Part 1

A BRITISH ARMY,

AS IT WAS,--IS,--AND OUGHT TO BE:

ILLUSTRATED BY

EXAMPLES DURING THE PENINSULAR WAR:

WITH OBSERVATIONS

UPON

INDIA--THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA--CANADA--THE BOUNDARY LINE--THE NAVY--STEAM WARFARE, &c.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL JAMES CAMPBELL, LATE BRIGADE-MAJOR 3RD DIVISION, AND FORMERLY OF THE 45TH AND 50TH REGIMENTS.

LONDON: T. & W. BOONE, 29, NEW BOND STREET. 1840.

TO

GENERAL SIR THOMAS M. BRISBANE,

BART., G.C.B., &c. &c. &c.

Sir,

As a soldier who has seen much service in all parts of the world, and commanded large bodies of troops in the field, you can decide if my views are correct or not. As a General of the 3rd division, you must know whether I have erred (certainly unintentionally) in my statements; and I also trust you will be able to bear me out when I say, that the honour and renown of my companions in arms, and the good of the army in general, are my sole objects in appearing before the public.

I wish to dedicate the fruits of my experience to you, as a trifling tribute of the gratitude I feel for the friendship and kindness you have shown me on many occasions.

I can with truth say, my motives in the following work are pure and disinterested; but my views are not those of the generality of writers of the day. I know, as well as they do, that British soldiers will always follow their gallant officers in any attempt, if even requiring the most supernatural efforts; but I am not, as they almost all seem to be, blind to the great imperfections of too many of those allowed to enter our regiments. I can gladly leave them the reputation of possessing the most undaunted courage of any soldiers in the world, and the nation the honour and glory their deeds in battle have acquired. Let both pride themselves, as they have a right to do, upon these; but for the time to come, we want, and ought to have, the good and true men of the British Empire brought into the ranks of our armies; and of whom many--very many--can be found, if called upon, as they should be, to serve their Sovereign and their country as they might hereafter be served by a British army, formed, as it ought to be, to suit the times.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your truly devoted humble servant,

THE AUTHOR.

_Ravensdale, June 10, 1840._

CONTENTS

CHAP. I.

Page

What a British Army was, is still, and the commencement of certain introductory matter, intended to show in part what it ought to be 1

CHAP. II.

Continuation of the subject, and pointing out what is required to render the army more suitable to the times 31

CHAP. III.

Continuation of the subject, and showing how essential it is that corps for East India service, and for our colonies, should be formed, with a view to rendering the regular army perfectly efficient.--Various changes recommended and reasons assigned for them being necessary.--Some observations 60

CHAP. IV.

Continuation of the subject, with observations upon various matters connected with the efficiency and discipline of the army.--Veterans unfit for service in North America.--Remarks upon proposed changes in our militia.--Attention called to various subjects.--Improvements in system, &c. suggested.--Numbers of men taken away upon service from corps as bat-men, &c., its evil effects, and a remedy proposed.--Baggage and followers of an army in the field, &c. 88

CHAP. V.

Introductory observations upon the staff of an army.--Remarks upon the état-major of the French army.--The staff wanted for a British army.--Remarks upon the battle of Talavera.--Staff of an army continued.--An efficient and highly respectable police for an army in the field recommended.--Some of its duties alluded to.--Important remarks upon military police and courts-martial.--Staff duties continued.--Medical department and its establishments in the field.--The commissariat department in the field.--Observations 126

CHAP. VI.

Farther observations.--Insufficiency of allowance of practice ammunition for corps.--Hints for the maintenance of discipline in quarters and in the field.--Attention to the religious and general education of regiments strongly urged.--A plan for this purpose proposed.--Various necessary observations, &c.--Lord Wellington's letter to generals commanding divisions and brigades, with remarks.--Useful observations upon the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo.--Remarks and general order relating to the 3rd division in the retreat from Elbodon to Guinaldo.--Storming of the castle of Badajoz.--Conduct of our troops there given to show the composition and conduct of a British army in the field 171

CHAP. VII.

The escalade of the castle of Badajoz held up as an example to future commanders of such enterprises.--The part performed by the 3rd division under Sir Edward Pakenham at Salamanca, with remarks, &c.--The French generals and état-major before the lines of Torres Vedras, &c.--Marshal Soult and his état-major before the battle of Toulouse, &c.--The 3rd division at Toulouse, &c.--Part performed by the 3rd division at Vittoria, with remarks.--Some occurrences at the Nivelle, with useful observations.--A few necessary remarks upon the battle of the Pyrenees. The 3rd division at Orthes, and shewing its style of fighting there, and upon other occasions.--This farther illustrated at the Vic Bigore, with other matters 219

CHAP. VIII.

Observations upon the United States of America.--Their present position as regards Great Britain, the Canadas, &c.--Attention particularly called to that country, with observations upon naval and military matters.--Expedition to Plattsburg, with other matters of importance; such as the question of the Boundary line, &c. and some official documents respecting our North American territories.--Instructions of a military nature, respecting Lower Canada in 1814, with useful hints and matters of consequence to be attended to by Great Britain.--Future combined naval and military enterprises, with necessary and useful observations.--Concluding general remarks 264

ON

THE BRITISH ARMY,

_&c. &c._

CHAP. I.

I have imposed upon myself a task which may probably expose me to much annoyance, or perhaps severe criticism; so much so, that I am almost deterred from entering upon it, in consequence of feeling that although I may fancy I understand the subjects I intend to write upon, yet at the same time I greatly fear I am unequal to do them that justice which they require; but something I shall neither attempt to describe, nor analyze, urges me on in what I consider, as an officer of some experience, I ought to undertake; and let the consequences be what they may, I have the consolation to think, that my motives, at all events, are pure and disinterested.

Many well-meaning men, and many mischievous men, have for years past been exerting themselves, with unwearied assiduity, to have the corporal punishment of flogging done away with in our army; but no experienced officer, or person acquainted with the subject, when he considers its former and present composition, can for an instant entertain such an idea, unless some other mode of punishment can be thought of, as a substitute, equally prompt, and which, from its consequences, would keep the transgressor as short a time from the performance of his duties as flagellation does.

I do not presume to say, that the conduct of all corps of cavalry, infantry and artillery, were alike; but such officers as have been much employed with a British army in the field, must be aware of what he had to contend with, to prevent irregularities, and above all drunkenness, and the crimes arising out of its demoralizing effects, into which our soldiers invariably fell; so much so, that the greater part of them could never be trusted out of the sight of those who had the charge of them; and the annoyances and sufferings of the unlucky officers who had too often to bear the blame for their disorderly conduct, especially in going to and returning from the several hospital stations, and upon escort, and other duties, which took them away from their corps in Portugal, Spain, and other countries, cannot have forgotten what they had to encounter, and they must fully bear me out when I say, that it was perfect misery to have any thing to do with them; and nothing but the certainty of being flogged, if caught by the Provost absent from their corps, kept many of them in the line of march, or in their camps afterwards; and as for their conduct at sieges, and upon other occasions, when they had the power of breaking loose, or from under the watchful eyes of their officers, the less that is here said by me upon the subject the better.

This is really a melancholy picture to draw of most of our soldiers; but I lament to say it is a true one, and I am also reluctantly obliged to admit, that the almost only redeeming quality which they possessed, was undaunted courage in battle. But to show that I do not make these assertions on slight grounds (and I would never have been induced to do so without an important object in view), I must beg that the words of his Grace the Duke of Wellington, upon several occasions, may be duly considered.

In the month of May, 1809, he thus, in general orders, addresses his army--"The Commander of the Forces is much concerned to be obliged again to complain of the conduct of the troops; not only have outrages been committed by whole corps, but there is no description of property of which the unfortunate inhabitants of Portugal have not been plundered by the British soldiers, whom they have received into their houses, or by stragglers from the different regiments of the army. The Commander of the Forces apprehends that the interior discipline of the regiments is materially relaxed, &c. &c."

After establishing certain regulations for the maintenance of discipline, his Grace further observes that, "the object of these visitings is to see that the soldiers conduct themselves regularly in their quarters, to ascertain if there are any complaints by their landlords, and of whom, and that the men are in their quarters, instead of marauding in search of plunder." And after calling upon officers of all ranks to perform the duties required of them, he thus concludes--"The people of Portugal deserve well of the army; they have in every instance treated the soldiers well; and there never was an army so well supplied, or which had so little excuse for plunder, if any excuse can in any case exist. But if the Commander of the Forces should not by these and other measures be enabled to get the better of these practices, he is determined to report to His Majesty, and send into garrison those corps who shall continue them, as he prefers a small but disciplined and well-conducted body of troops to a rabble, however numerous; and he is resolved not to be the instrument of inflicting upon the people of this country the miseries which result from the operations of such a body. The regulations of these orders are to be understood as applicable to the dragoons and the artillery as well as the infantry."

Again, in the month of June, 1812, we read--"The soldiers must not be allowed to quit their corps to plunder, and Assistant-Provosts attached to divisions must see that the orders of the army on this subject are not disobeyed. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to observe, that the outrages so frequently committed by the soldiers when absent from their regiments, and the disgraceful scenes which occurred upon the storming of Badajoz, have had the effect of rendering the people of the country the enemies, instead of being the friends of the army. It is the duty of all officers to prevent the soldiers from plundering, and the Commander of the Forces calls upon them to perform it. He declares his determination to punish any person who may be found plundering on any occasion, and to make the soldiers give up any money or other valuable articles that they may have plundered.

"As these acts of outrage are generally committed by parties of men, the parties shall be put under stoppages to make good the damage which they shall do upon any occasion," And His Grace concludes this order by calling upon the officers, and non-commissioned officers, to assist in putting a stop to such disgraceful crimes and irregularities.

We again read in the General Orders of the 31st of July, 1812:--

"The Commander of the Forces requests to have returns of the several men missing from their regiments in the march of the 10th instant. It is reported to the Commander of the Forces that the enemy have in their power above a hundred men, British soldiers, taken on that day, straggling in the rear, and in the flanks of the army. As the army did not march more than ten or twelve miles on that day, and the country was perfectly open, the straggling of the soldiers, and their being prisoners, must be attached to the neglect of the officers of their regiments. It is quite obvious that if the soldiers cannot be made to march in their ranks at all times, the army cannot effect a march in face of an enemy, and it is so far unfit for service, &c. &c."

I do not at present wish to give many extracts from the Duke of Wellington's orders; but another dated Paris, the 9th of August, 1815, will be sufficient to prove that the character of British soldiers had not changed from 1812 up to that period.

No. 4. "The Field Marshal receives constant complaints of the robberies committed on the road from Neuilly to Paris, and he therefore now desires that guards may be mounted by the divisions encamped at Neuilly, and in the Bois de Bologne, so as to have sentries in communication with each other from Neuilly to the barrier de L'Etoile."

I consider it also necessary to give here two division orders nearly to the same effect:

"D.O. _Madrid, 28th August, 1812._

"1. The officer commanding the escort of prisoners furnished by the 3rd division, which rejoined this morning, has reported that the men composing that detachment, were extremely irregular while absent, and some individuals were disobedient to a great degree.

"2. The disobedient non-commissioned officers and soldiers are to be tried by a Division Court Martial, and the soldiers composing the remainder of the detachment are to stand under arms from six o'clock every evening till nine at night, for seven successive days, when they are to be marched into their quarters, to which they are also to be confined for the same period.

"3. No soldier of this detachment is to be suffered to take his duty for seven days, but must make it up afterwards.

"4. Any man of this detachment who shall fall sick before the expiration of punishment, must stand under arms after recovery.

"5. The British Brigade will ultimately furnish three sergeants to superintend this disgrace under the orders of the Provost-martial, who will correct, on the spot, any soldier who may commit further irregularity.

"Severity and shame are required to bring soldiers to a sense of duty, who forget every principle when detached, and require force to command them."

"D.O. _Moimenta de Beira, 24th Dec. 1812._

"1. The detachment of recovered men that left Celorico on the 15th instant, were irregular and disobedient.

"2. So much has been said on the subject of soldiers forgetting their duty when detached, that Major-General Pakenham, for the present, gives up the idea of bringing the troops to a sense of discipline by reason.

"3. When punishment has made the unprincipled sensible of their crimes, and the good soldiers know they will be supported if they will take the lead, then reason shall again be referred to.

"4. The soldiers composing the detachment of Lieutenant Walsh, 5th regiment, are to be assembled at the head-quarters of their respective brigades, for the purpose of being kept under arms, for ten days, from daylight till nightfall.

"5. The said soldiers are afterwards to be drilled for one month with the young soldiers, and they are not to have either spirits or wine for the whole period.

"6. The Provost-martial and assistant will frequently visit this punishment and notice any impropriety.

"7. Officers commanding brigades will report the manner in which the detachment joined the several battalions on the 22d instant."

Many more of Lord Wellington's observations upon the conduct of soldiers might be adduced, but what I have given, and the orders of Sir Edward Pakenham, are deemed sufficient for the object now in view. But his Grace throughout the whole of his campaigns threw most of the blame for such outrages occurring upon the officers, whom he constantly accused of neglect of duty, or such crimes could not have been perpetrated. I beg leave, however, to observe, and I am alone induced to do so in some measure to justify officers in general, that many of them were both active and zealous in the performance of their duties, but the men they had to deal with were very incorrigible; and those who were then subalterns must well remember that the chief responsibility rested most heavily upon them; for the soldiers were almost never allowed to leave their camps but under their charge; for it was too well known, and I regret to say it, that many of the non-commissioned officers could not be much more trusted than the privates.

As a regimental officer of long experience, not only at home and abroad, but also in the field; as a staff officer during the greater part of the Peninsular war; and with the army of occupation in France, and in other parts of the world, I unhesitatingly declare, that corporal punishment as now inflicted in the army, cannot be dispensed with, but at the risk of the total subversion of all discipline: indeed the hampering commanding officers in this respect, as has been the fashion of late years; and its being fancied, or pretended, that he is the best commander of a regiment, who returns the smallest number of soldiers punished, is, to say the least, very impolitic, and most injurious to the interests of the army; for crimes which should have called for punishment, must in consequence have been passed over, or so inadequately visited upon the offenders, that other men could not have been deterred from being guilty of similar conduct, and the effects of this, I fear, must in the end be dangerous; for what we frequently hear of and read respecting military punishments, in some of the newspapers, can scarcely, when coupled with an unavoidably relaxed state of discipline, be expected to have any other tendency. Solitary confinement, to be at all efficacious in preventing or punishing crimes in the army, keeps the soldier too long away from his necessary exercises and duties, and if it takes place in our common jails, whatever he may have gone into them, he certainly must come out matured in crime, from being the associate of criminals of the worst description; for what jail can contain sufficient cells to separate all who may be sent there. Offenders' lists, common and marching order drills, confinement to barracks, &c. &c., are all well enough, in these quiet times, for trifling offences or irregularities at home or abroad, so long as the soldier knows that he can be brought to the halberts for any act of insubordination on such occasions; but in case of war, and should it be necessary for our army to take the field, this system would never answer. I must beg, however, that it may not be supposed, that I am by any means an advocate for continuing corporal punishments, or that I have any intention of extenuating or justifying what was sometimes practised by officers, under generally, I feel convinced, a mistaken idea, that they were only doing what their duty required of them; but my surprise often was, how officers who composed courts-martial, could by their sentences, always so readily lend themselves to the views, or perhaps badly regulated feelings of their commanders: indeed the trials I have witnessed were sometimes little else than mere matter of form, and they could not well be otherwise, for I have seen a soldier receive two or three hundred, or even more lashes, inflicted with great severity, under a sentence awarded by a drum-head court-martial, after an investigation of a few minutes duration of the charges brought against him. Such arbitrary proceedings as these, were generally abuses of power, with which many men are unfit to be entrusted; and from habit we really thought little of such matters, and the soldiers themselves were only thereby rendered the more callous. I declare, however, that I am at a loss to say, which is preferable--the prompt manner of acting in our navy, where a captain when he orders the punishment of a man, does so on his own serious responsibility, or that of a commanding officer of a regiment, who can generally act as he pleases, whilst all he does is sanctioned by a court martial.

I could easily bring forward many occurrences which would show in the strongest light, how much a serious consideration of both our old and present system in the army, as regards punishments, is required; but so heartily do I detest flogging, that my thoughts have been long directed to devise means of getting rid of it; but I always tremble at the obvious alternative--_capital punishments_--which must be resorted to, and I should fear, very frequently, as in the French armies, especially upon service, as a substitute for flogging for the maintenance of discipline; for an army without it, is, as the Duke of Wellington observed in one of the orders I have given, a rabble, and must be far more dangerous to the country to which it belongs, than formidable to its enemies.

For years past, I have given this subject most serious consideration. I have weighed all its difficulties, and I can see no way of doing away with flogging in a British army, so long as it is composed of the present description of men. But I am inclined to hope, and I must now beg that all I have to say may be heard with patience--that this most desirable object may be attained by a completely new organisation of our regiments, and bringing into their ranks a totally different description of men, from those who generally offer themselves as recruits--men with other ideas, and altogether other feelings.

But as I wish to bring the subjects I intend to discuss, candidly and fairly before the reader, I must beg leave to transcribe what Sir George Murray lately said at a great public meeting in London, as taken from "the Times." "The British Army did not consist of the constrained conscripts of arbitrary power, but of citizens voluntarily in arms to defend their country, to obey and respect her laws at home, and to resist and repel, with their utmost energy, every effort of her foreign foes, &c. &c." Sir George Murray, as the world knows, and as the British Army in particular knows, is a most able and accomplished Quarter Master General; but as such he could not have had much to say to the maintenance of discipline, for that comes under the Adjutant-General; yet still he will no doubt be looked upon as good authority in such matters, so much so, that I have been induced thus to give what may be considered as his opinion, and which the sequel will still more show to be contrary to mine: indeed, if I were not borne out by the evidence I have even already adduced, my attempting to do any thing towards improvement in our army would seem to be unnecessary and uncalled for.