CHAPTER IX.

THE DISPUTED TERRITORY.

We must now look back and gather up the threads—hitherto interwoven with accounts of other matters—connected with what has been rightly called the “burning question” of the disputed territory, which led eventually to the Zulu War.

The disputes between the Boers and Zulus concerning the boundary line of their respective countries had existed for many years, its origin and growth being entirely attributable to the well-known and usually successful process by which the Dutch Boers, as we have already said, have gradually possessed themselves of the land belonging to their unlettered neighbours. This process is described by Mr. Osborn, formerly resident magistrate of Newcastle, now Colonial Secretary of the Transvaal Government, September 22nd, 1876 (1748, p. 196).

“I would point out here that this war (with Sikukuni) arose solely out of dispute about land. The Boers—as they have done in other cases, and are still doing—encroached by degrees upon native territory; commencing by obtaining permission to graze stock upon portions of it at certain seasons of the year, followed by individual graziers obtaining from native headmen a sort of license to squat upon certain defined portions, ostensibly in order to keep other Boer squatters away from the same land. These licenses, temporarily extended, as friendly or neighbourly acts, by unauthorised, headmen, after a few seasons of occupation by the Boer, are construed by him as title, and his permanent occupation ensues. Damage for trespass is levied by him upon the very men from whom he obtained right to squat, to which the natives submit out of fear of the matter reaching the ears of the paramount Chief, who would in all probability severely punish them for opening the door of encroachment to the Boer. After awhile, however, the matter comes to a crisis, in consequence of the incessant disputes between the Boers and the natives; one or other of the disputants lays the case before the paramount Chief, who, upon hearing both parties, is literally frightened with violence and threats by the Boer into granting him the land. Upon this, the usual plan followed by the Boer is at once to collect a few neighbouring Boers, including an Acting Field Cornet, or even an Acting Provisional Field Cornet, appointed by the Field Cornet or Provisional Cornet, the latter to represent the Government, although without instructions authorising him to act in the matter. A few cattle are collected among themselves, which the party takes to the Chief, and his signature is obtained to a written instrument, alienating to the Republican Boers a large slice of, or all, his territory. The contents of this document are, so far as I can make out, never clearly or intelligibly explained to the Chief, who signs it and accepts of the cattle, under the impression that it is all in settlement of hire for the grazing licenses granted by his headmen.”

“This, I have no hesitation in saying, is the usual method by which the Boers obtain what they call cessions of territories to them by native Chiefs. In Sikukuni’s case, they say that his father, Sikwata, ceded to them the whole of his territory (hundreds of square miles) for one hundred head of cattle.”

Also Sir H. Barkly, late Governor of the Cape, writes as follows, October 2nd, 1876 (1748, p. 140):

“The following graphic description of this process (of Boer encroachment) is extracted from a letter in the Transvaal _Advocate_ of a few weeks ago: ‘Frontiers are laid down, the claim to which is very doubtful. These frontiers are not occupied, but farms are inspected (“guessed at” would be nearer the mark), title-deeds for the same are issued, and, when the unlucky purchaser wishes to take possession, he finds his farm (if he can find it) occupied by tribes of Kafirs, over whom the Government has never attempted to exercise any jurisdiction.’ ‘Their Chief,’ it adds, ‘is rather bewildered at first to find out that he has for years been a subject of the Transvaal.’ ‘The Chief in question is one Lechune, living on the north-west of the Republic. But the account is equally applicable to the case of Sikukuni, or Umswazi, or half-a-dozen others, the entire circuit of the Republic, from the Barolongs and Batlapins on the west, to the Zulus on the east, being bordered by a _series of encroachments disputed by the natives_.’”

A memorandum from Captain Clarke, R.A., Special Commissioner at Lydenburg, dated April 23rd, 1879 (C. 2367, p. 152), also gives an account of the way in which the Boers took possession of the Transvaal itself, highly illustrative of their usual practice, and of which the greater part may be quoted here, with a key to the real meaning of phrases which require some study to interpret.

“On the entrance of the Fou Trekkers into the Transvaal, they were compelled against their hereditary instincts to combine for self-defence against a common foe.” (That is to say, that, having forced themselves into a strange country, they necessarily combined to oust those they found there.) “External pressure was removed by success, and the diffusive instinct asserted itself”—which being translated into ordinary English simply signifies that, having conquered certain native tribes, they settled themselves upon their lands, and returned to their natural disunited condition. “Isolated families, whose ambition was to be out of sight of their neighbours’ smoke, pushed forward into Kafir-land” (as yet unconquered).

“Boundaries were laid down either arbitrarily or by unsatisfactorily recorded treaty with savage neighbours. The natives, forced back, acquired the powers of coalition lost by the Boers, and in their turn brought pressure to bear on their invaders and whilom conquerors; farm after farm had to be abandoned, and many of the Boers who remained acknowledged by paying tribute that they retained their lands by the permission of neighbouring chiefs. The full importance of this retrograde movement was not at once felt, as a natural safety-valve was found.”

“A considerable portion of the east of the Transvaal is called the High Veldt, and consists of tableland at a considerable elevation, overlying coal-measures; this district appears bleak and inhospitable, overrun by large herds of game and watered by a series of apparently stagnant ponds which take the place of watercourses.... From various sources, within the last six years, it has been discovered that the High Veldt is most valuable for the grazing of sheep, horses, and cattle; and farms which possess the advantage of water are worth from £1,000 to £1,200, where formerly they could have been bought for as many pence.”

“This discovery has opened a door of escape for many of the _native-pressed borderers_. _The pressure_ on those that remain increases, and on the north-east and west of the Transvaal is a fringe of farmers who live by the sufferance or in fear of the interlacing natives.”

The phrases which I have italicised seem to indicate that the writer has lost sight of the fact that, if the border farmers are “native-pressed,” it is because they have intruded themselves amongst the natives, from which position a just and wise government would seek to withdraw them, instead of endeavouring to establish and maintain them in it by force. This latter course, however, is the one which Captain Clarke recommends. The remainder of his memorandum is a series of suggestions for this purpose, one of which runs as follows: “To take away the immediate strain on the border farmer, and the risk of collision which the present state of affairs involves, I would suggest the establishment of Government Agents, who should reside _on or beyond the border now occupied by the farmers_.[70] ... Each Residency should be a fortress, built of stones and prepared for defence against any native force.”

Sir Bartle Frere’s version of Captain Clarke’s account, given to the Secretary of State in a despatch enclosing the above, runs as follows: “Most of the native chiefs now there have gradually crept in, under pressure from the northward, and finding no representatives of the Transvaal Government able to exercise authority on the spot, have gradually set up some sort of government for themselves, before which many of the Boers have retired, leaving only those who were willing to pay a sort of tribute for protection, or to avoid being robbed of their cattle.”

With whatever oblique vision Sir Bartle Frere may have perused the enclosure from which he gathers his facts, no unbiassed mind can fail to detect the singular discrepancy between the account given by Captain Clarke and that drawn from it by the High Commissioner in his enclosing letter.

He makes no mention of the _driving out_ of the natives which preceded their _creeping in_, and which figures so largely in Captain Clarke’s memorandum, of which he professes to give a sketch. And he introduces, entirely on his own account, the accusation against the natives implied in the phrase “or to avoid being robbed of their cattle,” of which not a single word appears in the memorandum itself.

Properly speaking, there were two disputed boundary lines up to 1879, the one being that between Zululand and the Transvaal, to the south of the Pongolo River; the other that between the Zulus and the Swazis, to the north of, and parallel to, that stream.[71] The Swazis are the hereditary enemies of the Zulus, and there has always been a bitter feeling between the two races, nevertheless the acquisitiveness of the Transvaal Boers was at the bottom of both disputes. They profess to have obtained, by cession from the Swazi king in 1855, a strip of land to the north-east of the Pongolo River and down to the Lebomba Mountains, in order that they might form a barrier between them and the Zulus; but the Swazis deny having ever made such cession.

In addition to the doubt thrown upon the transaction by this denial, and the well-known Boer encroachments already described, it remains considerably open to question whether the Swazis had the power to dispose of the land, which is claimed by the Zulus as their own. The commission which sat upon the southern border question was not permitted to enter upon that to the north of the Pongolo, which therefore remains uncertain. The one fact generally known, however, is undoubtedly favourable to the Zulu claim. The territory in question was occupied until 1848 by two Zulu chiefs, Putini of the Ama-Ngwe, and Langalibalele of the Ama-Hlubi tribe, under the rule of the Zulu king Umpande. These chiefs, having fallen into disgrace with the king, were attacked by him, and fled into Natal. They were ultimately settled in their late locations under the Draakensberg, leaving their former places in Zululand, north and south of the Pongolo, the inNgcaka (Mountain), and inNgcuba (River) vacant.

Sir Henry Bulwer remarks on this point—(P. P. 2220, pp. 400-2):

“Sir T. Shepstone says indeed, that there is no dispute between the Transvaal and the Ama-Swazi; but, as he adds that, should questions arise between them, they may be settled on their own merits, it is not impossible that questions may arise; and I am certainly informed that the Ama-Swazi used formerly to deny that they had ever ceded land to the _extent_ claimed by the Republic.” But that the western portion, at all events, of the land in dispute was at that time under Zulu rule, is apparent from an account given by members of the house of Masobuza, principal wife of Langalibalele, and sister to the Swazi king, who was sheltered at Bishopstowe after the destruction of the Hlubi tribe, and died there in 1877.

“In Chaka’s time, Mate, father of Madhlangampisi, who had lived from of old on his land north of the Pongolo, as an _independent_ chief, not under Swazi rule, gave, without fighting, his allegiance to Chaka; and from that time to this the district in question has been under Zulu rule, the Swazi king having never at any time exercised any authority over it.” The same statement applies to several other tribes living north, and on either side of the Pongolo, amongst them those of Langalibalele and Putini.

“Madhlangampisi’s land was transferred by the Boer Government as late as January 17th, 1877, to the executors of the late Mr. M’Corkindale, and now goes by the name of ‘Londina,’ in which is the hamlet of ‘Derby.’... We are perfectly aware that the southern portion of the block is held by command of the Zulu chief, and the executor’s surveyors have been obstructed in prosecuting the survey.”—_Natal Mercury_, July 23rd, 1878.

In 1856 a number of Boers claimed _Natal_ territory _west_ of the Buffalo, as far as the Biggarsberg range, now the south-west boundary of the Newcastle County, and some of them were in occupation of it; and, a commission being sent to trace the northern border of the colony along the line of the Buffalo, these latter opposed and protested against the mission of the Commissioners; but their opposition spent itself in threats, and ended in the withdrawal from Natal of the leaders of the party.

Other Boers had settled _east_ of the Buffalo, in the location vacated by the tribe of Langalibalele, as to whom the aforesaid Commissioners write:

“During our stay among the farmers it was brought to our notice by them that they had obtained from Panda the cession of the tract of country beyond the Buffalo (inNcome), towards the north-west; they had subscribed among themselves one hundred head of cattle for this land, which had been accepted by Panda.”

And Sir T. Shepstone says:

“Panda never denied this grant (N.B.—in respect of what lay _west_ of the Draakensberg), but repudiated the idea that he had sold the land. His account was that, when the farmers were defeated by Her Majesty’s troops in Natal, some of them asked him for land to live upon outside the jurisdiction of the British Government, and that he gave them this tract ‘only to live in, as part of Zululand under Zulu law’” (P. p. 1961, p. 28). “The cattle they say they paid for it, Panda looked upon as a thank-offering, made in accordance with Zulu custom” (1961, pp. 1-5).

In reply to messages sent by the Zulu king to the Natal Government, complaining of the encroachments of the Boers on the _north_, as well as the west of Zululand, and begging the friendly intervention and arbitration of the English, the advice of the Natal authorities was always to “sit still,” and use no force, for England would see justice done in the end.[72]

From all this it would appear that the claim of Cetshwayo to land north of the Pongolo was not an “aggressive act,” without any real foundation in right, and merely a defiant challenge intended to provoke war; but was a just claim, according to the tests applied by Sir Bartle Frere—(P. p. 2222, p. 29)—viz. “actual occupation and exercise of sovereign rights.”

The subject is fully gone into, and further evidence produced, in the Bishop of Natal’s pamphlet, “Extracts from the Blue-Books;” but the main facts are as here stated.

On turning to the subject of the better known border dispute, between the Zulus and the Transvaal Boers on the east, we are confronted at once by the fact that the decision of the Commissioners, chosen by Sir H. Bulwer to investigate the matter, was decidedly favourable to the Zulu claim; which, after careful consideration of all the evidence on either side, they found to be a just and good one. This decision should, in itself, have been sufficient to relieve the Zulu king from the accusation of making insolent demands for territory with aggressive and warlike intentions. But as, up to July, 1878, the above charge was the sole one brought against him, and on account of which troops were sent for and preparations made for war; and as, also, Sir Bartle Frere has thought fit to cast a doubt upon the judgment of the Commissioners by the various expressions of dissatisfaction which appear in his correspondence with the Bishop of Natal; it will be necessary for us to enter fully into the matter, in order to understand the extent to which the question bore fruit in the Zulu War.

In 1861 Cetshwayo demanded from the Transvaal Government the persons of four fugitives, who had escaped at the time of the Civil War of 1856, and had taken refuge amongst the Boers. One of these fugitives was a younger son of Umpande, by name Umtonga, who took refuge at first in Natal; from whence, however, he carried on political intrigues in Zululand, with the assistance of his mother, which resulted in the death of the latter and in a message from Cetshwayo to the Natal Government, complaining of Umtonga’s conduct, and requesting that he should be placed in his hands. This was refused, but the Government undertook to place the young man under the supervision of an old and trusted colonial chief, Zatshuke, living in the centre of the colony. Umtonga professed to accept and to be grateful for this arrangement; but, upon the first step being taken to carry it out, he fired twice at the policeman who was sent to conduct him to Zatshuke, but missed him, and then escaped to the Transvaal territory.

From thence he, with another brother, and two indunas (captains) were given up to Cetshwayo by the Boers, who required, in return for their surrender, the cession of land _east_ of the Blood River, and a pledge that the young princes should not be killed. Cetshwayo is said by the Boers to have agreed to both conditions, and he certainly acted up to the latter, three of the four being still alive, and the fourth having died a natural death.[73] It is this alleged bargain with Cetshwayo (in 1861) on which the Boers found their claim to the main portion of the disputed territory—a “bargain in itself base and immoral; the selling of the persons of men for a grant of land, and which no Christian government, like that of England, could recognise for a moment as valid and binding,” even if it were ever made. _But it is persistently denied by the Zulus_ that such a bargain was ever consented to by them or _by their prince_. On this point Cetshwayo himself says: “I have never given or sold any land to the Boers of the Transvaal. They wished me to do so when I was as yet an umtwana (child, prince). They tried to get me to sign a paper, but I threw the pen down, and never would do so, telling them that it was out of my power to either grant or sell land, as it belonged to the king, my father, and the nation. I know the Boers say I signed a paper, and that my brothers Hamu and Ziwedu did also. I never did, and if they say I held the pen or made a mark, giving or selling land, it is a lie!” The Prince Dabulamanzi, and chiefs sitting round, bore out the king in this statement. (From Report of Mr. Fynney on July 4th, 1877—P. p. 1961, p. 45.)

And so says Sir T. Shepstone (1961, p. 5): “Panda, who is still living, repudiated the bargain, and Cetshwayo denied it. The Emigrant Farmers, however, insisted on its validity, and proceeded to occupy. The Zulus have never ceased to threaten and protest. And the Government of Natal, to whom these protests and threats have been continually made, has frequently, during a course of fifteen years, found it very difficult to impress the Zulus with the hope and belief that an amicable solution of the difficulty would some day be found, provided that they refrained from reprisals or the use of force.”

The first message from the Zulus on the subject of the disputed territory was received on September 5th, 1861, in the very year in which (according to the Boers) the cession in question was made (1961, p. 7). The Bishop of Natal, in his “Extracts” already mentioned, records eighteen messages on the same subject, commencing with the above and concluding with one brought on April 20th, 1876 (1748, p. 49), showing that for a period of fifteen years the Zulu king (whether represented by Umpande or by Cetshwayo) had never ceased to entreat “the friendly intervention and arbitration of this Government between them and the Boer Government” (1961, p. 9). These eighteen messages acknowledge the virtual supremacy of the English, and the confidence which the Zulus feel in English justice and honour, and they request their protection, or, failing that, their permission to protect themselves by force of arms; they suggest that a Commission sent from Natal should settle the boundary, and that a Resident or Agent of the British Government should be stationed on the border between them and the Boers, to see that justice was done on both sides. They report the various aggressions and encroachments by which the Zulus were suffering at the hands of their neighbours, but to which they submitted because the question was in the hands of the Government of Natal; and they repeatedly beg that the English will themselves take possession of the disputed country, or some part of it, rather than allow the unsettled state of things to continue. “They (the Zulus) beg that the Governor will take a strip of country, the length and breadth of which is to be agreed upon between the Zulus and the Commissioners (for whom they are asking) sent from Natal, the strip to abut on the Colony of Natal, and to run to the northward and eastward in such a manner, in a line parallel to the sea-coast, as to interpose in all its length between the Boers and the Zulus, and to be governed by the Colony of Natal, and form a portion of it if thought desirable.

“The Zulu people earnestly pray that this arrangement may be carried out immediately, because they have been neighbours of Natal for so many years, separated only by a stream of water, and no question has arisen between them and the Government of Natal; they know that where the boundary is fixed by agreement with the English there it will remain.

“Panda, Cetshwayo, and all the heads of the Zulu people assembled, directed us to urge in the most earnest manner upon the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the prayer we have stated.”

This is the concluding portion of the fourth message, received on June 5th, 1869 (1961, p. 9). The fifth, reporting fresh Boer aggressions, was received on December 6th, 1869.

In the course of the same year Lieutenant-Governor Keate addressed the President of the South African Republic on the subject, and suggested arbitration, which suggestion was accepted by the President, provided that the expenses should be paid by the losing party; and during the following two years repeated messages were sent by Mr. Keate reminding the President that being “already in possession of what the Zulu authorities put forward as justifying their claims,” he only awaits the like information from the other side before “visiting the locality and hearing the respective parties.”—(P. p. 1961, p. 24).

On August 16th, 1871, the Government Secretary of the South African Republic replies that he has “been instructed to forward to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the necessary documents bearing on the Zulu question, together with a statement of the case, and hopes to do so by next post; but that, as the session, of the Volksraad had been postponed from May to September, it would be extremely difficult to settle the matter in 1871,” he therefore proposed January, 1872, as a convenient time for the purpose.

Nearly eight weeks later (October 9th) Lieutenant-Governor Keate informs the President that the documents promised, upon the Zulu border question, have not yet reached him; but sees nothing, at present, likely to prevent his “proceeding, in January next, to the Zulu border for the purpose of settling the matter at issue.”

But the promised papers appear never to have been sent. The arbitration never took place. Lieutenant-Governor Keate was relieved from the government of Natal in 1872; and the next stage of the question is marked by the issue on May 25th, 1875, of a proclamation by Acting-President Joubert, annexing to the dominion of the South African Republic the territory, the right to which was to have been decided by this arbitration.

In this proclamation no reference is made to the (alleged) Treaty of 1861 (see p. 176), by which “what is now and was then disputed territory had been ceded to the South African Republic,” though it certainly annexes to the Republic all the country included in the Treaty, and seems to annex more. But no ground of claim is set forth or alluded to upon which the right to annex is founded, “with reservation of all further claims and rights of the said Republic,” nor any reason assigned for the act, except to “prevent disagreement” between the Boers and the Zulus. And Sir T. Shepstone goes on to say (1961, p. 5):

“The officers of the South African Republic proceeded to exercise in this annexed territory the ordinary functions of government, and among these, the levying taxes on natives. The Zulus, who had been persistent in repudiating the cession, and who have continued to occupy the territory as theirs, resisted the demand by Cetshwayo’s directions, and a collision appeared imminent, when the difficulty was avoided by the officers withdrawing the order they had issued.”

Nevertheless, in spite of the repeated disappointments with which they met, the Zulus continued to send complaints and entreaties to the Government of Natal; which messages, although they never varied in their respectful and friendly tone towards the English, show plainly how deeply they felt the neglect with which they were treated. The English “promises” are spoken of again and again, and the thirteenth message contains a sentence worth recording, in its simple dignity. “Cetshwayo desired us,” say the messengers, “to urge upon the Governor of Natal to interfere, to save the destruction of perhaps both countries—Zululand and the Transvaal. He requests us to state that he cannot and will not submit to be turned out of his own houses. It may be that he will be vanquished; but, as he is not the aggressor, death will not be so hard to meet” (1748, p. 14).

Sir Henry Bulwer’s answers to these messages contain passages which sufficiently prove that up to this time the Government of Natal had no complaints to make against the Zulu king. “This is the first opportunity the Lieutenant-Governor has had,” he says, “of communicating with Cetshwayo since his (Sir H. Bulwer’s) arrival in the Colony. He therefore takes the opportunity of sending him a friendly greeting, and of expressing the pleasure with which he had heard of the satisfactory relations that have existed between this Colony and the Zulus,” November 25th, 1875 (1748, p. 15).

“This Government trusts that Cetshwayo will maintain that moderation and forbearance which he has hitherto shown, and which the Government has great pleasure in bringing to the notice of the councillors of the great Queen, and that nothing will be done which will hinder the peaceful solution of the Disputed Territory question,” July 25th, 1876 (1748, p. 97).

Meanwhile repeated acts of violence and brutality on the part of the Boers are reported, and in the Blue-books before us the Zulu complaints are confirmed from various official sources, by Mr. Fynn, Resident Magistrate of the Umsinga Division (1748, p. 10), by Sir Henry Bulwer (1748, pp. 8, 11, 12, 25), by Sir T. Shepstone himself (1748, pp. 10, 24, 29, 52, 56), by Mr. Osborn (1748, p. 82), and by Sir Henry Barkly (1748, p. 25). No attempt at settlement, however, had been made in answer to these appeals up to the time of the annexation of the Transvaal, in 1877, by Sir T. Shepstone; after which so great a change took place in the tone of the latter upon the subject of the disputed territory.

Upon this question we may quote again from Mr. Fynney’s report of the king’s answer to him upon the announcement of the annexation of the Transvaal. “I hear what you have said about past disputes with the Boers, and about the settlement of them,” said the king; “the land question is one of them, and a great one. I was in hopes, when I heard it was you who visited me, that you had brought me some final word about the land, as Somtseu had sent from Newcastle by Umgabana to say that his son would come with the word respecting the land so long in dispute, and I felt sure it had come to-day, for you are his son. Now the Transvaal is English ground, I want Somtseu to send the Boers away from the lower parts of the Transvaal, that near my country. The Boers are a nation of liars; they are a bad people, bad altogether; I do not want them near my people; they lie, and claim what is not theirs, and ill-use my people. Where is Thomas (Mr. Burgers)?”

“I informed him,” says Mr. Fynney, “that Mr. Burgers had left the Transvaal.”

“Then let them pack up and follow Thomas,” said he, “let them go. The Queen does not want such people as those about her land. What can the Queen make of them or do with them? Their evil ways puzzled both Thomas and Rudolph (Landdrost of Utrecht); they will not be quiet. They have laid claim to my land, and even down to _N’Zabankulu_ (you saw the line), burned it with fire, and my people have no rest.”

“Umnyamana (Prime Minister) here remarked,” continues Mr. Fynney, “we want to know what is going to be done about this land; it has stood over as an open question for so many years. Somtseu took all the papers to England with him to show the great men there, and we have not heard since.” To which Mr. Fynney, of course, had no reply to make.

Within a fortnight of the annexation the Boers on the Zulu border presented Sir T. Shepstone with an address, stating that during the last ten or twelve years (_i.e._ from 1861, when this encroachment was begun by the Boers) they had “suffered greatly in consequence of the hostile behaviour of the Zulu nation, but more so for the last two years” (_i.e._ from 1875, when the Boer Government proclaimed the disputed territory to belong to the Transvaal, and proceeded to levy taxes upon its Zulu inhabitants), so that, they said, their lives and goods were in danger (1814, p. 14).

Accordingly Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon as follows: “I shall be forced to take some action with regard to the Disputed Territory, of which your lordship has heard so much, but I shall be careful to avoid any direct issue.”[74]

“It is of the utmost importance,” he continues, “that all questions involving disturbance outside of this territory should be, if possible, postponed until the Government of the Transvaal is consolidated, and the numerous tribes within its boundaries have begun to feel and recognise the hand of the new administration.”

These remarks already show the change in sentiment, on Sir T. Shepstone’s part, which was more markedly displayed at the Blood River meeting between him and the Zulu indunas. The conference proved an utter failure, as also did several other attempts on Sir T. Shepstone’s part to persuade the Zulus to relinquish to him, on behalf of the Transvaal, the claims upon which they had so long insisted.

On December 5th, 1877, two indunas came from Cetshwayo to the Bishop of Natal with a request that he would put the Zulu claim in writing, to be sent to Sir H. Bulwer and the Queen. The same indunas, a few days later, with Umfunzi and ’Nkisimane—messengers from Cetshwayo—appointed, before a notary public, Dr. Walter Smith and Mr. F. E. Colenso to be “diplomatic agents” for Cetshwayo, “who should communicate on his behalf in the English language, and, when needful, in writing,” and especially to “treat with the British Government on the boundary question” (2000, p. 58);[75] which appointment, however, Sir H. Bulwer and Sir T. Shepstone refused to recognise; and the former, having proposed the Border Commission before receiving notice of this appointment—though the Commissioners had not yet started from ’Maritzburg—did not feel it advisable, as “no such appointment had been made by the Zulu king,”[76] to communicate to Messrs. Smith and Colenso Lord Carnarvon’s despatch (January 21st, 1878), which said:

“I request that you will inform Mr. Smith and Mr. Colenso that the desire of Her Majesty’s Government in this matter is that the boundary question shall be fully and fairly discussed, and a just arrangement arrived at, and that you will refer them to Sir T. Shepstone, to whom has been committed the duty of negotiating on the subject.”[77]

Meanwhile, however, Sir T. Shepstone’s “negotiations” had proved unsuccessful, and Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Sir Bartle Frere (2000, p. 68): “It seems but too clear, from all that has now happened, that the prospect of a settlement of the question by direct negotiations between the Government of the Transvaal and the Zulu king is at an end. The feeling against the Boers on the part of the Zulu king and people is too bitter, and they are now scarcely less angry against the new Government of the Transvaal than they were against the old Government.” He then suggests arbitration as a way by which the Zulu king “can escape the alternative of war, by which he can obtain justice, and by which, at the same time, he can avoid direct negotiations with the Government of a people whom he dislikes and distrusts.”

The diplomatic agents were never recognised by the colonial authorities, or allowed to exercise their functions; but a visit which Mr. Colenso paid to the Zulu king in connection with the appointment is worth recording for the sake of the glimpse it gives of Cetshwayo’s habits and daily life, as told by a disinterested eye-witness.

The king, it appears, whom so many have delighted to represent as a corpulent unwieldy savage, to whom movement must be a painful exertion, was in the habit of taking a daily constitutional of about six miles out and back. Mr. Colenso observed that this was his regular habit, and during his stay at the royal kraal he daily saw Cetshwayo start, and could trace his course over the hills by the great white shield carried before him as the emblem of kingship.

On his return the king regularly underwent a process of ablution at the hands of his attendants, who poured vessels of water over him, and rubbed the royal person down with a species of soft stone. This performance over, Cetshwayo ascended his throne or chair of state, upon which he remained, hearing causes, and trying cases amongst his people, until the shades of evening fell, before which time he did not break his fast.

This description, of the accuracy of which there can be no question, gives a picture of a simple, moderate, and useful kingly existence, very different from the idea commonly received of a savage monarch, wallowing in sloth and coarse luxury, and using the power which he holds over his fellow-creatures only for the gratification of every evil or selfish human passion. Cetshwayo ruled his people well according to his lights: let us hope that, now we have wrested his kingdom from him, our government may prove a _more_ beneficent one.