CHAPTER III.

TRIAL OF LANGALIBALELE.

Meanwhile the fugitive chief had at last been captured by the treachery of a Basuto chief named Molappo, who enticed him into his hands, and then delivered him up to Mr. Griffiths, resident magistrate in that part of British Basutoland. When he and his party were first captured they had with them a horse laden with all the coin which the tribe had been able to get together during the last few days before the expedition started from Pietermaritzburg, and which they had collected to send down as a ransom for their chief. Their purpose was arrested by the news that the soldiers had actually started to attack them; when, feeling that all was lost, they fled, carrying the chief and his ransom with them. What became of the money, whether it became Molappo’s perquisite, or whether it formed part of the English spoil, has never been publicly known. But it can hardly be denied that the readiness of the people to pay away in ransom for their chief the whole wealth of the tribe earned by years of labour on the part of the working members, is in itself a proof that their tendencies were by no means rebellious.

Langalibalele, with seven of his sons and many indunas (captains) and headmen, was brought down to Pietermaritzburg for trial, reaching the town on the 21st December.

So strong was the unreasoning hatred of the colonists against him on account of the death of the three Carbineers which had resulted from the expedition, that the unhappy man, a helpless captive, was insulted and pelted by the populace as he was conveyed in irons to the capital; and again, after sentence had been passed upon him, upon his way to Durban.

It was at this stage of affairs that the Bishop of Natal first came upon the scene, and interfered on behalf of the oppressed. Until 1873, while earnestly endeavouring to do his best as teacher and pastor amongst the natives as well as amongst their white fellow-colonists, he had not found it to be his duty to go deeply into political matters concerning them. He had great confidence at that time in the justice and humanity of their government as carried on by Mr. Shepstone, for whom he had a warm personal regard, based on the apparent uprightness of his conduct; and he had therefore contented himself with accepting Mr. Shepstone’s word in all that concerned them.

That so many years should have passed without the Bishop’s having discovered how greatly his views and those of his friend differed in first principles as to the government of the people, is due partly to the fact that the two met but seldom, and then at regular expected intervals, and partly because no great crisis had previously taken place to prove the principles of either in that respect. Their regular interviews were upon Sundays, when the Bishop, going into Pietermaritzburg for the cathedral service, invariably spent a couple of hours with his friend. During these comparatively short meetings doubtless Mr. Shepstone’s real personal regard for the Bishop caused him temporarily to feel somewhat as he did, and, where he could not do so, to refrain from entering upon political discussion. The sympathy with Mr. Shepstone which existed in the Bishop’s mind prevented the latter from looking more closely for himself into matters which he believed to be in good hands, and which did not naturally fall within the sphere of his duties; while the comparatively trivial character of the cases with which the native department had hitherto dealt, was not such as to force their details before a mind otherwise and fully employed.

The Langalibalele expedition, however, opened the Bishop’s eyes. While it lasted, although deeply deploring the loss of life on either side, and feeling great indignation at the atrocities perpetrated on ours, he did not doubt that Mr. Shepstone had done all he could to avert the necessity of bloodshed, and expected to find him, upon his return to Pietermaritzburg, much grieved and indignant at the needless amount of suffering inflicted upon his people, the greater portion of whom must be entirely innocent, even although the charges against their chief should be proved.

The discovery that Mr. Shepstone entirely ratified what had been done[20] was the first blow to his friend’s reliance on him. The mockery of justice termed a trial, granted to Langalibalele, was the next; and the discovery of how completely he had misconceived Mr. Shepstone’s policy closed the intimacy of their friendship.

It soon became apparent that the trial of the chief was indeed to be a farce—a pretence, meant to satisfy inquiring minds at home that justice had been done, but which could have but one result, the condemnation of the prisoner, already prejudged by a Government which, having declared him to be a rebel and having treated him as such, was hardly likely to stultify itself by allowing him to be proved innocent of the charges brought against him.

That there might be no doubt at all upon the subject, the prisoner was denied the help of counsel, white or black, in the hearing of his case, even to watch the proceedings on his behalf, or to cross-examine the witnesses; consequently the official record of the trial can only be looked upon as an _ex parte_ statement of the case, derived from witnesses selected by the Supreme Chief,[21] examined by the Crown Prosecutor, and not cross-examined at all on the prisoner’s behalf, although the assistance of counsel was recognised by the Crown Prosecutor himself as being in accordance with Kafir law.[22]

But the formation of the court and its whole proceedings were palpably absurd, except for the purpose of securing a conviction; and that this was the case was generally understood in Natal, Even those colonists who were most violent against the so-called “rebel,” and would have had him hanged without mercy, asserting that he had been “taken red-handed,” saw that the authorities had put themselves in the wrong by granting the prisoner a trial against the justice of which so much could be alleged.

In point of fact, the Lieut.-Governor had no power to form a court such as that by which Langalibalele was tried, consisting of his excellency himself as Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native Affairs, certain administrators of native law, and certain native chiefs and indunas. Besides which the Lieut.-Governor was not only debarred by an ordinance of the colony[23] from sitting as judge in such a court, from which he would be the sole judge in a court of appeal, but had already committed himself to a decision adverse to the prisoner by having issued the proclamation of November 11th, 1873, declaring that the chief and his tribe had “set themselves in open revolt and rebellion against Her Majesty’s Government in this colony,” and “proclaiming and making known that they were in rebellion, and were hereby declared to be outlaws,” and that “the said tribe was broken up, and from that day forth had ceased to exist,” and by further seizing and confiscating all the cattle and property of the said tribe within reach, deposing Langalibalele from his chieftainship, and otherwise treating him and his tribe as rebels.

His Excellency, therefore, could not possibly be looked upon as an unprejudiced judge of the first instance in the prisoner’s case; nor could the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone, by whose advice and with whose approval the expedition had been undertaken. As to the minor members of the court, they could hardly be expected to have an independent opinion in the matter, especially the “native chiefs and indunas,” who knew very well that they would be liable to the accusation of disaffection themselves if they ventured to show any bearing towards the prisoner, or to do otherwise than blindly follow the lead of their white “brother-judges” (!) and masters.

The native names gave a satisfactory air of justice to the proceedings of the court in English eyes, but in point of fact they were but dummy judges after all.

Not only, however, was the court wrongly constituted, but its proceedings were irregular and illegal. It was called, and considered to be, a _native_ court, but in point of fact it was a nondescript assembly, such usages of either native or supreme court as could possibly tell on the prisoner’s side (notably the use of counsel) being omitted, and only those which would insure his conviction admitted.

It was not the practice of the colony for serious crimes to be tried before a native court. But in this case they were obliged to run counter to custom for the reason given in a previous note, that most of the separate charges against the chief could not be recognised as crimes at all in an English court of law. At the same time the sentence finally given was one quite beyond the power of the court to pronounce. Clause 4 of the ordinance limits the power of the Supreme Chief to “appointing or removing the subordinate chiefs or other authorities” among the natives, but gives him no power to sentence to death, or to “banishment or transportation for life to such place as the Supreme Chief or Lieut.-Governor may appoint.” When Langalibalele had been “removed” from his chieftainship, and himself and the bulk of his tribe “driven over the mountain out of the colony” by the Government force, as announced in the bulletin of November 13th, 1873, the cattle within the colony seized, and many of the tribe killed in resisting the attempt to seize them, the Supreme Chief, under native law, had expended his power; while banishment is a punishment wholly unknown to Kafir law, as is plainly stated in “Kafir Laws and Customs,” p. 39.

Again, throughout the trial, the prisoner was assumed to have pleaded guilty, although in point of fact he had merely admitted that he had done certain acts, but desired witnesses to be called whose “evidence would justify or extenuate what he had done,” a plea which in any ordinary court would be recorded as a plea of “Not guilty.”

The native members of the court, also, were made to sign a judgment, the contents of which had been “interpreted” to them, and their signatures “witnessed,” by which the prisoner is declared to have been “convicted, on clear evidence, of several acts, for some of which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the world.” The absurdity of this is palpable, since it was impossible that these men should know anything of the law of any civilised land; it is plain, therefore, that in pretending to agree with assertions, of the meaning of which they were totally ignorant, they were under some strong influence, such as prejudice against the prisoner, undue fear of the Supreme Chief, or desire to please him—one of them being “Head Induna of the Natal Government,” and another the “Induna to the Secretary for Native Affairs.”

To turn to these crimes, “for some of which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the world”—to which statement His Excellency the Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native Affairs, and the Administrators of Native Law have also signed their names—we find that the charges run as follows:

1. “Setting at naught the authority of the magistrate in a manner[24] _not indeed sufficiently palpable to warrant the use of forcible coercion to our_ (civilised) laws and customs.” Which charge we may at once dismiss as absurd.

2. “Permitting, or _probably_ encouraging, his tribe to possess fire-arms, and retain them contrary to law.”

3. “With reference to these fire-arms, defying the authority of the magistrate, and once insulting the messenger.”

4. “Refusing to appear before” the Supreme Chief when summoned, “excusing his refusal by evasion and falsehood,” and “insulting his messenger.”

5. “Directing his cattle and other effects to be taken out of the colony under an armed escort.”

6. Causing the death of Her Majesty’s subjects at the Bushman’s River Pass.

It is plain to the most casual observation that none of the first five accusations, even if fully proved, refer to crimes punishable by death in any civilised land; and it is difficult to see how the Chief could reasonably be considered responsible for the sixth and last, seeing that the action took place in his absence, against his express commands, and to his great regret.

Returning to the five first-named offences, we find that the statements contained in the second and third charges are the only proofs alleged of the truth of the first—to which therefore we need give no further attention—the magistrate himself stating that “this was the first time the prisoner ever refused to appear before him when ordered to do so;” and this was the first time for more than twenty years that he had been reported for any fault whatever.

Proceeding to charge No. 2, we find that the prisoner entirely denied having encouraged his young men to possess themselves of guns; nor could he justly be said to have even “permitted” them to do so merely because he did not actively exert himself to prevent it. The men went away from home, worked, were paid for their services in guns, or purchased them with their earnings, without consulting him. He had never considered it to be part of his duty to search the huts of his people for unregistered guns, but had simply left them to suffer the consequences of breaking the laws of the colony, if discovered. It is also to be observed that amongst the seven sons captured with him only one had a gun at a time when certainly, if ever, they would have carried them; which does not look as though he had greatly encouraged them to possess themselves of firearms.

But if the second charge, in a very modified form, might be considered a true one, yet Langalibalele had done no worse in that respect than most of the other chiefs in the colony. In proof of this assertion may be brought “Perrin’s Register” for the years 1871-2-3—the years during which a large number of natives received payment for their services at the diamond-fields in guns. From this register it appears that the total number of guns registered in eight of the principal northern tribes of the colony—the two first-named chiefs being _indunas_ to the very magistrate who complained of Langalibalele—was as follows:

+---------------------+--------------------+ | | GUNS REGISTERED IN | | HUTS. +--------------------+ | | 1871.| 1872.| 1873.| +---------------------+------+------+------+ | Ndomba 1190 | — | — | — | | Faku 2071 | — | 2 | — | | Mganu 1277 | — | — | — | | Pakade 2222 | 1 | — | 1 | | Zikali 1651 | — | 1 | — | | Nodada 3000 | — | 1 | 2 | | Putini 1239 | — | 1 | — | | Langalibalele 2244 | — | 9 | 4 | +---------------------+------+------+------+

Furthermore, any fault with respect to the guns was not an offence under Kafir Law, and could only have been tried in the Colonial Court under the ordinary law of the colony.

The third and fourth charges were those which, when first reported in Natal, produced considerable alarm and indignation in the minds of the colonists. A defiance of the authority, both of magistrate and Supreme Chief, and insult offered to their messengers, looked indeed like actual rebellion. The charges, however, dwindled down to very little when properly examined. The “defiance” in question consisted only in an answer made to the magistrate to the effect that he could not send in as desired five young men—in possession of unregistered guns—because they had run away, he knew not whither, being frightened by the course pursued by the magistrate’s messenger; and that he could not find eight others, said to have come into the colony with guns, and to belong to his tribe, upon such insufficient data, and unless their names were given to him. The sincerity of which reasoning was shortly proved by the fact that, as soon as their names were notified to him, he did send in three of those very lads, with their guns, and two more belonging to other members of their party, besides sending in with their guns those who had worked for Mr. W. E. Shepstone, and who probably thought that the name of their master was a sufficient guarantee for their right to possess firearms.

The charge of insulting the native messengers from Government, of which a great deal was made at first, proved to be of very little consequence when investigated, but it is one to which special attention should be given because, indirectly, it is connected with the Zulu War.

The facts are as follows: One of the chief witnesses for the prosecution, Mawiza, a messenger of the Government, stated in his evidence-in-chief on the second day of the trial, that on the occasion of his carrying a message from Government, the prisoner’s people had “taken all his things from him,” and had “stripped, and taken him naked” into the Chiefs presence. But on the fourth day, in answer to a question from His Excellency, he said “that they had _intended_ to strip him but had allowed him to retain his trousers and boots,” thereby contradicting himself flatly. Nevertheless the court being asked by His Excellency whether it required further evidence on this point, replied in the negative. They did not even ask a question, on the subject, of Mawiza’s two companion messengers, Mnyembe and Gayede, though both these were examined; Mnyembe’s evidence-in-chief being cut short _before_ he came to that part of the story, and Gayede’s taken up just _after_ it.

The chief was kept in solitary confinement from the day when he was brought down to Pietermaritzburg, December 31st, till the day when his sons were sentenced, February 27th; not being allowed to converse with any of his sons, or with any members of his tribe, or with any friend or adviser, white or black. It was therefore quite out of his power to find witnesses who would have shown, as Mnyembe and Gayede would have done, that Mawiza’s statements about the “stripping” were false; that he still wore his waistcoat, shirt, trousers, boots, and gaiters, when he was taken to the chief; and that the “stripping” in question only amounted to this, that he himself put off his two coats, by the chiefs orders, “as a matter of precaution caused by fear” and not for the purpose of insulting the messenger, or defying the Supreme Chief. They would have satisfied the court also that other acts charged against the prisoner arose from fear, and dread of the Supreme Chief, and not from a spirit of defiance.

This affair of the messenger, explained by fear and suspicion on the part of Langalibalele, by which, also, he accounted for his refusal to “appear before” the Supreme Chief (which is to say that, being desired to give himself up into the hands of the Government, he was afraid to do so, and ran away), was the turning-point of the whole trial. What special reason he had for that fear and distrust will be inquired into shortly. Meanwhile the court considered that such expressed distrust of the good faith of the authorities was an added offence on the part of the prisoner, who was formally condemned to death, but his sentence commuted to banishment for life to Robben Island, the abode of lunatics and lepers, in which other captive native chiefs had languished and died before him.[25]