CHAPTER XVI.
NO. 4 COLUMN—INTOMBI—INDHLOBANE—KAMBULA—KING’S MESSENGERS.
On January 6th, No. 4 Column, under Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B.—strength previously detailed—crossed the Blood River (the Zulu boundary according to the award of the Commission) and advanced to Bemba’s Kop.
On the 11th, Colonel Wood met the General halfway to Rorke’s Drift, and received instructions “to occupy himself with the tribes on his front and left flank, notably Seketwayo,” until No. 3 Column was ready to advance to Isipezi Hill, when he was to proceed to Ingwe, both columns to establish advanced depôts, bring up supplies, and then move forward. Colonel Wood induced the Zulu chief Bemba to give up his arms and come in, which he did on the 10th, bringing with him about eighty of his people and 1000 head of cattle, sheep, and goats; they were sent to Utrecht.
On the 11th, Colonel Wood, who had advanced with a portion of the force from Bemba’s Kop towards Rorke’s Drift to meet the General on his return march, seized about 2000 head of cattle, the owners of which were quietly tending them as usual (these were supposed to be Sihayo’s), and next day attacked a petty chief, who was said to have “given considerable trouble to the Transvaal farmers”, with the result of seven Zulus killed and upwards of 500 head of cattle captured.
Some 2000 to 3000 head of cattle were also taken from the Sondolosi tribe,[161] a slight resistance being offered by the Zulus, of whom one was killed. Colonel Wood _thus_ endeavoured to induce Seketwayo’s people to be pacified, and was “therefore most anxious to refrain from taking any steps which might discourage these men from coming in!”
The General, on entering Zululand, finding the difficulties greater than he had anticipated, instructed Colonel Wood “to act altogether independently, about the head waters of the White Umveloosi River” (16th January, 1879), and when Seketwayo had either surrendered or been defeated, to “take up a position covering Utrecht and the adjacent Transvaal border, wherever he considers his force can be most usefully employed,” and not to “attempt to advance towards the Inhlazatye Mountain until an advance by the other three columns across the Umhlatoozi River has become possible.” (P. P. [C. 2252] p. 63.) Colonel Wood, from Bemba’s Kop, communicated with Uhamo—a brother of Cetshwayo—who had asked for a way to be pointed out by which he might escape.
No. 4 Column now moved towards Intemgeni River, and encamped there on 18th January, Colonel Wood reporting “many of the natives are giving themselves up to me; I have captured about 4000 head of cattle.” On the previous day a party of Wood’s “irregulars” attacked some Zulus, killing 9, wounding about 20, and taking 5 prisoners and 100 sheep; with a loss to themselves of 2 wounded (_ibid._ p. 66). On the 19th and 20th there were skirmishes with some of Tinta’s people, of whom about 12 were killed. A prisoner was brought in by the Native Contingent on the 19th, whom they gravely asked permission to kill in the evening, “thinking they had done their whole duty in obeying orders and bringing the man in.”
The column encamped at Tinta’s kraal, on the left bank of the Umvolosi River, and a stone fort was commenced. A reconnaissance across the Umvolosi to Zinguni Mountain met the Zulus in force, and was compelled to retire with a loss of two wounded, the enemy not being checked until the river was recrossed. January 22nd, the Zinguni Mountain was patrolled by a strong force, the enemy retiring hastily, and leaving about 600 head of cattle. In the distance a large force, estimated at 4000, was seen, and it apparently ascended the Indhlobane Mountain. The column had a smart engagement with the enemy on the 24th, and drove them off with a loss of about fifty killed; but on receiving intelligence of the disaster to No. 3 Column, retired to Fort Tinta.
At Luneburg a laager was formed by the Dutch farmers, under Commandant Schermbrucker, and Colonel Wood moved his force to Kambula Hill, to cover Utrecht and the neighbouring border, and there firmly entrenched himself. The situation chosen was a commanding and central position between the Umvolosi and Pevana rivers on the Jagt-pad (Hunter’s path), covering the country northward to Luneburg, eastward to the Amaqulusi, southward to the Umvolosi, and westward to Balte’s Spruit and Utrecht.
The Zulus abandoned the open, and remained in the mountains and broken country, where rocks and caves afforded them secure positions.
On February 1st, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with 140 irregular cavalry, made a dash at the Amaqulisini (or Amaqulusi) kraal, thirty miles distant. This was a military stronghold, deemed by the Boers to be impregnable. It was situated in a basin at a distance of nearly two miles from the summit of the rugged heights by which it was surrounded, and almost hidden from view, although about 300 yards in diameter and containing at least 250 huts.
Leaving thirty men as a covering party, Colonel Buller moved with the remainder down the almost precipitous slopes, the horsemen frequently obliged to dismount and lead their horses. However, the kraal was not occupied in force, and, after a few shots, the inmates fled. Six Zulus were killed, 270 head of cattle taken, and the kraal burnt, the force returning from this daring exploit without casualty, after a hard day’s work of twenty hours.
A small fort was finished and armed on February 3rd, and, on the 10th, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with 400 irregular cavalry, reconnoitred the Indhlobane Mountain, and, after a slight skirmish, captured 490 head of cattle.
A new fort was commenced at Kambula, about two miles higher up the spur, and the camp moved to this spot on the 13th, the fort being garrisoned by two companies of infantry and two guns.
It was reported that Manyonyoba (an independent native chief) had been killing and plundering in the Intombi Valley, so Colonel Buller was sent with a force to the spot. The Swazi chief Umbilini was also reported by Commandant Schermbrucker to have raided, in combination with Manyonyoba, and done much mischief to life and property; however, a force sent from Luneburg had a successful skirmish with them.
The king’s brother, Uhamo, came in to Captain McLeod from the Swazi border with 300 of his people and 1000 cattle, and reached Derby on February 4th, his following increased to about 600, and was moved down to Luneburg, where he arrived on March 7th.
A sad disaster occurred on the Intombi River to a detachment of the 80th Regiment on the 12th March. Captain Moriarty, with 104 men of the 80th, was escorting a convoy from Derby to Luneburg. On reaching the Intombi Drift (about four miles from Luneburg) the river was found to be rising, and by the time the advanced guard (thirty-five men, under Lieutenant Harward) had crossed, it was impossible to take the waggons over. They were therefore laagered on the river-bank in the shape of a triangle; and there they remained next day. About 4 A.M. on the 12th a shot was fired, and the troops turned out, remaining under arms for half an hour, when, all being quiet, they returned to their tents (it transpired afterwards that the outlying sentries had been surprised and killed by the enemy). Suddenly the fog lifted, and a large body of Zulus without any warning rushed on and took the laager, driving the troops into the river. The party under Lieutenant Harward, which was encamped on the opposite bank, opened a brisk fire, but were soon broken, and obliged to fly towards Luneburg; Lieutenant Harward, galloping in, gave the alarm. Only forty-four men of this detachment survived.
Major Tucker sallied out from Luneburg, when the enemy slowly retreated. The waggons were saved, and the bodies of Captain Moriarty and his unfortunate men buried.
The comparatively quiet time at Kambula was passed thus: Colonel Wood was up with the first in the early morning, and often out with the patrols who daily scouted the country round for miles; his force securely entrenched; himself a very strict but kind commander, who had the full confidence and good-will of his troops. Sports were got up for the amusement and occupation of the men. A band played in the evening, and the singing and laughter in camp showed that all were in excellent spirits. The daily business was cutting wood from the mountain-side some three miles distant, escorts, patrols, and piquet-duty. One of the night piquets (eight men) posted at some distance from camp was termed “the forlorn hope;” its special duty was to give early warning of an enemy’s approach. But the most unpleasant feature in this camp-life was the absence of comfort at night. The troops necessarily “turned in” dressed, armed, and ready for instant work, with the _personal_ discomfort illustrated by this soldier’s joke—that it was “Cetshwayo outside and Catch-away-o! inside.”
Lieut.-Colonel Buller, having returned to Kambula, patrolled Uhamo’s district, and in the direction of the Indhlobane range; and on the 16th brought into camp 958 of Uhamo’s people.
On March 28th, a reconnaissance by the whole cavalry force was made towards Indhlobane. The Zulus were in possession of the mountain, which was ascended in skirmishing order as rapidly as possible, the enemy keeping up a heavy fire from caves and from behind huge rocks. The summit was reached with the loss of one officer—Lieutenant Williams—and serious fighting was kept up for some time in the endeavour to dislodge the Zulus from their secure positions. Captain the Hon. R. Campbell was killed, also Lieutenant von Sticenstron, and Colonel Wood himself had a very narrow escape.
Whilst engaged in this struggle a Zulu army was moving up to seize the approaches to the mountain, and cut off the force from the camp. Immediately on this being observed a retreat was made in rapid but good order, until a very steep and stony krantz was reached, where the men could only move in single file; here the enemy got in amongst the troopers, causing utter confusion. The officers did their best to steady their men, but it became a case of _sauve qui peut_.
Captain Barton’s troop was sent down the mountain to recover the body of Lieutenant Williams, and returned, having been joined by Mr. Uys. On the flats they came up with Colonel Weatherley’s troop, and found the enemy in front and on the right and left. Retreating a short distance they were surrounded, so, opening out, they charged through the enemy and over the neck, which was lined with Zulus. But few were enabled to win their way through this perilous pass, and of those who did many were overtaken and killed on the plain. Of Captain Barton’s troop but eight men returned to camp that night.
The broken force fought its way to the camp, followed by the enemy for several miles. Many a man’s life was saved by a comrade halting and taking him up on his own horse, a personal instance of which Captain D’Arcy gives. His horse had been killed under him in the descent of the mountain, and he ran for his life for some 300 yards, when a man named Francis caught a horse for him, which, however, he shortly relinquished to a wounded comrade, running on himself on foot. Colonel Buller picked him up when nearly exhausted, but when he recovered his breath he dismounted; he was a second time in difficulties, and assisted by Lieutenant Blaine, and again, a third time, by Major Tremlett, R.A. Indeed, most of the men got into camp with comrades mounted behind them. The loss was 12 officers and 84 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and also Colonel Wood’s staff-officer, Captain the Hon. R. Campbell; Captain Barton, Coldstream Guards; and Mr. Lloyd, Political Assistant. Colonel Wood’s horse was shot under him.
Mr. Piet Uys, the leader of the Burgher force, was likewise amongst those killed in action this day.
Small patrols were sent out next morning to endeavour to find any men who might have escaped.
Warning of an intended attack on Kambula was brought in by a native—one of Uhamo’s men—and, about 11 A.M., dense masses of the enemy were seen in the distance, when all the force was assembled and the cattle driven into their laager. At 1.30 P.M. the action commenced by mounted troops, under Colonels Buller and Russell, engaging the enemy on the north of the camp. They were speedily forced to return into the laager, followed by the Zulus until they were within 300 yards, when a heavy fire from the 90th Regiment checked their advance, and they opened out round the camp.
At 2.15 the right front and rear of the camp were attacked by heavy masses of the enemy, who, apparently well supplied with Martini-Henry rifles, occupied a hill commanding the laager, enfilading it so that the company of the 13th posted at the right rear of the enclosure had to be withdrawn. The front of the cattle-laager was, however, stoutly held by a company of the 13th; but the Zulus coming boldly on, Major Hackett, with two companies of the 90th, was directed to clear the slope. They sallied out into the open, driving the Zulus back in a gallant manner under a heavy fire, until ordered to retire by Colonel Wood.
While bringing his men in, Major Hackett was dangerously wounded.
The two guns in the redoubt were admirably worked by Lieutenant Nicholson, R.A., until he was mortally wounded; when Major Vaughan, R.A., replaced him.
Major Tremlett, R.A., with four guns, remained in the open during the engagement.
The attack began to slacken about 5.30 P.M., enabling Colonel Wood to assume the offensive; the Zulus were driven from the cattle kraal into which they penetrated, and from the immediate vicinity of the camp, the infantry doing great execution among the retreating masses.
The pursuit was taken up by the mounted men under Colonel Buller, and continued for seven miles, “killing great numbers, the enemy being too exhausted to fire in their own defence” (_vide_ Colonel Wood’s despatch of March 30th). All agreed in admiring the pluck of the Zulus, who, “under tremendous fire, never wavered, but came straight at us.”
The loss of No. 4 Column was 2 officers killed, 5 wounded, and 80 men killed and wounded. The strength of the enemy was thought to be about 20,000, of whom 1000 are supposed to have been killed. Colonel Wood’s operations at Indhlobane were for the purpose of “making demonstrations against the enemy,” as directed by the General, who had reason to believe at that time, that he should find the whole Zulu army between his force and Etshowe. (P. P. [C. 2367] p. 35.) One trooper, a Frenchman named Grandier, had a very remarkable escape from Indhlobane, of which the following is his account: On coming down the mountain we were met by a large Zulu force, and fell back across the neck assailed on all sides. I was about the last, having put a comrade on my horse whilst I ran alongside, when a Kafir caught me by the legs, and I was made prisoner. I was taken to Umbilini’s kraal and questioned; after which, I passed the night tied to a tree. Next day I was taken into the middle of a large “impi,” where I was threatened with death, but the leader said he would send me to Cetywayo. Next day I started for Ulundi, in charge of four men, who were riding, but I had all my clothes taken from me, and had to walk, carrying their food. On the evening of the fourth day we reached Ulundi, and I was kept tied in the open till about noon next day, when Cetywayo sent for me, and questioned me about what the English wanted, where Shepstone was, etc. A Dutchman acted as interpreter, and I saw a Portuguese, and an English-speaking Zulu, who could read.[162] Cetywayo had a personal guard of about one hundred men, but I did not see any large numbers of men at his kraal, but there were two small cannons there. During my stay I was fed on mealies, and frequently beaten. At last messengers arrived reporting the death of Umbilini, and Cetywayo said he would send me to his Kafirs to kill. On 13th April I started in charge of two Kafirs, one armed with a gun and both with assegais. About midday we were lying down, the Kafirs being sleepy, when I seized an assegai and killed the man with the gun, the other running away. I walked all night guided by the stars; next day I saw an impi driving cattle towards Ulundi, so had to lie still. After this I saw no Kafirs, and walked on at night. On the morning of the 16th I met some of our own people and was brought into camp. Trooper Grandier, when brought in, was dressed in an old corduroy coat, cut with assegai stabs, and a pair of regimental trousers cut off at the knee; these he had picked up on the Veldt. He had strips of cloth round his feet.
The independent chief Umbilini, who was such a thorn in the side of the Transvaal, was killed early in April. Small parties had raided into the Pongolo Valley from Indhlobane, opposite Luneburg, until they were said to number some hundreds, when they came upon two companies of the 2-24th on the march; these at once laagered, and the enemy moved on; Umbilini, Assegai’s son, and four horsemen, going back with twenty horses. They were pursued by Captain Prior, 80th Regiment, with seven mounted men (80th), and another European, when Assegai’s son was killed, and Umbilini mortally wounded.
The raiders were attacked by some parties of natives, but went off to the Assegai River with several beasts and sheep.—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 51).
Meanwhile, many attempts were made by the Zulu king to arrest the tide of invasion, and to bring about a more peaceable solution of the difficulties between him and the English Government.
When Lord Chelmsford first crossed into Zululand, messengers were sent by the king to the column on the Lower Tugela asking for an explanation of the invasion, suggesting that hostilities should be suspended, that the British troops should re-cross the Tugela, and that talking should commence.[163] These men did not return to the king, but remained at the Lower Tugela, Sir Bartle Frere says by their own desire, since they dared not return with an unsatisfactory answer.
And Bishop Schreuder narrates on March 3rd that—“Two Zulus arrived here yesterday with a message from the king.... The king says: ‘Look here, I have taken care of the deserted mission stations, and not allowed them to be destroyed, thinking that the missionaries in time would return to them, such as Mr. Robertson’s at Kwamagwaza, and Oftibro’s at Ekhowe, but we now see what use the missionaries make of the station-houses; Robertson has come with an impi (army) to the Ekhowe mission station, and there has made a fort of it, the houses being turned to advantage for our enemies. Seeing this, my people have of their own accord destroyed the other mission stations; and although I have not ordered this destruction, still I cannot complain of it, seeing that the houses on the stations will serve as a shelter for our present invading enemy. I am in a fix what to do with your station Entumeni, for it is reported ... that the column at Miltongambill is to ... march to Entumeni, turn the station into a fort, like Robertson has had the Ekhowe turned into a fort. In that case I will, much against my wish, be obliged to destroy the house at Entumeni, as a matter of self-protection, the last thing I ever thought of doing, as I have no grudge against you or your station.’ This is the substance of the king’s message to me with respect to my station, Entumeni; it, therefore, now will entirely depend on the decision of the General Lord Chelmsford, whether the Entumeni station-houses are to be destroyed or _not_.” Bishop Schreuder says: “The messengers also report that the king has sent, through a certain Ikolwa Klass (not known to me), that copy of Sir T. Shepstone’s report which I, on behalf of the Natal Government, handed over to him from Her Majesty Queen Victoria, August, 1875.
“Already Umavumendaba had requested the king to send that book with the deputation that met at Tugela, 11th December, 1878, in order that there might be proved from that book wherein the king had sinned, since the English had put forth such warlike demonstrations; but Umavumendaba’s request was not then acceded to. The king now sends this book that from the contents of it may be proved wherein he has broken the compact made at his installation, 1st September, 1875” [1873].—(P.P. [C. 2318] pp. 35-37).
Bishop Schreuder requested Mr. Fannin, the border agent, “to receive the message from the messenger’s own lips, and communicate it to His Excellency.” He reported that Cetshwayo wished to explain to the Government that he had never desired war. He had not, he said, refused the terms proposed at the Lower Tugela; he had collected 1000 head of cattle to pay the demand made on him, and would even have delivered up Sihayo’s sons to the General, but “any Zulu that showed himself was immediately fired upon.” The attack upon Sandhlwana, he protested, was not made by his orders, and his induna was in disgrace for having made it. As regards Inyezane, the king contended that Colonel Pearson provoked the attack made on him by burning kraals, and committing other acts of hostility. He asked that both sides should put aside their arms, and resume negotiations with a view to a permanent settlement of all questions between himself and the Government. He would, he said, have sent in a message some time since, but was afraid, because the last time, when he sent eight messengers to the Lower Tugela, they were detained, whom he now begged might be sent back to him (_ibid._ pp. 40, 41).
Mr. Fannin, on the 22nd March, reports the arrival of the messengers with the book, and says: “Cetywayo sends by the messengers the book containing the laws promulgated at the time of his coronation, and presented to him by Her Majesty the Queen.
“It will be remembered that this book was handed to the Zulu king by Bishop Schreuder at the request of the Natal Government some time after the coronation took place. The king now returns it, and asks him to cast his eye over its contents, and say in what way he has transgressed its provisions” (_ibid._ p. 47).
On March 28th Mr. Fannin reports that “three messengers have arrived with a message from Cetywayo. Their names are Johannes (a native of Entumeni), ’Nkisimana, and Umfunzi. On approaching the ferry they were fired on by the Native Contingent.... The message is very short; it is simply to say, Cetywayo sees no reason for the war which is being waged against him, and he asks the Government to appoint a place at which a conference could be held with a view to the conclusion of peace.” They further brought a message from Dabulamanzi, that “a few days ago he sent a white flag with two messengers to Ekhowe, to ask for a suspension of hostilities, until the result of this mission was known, but the men have not returned. He asks that the men may be released.” Mr. Fannin says: “Four other Entumeni men have arrived with these messengers,” and he suggests, “that the Entumeni men should not be allowed to return to Zululand” (_ibid._ pp. 44, 45).
“Owing,” says Sir B. Frere, on June 17th, “to some misunderstanding between the various civil and military authorities, these messengers also were detained for several weeks, and have only lately been sent back.”
“I do not for a moment suppose,” he continues, “that either the civil or military authorities were aware of this, or could have prevented it by bringing their detention to notice at an earlier period, but it shows the difficulties of intercourse on such subjects with the Zulus, where such things could occur without the slightest ground for suspicion of bad faith on the part of either the civil or military authorities.”[164]
It is not easy to discover what unusual and mysterious difficulties the civil and military authorities can have found in communicating with the Zulu messengers (men who had been employed for many years in carrying the “words” of Government and the Zulu king to each other), and it is still more inexplicable to whose notice the said authorities could have brought their detention. The whole matter is about as comprehensible as the statement which appeared at the time in the Natal papers, that when these same messengers—a small party—approached our camp, bearing a white flag, “_we fired upon it_ (_i.e._ the flag) _to test its sincerity_.”
The detention of these messengers as prisoners at Kranz Kop came to the knowledge of the Bishop of Natal about the middle of April, and he at once brought the fact to the notice of the civil and military authorities. On the 20th April he saw Lord Chelmsford in Pietermaritzburg, and spoke to him on the subject. The General informed him that he had already ordered them to go back to Cetshwayo, and to say that he must send indunas to meet him (Lord Chelmsford) at General Wood’s camp, to which he was then bound. Nevertheless the General’s message, which would take but two days on the road, had not reached Kranz Kop on the 29th, nor were the men actually released until the 9th of May. When finally set at liberty they carried with them a message calculated to discourage any further attempts on the Zulu king’s part at bringing about a peaceful issue to the war, being merely that if “Cetywayo sends any more messengers he must send them to the Upper Column (Dundee).”
Nevertheless on the 12th of June the same two old men appeared again, brought down, bearing a white flag, to ’Maritzburg by policemen from Mr. Fynn, resident magistrate at the Umsinga. Apparently they had been afraid to cross at Kranz Kop, where the “sincerity” of their white flag had been “tested” before, and were sent, not to the military authorities, but to the civil magistrate, who sent them down to Sir Henry Bulwer. He would have nothing to say to them, and transferred them to General Clifford, who examined them on the 13th, and sent them off on the following day to Lord Chelmsford. They had already walked one hundred and fifty miles from Ulundi to ’Maritzburg with their message of peace, and had then still further to go in order to reach the General, before they could get any kind of answer. Meanwhile the campaign was prosecuted without a pause.
General Clifford’s account of this is as follows:
“I began by informing them that I was only going to ask them such questions as would enable me to judge whether I should be justified in sending them on to my Chief, Lord Chelmsford, now in Zululand carrying on the war. The headman, Umfundi, then made the following statement: ‘We are Umfundi and Umkismana, Zulu messengers from Cetywayo. I am sent here by Cetywayo to ask for time to arrange a meeting of Chiefs with a view to arranging peace. We did not go to the head white Chief, because Fynn at Rorke’s Drift, whom I knew, told me the Great White Chief was in Zululand, and we had better see Shepstone and the second White Chief, who were at Pietermaritzburg, so we came on here advised by Fynn. I have been here about twice a year for the last six years as King’s messenger, but not as Chief. I am nothing but a messenger, and I have no authority from the King to treat for peace, or to do anything besides delivering my message, asking if time will be given to assemble a meeting of Chiefs. I know Mr. Shepstone, Mr. Gallway, and Bishop Colenso, and I have seen Bishop Colenso in this town, and also at his place in the country, but I do not wish to see him now, and I have not asked to see him.’ (This, according to their custom, merely implied that they had no message for him.) ‘I want to see the Great Chief, as the King ordered me to do. I only came here to deliver my message and because Fynn told me. This is the seventeenth day since I left the King’s kraal. Am an old man and cannot go so fast as I could when I was young, and heavy rain detained me three days. The King told me to hurry on and return quickly. It will take us seven days to get from here to Ibabamango Mountain if we go by Rorke’s Drift. We only know of two other messengers sent by the King; one is Sintwango, the name of the other we do not know. They have been sent to the lower column because Cetywayo thinks there are two Chiefs of equal power, one with the upper column and the other with the lower column. They are sent like us to ask for time to get out by the door. The King does not know the name of your big Chief, and we do not either. We are the same messengers the King sent to Fort Buckingham with the same message we have now. Only then our orders were not to go to your Chief as now, but to go to Fort Buckingham and wait for the answer there. We delivered our message to the military Chief there, and he sent the message on. The Chief was at Etshowe fighting, and the answer did not come for two months; when it came it was that the great Chief was surprised we were still there. He thought we had gone back to the King long ago. The officer at Fort Buckingham advised us to go to the great white Chief, but we said: “No, those are not the King’s orders; our orders are to come here, and now we will return and tell the King;” and it was half of the third month when we got back to him. We told him what had taken place. He consulted his great Chiefs, and then sent us with the orders we now have to go and see the great white Chief, and that is now what we are trying to do. I have no power given me but to ask for time. The King sends his messengers first, because it is the custom of the country to do so, and not to send a great Chief till arrangements have been made where the Chiefs are to assemble to talk about peace. We have no power to talk about terms of peace. None but messengers have yet been sent. The messengers sent to the lower column went before the fighting began; they were detained and did not return to the King’s kraal till we did.’ I said I was satisfied they ought to be sent on at once to Lord Chelmsford.
“I would give a letter, written by me to Lord Chelmsford, to Umfunzi, to be given by him with his own hand to Lord Chelmsford, and outside the letter I would say that no one but Lord Chelmsford was to open it. This appeared to please them much. I said I would write to the commanding officers along the road they were going to look after them, and to the officer at Rorke’s Drift to see them safe to Ibabamango.’ ‘Would a white man be safe going with them?’ ‘Yes,’ they said, ‘quite,’ and they wished one could be sent with them; but still more, the King would be pleased if a white man was sent to him. I said I would not send a white man alone into Zululand with them, because my Chief did not approve, still less could I send one to the King, because I was only under the big Chief. Anything they wished to say about peace or anything else they must say to the big Chief when they saw him.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 111).
At no time during the war, indeed, did we encourage the Zulu king in his persistent efforts to get peace; but more of this hereafter. Here we will only add one further instance, namely, that of two messengers sent to Colonel Pearson at Etshowe, who, although brought blindfold into the camp, were kept as prisoners in irons until the garrison was relieved. The pretext for this detention was that they were _supposed_ to be spies; but officers present were satisfied that there were no grounds for the supposition, or for the treatment which they received.
Sir Bartle Frere of course inclines to the opinion that _all_ Cetshwayo’s messengers were spies, his entreaties for peace but treacherous pretexts to cover his evil intentions. Some of the men sent were old accredited messengers to the Government, whose names are frequently mentioned in earlier Blue-books, yet Sir Bartle Frere says of them: “In no case could they give any satisfactory proof that they really came from the king.”[165]
But the High Commissioner’s habit of finding evil motives for every act of the Zulu king, made the case of the latter hopeless from the first.
Meanwhile the despatches received from Sir Michael Hicks-Beach contained comments amounting to censure upon the High Commissioner’s proceedings in forcing on a war with the Zulus. He is plainly told that he should have waited to consult Her Majesty’s Government upon the terms that Cetshwayo should be called upon to accept, and that “they have been unable to find in the documents you have placed before them that evidence of urgent necessity for immediate action which alone could justify you in taking, without their full knowledge and sanction, a course almost certain to result in a war, which, as I had previously impressed upon you, every effort should have been used to avoid.”
“The communication which had passed between us,” continues the Secretary of State, “as to the objects for which the reinforcements were requested and sent, and as to the nature of the questions in dispute with the Zulu king, were such as to render it especially needful that Her Majesty’s Government should understand and approve any important step, not already suggested to them, before you were committed to it; and if that step was likely to increase the probability of war, an opportunity should certainly have been afforded to them of considering as well the time as the manner of coming to issue—should it be necessary to come to issue—with the Zulu king. And though the further correspondence necessary for this purpose might have involved the loss of a favourable season for the operations of the British troops, and might have afforded to Cetywayo the means of further arming and provisioning his forces, the circumstances rendered it imperative that, even at the risk of this disadvantage, full explanations should be exchanged.”
The despatch from which the above is quoted was written on the 19th March, and another, dated the following day, expresses the writer’s “general approval of the principles on which the boundary award was based,” as intimated in a previous despatch, but gives a very qualified assent to Sir B. Frere’s emendations by which he seeks to secure the “private rights” of settlers on the wrongfully appropriated land, and remarks that he is disposed to think that the recognition of these said private rights of European settlers in the district declared to be Zulu territory should have been restricted as far as possible to those cases in which _bonâ fide_ purchasers had improved their farms by building, planting, or otherwise, which restriction would have limited them to a very small number indeed. Sir M. Hicks-Beach also reminds Sir B. Frere that Her Majesty’s Government had distinctly said beforehand that “they could not undertake the obligation of protecting” the missionaries in Zululand. His comments upon the terms of the ultimatum, he says, are intended for Sir B. Frere’s guidance when the time for once more proposing terms should arrive, and he concludes: “It is my wish that, as far as possible, you should avoid taking any decided step, or committing yourself to any positive conclusion respecting any of them until you have received instructions from Her Majesty’s Government.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] pp. 108-111).
Again, upon April 10th, after receiving Sir Bartle Frere’s explanations, Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes as follows:
“Since I addressed to you my despatches of the 19th and 20th March, I have received your two despatches of February 12th and March 1st, further explaining the considerations which induced you to decide that the demands made upon Ketshwayo must be communicated to him without delay. The definite expression of the views and policy of Her Majesty’s Government contained in my despatches already referred to, which will have reached you before you receive this, makes it unnecessary that I should enter into any examination of the arguments or opinions expressed in your present despatches. It is sufficient to say that Her Majesty’s Government do not find in the reasons now put forward by you any grounds to modify the tenor of the instructions already addressed to you on the subject of affairs in South Africa, and it is their desire that you should regulate your future action according to these instructions.
“But there is one point alluded to in your despatch of March 1st which I feel it necessary at once to notice, in order to prevent any misunderstanding. You refer, in the thirty-second paragraph of that despatch, to ‘much that will remain to be done on the northern Swazi border and in Sekukuni’s country,’ and to the probability that ‘the Transvaal, the Diamond Fields, Basutoland, and other parts now threatened with disturbance, will not settle down without at least an exhibition of force.’ I entertain much hope that in each of these cases, including that of Sekukuni, the troubles now existing or anticipated may disappear, either independently of or as a consequence of that complete settlement of the Zulu difficulty which I join with you in trusting to see speedily effected. But, if this expectation should unfortunately not be fulfilled, you will be careful to bear in mind that Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to sanction any further extension, without their specific authority, of our responsibilities in South Africa; that their desire is that the military operations now proceeding should be directed to the termination, at the earliest moment consistent with the safety of our colonies and the honour of our arms, of the Zulu question; and that any wider or larger action of the kind apparently suggested in your despatch, should be submitted to them for consideration and approval, before any steps are taken to carry it into effect.”—(P. P. [C. 2316] p. 36).