CHAPTER V

.

THE BATTLE Of THE SOMME.

(_a_) July and August, 1916.

The first half of the year 1916 was a period of comparative quiet for the British Expeditionary Force. During those six months it attempted no serious offensive, and the Germans were far too fully occupied in the neighbourhood of Verdun to be able to expend much energy elsewhere. The terrific attack on their eastern stronghold, caused the French much anxiety, and it undoubtedly influenced their strategy. Nevertheless, it did not prevent them making their preparations for the great offensive, which had been planned for the summer, in conjunction with the British. This attack was to take place on a wide front, where the allied lines joined in the Somme district; and the battle which resulted takes its name from that river.

The only part of the Somme battlefield which is of interest in a history of the Fourth Battalion is the neighbourhood of the village of Thiepval and the wood of the same name. From Albert the River Ancre flows in a northerly direction to about St. Pierre Divion, where it turns nearly east towards Miraumont. Its banks rise steeply on both sides; its width is considerable; and the extensive marshes and shallow lagoons, which fringe so much of its course, render it a formidable obstacle. It is surprising that the enemy ever allowed the French to establish themselves on the eastern bank in 1914. By the summer of 1916, many military bridges had been built across the river and its marshes; but the allied bridge-head, though wide, was shallow, particularly at the northern end. Everywhere it was dominated by the Germans, who occupied all the commanding positions on the line of hills. To the north they held the village of Beaumont Hamel, from which they could overlook the whole course of the river, as far south as Albert. Their line crossed the Ancre near St. Pierre Divion and then ran approximately south, including the village of Thiepval, to La Boiselle. Few stronger defensive systems, than that around Thiepval, have ever been constructed on the western front. To the north the village was defended by the mighty Schwaben Redoubt, to the south by the equally formidable Leipsig Redoubt and that network of fortifications, well-styled the “Wonderwork.” Everywhere the line was well supplied with deep dugouts, which were comparatively easy to construct in the chalky soil of the district. The Germans thus had many advantages over the British. Their commanding positions gave them better opportunities for observation, and their machine guns could sweep every inch of ground in No Man’s Land. The shallowness of the bridge-head cramped the British, and hampered their assembly for the attack, while it gave unrivalled opportunities to the enemy artillery.

Nevertheless, it was with the highest hopes that the allied armies looked forward to “Z” day. Months of preparation had been necessary for this offensive, and some account has already been given of the “spade work” done by the Battalion in that connection. Towards the end of June, much time was spent in reconnaissance. Before the battle began all the officers, and most of the N.C.O’s in the Battalion, knew every dump, aid post, ammunition store and source of water supply between the Ancre and Authuille Wood.

The concentration of artillery on the British front was colossal, and the reserves of ammunition seemed almost inexhaustible. A week before the end of the month the guns opened fire, and, from that time, the Germans can have had no doubt of what was coming, and which of their positions were threatened. Day and night, for seven days, the rain of shells poured down on the enemy line without ceasing. A good view of much of the shelled area could be obtained from Senlis Mill, and many officers of the Battalion visited the observation post there, to watch the bombardment. All came away with the same opinion--that nothing could live in the German lines. Their hopes of an early and decisive victory were very high. They had yet to learn the strength of the enemy’s deep dugouts.

The opening of the infantry attack was fixed for the morning of July 1st. The 49th Division formed part of the X. Corps, whose left rested on the River Ancre and right near Authuille Wood. The Corps objectives, including as they did the villages of Grandcourt and Thiepval, and all their outworks, were second to none in difficulty on the British front. The attack there was entrusted to the 32nd Division on the right, and the 36th (Ulster) Division on the left. The 49th Division was held in Corps reserve; it was to assemble in previously-selected positions and there await orders. The Battalion’s assembly position was in Aveluy Wood, where it was to occupy some of the very trenches it had dug about two months before. Just before the battle, Lieut.-Col. E. G. St. Aubyn was summoned to Corps H.Q. There he remained until nearly the end of July, being held in reserve to take command of a brigade should any Brigadier become a casualty during the battle. The command of the Battalion thus devolved on Major J. Walker. “The Commanding Officer wishes all ranks to remember that in the work in front of us we are putting to the test our reputation as a Battalion and has absolute confidence that Officers, N.C.O’s and men will worthily uphold the honour of the Regiment to which we belong,” was his message to the troops on the eve of battle.

About midnight on June 30/July 1st, the Battalion marched out of Senlis. Though its role was still indefinite, everything had been prepared so that it could move into battle at a moment’s notice. The transport moved to lines near Hedauville. The Battalion itself marched to B Assembly Trenches in Aveluy Wood, arriving long before dawn. There was none too much room in the trenches, but all the men were got in somewhere. The enemy was quiet. There can be no doubt that he knew full well what was impending, but he reserved his fire for the better targets which would soon present themselves. Few of the men even tried to sleep; excitement was far too high for that.

At zero hour--7-30 a.m.--the British artillery fire lifted from the enemy front line, and the British and French infantry “went over the top.” Much has been written of that great assault, but nothing need be noticed here, except what took place on the X. Corps front. There the 36th and the 32nd Divisions went forward with a magnificent dash. They swarmed over the first enemy lines; they over-ran Thiepval and St. Pierre Divion, the Schwaben and the Leipsig Redoubts. Some of the Ulstermen even reached Grandcourt Railway Station. But their casualties were appalling. “Mopping-up” was then unheard of; counter-battery work was in its infancy; creeping barrages were unknown. Down came the enemy artillery barrage, and it was such as few had seen before. German machine gunners and riflemen, emerging from the security of their deep dugouts, took the attack in enfilade and in reverse. Men fell in thousands. The survivors were too few to maintain the positions they had reached. By an early hour the attack on the N. Corps front had failed.

Of course, all this was only learned by the Battalion later. From Aveluy Wood nothing could be seen of what was happening on the Corps front. The men knew that the attack had opened; for a time they knew nothing of its progress. They had nothing to do. They were not troubled by enemy shelling, for the hostile artillery had far better targets elsewhere. After some time, wounded began to pass, and also a number of prisoners. The former were eagerly questioned, and some news of the earliest stages of the attack was obtained; but it was not until much later that authentic information was received.

Towards 11-0 a.m., orders to move across the River Ancre arrived. The Battalion Intelligence Officer was immediately sent forward to reconnoitre the bridges and report on the safest; none envied him his job, but, as things turned out, it was simple enough. The enemy was paying no attention to the bridges. About 11-30 a.m. the Battalion moved off by platoons, at fifty yards’ interval, A Company leading. Marching via Brooker’s Pass, it reached the Southern Dugouts near Crucifix Corner, Aveluy, without incident. There it remained until the evening of the next day. The 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt, was also there and accommodation was very crowded; but otherwise the men were not uncomfortable. Aveluy was not shelled. Crowds of stragglers from different battalions of the attacking divisions were coming in to reorganise, and rumours of the failure of the attack were increasing. Apart from carrying wounded to the neighbouring dressing station, and helping men who came back from the line absolutely worn out, the Battalion had nothing to do.

About 7-0 p.m. on July 2nd the Battalion left Aveluy and moved up to relieve the 5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. in Johnstone’s Post. This position was in the narrow and deep valley which lies along the south-eastern edge of Thiepval Wood. Two large cemeteries now occupy a great part of the valley, and the inscriptions on the weather-beaten crosses bear eloquent testimony to the presence of the 49th Division in that area. None who were there in July, 1916, will ever forget it. It was a point at which many trenches met, but, apart from these and a few shelters in the bluff along the edge of Thiepval Wood, there was no cover. When the Battalion arrived that evening, the enemy was putting down a terrific counter-preparation on Johnstone’s Post, where he evidently suspected an assembly for the attack. A continual stream of 15 cm. high explosive shells poured into the hollow from the south-east. The cover of existing trenches was nothing like enough to accommodate the Battalion, and all that could be done was to get the men as close as possible to the steep south-eastern side of the valley, which afforded a little protection.

Very early the next morning, orders were received for the Battalion to support a fresh attack which the 32nd Division was about to make on Thiepval. These orders did not arrive until about half-an-hour before the attack was to begin. What was to be done? Very little was known of the ground; there was no time for reconnaissance; there was not even time to issue proper orders to companies. Fortunately, the instructions were cancelled before zero hour. The 32nd Division, however, made its attack. It had little success. One corner of the Leipsig Salient was taken, and was very useful two months later as a starting point in the operations which outflanked Thiepval on the south. It was also much used as a “show ground” in the next few weeks, as there were many fine enemy dugouts in the German line. Apart from this, the attack was a failure.

The whole Battalion remained at Johnstone’s Post until the evening of July 4th, when two companies moved to the Northern Dugouts, Authuille Bluff. Throughout its stay it was never free from shelling, and frequently the enemy put down counter-preparations of exceptional intensity. Casualties were terrible. The Aid Post became frightfully congested, not only with the Battalion’s own men, but with crowds from other units; and it is no exaggeration to say that the dead lay around it in heaps. None could have done more--few could have done half as much--than Capt. S. S. Greaves, R.A.M.C., did. Day and night he worked without ceasing. He might have been in a hospital, far from the scene of action, for all the excitement he showed. Many a man owed his life to the skill and care lavished on him by the 4th Battalion Medical Officer at Johnstone’s Post. But the casualties of those first days on the Somme were so appalling that the medical staffs were quite inadequate to deal with them. Hour after hour the Battalion worked to clear the wounded, but fresh cases streamed in far more quickly than earlier ones could be evacuated. And all the time, into the midst of that deadly valley, the 5.9’s screamed, taking their remorseless toll of human life and limb. Without a chance of a fight, scores of the Battalion went down. Chief among them was Capt. E. E. Sykes, M.C., an officer of magnificent physique and dauntless courage; one who had gone to France with the original Battalion, and whose men would have followed him “into the mouth of hell.” Fearfully wounded in the abdomen, he died shortly after at the Aid Post, and his body rests in Authuille Military Cemetery, not far from the scene of his death.

But enough has been said of these horrors. Men who were there will ever remember them. Others who know what battle is can picture them, far better than words can describe. To those who have been fortunate enough never to see such things, no language can describe them.

[Illustration: Capt. W. N. EVERITT, M.C.

(Killed).]

[Illustration: Capt. C. HIRST.

(Killed).]

[Illustration: Lieut. J. T. RILEY.

(Killed).]

[Illustration: Capt. S. S. GREAVES, D.S.O., M.C., R.A.M.C.]

On the evening of July 5th the Battalion relieved the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. in the front line, just in front of Thiepval village. It was responsible for a sector about a thousand yards in length, and all four companies held portions of the front line. These trenches were the very ones from which the attack had been launched on July 1st--no permanent advance had been made on that front, nor was there to be any until late in September. No Man’s Land was thick with dead; occasionally a wounded man, who had lain out for days, succeeded in crawling into the British lines. Trenches and shelters had been so terribly battered that all work had to be concentrated on the necessary repairs. The enemy artillery was extremely active, and many men were killed or wounded before the two days’ tour came to an end. When the Battalion was relieved on July 7th, partly by the 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., and partly by the 5th Battalion King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, it withdrew to the assembly trenches in Aveluy Wood, which it had occupied on the morning of July 1st. The relief was very late, everything was sodden with rain, and the one night which was spent there was little enough rest for anyone.

On the way back to Thiepval Wood the next night, a shell near Lancashire Dump wounded several men and killed Sec.-Lieut. W. S. Booth. He had been bombing officer for some time and was a tower of strength to the Battalion.

Then began the longest continuous stretch of duty, under battle conditions, which the men were ever called upon to perform.

Tucked away near the point of the angle, between the enemy front line and the River Ancre, was Thiepval Wood. It was bordered on the west by the marshes of the river, and on the south and south-east by the Johnstone’s Post valley; on the east and north-east the ground sloped steeply up to the German lines on the heights above. With its trees, its thick undergrowth and numerous “rides,” it must have been a pleasant spot in pre-war days. But, during the early weeks of the Battle of the Somme, it rapidly became a desolation little better than the woods in the Ypres Salient the following year. Such was the home of the Battalion from July 8th to August 19th. Never, during the whole of that time, did the men leave it. Reliefs were carried out every few days with the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.; but periods in Brigade Reserve were little improvement on those in the front line, for both were passed in the wood.

With the exception of its first tour, the Battalion always held the extreme left sector. Its left flank rested on the River Ancre and its right on Union Street, the length of front being about a thousand yards. All four companies held portions of the front line, and, tour after tour, they returned to the same positions--A, B, C, D from right to left. No Man’s Land varied from about 250 to 400 yards in width. Along it, and roughly parallel to the opposing lines, lay the sunken Thiepval Road. Crowded as it was with the bodies of the Ulstermen, who had fallen or crawled there to die on July 1st, this road was a ghastly place. The British front line lay along the north and north-eastern edges of Thiepval Wood. Hewn out of the chalk, the trenches had been comparatively good up to the opening of the battle; but the fearful hammering they had since received had almost obliterated them in many places. There were some good deep dugouts, but not nearly enough to accommodate all the men. The communication trenches, which led back to Battalion H.Q. and the crossings over the Ancre, were badly constructed and sited; the main ones lay along, or just beside, the chief rides in the wood, and they were so straight that they could easily be enfiladed by the enemy artillery.

Battalion H.Q. was at Gordon Castle. There, too, accommodation was scanty. Some attempts were made to improve it, but these were greatly hampered by enemy shelling. In particular, a bath-house was planned and, after a week’s hard work, was completed, only to be demolished the following morning by a shell. Nothing daunted, Lieut. J. T. Riley set to work to rebuild it. But the second attempt had no more success than the first. The very night the building was pronounced ready for use, another shell knocked off one of the corners. That was too much. The yearning for cleanliness had to remain unsatisfied, while the remnants of the building were used for the holding of the numerous courts of enquiry which were so popular about that time.

Throughout this period, though the role of the Battalion was the purely passive one of holding a portion of the line, that line was situated right in the middle of a furious battle. The first attacks on Thiepval had failed; but the very substantial successes, which were being gained further to the south, were gradually turning the defences of that village on the east. The enemy undoubtedly feared a repetition of the attack, made by the X. Corps on July 1st. His artillery was always active, and often regular barrages would fall on the wood. The front line came in for a great deal of attention, and it was only by much labour that posts at all fit for occupation could be maintained. Elgin and Inniskilling Avenues, the two chief communication trenches to Battalion H.Q., were often enfiladed by field guns. But the worst shelled area of all was the Ancre, in the neighbourhood of which ration-carrying parties had a very bad time. As the weeks dragged on the wood became thinner and thinner, until all the trenches were easily visible to aircraft and even to ground observers. Then artillery, from the heights north of the river near Beaumont Hamel, began to take the wood in enfilade, and caused much damage. But, apart from artillery fire the enemy was not very aggressive. There was not much rifle fire, and, except to repel a definite attack, machine guns were little used. Taking everything into account, the casualties suffered by the Battalion were not excessive. They were constant--it is doubtful whether a day passed without some men being killed or wounded--but they were not out of proportion to the enormous weight of artillery fire.

Since the early days of July, the direct attacks on Thiepval had been discontinued, and a defensive policy had been adopted on that sector, for the time being. Nevertheless, there was considerable activity, every effort being made to pin the enemy to his ground, and to distract his attention as much as possible from the operations of the Fourth Army on the right. The British artillery fire never slackened; day after day, and week after week, the deluge of shells was kept up. This fire was supplemented by the trench mortars, with which the troops were now much better supplied. Considerable use was made of the new Lewis guns, especially at night; and C.S.M. McNulty was again to the fore with his Winchester. Minor demonstrations were constantly being made, with the object of deceiving the enemy and making him believe that an attack was imminent. The following order, from 147th Infantry Brigade, is an example of what the Battalion was frequently called upon to do:--

“The Army Commander wishes everything possible to be done to keep the enemy in front of the Division on the alert, make him man his parapets and get him under our shrapnel fire.

With this object the following demonstration will be made to induce the enemy to man his parapets. At 1-0 p.m. to-day as many bayonets as possible will be shown along the whole front of the Brigade as if assault is imminent and timed for 1-0 p.m. For five or ten minutes previous to this hour whistles should be blown at intervals along the front as if signals were being made. The tops of ladders or trench grids should be shown over the parapets. The artillery immediately after 1-0 p.m. will open bombardment on enemy front and support trenches, especially on those trenches which can be taken in enfilade.

Any other device which can lead the enemy in front line to expect an assault at 1-0 p.m. should also be employed and Machine guns will fire during the artillery bombardment.”

On several occasions smoke barrages were put up by the Battalion. For this purpose, special emplacements were constructed about every twenty-five yards along the front line, and from these smoke bombs were thrown out into No Man’s Land. Usually the wind changed just before zero hour and Thiepval Wood was enveloped in a wonderful haze of smoke. There can be no doubt that these activities met with a certain amount of success. This was amply proved by the speed with which the enemy put down his defensive barrages time after time.

Patrolling too was very active. It was mainly carried out by the Battalion H.Q. Scouts, and much very useful, and often dangerous, work was done by them. In particular, some extremely daring and skilful patrols were done by Sec.-Lieut. H. H. Aykroyd, the Battalion Intelligence Officer, in the Ancre valley, for which he was awarded the Military Cross. On one occasion, when visiting the neighbouring battalion’s post at the Mill, he had the unpleasant experience of being mistaken for an enemy patrol, and was heavily bombed.

Reliefs were carried out with the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regiment every few days and soon became very simple, for companies always occupied the same positions, both in the front line and in reserve. Battalion H.Q. only had to move about two hundred yards from Gordon Castle to Belfast City. When in Brigade Reserve, two companies were in support to each of the battalions in the front line. During the day there was little to do, but at night working parties had to be found. It was a dreary life, though enlivened occasionally by the exploits of the Intelligence Officer. He it was who, whilst engaged in a scientific investigation of German flares, nearly burnt out Battalion H.Q. To him also was due the wondrous camouflaging of Belfast City, the remains of which may still be seen in Thiepval Wood.

The long and unbroken spell in Thiepval Wood caused much hardship to the men. There were no facilities for cooking, and so all food had to be sent up cooked from the transport lines. For six weeks, no one had a decently-prepared dinner. Supplies of clean clothing were not often available, and baths for the men were absolutely impossible. It can be imagined what an awful state they got into, living as they were under filthy conditions during the hottest season of the year, with never a chance of a good wash. At first some men bathed in the Ancre, but this was very dangerous owing to the thick weeds; after a man had been accidentally drowned there about the middle of July, all bathing was strictly forbidden. There can be no doubt that this long period of harassing and filthy conditions seriously affected the men physically.

Towards the end of July, Lieut.-Col. E. G. St. Aubyn came back to the Battalion. From that time, until August 19th, Major J. Walker and Capt. A. L. Mowat shared the duties of second-in-command, taking turns in the line and with the rear echelon.

During July work had consisted mainly of keeping the front line in a habitable condition, and repairing the communication trenches, which were continually being damaged by shell fire. Many bodies too were recovered from No Man’s Land and decently buried. But, about the beginning of August, the digging of the famous parallels began. It had been decided to renew the frontal attack on the sector from Thiepval to the River Ancre, but, after the experience of July 1st, No Man’s Land in that area was considered too wide to attack across successfully. Hence it was determined to push forward the British front line by digging a series of trenches in No Man’s Land. These “parallels” stretched from the Ancre to the top of Inniskilling Avenue, the foremost being roughly along the line of the sunken road, though on the extreme right it crossed the road. In other words, the front on which they were dug corresponded almost exactly with the Battalion sub-sector. Practically none of the actual digging was done by men of the Battalion, but, whenever they were occupying the front line, they had to find covering parties for the work. Every night, as soon as it was dark enough to conceal movement, one platoon per company moved out into No Man’s Land, and took up a line along the northern edge of the sunken road. There they remained so long as the work was in progress. Company Commanders took turns in charge of the whole covering party. The actual working parties--nearly a thousand men nightly--were provided by the 148th Infantry Brigade. Really this number was much too big. Heavy shelling had reduced the communication trenches in Thiepval Wood to a very derelict condition; the movement of large parties along them became very slow, and much time was wasted in coming and going. No Man’s Land too became very congested. As a result, the amount of work done on the parallels was small compared with the number of men engaged.

The work of the covering parties proved tedious, but not particularly dangerous. The enemy infantry made practically no attempt to interfere with the digging, and only once was a party of Germans encountered. It happened in this way. An officer of A Company was on the right of the covering party one night. Following a not uncommon practice of his, he was moving about alone, when he saw a party of men, a little way off on the flank, who did not appear to be working. He went up and gently exhorted them to get on with their job. A chorus of gutterals was his answer, as an affrighted party of Germans made off. But though the enemy infantry was comparatively inactive, this cannot be said of his artillery. Even if the actual working parties were not observed the first night, the results of their labours cannot have escaped the German observers the next day, for the newly-turned chalk showed very white on the ground. From that time the enemy made a practice of putting down a barrage regularly soon after midnight, and there were many casualties among the crowds of men in No Man’s Land. But the barrage did not seriously affect the covering parties, which escaped with very little loss. The parallels were nearly complete before the Battalion left Thiepval Wood, and had been absorbed into the front line system.

[Illustration: Thiepval Wood.

1916.]

All things considered, there was not much recognition of the good work done by the men of the Battalion at this period. Mention has already been made of the Military Cross awarded to Sec.-Lieut. H. H. Aykroyd. The only other officer to receive that decoration was Sec.-Lieut. F. V. Blackwell, who was brought to notice by a daring daylight patrol, which resulted in the recovery of several machine guns lost by the British on July 1st. R.S.M. F. P. Stirzaker was also awarded the Military Cross, more for his continuous gallant work than for any specific act; throughout all this period he earned a magnificent name for hard work, devotion to duty and gallantry. But he was not the first warrant officer of the Battalion to receive the Military Cross. That honour had already been won by C.S.M. (now R.Q.M.S.) W. Lee, for conspicuous gallantry while the Battalion was near Ypres in 1915, particularly for his conduct on that never-to-be-forgotten December 19th.

The longest tour comes to an end at last. On August 19th the 9th Battalion Loyal North Lancs. Regt. relieved the Battalion, which moved back to billets near Raincheval. There it remained until August 27th. The 49th Division was at last to be thrown into the attack, and the time at Raincheval was mainly occupied with special assault training. A facsimile of the enemy trenches, which formed the objectives, had been taped out, and over this the men practised every morning. The rest of each day was occupied with the thousand and one preparations essential to the success of any operation.

When the Battalion first moved back to Raincheval, the operation was expected to take place within a very few days. But, like so many of the British attacks, it was postponed. It was a pity that the Battalion did not know from the very first how long a time it would have out of the line. The men were very run down after their long spell in Thiepval Wood, and much might have been done to improve their condition. Instead, they were kept for many days in that nervous state which must precede every attack, and the period of rest could not be utilised nearly so fully as it might have been. Even after a move had been made to Forceville on August 27th, the exact date of zero day still remained for a time in doubt. At length the attack was definitely fixed for September 3rd.

Two days before the operation, the Battalion suffered a great loss. Lieut.-Col. E. G. St. Aubyn became so seriously ill that he was evacuated sick on September 1st, and soon afterwards was sent to England. So ended his connection with the Battalion, for which he had done so much. He returned to the 147th Infantry Brigade in the autumn, but took command of the 7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. Thus it fell to Major J. Walker to command the Battalion in its first big attack.

(_b_) September 3rd, 1916.

The attack made on September 3rd, 1916, is one of the most important events in the Battalion’s history. Never before had it been selected for an operation of that kind. It is therefore very unfortunate that the difficulties of writing a strictly accurate account are so great. Yet, of all the operations in which the Battalion took part during the war, none is so obscure in many of its details, and around none has so much controversy raged. At the time, the higher commands certainly did not understand clearly what had taken place. Nearly all the officers and senior N.C.O’s, who took part in the assault, were killed. Survivors’ narratives differ considerably in matters of detail. In short, it is impossible to write an account which is absolutely exact in such details as the precise times at which certain events took place. The following account has been written after a careful study of all the available official documents, supplemented by the personal narratives of many of the survivors. Among the official papers, none is of greater interest and importance than a German narrative, which was captured two or three weeks after the event. This is the report of the Officer Commanding the 1st Battalion 180th Infantry Regt.--the unit which was holding the line south of the Ancre when the Battalion attacked. In it are detailed the extent of the British success, the dispositions made by the Germans to counter-attack, and the operations which finally resulted in the recapture of the positions, which the enemy had temporarily lost.

The operation was part of a big attack, which was to be made about dawn, on both sides of the River Ancre. South of that river the 49th Division was attacking, with the 147th Infantry Brigade on the right and the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left. On the front of the 147th Infantry Brigade, the 4th Battalion on the right, and the 5th Battalion on the left, were detailed for the assault; the 6th and 7th Battalions were in support and reserve respectively. The Battalion was thus on the extreme flank of the divisional front, and, as no one was attacking further to the south, had its right “in the air.” The following is a brief summary of the Operation Orders:--

1. Companies were to assemble in the parallels before dawn, in the positions shown on the map.

2. At zero hour A, B and D Companies were to advance simultaneously. As soon as B Company had taken the First Objective, A and D Companies were to go through it to the assault of their respective objectives.

3. Company objectives were as follows:--

B Company. Enemy front line from point 84 to point 54.

A Company. Enemy support line from point 95 to point 66. One platoon was to push up the Munster Gasse, and make a block in that trench beyond the support line.

D Company. Enemy communication trench from point 84 to point 95. Blocks were to be made in the enemy front and support lines towards the Schwaben Redoubt.

C Company was to remain in Battalion reserve.

4. A hurricane bombardment was to open at zero hour on the objectives; it was to remain on the enemy front line for three minutes, and on the enemy support line for eight minutes.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty in the operation was the keeping of direction. A glance at the map will show that A and B Companies had to advance approximately half right on leaving the parallels--an extremely difficult manœuvre to carry out in battle, in the half light of early dawn, and in a country where there were no landmarks. The task of D Company was even harder. Not only had the men to advance on an incline, but, on reaching point 84, they had to “right form,” in order to occupy the communication trench, with their front towards the Schwaben Redoubt. Of course these manœuvres had been carefully practised over the “tapes” at Raincheval, but the carrying of them out in the excitement of battle, under heavy fire, was a very different matter.

The parallels, in which the Battalion was to assemble, were already very well known to many of the men. They were rough and narrow, and so deep that ladders had to be provided for the men to leave them by. The first objective--the enemy front line--was about two hundred and fifty yards from the foremost parallel. No Man’s Land was to be crossed in quick time and three minutes were allowed for this, rather a short period when it is remembered that the ground was one mass of shell holes and debris, and that the advance was up a decidedly steep slope. The enemy front line, owing to the shape of the ground, was barely visible from the parallels. The Battalion’s objectives lay in a re-entrant between the Schwaben Redoubt and the Pope’s Nose, from which positions a deadly cross-fire could be brought to bear on the advance, unless it were well protected by the British artillery. The slope and condition of the ground, between the enemy first and second lines, was very similar to No Man’s Land. The shelling of the past two months had so battered the enemy defences that it was extremely difficult to recognise definite points, or even stretches of trench.

During the afternoon of September 2nd, the Battalion marched from Senlis to Martinsart Wood, where it halted until evening. A hot meal was served at 8-0 p.m., and, about an hour later, the platoons began to move off to their positions of assembly. No smoking was allowed, and the strictest orders about silence had been issued. So, with no noise save the squelch of boots in the mud and the occasional rattle of equipment, the men passed through Aveluy Wood, along a specially taped line, drew bombs and other battle equipment at the bottom of Black Horse Road, and crossed the Ancre. During the crossing they were somewhat harassed by enemy shelling, and D Company suffered some casualties. But, apart from this, the march was not seriously hampered, and all were in position by 3-25 a.m. on September 3rd. Then followed two weary hours of waiting for the dawn and that hurricane burst of artillery fire, which was to be the signal for the assault. High as was the nervous tension, and great the excitement in those crowded parallels, some of the men actually slept. How few realised that, within the next few hours, scores would be sleeping for ever!

About 5-0 a.m. dawn was breaking. The enemy had been very quiet during the night, but he now began to show traces of nervousness and occasional bursts of machine gun fire clipped the parapets. The Battalion[7] stood to, and bayonets were quietly fixed. At 5-10 a.m. one great gun spoke, and then, to quote the words of one who took

## part in the attack, “the whole sky seemed to light up suddenly.” The

hour had come. Up rose the three companies like one man. There was no hesitation. Over the parapet they swarmed. The attack had begun.

The enemy was thoroughly on the alert. Flares went up all along the front, and, in spite of the British barrage, which was very good, a deadly cross fire of machine gun bullets opened from the directions of the Schwaben Redoubt and the Pope’s Nose. There is some doubt as to the exact time when many of the officers and senior N.C.O’s were hit; but it is practically certain that Capt. C. Hirst, Sec.-Lieut. A. E. Hirst and Sec.-Lieut. C. W. Tomlinson were all killed, and Sec.-Lieut. G. F. Robertshaw wounded, before the first objective was reached. Many men fell, but the lines went forward splendidly. Steadily they crossed No Man’s Land, halted, and got down a few yards from the enemy front line, waiting for the barrage to lift. But already there was apparent one point, which seriously affected the success of the operation. Companies were becoming mixed. Some of the men of A and D Companies were mingled together; and many men of the 5th Battalion were in the ranks of the 4th Battalion. Also, in the half light, the rear waves of the attack did not notice quickly enough that the first wave had halted, and so they crowded up on it. The difficulties of keeping distance and direction had been too great.

The enemy artillery barrage did not open properly until nearly ten minutes after zero hour, but then it was very heavy. The old British front line and the first parallel received most attention, and were soon almost obliterated. Heavies rained down on the tunnel entrances; shrapnel deluged the communication trenches. The barrage embraced the whole of Thiepval Wood, and many casualties were suffered by the two reserve battalions of the 147th Infantry Brigade. But the foremost parallel and No Man’s Land were not heavily shelled at first, and thus machine gun fire was the only serious danger to the men lying near the enemy front line.

Immediately the British barrage lifted, B Company charged and captured its objective without much difficulty. This line had been terribly shattered by the bombardment of the previous two months and in places had almost disappeared. It was so bad that most of the men did not enter it at all, but remained in shell holes in the open, where they began to consolidate. Their position was very exposed and, as time went on, they lost heavily from machine gun fire. Others, among whom C.S.M. W. Medley was most conspicuous, worked along the trench, bombing the deep dugouts with which it abounded, and collecting prisoners. The latter were sent back across No Man’s Land, but only one is known to have arrived at Battalion H.Q. The rest probably perished under the fire of their own artillery and machine guns. One part of B Company worked a considerable distance along the enemy front line towards the Pope’s Nose, bombing as it went. All that trench was thoroughly cleared, but the company, and the men of the 5th Battalion who were with it, were not strong enough to hold the whole, and it had to be left unoccupied. Numbers of Germans, some without rifles, were seen making off across the open on the left, and were heavily fired upon. It seems probable that, for some time, the Pope’s Nose was evacuated by the enemy; but it was never occupied by the British.

Meanwhile, A Company had advanced, hard on the heels of B Company. Passing straight over the captured line, the men moved across the open until about fifty yards from the enemy support trench. There they halted, sheltering in shell holes, and waiting for their barrage to lift. Already they had suffered very heavy casualties. Some, in their over-eagerness, had advanced too far, and had been hit by their own shells. Only one officer--Lieut. W. N. Everitt, M.C.--had survived; C.S.M. A. Stirzaker, D.C.M., had fallen between the first and second objectives; and scores of N.C.O’s and men had been killed or wounded. But they had been reinforced by some men of B Company, who had gone forward with them, and by Cpl. A. Denham’s Lewis gun team, which had lost D Company and had advanced on the right of A Company. The men came under a very heavy fire from the German support line. Numbers of the enemy were seen making off across the open, and Cpl. Denham did some execution with his Lewis gun; but the bulk of the German garrison held its ground and fought well. For some time the Company lay in the open, exchanging shots with the enemy in his line. The British barrage had now lifted, and there was thus nothing to interfere with the German marksmen and machine gunners. Casualties were piling up, but the second objective was not yet taken. Lieut. Everitt, with Sergt. Bancroft, had already reconnoitred right up to the line, and had thrown some bombs among the enemy there. He now determined to try to rush the position, after a short burst of Lewis gun fire. Assisted by Sergts. Haigh and Bancroft, he crawled round and informed the men of his intention. They were told to charge as soon as the Lewis gun ceased fire. The gun opened, but stopped almost at once with a broken return spring; quite coolly the N.C.O. on the gun--his name is now unknown--changed the part, and reported to Lieut. Everitt that he was ready to reopen fire. One magazine was fired, and then A Company charged. Everitt himself was first in the trench, and was followed closely by Haigh. The bay they entered was unoccupied, but the next was full of the enemy. These were bombed, and either fled or dived into their deep dug outs. Parties then moved to right and left along the trench, bombing dugouts and collecting prisoners. The latter were sent back across the open, but none appear to have arrived. Many Germans were killed in the second objective. Of the parties which moved along the support line, that to the right got well beyond point 95, towards the Schwaben Redoubt, without encountering any of the enemy; but it could find no trace of D Company, which should have had a post near that point. The other party cleared and occupied the whole line to beyond point 66, where Sergt. H. Haigh got in touch with a small party of the 5th Battalion. Consolidation of the line, which was very wide and deep, then began. Only about forty of the Battalion had reached the second objective. These were organised in a line of posts from point 86, which was held by Sergt. Bancroft and Cpl. Denham, to beyond point 66. The second objective had been taken a little before 6-0 a.m. Soon after, the Germans began to bombard it heavily with artillery and trench mortars, and the discomfort of A Company was added to by some of the British guns, which had not “lifted” sufficiently and were firing into its back.

[Illustration: Lieut.-Col. J. WALKER, D.S.O.]

Meanwhile, except for such men as Cpl. Denham’s Lewis gun team which had become detached from its company, no one had seen or heard anything of D Company since the opening of the attack. Like the rest it had advanced at zero hour, and had crossed No Man’s Land on a right incline. Its two waves had halted near the enemy front line, waiting for the barrage to lift. Comparatively few casualties had been suffered in the advance, but these included Sec.-Lieut. C. W. Tomlinson missing, and Lieut. J. T. Riley and C.S.M. J. C. Walker wounded. Both of the latter refused to go to the rear to have their wounds dressed, and continued the advance with the rest of the company. When the barrage lifted, the men stormed the enemy front line, and some of them extended up a very battered communication trench, which they believed to be their objective. All dugouts were bombed, and several prisoners were taken; these apparently suffered the same fate as most of the other prisoners that day. The men set to work to consolidate what had been captured. They had not been long in their new position when the enemy made a weak counter-attack, from the direction of the Schwaben Redoubt. This was driven off without difficulty, but the men had very little opportunity to carry on with the consolidation. Their position was very exposed and the enemy defences, which had been captured, were so shattered that they afforded little cover. Very heavy rifle and machine gun fire, both from the Schwaben Redoubt and the east, was directed on them; and shells were soon bursting in their midst. But where was the Company? The exact position it reached that day has been a matter for controversy ever since. No other company ever got into touch with it, and the German report, already mentioned, sheds no light on the mystery. It seems probable, indeed almost certain, that they inclined too much to the right in crossing No Man’s Land, and entered the enemy front line to the south-east of point 84; in fact, it would appear that the Company actually captured, and held for some hours, the fringe of the Schwaben Redoubt. But it is only fair to say that Sergt. (now C.S.M.) W. Brooke, the only senior N.C.O. of D Company who got back to the British lines, is still convinced that the Company reached point 84, its correct objective.

It is convenient, at this point, to interrupt the narrative for a short time, in order to summarise the situation about 7-0 a.m. and to note what steps had been taken by the enemy to deal with it.

About 7-0 a.m. the positions of companies were as follows:--

A Company held the German support line from point 86, where there was an isolated post, to a little way beyond point 66. On both flanks the line was clear of the enemy for some considerable distance.

B Company held the German front line, from about midway between points 84 and 54, to beyond point 54. No enemy was in the line between the Company and point 84, nor for some distance on the left.

D Company held a position facing south-east, on the fringe of the Schwaben Redoubt; exactly where cannot be said.

All companies were very weak and no reinforcements had arrived, for reasons which will be indicated later. Only one officer per company was left--Lieut. W. N. Everitt, M.C., with A Company, Sec.-Lieut. H. E. Pohlmann with B Company, and Lieut. J. T. Riley with D Company. Sec.-Lieut. V. A. Horsfall of B Company fell soon after the first objective was taken. Sec.-Lieut E. C. Mee of D Company was lying dead in the enemy wire. Supplies of S.A.A. were running very low, and bombs were almost exhausted. No carrying parties had been able to get up to the captured positions, and the only way to replenish was to collect from the dead and wounded who dotted the ground. But the most serious aspect of the situation was that the rest of the attack south of the Ancre had failed. By 7-0 a.m. the only British troops maintaining their positions in the enemy defences were those of the Battalion, with elements of the 5th Battalion--all hopelessly mixed up. The enemy, finding there were no British near the Pope’s Nose, was re-occupying his front line there, and cautiously feeling his way along the trench towards B Company.

Meanwhile, energetic measures had been taken from the start by the German commander opposite. As soon as the situation began to develop clearly, he directed part of his reserve troops to counter-attack along, and parallel to, the Munster Gasse. The remainder were sent to the Schwaben Redoubt to strengthen the garrison there, and to counter-attack from that direction. There is no doubt that the enemy attached more importance to the holding of the Schwaben Redoubt than to anything else on that front. This is amply proved by the dispositions of his reserve troops on September 3rd. It is also borne out by men of the Battalion who were captured that day, and who have given accounts of their examinations by the enemy. And the enemy was right. With the Schwaben Redoubt still in his hands, he could dominate and enfilade practically all the objectives of the 49th Division. It would also appear, from their own account, that the Germans found it necessary to utilise the whole of their regimental reserve that day, before they succeeded in repelling the British; and that they even began to draw reinforcements from another unit--the 66th Infantry Regt.

Soon after 8-0 a.m., serious enemy counter-attacks began on A Company’s position. For some time the barrage had slackened, and even rifle and machine gun fire had died down. What puzzled the men of A Company was to see Germans in the neighbourhood of the Pope’s Nose, and in the support line in rear of it; for it must be borne in mind that no one knew anything of the situation on any other front than his own. These Germans, as has already been said, were cautiously working their way along the trenches towards the British, bombing as they went; but they were still a long way off. The real counter-attack at length came from enemy troops who advanced across the open, on both sides of the Munster Gasse. The post at point 86 had, by this time, completely run out of S.A.A. and bombs, and so was unable to offer any real resistance to the advance. The Germans came cautiously forward; avoiding a frontal attack, they worked round the right flank of the post until they were in its rear. Bombing it from this position, they caused many casualties. Sergt. Bancroft, Cpl. Payne and several men were killed; Cpl. Denham and a number of others were wounded. Having thus prepared the way for an assault, the enemy rushed the post, overwhelmed and made prisoners of the few survivors. This happened unbeknown to the rest of the men of A Company. The first indication they had of it was the enemy bombing along the second objective from the right. The situation soon became impossible. With no bombs and scarcely a round of S.A.A. left, they were forced slowly to withdraw towards their left. On arriving at point 66, they found themselves between two fires, for the enemy bombing party from the west was also approaching along the trench. The position was clearly untenable. Lieut. Everitt had only a handful of men left. He gave orders to withdraw down the communication trench to point 54. The withdrawal was conducted slowly and in good order, two or three men waiting at each bend in the trench to cover it. At length the front line was reached, but only a few isolated men of B Company could be found there; the enemy artillery and machine guns had done their work only too well. The party reconnoitred along the trench towards the Pope’s Nose; another enemy bombing party was encountered. With so few survivors, and almost without ammunition, Lieut. Everitt could do no more. He gave the order to withdraw to the parallels. The men jumped out of the trench and started across No Man’s Land, but they did not scatter sufficiently. Few ever reached the comparative safety of their own lines. A machine gun opened from the Pope’s Nose, and most of them fell. Of the fate of Lieut. Everitt nothing certain is known. For some time it was hoped that he was still alive. But nothing definite was ever learned of what happened to him after he gave the order to withdraw. One of the most gallant, competent and hardworking officers the Battalion ever had, he probably fell when so many of his men went down in that last crossing of No Man’s Land.

And what of D Company? Its fate was much the same as A Company’s. Harassed by machine guns from the Schwaben Redoubt, and by rifle fire from snipers to the east, it beat off several counter-attacks. S.A.A. and bombs ran out, and the men searched the dead to replenish their supplies. Rapidly their numbers dwindled. Severely wounded and in great pain, Lieut. J. T. Riley fought fiercely until he was at length killed. C.S.M. J. C. Walker, who had carried on though wounded early in the action, was also killed. Yet, practically leaderless, the men still fought on, until an officer of the 5th Battalion, who had become mixed up with D Company, ordered a withdrawal. Then the remnants of the company--they did not muster twenty, all told--withdrew to the parallels.

Everything that had been gained was lost. Not a Britisher remained in the enemy lines, save the few men who had been captured. The number of these was very small. On the authority of the Germans themselves, only seven unwounded prisoners from the 4th and 5th Battalions were taken that day. Many men were still lying out in shell holes, and, during the rest of the day and night that followed, some of these crawled back into the lines. But there were far more lying out there who would never crawl again.

Throughout the action Battalion H.Q. was located in a deep dugout, near the junction of Inniskilling Avenue with Whitchurch Street; C Company was in Battalion reserve, either in or near the old British front line. All arrangements had been made for sending up stores soon after the objectives were taken. East Koyli Sap was to be improved, and used as a communication trench for that purpose. But this was never done. Early in the action it became so crowded with casualties and others that

## parties could not move along it. Even if they had been able to do so,

it entered the enemy front line at the Pope’s Nose, which was never occupied by the British on September 3rd.

Lack of reliable information was the most serious difficulty with which Battalion H.Q. had to contend dining the battle, and the 5th Battalion was even worse off in that respect. Signallers had gone forward with the assaulting companies, but no message ever came back from them. Cpl. C. Landale, D.C.M. made gallant attempts to run a telephone line across No Man’s Land, but it could not be maintained on account of the enemy barrage. Most of the runners who left with messages were killed. No information was ever received from the observation post. The result was that, during the whole operation, Battalion H.Q. was almost completely ignorant of what was happening.

For a long time the sole information obtained was from wounded men, and was very indefinite. At 5-55 a.m. it was learned that the first objective had been taken, that the second was being attacked, and that the two assaulting battalions were badly mixed. Ten minutes later a wounded man reported that A Company had taken its objective. Then there was little news for more than an hour and a half. Two carrying parties were sent forward, and it is believed that a few bombs did reach the German front line and were used by the 5th Battalion. Runners were twice sent out to get in touch with B Company, but none came back. Information that the attack of the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left had failed was received by the Battalion about 6-30 a.m. Knowing so little of the situation, the Commanding Officer naturally hesitated to throw any more troops into the battle; and, as events turned out, it is well he did not use his reserves, for they could have done little real good, and there would only have been more casualties.

At last a wounded runner arrived from B Company, bearing the following message from Sec.-Lieut. H. E. Pohlmann:--

“To I.R. Am holding point 54 and to left 100 yds. In touch with 5th. Only remaining officer in B Coy. Bombs wanted. 6-40 a.m. 3.9.16. H. E. Pohlmann, 2 Lt. B Coy.”

It had taken the runner two hours to come.

At once Major Walker ordered two platoons of C Company, and two of the reserve bombing teams, to advance across the open and reinforce B Company. But these orders were never issued. Before they could be written out the advanced signal station reported that the men of the 147th Infantry Brigade were withdrawing.

C Company had not been engaged, but it had suffered many casualties from shell fire. When it was clear that the attack had failed, Capt. Marshall was ordered to man the parallels, in case the enemy tried to counter-attack. But no such attempt was made.

At 11-50 a.m., more than four hours after it had been written, a message was brought in from Lieut. Everitt, by a wounded runner. Arriving so late, it was of no practical use; the situation had entirely changed. But as evidence of the deeds of A Company that day, it deserves to be quoted in full:--

“To the Adjt.

My right is only at the communication trench point 86. I am

## partly in the fifth lines. I have only roughly 25 men including

six from B Coy. Have no bombers. Short of bombs and Lewis Gun ammunition. Our artillery firing into our back especially on the right.

Don’t know where D Coy. are.

W. N. Everitt, Lt., 3.9.16. 7-40 a.m. O.C. A Coy.”

About 5-0 p.m. troops of the 148th Infantry Brigade relieved the Battalion in the line. The weary men withdrew to Martinsart Wood to reorganise, but a party of C Company was left in for the night, to search No Man’s Land for wounded, and to help in the evacuation of those who had already come in.

Only once--October 11th, 1918--has the Battalion had heavier casualties than on September 3rd. It went into action 18 officers and 629 other ranks strong; of these only three companies, each consisting of 3 officers and 127 other ranks, and a few Battalion H.Q. details, went “over the top.” The total casualties that day were 11 officers and 336 other ranks. More than half were either known to be dead, or were missing; and as the number of prisoners taken by the enemy was very small, it may fairly be presumed that the Battalion lost, in killed alone, at least 150 other ranks. Of the nine officers who went over with the assaulting companies, only two, both wounded, returned; in addition, Sec.-Lieut. F. A. Innes was killed at 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q., and Sec.-Lieut. W. Smith was wounded with C Company. September 3rd is the blackest day in the Battalion’s history, for, unlike October 11th, 1918, it had no success to compensate for its casualties. To-day, upon the very line of the first objective, which B Company carried that eventful morning and was later forced to evacuate, there stands a great cemetery. In it have been collected the remains of many men, from scores of solitary graves; and on the crosses the legend “Unknown soldier 1/4th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.” is one of the most common. There rest many of the gallant men who fell that day.

It is not the purpose of this book to criticise as a general rule, but some slight exception must be made in connection with the attack on September 3rd. At the time there was a widespread belief, which was certainly held by most of the higher authorities, that the Battalion never gained its objectives. This was wrong. A and B Companies reached, and cleared the enemy from the whole of the first and second objectives; it is true they did not occupy the whole of them, but that was due simply to lack of men. For more than two hours there were no Germans in either of the lines which the Battalion was ordered to capture. These facts are clearly proved, not only by the evidence of the men who carried out the assault, but also by the German official report on the action. The men of D Company, as has been stated, seem to have got too far to the right; but even they fulfilled their role, for they successfully defended the Battalion’s exposed right flank so long as there were men enough to hold the ground which had been won. During the next few weeks several divisions successively failed to carry the objectives of September 3rd. Even after Thiepval itself had fallen, it was some time before the Schwaben Redoubt and the defences north of it passed into British hands.

(_c_) The Leipsig Redoubt.

The day after the Battalion’s unsuccessful attack on the German line, Major R. E. Sugden, D.S.O., rejoined and assumed command, being promoted Lieut.-Colonel a few days later. He had been in England for nearly nine months, as the result of his wound received near Ypres the previous December; but now, though he had not yet fully recovered the use of his hand and arm, he had returned to France. For nearly two years from this date he held command of the Battalion, only leaving it when he was appointed G.O.C., 151st Infantry Brigade, in June, 1918.

After a few days in Martinsart Wood, the Battalion moved back to bivouacs near Hedauville. Little work was done except reorganisation, which was very necessary. Not only had an enormous number of officers and N.C.O’s become casualties, but three whole companies had been practically wiped out. Out of these companies no officers, only one warrant officer--C.S.M. W. Medley--and very few N.C.O’s had survived. The elaborate B Echelons of later days were only in their infancy, and so little framework existed on which to rebuild. The only thing to do was to make use of the personnel of C Company to provide the necessary framework. Hence, many N.C.O’s and specialists were transferred to other companies. Sec.-Lieut. F. Walker and Lieut. J. G. Mowat were appointed to the command of A and B Companies respectively. C.S.M. A. McNulty again became C.S.M. of A Company, and C.Q.M.S. A. L. Lord of C Company was transferred to D Company as C.S.M. The supply of men was simpler. Large drafts arrived within a few days, and, by the middle of September, the Battalion’s fighting strength was practically the same as it had been at the beginning of the month. On September 21st a draft of eleven officers arrived, and several more joined a few days later. Among them were three or four who had already served with the Battalion abroad, either as officers or in the ranks, while others had seen active service elsewhere.

[Illustration: Sept. 3rd. 1916.]

While the Battalion was at Hedauville, Brig.-General E. F. Brereton, C.B., D.S.O., came over to say farewell. The men were drawn up in a hollow square, and were first addressed by the Divisional Commander. Then the Brigadier spoke. In a magnificent speech, which deeply impressed all who heard it, he paid a glowing tribute to the dead and said good-bye to the living. The parade was dismissed and all rushed down to the road. Roar upon roar of cheering burst forth as the car passed slowly through the lines of men and, at length, disappeared from view. If he had ever doubted it, the demonstration must have proved to the General how much he was beloved in his Brigade. Brig.-General C. G. Lewes, D.S.O., assumed command of the 147th Infantry Brigade.

By September 15th the Battalion was considered ready for active service again; it moved up to Martinsart Wood and from thence, the next day, to Crucifix Corner, Aveluy. On September 17th it was in support to an attack, made by the 1/7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., on part of the Leipsig Redoubt. Unlike the bigger operation of September 3rd, this attack was planned to take place in the evening, zero hour being 6-30 p.m. Thus the assaulting troops would have the whole night for consolidation. The main duty of the Battalion was to provide a number of carrying parties, no less than 7 officers and 215 other ranks being detailed for that purpose. Of these, about half were to work with the assaulting troops, while the remainder were responsible for keeping the various dumps supplied. Profiting by the experience of September 3rd, Brigade H.Q. had decided that carrying parties should actually accompany the assaulting troops when they attacked. It was hoped, in this way, to get some supplies of ammunition up to the objectives before the enemy barrage came down. The men for this duty were divided into three separate parties, under Sec.-Lieuts. H. N. Taylor, E. W. Flatow and E. Rawnsley respectively. A further party, under Sec.-Lieut. G. Rawnsley, was to carry up water in petrol tins.

Half-an-hour before zero all parties were in their assembly positions. Many of the men, who had only left England a few days, had never even been in the line before, and it must have been a particularly nervous time for them. The principal supplies to be carried up were Mills bombs, and every man had a box under each arm. When the assaulting troops went over, the carrying parties advanced immediately in rear of them. The ground was not easy to cross, being one mass of shell holes, and littered everywhere with the debris of shattered trenches and wire entanglements. Nevertheless, the men went well, and most of them succeeded in delivering their first load before the enemy barrage came down. Back they went for a second load, and this time the crossing was more dangerous. Though rather scattered, and not particularly heavy, the enemy barrage was most uncomfortable; and machine guns did not make the situation any pleasanter. But through it all the men worked splendidly. Backwards and forwards they went, time after time, until at length the unusual message came back “Enough bombs.” That message is the best criticism that can be given of the way in which the carrying

## parties did their work. By this time they had naturally become very

scattered. Many were being employed as messengers or guides; some had lost their bearings, for it was now quite dark; and there were many casualties. Altogether, the Battalion lost that day 12 other ranks, including C.S.M. T. H. Greenwood of C Company, killed, 7 missing, and 39 wounded. But the work had been well done. Officers collected all they could find of their parties, and rejoined the rest of the Battalion; but many men did not report back until long after dawn the next day.

The day after the attack the Battalion moved up into close support to the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., which had taken over the captured trenches. Three days later it took over the defence of the new line. D Company, with C Company in close support to it, held the whole of the captured ground; the other companies occupied the old British line. D Company’s sector was a ghastly place. Rain and shell-fire had turned the ground into a mass of mud, littered with the awful debris of battle. Never had the Battalion seen so many dead Germans; and there were many British too. Bodies were lying all over the ground in the open; many more were exposed by the shovel, and hastily recovered. A hot September sun beat down in the daytime, and the air was filled with the stench of decaying humanity. Water was scarce, as every drop of it had to be carried up, and had to be used very economically. Ration

## parties had a very hard task, for there were neither tracks nor proper

communication trenches. Almost the only real comfort was provided by the excellent German tunnelled dugouts which abounded, and were sufficient to accommodate the whole company. These were from twenty to thirty feet down; they were splendidly built and, in some cases, quite comfortably furnished; and they were proof against the heaviest shell. This was as well, for the hostile artillery was very active. Though the Germans probably had a very hazy idea of the British positions, they knew where their own deep dugouts had been and persistently shelled those localities. Practically all movement could be easily observed, and there was much coming and going of staff officers and others in connection with the new attack on Thiepval which was planning. D Company came in for all the shelling, which was brought on by this movement, and also for the not infrequent barrages put down by the enemy. The other companies had an easier, though far from pleasant, time.

Much work was done by the Battalion while it was in the Leipsig Redoubt. Its role was to prepare the way for an attack on Thiepval by the 18th Division. Assembly trenches had to be dug; the dead had to be buried. Most of this work was done by the support companies, who sent up large parties each night. D Company’s duty was restricted to holding the line--quite a sufficient task for the new men of whom the company was mainly composed. Casualties occurred almost hourly. It was a nerve-racking time.

At length the relief came on September 24th. A heavy bombardment of 15 cm. shells about 5-0 p.m., which at one time seemed likely to hinder the relief seriously, was stopped by the British retaliation. An unusually quiet night followed. Soon after dark the 12th Battalion Middlesex Regt. began to arrive; and when, about midnight, D Company’s relief was complete, the Battalion turned its back on the Somme battlefield for ever. B and C Companies had been relieved earlier and they marched straight through to Lealvillers. A and D Companies were to be met by buses at the bottom of Black Horse Road. The former got away after a long wait, but there were no conveyances for the latter. Wearily--few of them had had any sleep to speak of for three days or nights--the men dragged themselves along to Martinsart Wood, where they simply dropped down by the roadside and slept. About dawn buses did arrive, and the company was quickly taken to Lealvillers, where a halt was made for breakfast. Then it bussed straight through to Halloy, while the rest of the Battalion had to march. The ride was some satisfaction for the night spent on the road.

The day after its arrival at Halloy the Battalion learned of the fall of Thiepval. In the midst of the satisfaction caused by this news, there was naturally some little disappointment that, after so many months of work and fighting, it had not been “in at the death.”

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