CHAPTER II

THE OUTLOOK WAS, AT FIRST, NOT PLEASING

THE SILLY CRY OF “ON TO CANADA!”--THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES COMPARED WITH THOSE OF GREAT BRITAIN--THE FORESIGHT AND QUICK WORK OF CAPTAIN RODGERS IN GETTING A SQUADRON TO SEA--BUT HE MISSED THE JAMAICA FLEET HE WAS AFTER, AND WHEN HE FELL IN WITH A BRITISH FRIGATE, THE RESULTS OF THE AFFAIR WERE LAMENTABLE.

Although “vast multitudes” of the American people had “passionately wished for” a declaration of war against Great Britain, that declaration was, indeed, “a solemn and serious fact” to those who stopped to consider what odds must be met. What those odds were will be told further on, but in view of the fact that the naval supremacy of England is about as pronounced at the end of the nineteenth century as it was at the beginning, it is well worth while giving a glance at the plans of the Americans in 1812. For the cry was “_on to Canada!_” Canada was very likely to welcome an opportunity to join the republic, but even if she did not do that she was but feeble, and the spirited Yankee militia would overrun the whole region and take revenge for the wrongs received at the hands of the English by annexing the whole fair domain. The sea-power of Great Britain was overwhelming, of course, but we had coast-defence vessels by the hundred--nearly three hundred schooners carrying a big gun each, and these should defend the principal American forts while the valiant militia slaughtered the Canadians! The majority of the American people seriously believed that the way to defend American citizens from the aggressions of the only nation likely to abuse them was by building a navy for coast defence only and marching to Canada when ready for offensive operations. But if that must seem astonishing to every one who has rightly studied the war of 1812, what can be said of the fact that this same theory of protecting the United States from British aggression is still held by as great a majority as ever? For it must not be forgotten that the American assaults on Canada were as futile as the American militia were worthless. There was but one fight made by the land forces alone of which Americans are proud--that at New Orleans.

[Illustration: A Brigantine of a Hundred Years Ago at Anchor.

_From a picture drawn and engraved by Baugean._]

On a casual glance at the American sea-power in 1812 the lack of confidence in it was merited. For of sea-going craft we had only 17, carrying all told 442 guns and 5,025 men. Even of these ships two were condemned as unfit for service as soon as they were inspected. And as for the gun-boats, they were simply brushed aside the moment actual hostilities began. But Great Britain had 1,048 ships to our 17; these ships carried 27,800 guns to our 442 and 151,572 men to our 5,025. Of course the majority of these ships were employed elsewhere than on the American coast. But by the London _Times_ of December 28, 1812, the British had, “from Halifax to the West Indies, seven times the force of the whole American navy.” By a pennant sheet taken from the British schooner _Highflyer_ in 1813 there were on the American coast on March 13th, 107 British ships rated as carrying 3,055 guns, among which were 12 ships of the line rated as seventy-fours. As a matter of fact these ships actually carried at least ten per cent. more guns than their rating indicated. That this preponderance was increased as time passed, and that there was good reason for increasing it, will appear farther on.

The faint-hearted, indeed, were not without reason when they spoke of the declaration of war as “the dreaded and alarming intelligence.” But if the reader wishes for a correct idea of the quality of the men who in that day stood erect, facing the quarter-deck, and uncovered their heads whenever the brawny quartermaster hoisted the old flag, he will find it in the fact that they--the men of the American navy--were the foremost among those who “passionately wished for” a war with this power--a power that outnumbered them and out-weighed them on their own coast as seven to one.

[Illustration: An English Admiral of 1809.

_From an engraving at the Navy Department, Washington._]

Nor was the power of the British navy found only in the number and size of her ships and the number and size of the guns. “Since the year 1792 each European nation in turn had learned to feel bitter dread of the weight of England’s hand. In the Baltic Sir Samuel Hood had taught the Russians that they must needs keep in port when the English cruisers were in the offing. The descendants of the Vikings had seen their whole navy destroyed at Copenhagen. No Dutch fleet ever put out after the day when, off Camperdown, Lord Duncan took possession of De Winter’s shattered ships. But a few years before 1812 the greatest sea-fighter of all time had died in Trafalgar Bay, and in dying had crumbled to pieces the navies of France and Spain.” In spite of the infamous system under which the British ships were manned, the personnel of the British navy was--one is tempted to say it was beyond comparison better than that of any other European nation. For the others felt “the lack of habit--may it not even be said without injustice, of aptitude for the sea.” The officers and men who gathered to crush the navy of the young republic came from Aboukir and Copenhagen and Trafalgar Bay. They were veterans in naval warfare--men who preferred short weapons as the Romans did, men who preferred to fight with yard-arm interlocking yard-arm, where short carronades were better than long guns of smaller bore, and where even these might be made more effective through loading with double shot. Luckily for us their long experience had engendered prejudiced conservatism, their many victories had cultivated an overweening confidence, and their bull-dog courage had made them careless of the arts of seamanship.

As to the ability of the American crews who were to meet these tar-stained, smoke-begrimed, cicatrice-marked veterans, enough will be told in the descriptions of their battles, for they astounded the whole world.

Nevertheless, the war at sea began in a fashion to discourage the nation and humiliate the whole navy.

On the day (June 18, 1812) that war was declared, the effective part of the American navy--the only American naval ships ready for a fight--lay in New York Harbor, or else were at sea where they could not hear the news. The ships in New York were the flag-ship _President_, rated forty-four, Captain Rodgers; the _United States_, forty-four, Captain Decatur; the _Congress_, thirty-eight, Captain Smith; the _Hornet_, eighteen, Captain Lawrence, and the _Argus_, sixteen, Lieutenant Sinclair. Nothing more discreditable to the administration of President Madison than this fact can be told. He had seen for months that war was inevitable and yet he had done nothing to gather in the ships and prepare them for the fight. And Monroe was Secretary of State. But for the earnest remonstrances of Captains Bainbridge and Stewart, who repeatedly addressed the Department, every American warship would have been kept in port for harbor defence.

[Illustration: Representation of a Ship-of-war, dressed with flags, and yards manned.

1. American Ensign. 2. Ottoman-Greek 3. Norden. 4. Stralsund. 5. Greek. 6. Brandenburg. 7. Hanover. 8. Prussia. 9. Saxony. 10. Morocco. 11. Maltese. 12. Arabia. 13. Columbia. 14. Mexican. 15. Brazil. 16. Hayti. 17. Japan. 18. Mogul. 19. Buenos Ayres. 20. Spanish. 21. Tunis. 22. St. Domingo. 23. Old Sardinia. 24. Majorca. 25. Peru. 26. English (blue). 27. Venezuela. 28. Chili. 29. Normandy. 30. English (white). 31. French. 32. Tripoli. 33. Salee. 34. Old Portugal. 35. Algiers. 36. Senegal. 37. Oporto. 38. Central America. 39. English (red). 40. E. Russia. 41. Sandwich Islands. 42. American Jack. o. Commodore’s Broad Pendant.

_Note._--Those which have no numbers affixed are the ship’s signals, or, rather, the telegraphic numbers.

_From the “Kedge Anchor.”_]

[Illustration:

1. Paint-room. 2. General store-room. 3. Bread-room. 4. Coal-locker. 5. Tanks. 6. Casks. 7. Chain-locker. 8. Tier gratings. 9. Shot-locker. 10. Shell-room. 11. Spirit-room. 12. Bread-room. 13. Slop-room. 14. Marine stores. 15. Magazine. 16. Light-room.

The Internal Arrangements and Stowage of an American Sloop-of-War.

_From the “Kedge Anchor.”_]

But if the Administration had done nothing, Captain Rodgers, as commodore of the squadron in New York, had done everything--he had done so well that within one hour from the time that a messenger from Washington arrived on board the _President_ with the declaration of war and instructions to put to sea, the whole squadron except the _Essex_ was under sail, heading down New York Bay toward Sandy Hook.

This was on June 21, 1812. Commodore Rodgers was bound out to intercept a big fleet of British merchantmen sailing home from Jamaica, convoyed only by the thirty-six-gun frigate _Thalia_ and the eighteen-gun corvette _Reindeer_. This fleet had left Jamaica, it was said, on the 20th, and it was sure to follow the Gulf Stream under very easy sail. But when Rodgers was a short way out to sea an American brig reported the fleet well down the stream (about due east of Boston and well off shore) on June 17th. The fleet had sailed some days earlier than the Americans had supposed. So the squadron hauled to the northeast in pursuit.

At 6 o’clock on the morning of June 23d, when the squadron was thirty-five miles southwest of Nantucket shoals, a sail was seen. It was the thirty-three-gun frigate _Belvidera_, Captain Byron, that was then lying in wait for a French privateer expected from New London, Connecticut. At once the _Belvidera_ headed toward the American squadron to examine them, but when at 6.30 A.M. she discovered their character she wore around and headed away to the northeast with a smacking breeze over the port quarter and studding-sails set.

At once the Yankees made sail in chase, with the _President_, the swiftest of the squadron when sailing free, well in the lead. By 11 o’clock the _President_ was near enough to warrant clearing for action, but a shift of wind helped the _Belvidera_ and she held her own until 2 P.M., when another shift favored the _President_, so that at 4.20 P.M. the Britisher with her colors flying was within range.

Getting behind one of the long bow-chasers on the forecastle of the _President_, Commodore Rodgers carefully sighted it, and pulling the lanyard, fired the first shot of the war of 1812. It knocked the splinters out of the stern of the flying enemy. The second shot was fired from a bow-chaser on the deck below, and a third was fired on the forecastle. Each of these reached its target. One passed through the rudder-coat, and another, striking the muzzle of a stern-chaser, broke into pieces, which killed two men, severely wounded two more, and slightly wounded three others, including a lieutenant who was aiming the gun.

[Illustration: Guns Secured for a Gale.

_From the “Kedge Anchor.”_]

Greatly elated at the accuracy of their fire, the men working the _President’s_ bow-chaser on the lower deck aimed a fourth shot. A boy with his leather box full of powder-cartridges arrived just as the gunner was pulling his lanyard, and then when the hammer fell the gun exploded and the flames from the splitting breech darted into the open box of powder, setting it off as well.

The explosion knocked the men in all directions, disabled for the moment every one of the bow-chasers, and bursting up the deck above, it threw Commodore Rodgers so violently into the air that when he fell his leg was broken. Of the men standing about the gun two were killed and thirteen wounded.

At that moment the _Belvidera_ opened an effective fire with her stern-chasers, and one of her projectiles came crashing into the _President’s_ bows, and went bounding along the gun-deck, killing a midshipman and wounding a number of seamen. For a time there was not a little confusion on the _President_, but her crew soon got to work again and began to make it warm on the _Belvidera_ once more. But the mistake of yawing to fire broadsides was made. That “a whole broadside battery will be much less likely to ‘disable a flying enemy’ than the cool and careful use of one well-served gun,” has been amply proven. The yawing gave the _Belvidera_ a gain in the race. That she would have waited for a fight with the _President_ but for the presence of the other ships is not doubted, but, as it was, Captain Byron saw that something desperate must be done to escape, so he threw over his spare anchors and boats and fourteen tons of water in casks. So lightened, he was able to outsail the Yankee squadron and escape.

The _President_ lost three killed and nineteen wounded, and was considerably cut up aloft. The _Belvidera_ lost two killed and twenty-two wounded, Captain Byron being among the number. His rigging was also cut up somewhat, but he made such a good running fight of it that a painting, by a British artist, was made of the scene, that, according to Allen’s history, is preserved to this day.

As for the American squadron, it vainly followed the Jamaica fleet to within less than a day’s sail of the English Channel, and returned home by the way of the Madeiras and Azores, reaching Boston after a cruise of sixty-nine days, in which nothing had been accomplished, save only that seven merchantmen were taken and an American ship recaptured.

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