Part 5

There ought not to be any difficulties started as to the appointment of a board of management of the military fund, and as it is to be presumed that no member of Her Majesty's Government could have a wish to interfere, or to have any control over the board; I have now to propose (and I think this will satisfy all parties) that the Commander-in-Chief should have the nomination of the president and board, which should consist of at least two, if not of four efficient members, removable only by the authority which had appointed them to it, and which should also have the power of choosing as secretary, a gentleman of habits of business, who would require the assistance of a certain number of clerks. An annual report of the state of the military fund should be made out and submitted for the information of Government, the Commander-in-Chief, and that of every corps in the army.

The officers of the board and secretary for performing what cannot be otherwise than troublesome duties, all the details of which they would have to regulate, and as they must have considerable responsibility attached to them, probably requiring security to be given, I conclude they would be allowed respectable fixed salaries. The clerks will also be of course well paid. I may be sanguine, but I confess I feel very confident, that the plan would be found, under the management of an able board, to work well. I have been more minute than I could have wished, but my object in being so, was to obviate many of the objections which are likely to be started. I regret much, however, that I cannot now see how to include the officers of the navy in it; for, unless it were so arranged, that they could contribute towards the fund, as retiring officers of the army are made to do, I fear that so desirable an object cannot, as they are now situated, be effected for them.

By establishing this military fund, Government would not only be able to do away with half-pay, but also to discontinue the practice of granting pensions, excepting in particular cases to officers of the army, their widows and children, as I conclude that they would all in future be provided for under the regulations to be made by the board of management; and what a relief to the minds of officers, and what a proud and proper feeling it would be for them to indulge in, that they could at such a trifling sacrifice, and on such easy terms, provide for themselves; and for those about whom they must naturally be so anxious, without becoming a burden to the country; and would not this plan give them a stake in it, which must perpetuate (though it cannot for a moment be supposed, that in such feelings and principles they can be wanting,) that attachment to their Sovereign, and to our free and admirable constitution, which they have ever so strongly evinced; and thus an additional and powerful barrier would be formed against the dangerous designs of men, who apparently wish to see our excellent institutions destroyed, and the country thrown, to suit their own selfish purposes, into such confusion, as could only end in a despotism of some kind or other.

I am not blind to the circumstance, that if what I am endeavouring to establish for the good of the service is accomplished, a severe blow must be given to the patronage of the army, but I trust that this will not be allowed to become a stumbling-block in the way of so much general benefit. I, however, willingly leave the cause of our gallant army, with which I am now, I may say, almost unconnected, to public opinion, which fortunately in this country is so powerful, as not to be easily or long withstood; and we may, I will venture to say, be certain, that if what I have presumed to propose, is practicable and desirable, the Commander-in-Chief will readily meet the wishes of the country and the army, with all that good will and zeal which he has on so many occasions evinced for the welfare of both.

CHAP. III.

What I have next to propose, will I think be allowed to be of importance; for I wish to free our army from much inconvenience, and at the same time to insure its efficiency. I have therefore to recommend, that the East India Company should have the power of raising, as usual by bounty, in the United Kingdom, such a number of regiments as they may require for their service; to be commanded by their own officers, in the same manner as has hitherto been the custom in their European corps; so as to enable them to maintain their ascendancy in the East, without the aid of Her Majesty's troops, except in cases of great emergency; for I am most anxious that any of our regular regiments sent there, as I have before observed, should be immediately ordered home, as soon as the cause for which they may have been sent out had been removed.

I am convinced that the Honourable Company's native armies would be greatly improved, and rendered fully competent to contend with any troops in the world, if several corps of Malays were formed for their service, and officered in the manner now practised in Ceylon, and when in the field made to act along with the Sepoys; and for very unhealthy parts of India, where the heat is almost unbearable, some corps of those always effective, and light-hearted beings--Caffres, would be found most admirably calculated for service, either in garrison or in the field. I am however aware that prejudices exist against both Malays and Caffres, but they should be got over.

From what I have seen of Malays, I believe them to be the bravest people of the East. The only resistance, worth talking of, which our troops met with in taking Ceylon from the Dutch, was from a battalion of Malays in their service; and I am convinced, that Sir Stamford Raffles did not speak too highly in their praise. It was however, a sad mistake, our having relinquished so much of their country, and I fear too without their consent, to the tender mercies of the Dutch; for they were always greatly attached to us, and it is well known that they make excellent faithful soldiers. They are also very healthy in almost any situation, and this alone should induce us to prefer them to every other description of troops, which could be employed in Indian warfare. Ought we not to look forward, and that too before long, to the Company's wars increasing in number and importance; for does not history and experience show us, that conquerors cannot easily stop in their conquests, and say, this river, or that range of mountains shall be our future boundary, and we shall go no farther; do we not almost invariably find, that before they had long endeavoured to halt, and when they had just began to expect, in rest and peace, to enjoy the fruits of their victories, that they were either again obliged to go forward, or else to retrace their steps. These historical facts are particularly applicable, even at the present moment, and ought to be considered as timely notice to beware of rendering our already vast Eastern Empire too extensive, unless we are prepared to support our high pretensions, by powerful and well organized fleets and armies; and that our chief object is to disseminate the blessings of pure and reformed Christianity throughout the East, for the long neglect of which we have, as a nation, so much to answer for.

I well remember looking upon it as a hopeless business to expect that the Portuguese could ever be brought to stand before French troops; and in making this remark, I more particularly allude to the period when Marshal Soult occupied Oporto. I could then have got, most advantageously, as many did, into the Portuguese army; but having, by chance, witnessed what took place on that occasion, and on some others, nothing could induce me to have any thing to do with them. I certainly came to a wrong conclusion, and I did not calculate, as I ought to have done, that British officers can make almost any men in the world fight; at all events, when they have an opportunity of seeing how British troops set about their work.

I should greatly fear, that it cannot now be safe to employ--at least in some of our West India Islands--corps composed of Blacks; I must therefore beg leave to recommend, that regiments should be raised by bounty in the United Kingdom, for service in that part of the world, and in some of our other foreign possessions; and none of our regular regiments should be required to serve there, but in cases of emergency; and they ought always to be immediately re-called from such countries, when the cause for which they were sent out had been removed. Such an arrangement would obviate many objections to the plan of the ballot, and would be found the means (so desirable an object in these times) of keeping our regiments in a very high state of discipline and efficiency; for they would be then very superior in these respects to any troops we can now, or even could avail ourselves of; and if what I suggest be adopted, a vast saving of expense to the country would be the consequence, which is incurred in constantly relieving the number of regiments we are obliged to have always stationed abroad.

In order to shew in the strongest manner, how serious a drawback such prolonged service in tropical climates is to the British army, I shall here take the liberty of stating, that in the year 1820, the regiment to which I then belonged arrived in the East, complete in officers and men. It lately returned to England, without having lost, I believe, any individual in action; but the climate alone had produced great changes in its ranks; and although volunteers from other corps were added to it, and many recruits had been sent out during the period of its absence from home, to keep up its strength, yet when it returned it could scarcely be called a regiment. Some of the officers had certainly exchanged into other corps at home, or had sold out; but only one or two reached England of all those who had embarked with it. This is most injurious to the discipline and efficiency of our army; for, according to present arrangements, and from unavoidable circumstances, a corps can only be at home for so short a period, that there is not sufficient time allowed to bring it into that state in which it ought to be for service; and when regiments arrive in foreign stations, they are too often so much detached in small bodies, that notwithstanding all the zeal and exertions of officers, a certain degree of relaxation in discipline necessarily takes place, and generally increases the longer a regiment, always hoping to be re-called--is kept abroad. This feeling, or anxiety about home, at least to any considerable extent, could not be supposed to exist in Colonial corps; for those who voluntarily entered them, would have, in a great measure, made up their minds to consider such foreign stations as their homes, at all events, for a certain number of years, which both officers and men can, in most instances, contrive to pass both profitably and agreeably.

The officers of Colonial corps should be kept distinct from those of the regular army, and there ought to be no exchanges permitted from the one to the other; and it might perhaps be thought advisable, that Colonial officers should receive a higher rate of pay or allowances, and they ought to be allowed--as the same system of promotion is supposed to exist in such corps as in the regulars--to join the latter in making a provision for their retirement from the service, upon the plan I have endeavoured to establish. But fixed rates of pensions for service in the Colonial corps should be established for the non-commissioned officers and privates, which ought invariably to be in proportion to good conduct, and to the period spent in those generally unhealthy climates. In these stations, and in the East particularly, I have observed that soldiers of regiments of the line, were very liable to be cast down, in consequence of the expectations they had formed of the pleasures they were led to look for, not being by any means realized; and being exposed to temptations which they could not resist, especially that of drinking, they were more likely to become slaves to it, and reckless, than in other parts of the world; it would therefore be a point requiring serious consideration, how far it might be prudent, when the composition of these Colonial corps is borne in mind; to dispense entirely with corporal punishment; it ought not, however, to be permitted to take place, but when called for by the strongest possible causes, and a special report of the circumstance, should invariably and immediately be made, by the officer commanding the corps, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief.

The establishments of Colonial corps ought to be fixed according to the service likely to be locally required of them; and where their officers obtained the rank of generals, they could, of course, be employed in any manner, or upon any service for which the Commander-in-chief might think fit to select them; but their knowledge of these countries would eminently qualify them for colonial commands, and thus this branch of the service would not only be rendered highly honourable, but it would also hold out many advantages to those who entered it. They ought, therefore, to be obliged to undergo before appointment, and afterwards before they get the rank of major, the examinations to which the officers of the regular army must submit.

I must now request attention to what I shall next bring before the reader--that is to say--as no one would hereafter, according to the plan proposed, be permitted to enter our regular army, who was not of a certain height, and of a sound constitution, I must strongly urge, that the old fashioned fancy of having grenadier and light infantry companies to regiments should be discontinued; for it takes away the best, or the picked men from the others, to gratify the vanity of two of the captains, at the expense of the feelings of the rest, and which also most seriously affects the general efficiency, and ruins the appearance of regiments: and how galling and discouraging it is to a corps, but especially to its commanding officer, to have these companies placed under the orders of probably a stranger; who may have sufficient influence or interest with a general commanding an expedition, so as to be able to induce him to form grenadier, or light infantry battalions, for a particular service, and which any regiment, or part of it, ought to be as well able to perform.

A battalion, or any body of troops, which is not perfect in the exercises and duties of light infantry as well as in the less rapid movements of the line, should be looked upon as unfit for modern warfare. All regiments of infantry ought therefore to be like the old 43d and 52d; and I must, at whatever risk, presume to say, that officers unable to make their corps, if not altogether, at least almost as efficient as these were when they came from the hands of Sir John Moore, ought to be considered incapable of commanding them. I have also no hesitation in adding, that during the late wars, these corps and the Rifles, far surpassed all others in many respects.

We all know that the celebrated Marshal Saxe, who was looked upon as a high military authority in olden times, is reported to have said, that the whole art of war was in the legs. This, to a certain extent, is true; but he then, of course, only spoke of the trade and not of the science. I have no doubt but that some of our ancients may be inclined to think they got on well enough without exerting much activity in their day; yet I must say, that officers unfit for rapid movements _on foot_ should be recommended to retire from the service, as their unfitness in this respect might render it indispensable that they should not be allowed to remain a burden upon it. And I would likewise take the liberty of suggesting, that all regimental officers, according to their rank, should be dressed and appointed alike; and all the soldiers of the ten companies alike.

If all our regular regiments were made light infantry, which they ought to be, it might no longer be considered advisable to encumber them with the large colours now in use. Once upon a time, a commanding officer of a light corps (not belonging to the famous light division), expecting next day to be engaged, actually came to the strange determination of burning those of his regiment; but when acting in line, I would propose (though some one else might think of something very superior), that there should be substituted as rallying points, and to which should be attached the same importance as to colours, two golden-lions, which might be ornamented by a scroll, upon which could be emblazoned, or inscribed, the actions in which the corps may have distinguished itself--these should be screwed on to light staffs; those for English regiments, being near their heads, adorned with Roses; those for Scotch, with Thistles; and those for Irish, with Shamrocks: these standards in the field should be consigned to the care of the two youngest lieutenants, and they should be made strictly responsible for them; for I once knew an ensign, who, in action, actually threw down one of the colours of a renowned regiment, and made off to the rear, without thinking more of it, from having been hit rather sharply by a spent ball. These are likely, I fear, to be thought too trifling matters for a work of this kind; but I hope the reader will excuse me for having introduced them; and also for adding, that in order to keep pace with improvements made by other nations in modern warfare, ought it not to be well considered whether our slowest movements, in what is termed ordinary time, would not be improved, if the soldier was required to take a greater number of steps, say 87, of only 30 inches in length in the minute; and if what is called quick time was made 126 paces of only 30 inches each per minute, which would make him pass over the same extent of ground in the same space of time as he does by the present plan. At least, I have no doubt, and I speak, as an old adjutant, and as an officer long practised in the movements of both small and large bodies of troops, that all manœuvres would be performed at these paces with much less chance of confusion, and with more ease to the soldier, especially in action, than according to the present mode.

It would lead me far beyond my present intentions if I were to enter extensively upon the subject of military evolutions; but I beg leave to say, that to simplify and render their execution easy, ought to become the primary object of all modern tacticians.

In manœuvring, especially large bodies of troops, rapid movements in columns at quarter distances ought to be much more attended to than they are.--Masses of such columns, or close columns, as practised by the Duke of Wellington at Paris or elsewhere, can be quickly and scientifically placed or prepared for advancing or retiring in any direction, or for deployment, by simply, when put in motion, marking time and bringing up the shoulder; and by this means gradually producing a change of position or of formation of the whole mass. Deployments can be made from such columns in quick or double-quick time, and with the greatest accuracy, by merely moving in threes or fours to the right or left. What an advantage an army thus instructed would have over one proceeding in the old heavy manner, in seizing hold of a position, or of a point, presenting evident advantages, and that too with perfect safety; for, in case of a sodden attack of cavalry, a quarter-distance column is in security in square in an instant. This column also possesses many advantages over the close column, not only in the superiority and rapidity of its movements, but likewise in its being much less liable to get into disorder in broken ground, or to suffer from cannon, which very soon, if well served, destroy a perfectly solid mass, especially if steady battalions of infantry are also firing into it, as was the case at Talavera, when our Guards in the afternoon made a gallant but injudiciously-directed charge; and when the 48th regiment, on the one hand, and the 45th on the other, taught the French, that breaking through an enemy's line in dense columns would not answer with a British army.--Echelons of these quarter-distance columns would, in many instances, be very superior to lines of battalions or brigades, as they could be moved with rapidity to the points of formation in a new line or position, and without any risk of getting into confusion; commanding officers of corps, their majors and adjutants having only carefully to attend to, judge, and preserve their respective distances; and even in common drill or manœuvres of a single battalion, this ought always to form an important part of the practice and instruction of these officers, who in regimental tactics are, in general, not sufficiently occupied, and consequently are too often found ignorant of their business when obliged to act in brigade, and with this object in view every movement should be performed as if in reference to a corps supposed to be upon either or both flanks, with which they ought to work in unison. Now I must beg the unmilitary reader to imagine a large body of troops thus manœuvring in columns at quarter-distances, or in open columns, or lines formed from them, covered by clouds of sharpshooters, supported by these columns or lines, cannon and cavalry, and he will have at once before him a chief feature in modern warfare, in which science and experience on the part of generals and staff officers must be so essential and indispensable.