CHAPTER IX
.
THE BELLE VUE SPUR.
(_a_) October 4th–8th.
The Third Battle of Ypres opened on July 31st, 1917, with an attack by two British Armies--the Second Army on the right and the Fifth Army on the left--supported by a French Army Corps to the north. At first a considerable advance was made, but the unusually wet weather of August greatly hampered operations. During September the weather improved and progress continued, but the fighting was exceptionally severe, the enemy stubbornly defending every inch of the ground. Notwithstanding all difficulties, by the beginning of October the Second Army was in touch with the Passchendaele Ridge, which was the last natural barrier between the British and the fertile, low-lying plains of Belgium. Though this ridge proved so serious an obstacle to the British advance, it is by no means conspicuous. At no point is it as much as sixty metres above sea level, and its average height is little more than fifty metres.
Some description of the battlefield, which the Battalion entered early in October, is necessary. For nearly three years the enemy had been fortifying the area east of Ypres, making use of every method and device known to modern warfare--and throughout the war the Germans were unsurpassed as field engineers. The result was a mighty fortress, covering many square miles of ground, second to none on the Western Front, or, for that matter, in the world. The ground was covered with trenches, constructed according to the latest ideas of fortification, and crammed with every device for offence and defence. Thousands of miles of barbed wire had been used in the construction of obstacles. Hundreds of “pill-boxes”--massive but low-lying structures of reinforced concrete, invulnerable unless they received direct hits from at least an 8-inch shell--covered the country-side and sheltered thousands of machine guns. The German artillery was extremely powerful and magnificently handled; and as every ridge, up to the battle of Messines, was in enemy hands, his gunners had all the advantages of superior observation. Such was the country that the British had been attacking, and slowly penetrating, during the last two months.
This country the British and German artillery had turned into a desolation unparalleled even on the Somme battlefield in the previous year. Literally, every inch of ground had been torn up by shell fire. The whole appearance of the country-side had changed--most of the roads had almost disappeared, thick woods had become nothing but collections of broken and distorted tree-stumps, of some villages there was scarcely a trace. Everywhere the ground was littered with the awful debris of war--dead bodies of men and animals, derelict tanks and guns, shattered wagons and every conceivable form of what was known to the men as “salvage.” To crown all, the heavy rains of the late summer and early autumn had converted the whole area into a quagmire, the drainage system having been completely destroyed by artillery fire. Cross-country travelling was extremely difficult for a man on foot, for even when he picked his way carefully he was often bogged well above the knees; transport and animals could not move at all except by the newly-made roads and tracks. Every effort had been made to deal with the situation by the construction of plank roads, gridded tracks and light railways, but transport difficulties and the activity of the enemy artillery seriously interfered. Could the prophetic eye of Dante have looked so far forward into the future, he might readily have introduced this desolation as the setting to one of the lowest circles of Hell.
* * * * *
The Battalion was about to settle down for the night in Red Rose Camp when an urgent order from 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. altered everything. In spite of the rain that day, a particularly successful attack had been made on a wide front; all objectives had been reached, and, in some cases, passed. Luck had been on the side of the British for once, for that same morning the enemy had planned a big counter-attack. Unfortunately for him his zero hour had been fixed a few minutes later than the British, whose barrage, 1,000 yards in depth, had passed slowly over three enemy divisions, assembled in close order in the open, and had almost annihilated them. So promising had been the situation at one time that the 147th Infantry Brigade was within an ace of being thrown into the battle that very day, to exploit it. This, however, had not been done, but the Battalion now received orders to move up and relieve the 1st Battalion Canterbury Regt., in reserve to the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade. At once all was bustle and excitement, and, soon after 11-0 p.m. the Battalion, in battle order and at battle strength, marched out of camp to play its part in the battle for the Passchendaele Ridge.
The night was very dark and wet, and great difficulty was found in carrying out the relief. The route to Pommern Castle, where Battalion H.Q. was located and round which the whole Battalion was posted, lay along No. 5 Track--a single line of grids, in particularly evil condition, with fearsome mud on both sides. Relief was not complete until after dawn. Some anxiety was felt as to what should be done in case the enemy attacked, for not a man of the Battalion had any clear idea where he was, or where the front line lay. Accommodation was very bad. One or two low-lying, very wet, and extremely uncomfortable pill-boxes were occupied by Battalion H.Q.; but nearly everyone had to be content with a shell-hole over which he could spread his waterproof sheet. October 5th was spent mainly in trying to build habitable shelters.
On the night of October 5/6th the Battalion moved up to the line, where it relieved two New Zealand battalions. D and C Companies held the front line--D Company to the south of, and C Company along, the eastern edge of Berlin Wood; A Company was in support on Abraham Heights, and B Company in reserve near Otto Farm, where Battalion H.Q. was situated. Abraham Heights were rather heavily shelled at intervals, but, apart from this, nothing of importance happened during the twenty-four hours that were spent in the sector. The enemy was undoubtedly very disorganised after the attack of two days before, and was in no condition to be aggressive.
The night of October 5/6th was a particularly bad one for the Battalion transport men. Owing to the appalling condition of the ground, supplies could only be taken up on pack animals, and that night, for the first and last time, Texas packs were used. These proved most unsatisfactory, the loads could not be properly secured, and constant halts were necessary to readjust them. The amount of traffic on the roads was amazing. From Vlamertinghe to Ypres, and up beyond Wieltje, the whole road was packed with every conceivable form of vehicle and pack animal. Blocks were constantly occurring and causing wearisome halts. Soon after the convoy started it became split up, owing to vehicles pushing in between the animals. Beyond Ypres the conditions became even worse, and eventually the convoy returned to Red Rose Camp without having reached the Battalion. But soon after dawn a fresh convoy set out and succeeded in delivering the rations.
The next night the Battalion was relieved by the 2/5th Battalion Manchester Regt. (66th Division) and returned to Pommern Castle. The next two days were spent in active preparation for the attack which was to take place on October 9th. Large carrying parties were found for establishing forward dumps, and all officers reconnoitred routes up to the line and assembly positions for the attack.
This operation was on a very big scale. The 49th Division was to attack on the extreme left of the Second Army, with the Fifth Army attacking on its left and the 66th Division on its right. The main details of the attack were as follows:--
1. The 49th Division was to advance straight towards the point of the Belle Vue Spur, an offshoot of the main Passchendaele Ridge, on a frontage of about 1,500 yards.
2. Two objectives were to be captured and consolidated, the second objective being about 1,250 yards from the British Front Line.
3. The attack was to be made by the 148th Infantry Brigade on the right and the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left, each having two battalions in the front line. The 147th Infantry Brigade was to be in Divisional Reserve.
It was thus very uncertain what the role of the Battalion would be. Its orders were to be assembled at Pommern Castle by zero hour (5-20 a.m.) ready to move at a moment’s notice. There it was to remain until further orders were received from Brigade H.Q., and, as it was the reserve battalion of the Brigade, these orders were not expected very early.
The morning of October 8th was bright and sunny, and the ground was drying up splendidly. But about the middle of the afternoon very heavy rain began to fall which continued, almost without a break, right through the night. The ground, already in very bad condition, was thus rendered almost impassable in many places, and the assembly of the attacking Brigades was seriously hampered.
(_b_) October 9th.
By 5-0 a.m. on October 9th the Battalion,[11] with the exception of most of B Company, who had not yet returned from a carrying party, was assembled at Pommern Castle ready to move. At 5-20 a.m. the barrage opened, several batteries near where the Battalion was assembled being in action, and all knew that the attack had begun. For about two hours nothing happened; save for the noise of the guns, everything was quiet, and no news of the attack came through. About 7-30 a.m., orders were received for the Battalion to advance to the vicinity of Aisne Farm, some six or seven hundred yards west of Kansas Cross. B Company’s carrying party had not yet returned, so guides were left behind for them, and the rest of the Battalion moved off in artillery formation, with platoons at fifty yards’ interval. The ground was very wet after the heavy rain of the night before, and movement was slow and laborious. The Battalion had scarcely reached its destination when fresh orders arrived, directing it to proceed forthwith to the neighbourhood of Korek, where it would come under the orders of the 146th Infantry Brigade, whose advanced H.Q. was there. The route followed was along No. 6 Track, a single line of grids in none too good condition. Platoons had to move in single file, and, as they drew near to Korek, came under heavy artillery fire which caused several casualties--the first suffered that day. On arrival there the Battalion halted and began to dig in as the artillery fire was still heavy. While it was thus engaged, the remainder of B Company came up, so that the Battalion was again concentrated. The Commanding Officer went personally to the 146th Infantry Brigade H.Q. for orders and information as to the situation. The latter, he found, was very obscure. It was not definitely known where any of the Battalion H.Q. were situated; the 1/5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. was believed to be at or near Peter Pan, the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. somewhere between Kronprinz Farm and Yetta Houses. The only definite information was that both were in need of reinforcements, and the Commanding Officer was accordingly ordered to send up two companies in support of each. He returned to his Battalion H.Q. and orders, as definite as the situation would admit, were issued at 10-50 a.m. A and B Companies were placed under the command of Capt. A. E. Mander, whose instructions were to report to the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. and place himself under its orders. C and D Companies the Commanding Officer decided to lead in person to the assistance of the 1/5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt.
[Illustration: R.S.M. F. P. STIRZAKER, M.C.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: R.S.M. W. LEE, M.C.]
[Illustration: C.S.M. W. MEDLEY, M.C., M.M.]
[Illustration: Sergt. A. LOOSEMORE, V.C., D.C.M.]
At 10-55 a.m. Battalion H.Q. moved off, followed by C Company, with D Company bringing up the rear--all in artillery formation. Near Calgary Grange they came across Capt. Ablitt, of the 1/5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt., who stated that his Commanding Officer was wounded and he was now in command. Most of his H.Q. personnel were casualties, he had no proper Headquarters and knew very little of the situation. The Commanding Officer informed Capt. Ablitt that he was moving up to Peter Pan with two companies, and then continued on his way. There was no protective barrage to cover the advance of the Battalion, and, as it came down the slope past Calgary Grange, very heavy machine gun fire was encountered from the pill-boxes on the Belle Vue Spur. The enemy artillery was also active, and, though the companies extended, many casualties were suffered before the old British front line was reached. Here a halt was made for about fifteen minutes to give companies an opportunity to reorganise, and to allow time for the reconnaissance of the crossings over the Ravebeke. In normal times this stream would have been a very slight obstacle, but the devastating fire of the British artillery and the recent heavy rains had converted its course into a formidable morass. Sec.-Lieut. A. M. Luty went forward to reconnoitre for practicable crossings. Under a heavy artillery and machine gun fire he carried out this duty, marked the possible places with sticks, and then returned to his own lines.
Lieut. H. S. Wilkinson, the Battalion Intelligence Officer, was also sent forward, not only to reconnoitre the crossings of the stream, but to try to get into touch with men of the 146th Infantry Brigade. Running from one shell-hole to another, he soon lost touch with the two men who had started out with him, and went on alone. Near the Ravebeke, a bullet lodged in his steel helmet, fortunately without wounding him. As he could find no other means of crossing, he waded through the stream, the water coming above his waist. He then advanced straight towards Peter Pan, across awful mud, and with machine gun bullets whistling all round. Soon he met a party of the 1/6th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment, but they could tell him nothing of the situation. So he determined to reconnoitre as far as Peter Pan itself before returning to report. Not a dozen yards from the ruined building he was severely wounded. One bullet shattered his jaw; another went right through his left shoulder and fractured the arm. That was the end of his reconnaissance. He had established the very important fact that the enemy did not hold Peter Pan, but he was unable to return to give the information. In great pain and half covered with water, he lay in a shell-hole until the advance of the Battalion swept past him, and he was found and carried back.
Meanwhile, the Battalion was again advancing. C Company led the way, with D Company in close support. Under a hail of machine gun bullets, in the face of accurate sniping, and with shells bursting all round, they steadily advanced by section rushes, in extended order. The rear company gave covering fire to the leading one, and machine guns also assisted in keeping down the hostile fire. But many men went down, killed or wounded, in the mud, before the stream was reached. Then followed the crossing of the Ravebeke. Some of C Company had carried saplings with them which they threw across, others crossed on the fallen trees which were already lying there, yet others literally forced their way through the mud and water. On the far side of the Ravebeke the fire was, if anything, heavier; but the men pressed on to Peter Pan where many of them gained some temporary protection among the ruined buildings. It was in this crossing of the Ravebeke, and the advance to Peter Pan, that the Battalion suffered its heaviest casualties that day. Among others, Capt. N. Geldard, O.C. D Company, went down with a bullet wound in the ankle--his second wound in less than three months. Lieut. W. L. Hirst assumed command of D Company. Had the Battalion carried out its advance under a proper barrage the casualties would not have been nearly so heavy. But the Ravebeke had been crossed, which was, at the moment, the really important thing.
Battalion H.Q. was established in a newly-made shell hole, just in rear of the ruins of Peter Pan. C Company was pushed forward at once to get in touch with the West Yorks, and to gain contact with the enemy. Following a line slightly to the right of the direction of Wolf Copse, they came upon a number of West Yorks, who had dug themselves in, from two to three hundred yards in front of Peter Pan. Reconnoitring to their flanks, they also gained touch with a platoon of the 1/6th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. So they set to work to consolidate on that line. There were rumours of other troops of the 146th Infantry Brigade still further out in front, but, apart from a few advanced men in shell holes, none were seen, and it is unlikely that any existed. D Company was also sent forward to prolong C Company’s line to the left. Lieut. W. L. Hirst, with his C.S.M., first reconnoitred the ground, and, finding a company of the 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. already in position there, brought up his company to prolong the line on its left. With the exception of the platoons found by C Company, no formed body of the 146th Infantry Brigade was ever found by the Battalion, though various isolated groups and stragglers were taken charge of by different companies. Meanwhile, machine gun fire from the Belle Vue Spur and from Wolf Copse was still sweeping the Battalion front, and extremely accurate sniping from the latter direction made individual movement very hazardous. Companies were doing what they could to keep this down with Lewis gun and rifle fire, but casualties were frequent. Two signallers, attached to C Company, were shot through the head as they were moving along a shallow trench. The Adjutant, Capt. W. C. Fenton, M.C., while reconnoitring the positions, was also wounded in the head. As Lieut. H. S. Wilkinson had already been wounded, only the Commanding Officer and Lieut. W. T Scholes were left at Battalion H.Q. Such was the situation on the right about 3-0 p.m.
Meanwhile, A and B Companies had not moved with the rest of the Battalion. On receiving his orders to reinforce the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt., Capt. A. E. Mander had sent out scouts to try to find out the location of the Battalion H.Q.; but, after some time, these had returned without any information. The companies were therefore kept in shell holes in the vicinity of Calgary Grange until something definite could be discovered. It was not until 12-20 p.m. that they got into touch with the Commanding Officer of the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt., who was found moving his H.Q. back to Calgary Grange. He simply told them to stand fast for the present. They remained where they were until about 3-0 p.m., when they received orders to move up to Yetta Houses, and fill a gap in the line there. With A Company leading and B Company in support, they moved off in artillery formation, until they reached the swamps of the Ravebeke. Here heavy machine gun fire, and the same accurate sniping which had harassed the rest of the Battalion, forced them to extend. Capt. A. E. Mander was hit in the head by a sniper during the advance, and killed instantly. His death was a great loss to the Battalion, for he was not only a most conscientious officer, but a general favourite with all ranks; nothing was ever too much trouble for him if he thought it would benefit his men, and his only ambitions in life seemed to be to work hard and make others happy. On his fall, Lieut. A. Kirk assumed command of A Company.
A and B Companies reached their objective about 5-30 p.m. Like the rest of the Battalion, they found only stragglers of the 146th Infantry Brigade. A Company began to dig in to the right front of Yetta Houses, with B Company in support in an old trench in rear. Patrols sent out to the left failed to gain touch with any troops, save a few stragglers in shell holes, so Lieut. Kirk ordered the flank of his trench to be thrown back to protect his left. About dusk, patrols sent out by all companies succeeded in gaining touch with one another, and the line which was held for the night was as follows:--
Right:--C Company, facing N.E., and about 200 yards from Wolf Copse. It was in touch on the right with a platoon of the 1/6th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt., and had scattered men of the same battalion in shell holes in front of its position.
Right Centre:--A Company of the 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., under Capt. Buxton.
Left Centre:--D Company, N. of Peter Pan, and facing Wolf Farm.
Left:--A Company, just to the right front of Yetta Houses, with its left flank thrown back as no touch had been obtained there. B Company was behind Yetta Houses, in support to A Company.
Battalion H.Q. was behind Peter Pan, still occupying its shell hole, “and very uncomfortable at that,” according to the situation report sent in by the Commanding Officer. This line remained unchanged until the Battalion was relieved the following night.
Darkness brought a welcome relief from the harassing machine gun fire and the accurate sniping which had caused so many casualties during the day. Though heavy, casualties had not been sufficiently high to interfere seriously with the efficiency of the Battalion. C and D Companies combined had lost nearly 30 per cent. of their men, and A and B Companies about 20 per cent. These losses were, to a certain extent, made good by the temporary incorporation of numbers of stragglers. The men settled down for the night as best they could, tired out with their efforts of the day. Every officer and man was covered with mud from head to foot, and his clothes were thoroughly soaked with water. In these circumstances little comfort could be hoped for, especially as the Battalion failed to get in touch with the ration convoy. The night was very cold. Patrols were pushed out to maintain contact with the enemy, and these found the pill-boxes on Belle Vue Spur and the neighbourhood of Wolf Copse still held. One H.Q. scout unfortunately was captured by the enemy while out on patrol; he had become separated from the man he was working with, owing to the darkness and the very broken nature of the country. Suddenly he found himself right on the top of an enemy post; a bullet shattered one of his arms and paralysed his power of resistance, and, though he tried to run for it, he was easily taken.[12]
Throughout the day the enemy made no attempt to counter-attack, contenting himself by harassing the exposed British troops with his fire. About 7-0 p.m., a report that the Germans were massing for the attack caused some excitement, but it turned out to be incorrect. Towards midnight the Battalion was surprised by the opening of a heavy shrapnel barrage on its front. As everything was quiet at the time, no call for help had been sent back, and no operation was known to be in progress, the cause of this remained a mystery for some time. It was cleared up about 1-45 a.m. by the arrival of an order, from the 146th Infantry Brigade, to mop up a considerable area of ground on the front. The barrage had been intended to cover this operation, but so late did the order arrive, that it had long been over and nothing could be done.
The dawn of October 10th was ushered in by the customary German “hate,” but after that things became fairly quiet for a time. A change was made in the Battalion dispositions at dawn. B Company was moved back to the vicinity of 146th Infantry Brigade H.Q. where it became Brigade Reserve. A Company thereupon withdrew one platoon from the line to form a company reserve.
Little of importance happened during October 10th. Very accurate sniping from Wolf Copse, as on the previous day, caused much inconvenience and several casualties. At various times during the day numbers of the enemy were seen on the Belle Vue Spur, and artillery fire was directed on them. About 4-0 p.m., Battalion H.Q. was subjected to a heavy and very accurate shelling. This was believed to be a result of the laying out of the Battalion ground sign, which had been called for by a contact aeroplane; it was thought that this had been seen by enemy planes which were also up at the time.
Word had been received during the day that the Battalion was to be relieved that night by a New Zealand Battalion. About 10-0 p.m., these troops began to arrive. They did not take over in the ordinary way, but preferred to select their own position and dig an entirely new line for themselves. So, as the New Zealanders marched in and took up their position, the Battalion marched out. Relief was complete about midnight.
The orders issued to companies were that they should make for the Wieltje Road and follow it until they met the guides who were being sent up from the transport lines. All that night these guides were out on the road, directing men to X Camp, St. Jean, where they were to rest and where hot tea and rum awaited them. From about midnight until long after dawn, the troops of the 49th Division streamed down the road, some singly, some in groups of two or three, others in formed bodies. It is doubtful whether, before or since, the Battalion has been more thoroughly done up. After living in that waste of mud and water, with practically no shelter, for nearly a week, it had carried out an attack over the same appalling ground, and then consolidated and held its position in the face of violent artillery and machine gun fire.
The attack of October 9th had not been a complete success, but a very important advance had been made. The first objective had been carried practically in its entirety, and, in front of Peter Pan, a new line had been established some distance beyond it. But the second objective had not been reached. The most important success was the establishment of a line, well beyond the Ravebeke, along the whole front. This stream was a most serious obstacle, and the consolidation of a line to the east of it provided a good jumping-off ground for the troops who were to attack later on the same front. The difficulty of the operation may be judged from the fact that an attack launched from the new line a few days later by the New Zealanders failed to gain an inch of ground, and that the second objective of the 49th Division on October 9th was only just reached three weeks later by the Canadians, who had come up quite fresh to make the attack. The operation of October 9th was one of the first of that awful series of attacks on the Passchendaele Ridge which failed to obtain a full measure of success owing, not to the opposition of the enemy, but to the appalling condition of the ground.
That the work done by the 49th Division was appreciated by the higher commands is shown by the following message from the G.O.C., 2nd Anzac Corps, under whom the Division had fought:--
“Following message has been received by me from Army Commander, begins:--
‘Please accept and convey to all your troops engaged to-day my heartiest congratulations on success achieved.
General Plumer.’
The Commander-in-Chief also called here to-day and wished specially to congratulate you and your Division.
I wish also to add my high appreciation and thanks to you personally and to all ranks of your Division on having done so much under such arduous and trying conditions.
General Godley.”
The G.O.C., 49th Division, in a Special Order of the Day, wrote “Nothing could be finer than what the Division accomplished.” The G.O.C., 146th Infantry Brigade, in a personal letter to the Commanding Officer, said “I cannot thank you enough for the cheerful and thorough way in which all my orders were carried out.” While the Battalion’s own Brigadier, referring to the response of his troops when ordered up to support the other Brigades of the Division, said “Officers and men, though thoroughly exhausted, at once forgot their fatigue and advanced through the enemy barrage in the most gallant style worthy of the best traditions of the Army.”
[Illustration: _Belle Vue Spur 9.10.17._]
(_c_) Rest and Reorganisation.
Though a welcome change after the hardships of the Belle Vue Spur, X Camp, St. Jean, was far from a paradise. There were very few tents, and most of the men had to be content with small bivouacs or covered holes in the ground. The camp had been pitched hurriedly by a New Zealand battalion only a day or two before, and there had not been time to perfect it. It was not shelled, though the enemy paid attention to some neighbouring areas, and on several occasions his bombing planes were not far off at night. But the camp was made something like a home, and great regret was felt, and expressed, when a neighbouring Corps found that the Battalion was on the wrong side of the road and orders to move were issued. There was no other suitable camping site in the district. The best that could be found was a small field, pitted with shell holes, and covered with very long grass and rank weeds, all absolutely sodden by the rain. Into this field the tents and bivouacs were moved and repitched in the pouring rain, the men freely expressing their opinions, in language more forcible than polite, and the officers thoroughly sympathising.
On October 12th the New Zealand Division made its attack on the Belle Vue Spur, with the result already mentioned. One of the worst features of October 9th had been the difficulty of getting the wounded away; there had been far too few stretcher-bearers, and many of the wounded had suffered greatly by their long exposure. For the New Zealand attack each battalion of the 147th Infantry Brigade was asked to provide 200 men to assist in evacuating the wounded, and volunteers were readily forthcoming from among the men who had themselves learned the awful conditions. For two days these men worked in the battle area, fortunately with practically no casualties, and the gratitude of the New Zealand Division is shown by the following letter, written by its Divisional Commander to the G.O.C., 147th Infantry Brigade:--
“My Dear General,
Please express to the officers and men of your Brigade who came forward to assist in getting in the wounded, the very hearty thanks of myself and Staff, and the whole Division.
I have heard the warmest expressions of praise for the way in which your men volunteered to come forward and undertake what was certainly a very exhausting and maybe dangerous task.
I hope they did not suffer casualties, or if so, that they were light. The New Zealand Division will not forget the debt they owe to the officers and men of the 147th Brigade.
A. W. Russell, Major-General.”
On October 16th the Battalion moved back to a hutment camp south-east of Vlamertinghe and here there was more comfort, though the huts were very crowded. In fact, at this time, there was not nearly enough accommodation, around and behind Ypres, for the enormous number of troops which had been brought up to take part in the battle of Passchendaele. Some training was done during the week the Battalion was there, particularly of specialists, the loss of whom had been very heavy in the recent battle. There, too, Major-General E. M. Perceval, C.B., D.S.O., said farewell to the 147th Infantry Brigade. He had commanded the 49th Division for more than two years, but was now returning to England to take up a home command. The Brigade paraded in hollow square and was inspected by the General, who afterwards thanked the men for all they had done and wished them farewell. The Brigade then marched past. Major-General N. J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., who had formerly commanded an infantry brigade of the 50th Division, succeeded to the command of the 49th Division.
The Battalion was now sent well back for a period of rest and reorganisation. On October 24th it moved by motor bus to tents near Winnizeele, a village famous for a restaurant which catered specially for officers. The camp site was not a good one, but three days later the Battalion moved to billets near Steenvoorde, where it remained for about a fortnight. Time was spent in reorganisation and training. Some interesting tactical schemes were worked out, one of which was attended by the new Divisional Commander. This was the first time the men had met him, though they were to see much of him in the future. He turned out to be a man of exceptional energy, who spent much of his time in the line, and seemed to have a peculiar preference for visiting the hottest places he could find. Here some drafts, both of officers and other ranks, joined the Battalion; but the heavy casualties sustained at Nieuport and the Belle Vue Spur were not made good until the reorganisation of the British Expeditionary Force at the beginning of the next year. The arrangement of billets did not allow of much social relaxation being organised. B Company, who occupied a large and comfortable barn, held a very successful concert, chiefly noteworthy for the dancing of a certain “Miss” Hey, who there made her début in that role. Another feature was the lecturing of the Area Commandant of Steenvoorde, whose comments on the strategy of the war were most interesting, even though his prophecies were sometimes rather wide of the mark.
On November 9th the Battalion moved by motor bus to the neighbourhood of Ypres where it was to remain, save for one period of rest, until the last great enemy offensive was launched in the following spring.
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