for usable parts and then destroyed.

On 13 March, with the search and rescue tasks completed, Marine helicopters began shuttling South Vietnamese rangers to Mang Buc, a nearby government outpost. During this phase of the mission the helicopters received fire from Viet Cong who had moved into positions near the rangers’ perimeter. Three UH-34Ds delivered suppressive fire on the enemy with their door-mounted M-60 machine guns while the remaining helicopters picked up the troops in the landing zone. This was the first recorded instance of a Marine helicopter providing close air support in actual combat.

Other developments occurred in the early months of 1963 which either directly or indirectly affected the conduct of Marine helicopter operations. One was the improved coordination of intelligence gathering and usage among all South Vietnamese and American agencies within I Corps. This effort, which was essentially a concerted drive to streamline the collection and flow of intelligence information, was stimulated by a series of corps-wide intelligence seminars, the first of which was held in early February. Of special interest to the Marine aviators was the establishment of closer liaison between the Marine task element, U.S. Army Special Forces, and South Vietnamese units in the northern corps tactical zone.

Closely related to the improvement of the overall intelligence situation was the acquisition of some new equipment by the SHUFLY Marines. In March the task element received two new model hand-held aerial cameras for use by the crews of the O-1B observation aircraft. Later in the month a photo lab was completed to facilitate the rapid processing of the photographs. By the end of the month the Marines were also being provided with high altitude photographic coverage of some objective areas taken by U.S. Air Force reconnaissance jets.

The tempo of Marine helicopter operations began to quicken in early April with the advent of sustained periods of clear weather. On 13 April, HMM-162 participated in a major heliborne assault in which 435 2d ARVN Division troops were lifted into a suspected Communist stronghold in the mountains along the Song Thu Bon, about 30 miles south of Da Nang. As in most troop lift missions, the Marine O-1Bs provided reconnaissance and radio relay support. For the first time in the war Marine transport helicopters were escorted by helicopter gunships, the UH-1B Iroquois (a single-engine, turbine-powered utility helicopter built by the Bell Helicopter Company). Five UH-1Bs from a detachment of the Army’s Da Nang-based 68th Aviation Company, armed with M-60 machine gun clusters and 2.75-inch rockets, joined the VNAF fighter bombers to conduct preparatory airstrikes on the landing zones.

The initial landing met no enemy resistance but later in the day action in the operational area intensified. A Marine UH-34D was hit by eight rounds of enemy small arms fire while attempting to evacuate wounded South Vietnamese soldiers and U.S. Army advisors from a landing zone near the point where the ARVN forces had been landed that morning. With the copilot, First Lieutenant John D. Olmen, wounded, the badly damaged aircraft force landed in the Vietnamese position.

Two other Marine helicopters were dispatched to the scene to pick up the Marine crew and complete the evacuation. They managed to evacuate Lieutenant Olmen, a wounded American advisor, and one dead and four wounded ARVN soldiers without incident. On a return trip to pick up more wounded, however, one of the two UH-34Ds suffered heavy damage from Viet Cong fire. In this incident the crew chief, Corporal Charley M. Campbell, was wounded in the thigh, chest, and back by small arms fire, and the aircraft was forced to land near the first downed helicopter. The accompanying UH-34D landed, picked up Campbell, and returned him to Da Nang for emergency treatment. Repair teams were helilifted to the position on the afternoon of the 13th, and began repairing both helicopters. One was able to return to Da Nang later that day but the other required extensive repairs and could not be flown to safety until the 15th.

While HMM-162 repair crews were working feverishly to extricate their aircraft from the predicament along the banks of the Song Thu Bon, another of their helicopters was shot down nearby while supporting the same operation. This aircraft was hit four times while approaching an ARVN landing zone located in a small valley about three miles south of the action in which the two helicopters had been lost earlier. After temporary repairs were made, its crew flew the damaged UH-34D to Da Nang where more detailed repair work was accomplished.

The number of combat support sorties flown into the mountains by HMM-162’s crews rose steadily as the weather improved. Near the end of April, the Marines helilifted three battalions of the 1st ARVN Division into the mountains of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces near the Laotian border. These units were to participate in an extended multi-regiment drive against suspected Communist infiltration routes there. This operation, for which Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s squadron provided daily support after the initial landing, taxed the durability of both the Marine crews and their aircraft. For 90 days task element helicopters flew into and out of hazardous landing zones located at elevations as high as 4,500 feet. The majority of these sorties were resupply and medical evacuation missions with the occasional exception being the heliborne displacement of infantry and artillery units when distance or terrain prohibited overland movement. Despite the dangers inherent in helicopter operations conducted over mountainous terrain, the squadron incurred no aircraft or personnel losses while supporting the offensive in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

While his squadron’s support of the 1st ARVN Division’s ongoing drive near the Laotian border continued, Lieutenant Colonel Leu committed 21 UH-34Ds to support the offensive against the Do Xa base area along the southern edge of I Corps. On 27 April, Marine crews helilifted over 567 troops of the 2d ARVN Division into the mountainous area roughly 22 miles southwest of Tam Ky to begin Operation BACH PHUONG XI. The squadron was less fortunate during this operation than it was during the lengthy Quang Tri effort. One helicopter was shot down by Viet Cong fire which wounded the pilot, Captain Virgil R. Hughes, in the leg. The crew and the embarked ARVN soldiers escaped further injury when the aircraft made a crash landing in which it suffered extensive damage. After the crew was rescued, a salvage team from Da Nang stripped the helicopter of all usable parts and burned the hulk so the Viet Cong could not make use of it. This was the first Marine helicopter loss definitely attributed to direct enemy action.[9-3]

Following the initial heliborne assaults into the Do Xa area, two UH-34Ds were rotated to Tra My from Da Nang on a daily basis. Refueling from the TAFDS bladder, these standby aircraft were used primarily to perform medical evacuation missions for VNMC and ARVN units involved in BACH PHOUNG XI. Before the operation ended in mid-May, HMM-162’s crews had evacuated nearly 100 Marine and ARVN casualties from hazardous landing zones scattered along the border of I and II Corps. The task element’s O-1Bs also provided aerial reconnaissance support for all phases of the operation. On 19 May, the day before BACH PHOUNG XI terminated, 12 Marine UH-34Ds lifted the two Vietnamese Marine battalions to the provisional brigade command post at Tra My. This particular phase of the operation evoked favorable comment from an anonymous U.S. Marine pilot who noted on an unsigned debriefing form that the heliborne withdrawal had gone smoothly and that the Vietnamese Marines appeared “well organized in the landing zones and at Tra My.”[9-4] BACH PHOUNG XI ended unceremoniously the following day when HMM-162 helilifted the ARVN battalions from the Do Xa base area.

One trend which became increasingly apparent as the spring of 1963 unfolded was the growing utilization of the Army UH-1B helicopter gunships as escorts to and from landing zones. The gunships accompanied all Marine assault helilifts and medical evacuations, and when available, also escorted resupply flights in order to provide suppressive fire around government positions while landings were in progress. Although well suited for the escort missions, the lightly armed UH-1Bs did not replace the Vietnamese Air Force attack aircraft as the principal source of preparatory air strikes around landing zones being used for assault helilifts. The Marines continued to rely on the more heavily armed VNAF T-28s and A-1Hs to conduct the so-called “prep strikes.”[9-A]

[9-A] As a result of the joint helicopter operations in I Corps, a vigorous debate developed within the Marine Corps concerning the value of armed helicopters. This debate and the subsequent development, procurement, and operations of Marine helicopter gunships will be covered in a separate historical monograph being prepared by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

May was the last full month of combat support operations for Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s squadron. In the first week of June, transports from VMGR-152 began landing at Da Nang with the Marines of a new UH-34D squadron. Since assuming responsibility for helicopter support in I Corps in mid-January, HMM-162 had compiled a solid combat record. While under the squadron’s operations, the UH-34D helicopters had flown 17,670 sorties for a total of 8,579 flight hours. The O-1Bs added approximately 400 sorties and another 1,000 hours to these figures. In the month of May alone HMM-162’s helicopters flew over 2,000 flight hours--a number which approached the record set by HMM-163 during the previous summer in the Mekong Delta. Other statistics reflected the growing intensity of the Vietnam war. Since its deployment to Da Nang, Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s unit had lost three helicopters--two as a result of operations at extreme elevations and one to enemy fire. One member of the unit had been killed and three others wounded since the squadron entered the combat zone.[9-5]

After a brief change-over period, the outgoing squadron commander officially turned over his unit’s aircraft and maintenance equipment on 8 June to Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Shook, the commanding officer of HMM-261. Shook, who had flown Marine helicopters in combat during the Korean War, committed his crews to their first actual combat missions that same day.

A significant change took place in the coordinating arrangements that governed U.S. helicopter units supporting I Corps at approximately the same time that HMM-261 initiated combat support operations. Since its relocation at Da Nang, the Marine task element, along with all other aviation units in I CTZ, had received its missions from the Air Support Operations Center located within the corps headquarters. As the number of U.S. and VNAF aviation organizations assigned to I Corps grew and the total number of missions multiplied, it became necessary to modify the system of coordination and control. In accordance with a ComUSMACV directive, I Corps headquarters created an Aviation Headquarters Operations Center (AHOC) to oversee the employment of Marine and Army aircraft in the CTZ. The AHOC, which was composed of a senior Army representative, a senior Marine representative, and an operations section, was to be directed by the Commander, Task Element 79.3.3.6. Formally stated, its primary mission was to “plan, direct, and control the employment of all Army and Marine Corps Aviation Units and aircraft operations in direct support of I Corps.” The newly organized AHOC was also ordered to “participate in, and provide assistance to operational planning and the coordination of employment of USA/USMC Aviation with VNAF/USAF tactical air.”[9-6] The AHOC, therefore, was formed to supplement rather than replace the older Air Support Operations Center, which continued to direct and control all U.S. Air Force and VNAF operations over the northern provinces. It was under this arrangement that U.S. Marine and Army aviation units operated after mid-1963.

HMM-261’s Marines began encountering systematic Viet Cong resistance to their operations shortly after their first combat missions in early June. A 21-aircraft assault mission into the mountains west of Da Nang was aborted on 6 July when the Marine pilots discovered that the Viet Cong had obstructed the two available landing zones with upright stakes. While inspecting one of the landing zones on a low pass, a helicopter was hit in the forward fuel cell by Communist small arms fire. The damage to the aircraft was not serious enough to force a landing, but the pilot of an escorting U.S. Army UH-1B was mortally wounded while attempting to suppress the ground fire.

Ten days after the enemy forced the cancellation of the assault mission west of Da Nang, HMM-261 suffered its first aircraft loss in Vietnam. The crash, which was later attributed to mechanical failure, occurred about 37 miles southwest of Da Nang while one of the squadron’s helicopters was on a routine logistics mission. Six passengers, two American advisors and four ARVN soldiers, were injured in the accident. The squadron commander dispatched two other UH-34Ds to the scene of the crash to evacuate the wounded and insert a salvage team. The badly damaged aircraft was assessed as beyond repair and was destroyed.

In the second week of August, officers from HMM-261 and the task element’s staff (under the command of Colonel Gomez) met with American and Vietnamese officers at I Corps headquarters to plan a large-scale heliborne retrograde movement. The planned helilift was to mark the culmination of Operation LAM SON XII, a three-week long offensive by several battalions of the 2d ARVN Division against Communist infiltration routes in Quang Nam Province along the Laotian border. Although not encircled, the ARVN battalions had encountered increasing Viet Cong pressure since early August. I Corps authorities feared that unless their units were withdrawn promptly they might be cut off from the few landing zones that existed in the rugged operations area.

As planned, the retrograde operation involved helilifting some 1,300 troops with their artillery and equipment to Thuong Duc, a government-held town situated 30 miles southwest of Da Nang along the Song Vu Gia. The operation plan called for the commitment of 20 Marine helicopters, 18 of which would participate in the actual troop lifts. The two extra UH-34Ds would be used in the event it became necessary either to replace helicopters assigned to the troop lift or to conduct search and rescue operations for downed aircraft. Three VNAF UH-34s and two U.S. Army unarmed UH-1Bs were designated by the I Corps headquarters to assist HMM-261 with the helilift.

The Da Nang Air Support Operations Center assigned a variety of other aircraft to support the operation. These included two VNAF T-28s, one FARM GATE B-26, and two U.S. Army UH-1B gunships. These aircraft would share the task of providing close air support for the troop lift. A Marine O-1B was scheduled to perform weather reconnaissance missions.

The entire air operation was to be coordinated from two aircraft. An American forward air controller in a VNAF observation plane was to direct all air strikes while overall control for the multiservice, bilingual effort was to come from a U.S. Air Force U-10 Super Courier. This six-man, single engine aircraft, which possessed an eight hour fuel capacity and carried three radios, would serve as an airborne air support operations center (Airborne ASOC). It would be flown by an Air Force pilot and would carry a Marine officer from the task element along with U.S. and Vietnamese representatives from the Da Nang ASOC. These officers would be in continuous radio contact with all aircraft in the operations area, and also with the U.S. Air Force liaison officer to I Corps who would be positioned with the ground troops.

The concept of the operation called for the ARVN units to be lifted from two hazardous landing zones over a three-day period. According to the plan 500 ARVN soldiers were to be removed from Landing Zone HOTEL on Thursday, 15 August. Landing Zone HOTEL, a small clearing which could accommodate only three UH-34Ds, was situated along a river and was crowded between two 1,000-foot-high ridgelines only five miles from the Laotian border. The steep, jungle-covered ridges generally paralleled each other less than 400 meters apart on either side of the landing zone. Slightly west of the small clearing the ridges joined to form a box canyon. The physical structure of the location dictated that the transport helicopters use the same approach and retirement routes.

Due largely to the proximity of the high terrain which surrounded Landing Zone HOTEL, the ARVN adopted a Marine proposal to leave a 125-man security force on the two ridges. This force would provide cover for the helicopters conducting the final troop lift during this first phase of the retrograde movement. The 125 South Vietnamese soldiers would move cross-country to another landing zone to be picked up by helicopters following the completion of the helilift from Landing Zone HOTEL.

The second landing zone, codename ZULU, was nearly as treacherous as the first. ZULU was completely encircled by a rim of hills some 500 feet higher than the floor of the landing site. In addition to the 125-man security force from HOTEL, the Marine, Army, and VNAF helicopters were scheduled to lift 200 ARVN troops and two 105mm howitzers from this landing zone on 16 and 17 August (the second and third days of the operation).

An unexpected complication developed the morning the operation began when the Air Force grounded its B-26s after one of the attack bombers crashed elsewhere in the northern portion of Vietnam as a result of undetermined causes. Shortly after this crash, HMM-261 was called upon to divert a flight of helicopters to assist in search and rescue operations for the downed B-26, thus reducing even further the assets available to support the heliborne retrograde.

Despite the loss of some of the air power assigned to the operation, I Corps authorities elected to proceed with the helilift from Landing Zone HOTEL as planned. After the crew of a Marine O-1B confirmed that good weather prevailed over the operations area, the first helicopters departed Da Nang on schedule. Less than half an hour after take off the Marine and Vietnamese pilots began maneuvering their aircraft between the two ridges which dominated Landing Zone HOTEL. Twice during the pickup the armed UH-1B escorts drew fire from the thick jungle on one side of the approach lanes being used by the transports. Both times they returned fire in the direction of the unseen enemy and forced him to silence his weapons. The first phase of the operation was completed without serious incident four hours after it had begun.

The second phase of the helilift began the next morning with the two unarmed U.S. Army UH-1Bs making several trips to Landing Zone ZULU to lift out the disassembled ARVN 105mm howitzers. The Marine and VNAF transport helicopters followed and continued to shuttle troops out of the landing zone for three hours without encountering enemy opposition. Then a departing flight of UH-34Ds drew fire from a nearby ridgeline. One of the escorting UH-1Bs immediately marked the suspected target for the VNAF T-28s and the attack aircraft bombed and strafed the position. The Communist activity ceased.

After an overnight march, the covering force from Landing Zone HOTEL arrived at Landing Zone ZULU. Although they were not scheduled to be removed from the field until the next day, the schedule was adjusted and the 125 weary ARVN soldiers were flown to the secure assembly area on the afternoon of their arrival. This modification reduced the amount of work which would be required of the helicopters on the final day of the operation.

The next phase of the helilift from ZULU on 17 August was characterized by increasing concern for security around the landing site. The general scheme for protecting the helicopters during this critical stage of the exercise was to establish two perimeters, one around the rim of high ground which surrounded the zone and another around the immediate landing site. The outer perimeter would be withdrawn first, leaving the inside ring of troops to deny the enemy direct access to the landing zone while the force from the outer perimeter boarded the helicopters. Once the Vietnamese soldiers were withdrawn from the rim of hills, the area within 300 meters of the close-in defenses would be automatically cleared for air strikes. Even with these precautions the helicopters would be extremely vulnerable to any enemy force that might rapidly occupy the high ground above Landing Zone ZULU following the withdrawal of the outer perimeter. Accordingly, once the troops from the outer defenses were staged for the helilift, the transport helicopters would be directed by the airborne ASOC to tighten the landing interval between aircraft from the usual five minutes to as short a time span as possible. By landing in such rapid succession, the dangerous final stage of the operation could be accomplished more quickly.

Two hours after the helilift began on Saturday morning, the air liaison officer at ZULU reported that the outer perimeter had been withdrawn and that all remaining Vietnamese troops were in positions around the landing zone. At this point the operation, now in its most critical phase, began to experience agonizing delays. First, a loaded helicopter arrived at the assembly area with a rough running engine. Fearing that the fuel in the TAFDS had somehow become contaminated, Lieutenant Colonel Shook instructed all HMM-261 pilots to check their aircraft’s fuel strainers while their passengers disembarked at the assembly point. No evidence was found to indicate that the fuel contained contaminants, but the operation was slowed at the exact point where the intensified helilift was to have begun. Another minor delay occurred after a helicopter flying near the landing zone reported having drawn enemy ground fire. The approach and departure routes were adjusted slightly so that the transport helicopters would not fly over the area and VNAF T-28s were directed to attack the suspected enemy position. Shortly after the air strike ended the air liaison officer at the landing zone reported more enemy activity only 500 meters from his position. This momentary crisis was resolved when the American air liaison officer personally directed armed UH-1Bs to neutralize the target area.

Finally, the airborne ASOC passed instructions to proceed with the operation, whereupon HMM-261 and VNAF helicopters began spiraling down into the landing zone. The escorting UH-1B gunships provided continuous protection for the transport helicopters by flying concentric but opposite patterns around them. One after another the transports landed, took on troops, climbed out of the landing zone, and turned toward Thuong Duc. Less than five minutes after the stepped-up helilift began, the last troops were airborne. The crew chief of the helicopter which embarked the final ARVN heliteam then dropped a purple smoke grenade into the empty landing zone to signal all other aircraft that the lift was complete.

The three-day heliborne retrograde from the Laotian border proved to be one of the most efficient helicopter operations conducted by the Marines in the Republic of Vietnam during the early 1960s. Its success was due largely to detailed planning, particularly the South Vietnamese plans for the ground defense of both landing zones. These plans and their subsequent execution led a grateful Colonel Gomez, the task element commander, to declare: “This was the first time in our experience that a helicopter-borne withdrawal had been treated as a retrograde operation rather than an administrative lift. Without a sound retrograde plan the operation might well have failed.”[9-7]

Although this observation was correct, it should be added that the close coordination between the airborne ASOC, the operational aircraft, and the air liaison officer on the ground had contributed to the successful execution of the plans. These agencies were instrumental in coordinating the bilingual, multiservice effort, particularly when it was beset with difficulties in its critical final stage.

HMM-261’s combat support missions continued at a normal rate following the completion of the mid-August retrograde helilift. A month later, on 16 September, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s squadron lost its second UH-34D in a crash 25 miles west-southwest of Hue. The helicopter, which had developed mechanical problems while carrying troops of a South Vietnamese assault force, was damaged beyond repair. Its crew members and passengers fortunately escaped injury. The aircraft was stripped of usable parts by a salvage team from Da Nang and burned.

Shortly after this incident, the first elements of a new squadron began arriving at Da Nang and HMM-261 turned to preparations for its departure. Since early June, when it had become the fourth Marine helicopter squadron assigned to SHUFLY, Lieutenant Colonel Shook’s unit had accumulated 5,288 combat flying hours and 11,406 sorties in the UH-34Ds alone. The squadron’s crews had helilifted over 6,000 troops, nearly 1,900,000 pounds of cargo, and had accomplished over 600 medical evacuation missions.[9-8]

The new squadron, HMM-361, assumed responsibility for helicopter support in I Corps on 2 October after a short period of orientation flying with the crews of the departing unit. HMM-361’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Ross, was well qualified to direct a tactical aviation unit in a combat situation. Decorated with five Distinguished Flying Crosses during World War II and Korea, he was a recent graduate of the Air Force Command and Staff College.

Barely a week after Ross’ squadron initiated combat support operations at Da Nang, it suffered its first aircraft and personnel losses. The incident occurred on 8 October when two UH-34Ds crashed almost simultaneously while on a search and rescue mission 38 miles southwest of Da Nang. Both helicopters burned, killing 10 men; the pilots, copilots, the squadron’s flight surgeon, and five crewmen. A search of the area was initiated immediately for the downed aircraft, but darkness prevented their discovery until the next morning. By then the Viet Cong had surrounded both crash sites and were waiting to ambush the search and rescue helicopters which they knew would arrive. When the rescue aircraft attempted to land, they met determined enemy opposition. Colonel Gomez requested ARVN assistance and 254 South Vietnamese troops were lifted into nearby clearings with instructions to dislodge the enemy force from the area around the downed aircraft. While executing the landing, HMM-361 helicopters were hit nine times by small arms fire, but suffered only superficial damage. One ARVN soldier was killed.

The following day, as the South Vietnamese forces moved toward the downed UH-34Ds, three Marine helicopters escorted by three armed UH-1Bs and two VNAF T-28s lifted an inspection team into the crash site to recover the bodies and investigate the wreckage. Enemy automatic weapons fire broke out while the UH-34Ds waited in the landing zone and forced the pilots to take off while the inspection team found cover on the ground. After the Communist fire had been suppressed, the helicopters returned for the stranded Marines. Their investigation of the aircraft hulks had been fruitful: the evidence of enemy small arms fire in the wreckage and the relative positions of the two helicopters led Lieutenant Colonel Ross to conclude that the aircraft had been shot down by the Viet Cong.[9-9] But this was not a conclusive finding. There was room for speculation that the two helicopters had actually collided in midair while attempting to evade ground fire.

Ground action in the hills around the crash sites continued. On 11 October, another Marine helicopter was hit by Viet Cong fire while resupplying ARVN units in the area. In this incident the UH-34D was struck twice in the engine and once in the wheel strut while in a landing zone about two miles from the point where the crashes had occurred. After assessing the damage, a maintenance team from Da Nang determined that the helicopter would require a new engine. Marines from the security platoon were utilized to provide security until 13 October when an additional 120 ARVN troops were helilifted into the area and established a perimeter around the aircraft. Other helicopters then delivered the new engine and a maintenance crew to the landing zone. After the engines were exchanged, a crew returned the UH-34D to Da Nang.

By the time HMM-361 had removed the last ARVN troops from the hills around the scene of the tragic accidents, monsoon weather had begun to restrict flight operations. The remaining two weeks of October were characterized by a reduced number of missions, most of which were either resupply or medical evacuations. By the end of October, despite numerous flight cancellations, Lieutenant Colonel Ross’ crews had gained the unenviable distinction of having attracted more enemy fire during a one month period than any previous squadron to serve with SHUFLY. Their helicopters had been shot at on 46 different occasions and had been hit 18 times.[9-10]

SHUFLY’s combat support operations came to a halt in the first days of November as the reverberations from Diem’s overthrow spread to South Vietnam’s northern provinces. American officials in Washington and Saigon, aware of the pitfalls that might accompany open support of either side in the power struggle, ordered all U.S. military forces to cease advisory and combat support activities. As a result of the sensitive political situation, no U.S. aircraft left the ground on 2 November. Two days after the new regime seized power in Saigon, the U.S. Marine helicopters were permitted to perform emergency medical evacuation and emergency resupply missions. Even these flights were to be approved beforehand by ARVN military officers in Saigon. Four days after Diem’s overthrow, the new leaders in Saigon eased the political restrictions and SHUFLY’s operations returned to near normal. One remaining limitation stipulated that U.S. helicopters could not transport ARVN units into population centers even though troops could be helilifted from the cities into rural areas.

Due to torrential monsoon rains which began striking the Da Nang area in mid-November, HMM-361’s combat support operations continued at a relatively low level throughout the remainder of the year. This trend was confirmed by the flight totals compiled for the final two months of 1963. In November, the squadron’s UH-34Ds flew only 145 sorties for 233 flight hours. December’s statistics, 230 helicopter sorties for 338 flight hours, indicated a slight upswing but fell far short of the monthly figures achieved earlier in the year. With rain and fog frequently rendering the mountains inaccessible by air, the preponderance of the squadron’s missions were conducted along the coastal plains. As 1963 ended SHUFLY’s combat support operations were continuing at a greatly reduced rate.

_The Situation in Vietnam_

Although not yet desperate, the overall situation in South Vietnam at the end of 1963 was far from favorable. Mismanaged and poorly coordinated from the outset, the Strategic Hamlet Program had failed to fulfill even the most moderate of American and South Vietnamese expectations. Little discernable headway had been made toward restoring any large segment of the populated rural areas to government control. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had disregarded the Geneva Agreement of 1962 and had continued to infiltrate troops and material down the Laotian corridor into the South. Although the 1963 figure of 4,200 confirmed infiltrators was roughly 1,000 men lower than the figure for the previous year, it was substantial enough to force the government to deviate more and more from its avowed strategy of clearing Viet Cong formations from the vital populated areas. To help meet this continuing influx of Communist regulars, the government had committed its ground force to operations against base areas located in the remote hinterlands with increasing frequency. More often than not these multi-battalion offensives, such as the VNMC-ARVN drive into the Do Xa base area in May, proved futile, usually resulting in scattered and inconsequential clashes with small groups of Viet Cong. The continuation of such actions, of course, worked to the advantage of the Communists as the government forces expended time, energy, and lives without exacting a commensurate price from the enemy.

Other disturbing trends had emerged on the South’s battlefields during the course of the year. Following an action fought in the Mekong Delta during early January in which the Viet Cong soundly defeated a multi-battalion ARVN heliborne force, enemy main force units continued to maintain their integrity and fought back when confronted with helicopter assaults. This trend was evident even in the northern provinces where each successive assault by Marine helicopters appeared to meet more determined resistance. Aside from the Viet Cong’s new-found confidence in countering heliborne offensives, another source of concern to U.S. and Vietnamese officials was the appearance in the South of several Viet Cong regimental headquarters during the year. The activation of these headquarters, which assumed control of already operational main force battalions, seemed to presage another phase of Communist military escalation.

The situation throughout South Vietnam worsened in the aftermath of the Diem coup. Subsequent to the widespread command changes ordered by the new government, the morale, and in turn the effectiveness, of the Vietnamese armed forces declined sharply. The Viet Cong moved quickly to exploit the prevailing state of confusion by staging a rash of attacks in the weeks after Diem’s overthrow--attacks which worked a profound influence on the already faltering Strategic Hamlet Program. “The fall of the Ngo regime,” wrote one American scholar, “was accompanied by the complete collapse of the pacification efforts in many areas, and vast regions that had been under government control quickly came under the influence of the Viet Cong.”[9-11] The nation’s new leaders therefore formally terminated the badly damaged Strategic Hamlet Program. Although it was soon to be replaced with similar pacification campaigns, most Vietnamese and American officials conceded that much time and energy would be required to restore momentum to the government’s efforts at securing the allegiance of the rural population. So, by the end of 1963 both the tempo and effectiveness of South Vietnam’s overall war effort was at its lowest ebb since the intensification of the U.S. military assistance program in early 1962.

[Illustration: _ARVN troops fan out from an HMM-361 helicopter during an assault into the mountains of I Corps. (USMC Photo A420866)._]

This threatening situation was hardly consistent with American military plans which were being implemented at year’s end. Drawn up at Secretary of Defense McNamara’s direction and approved by him in the late summer of 1963, these plans called for a phased withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. servicemen from Vietnam by January 1964. The phased withdrawal plan, whose ultimate objective was to end direct American participation in the war, envisioned a gradual scaling down of U.S. involvement while simultaneously turning over more military responsibility to the South Vietnamese. Included in the initial 1,000-man reduction was the 47-man security platoon which had guarded the U.S. Marine task element’s compound at Da Nang since April. For the Marines serving with the task element, 1963 thus ended on an incongruous note. While the Viet Cong threat appeared on the rise, their own defenses were being reduced. Clearly, events in Vietnam had overtaken long-range plans already in motion.

PART IV

AN EXPANDING GROUND WAR, 1964