Part 14

We are not to suppose that the Emperor Napoleon could have gained such advantages over a Prussian army, manœuvred by such able officers as those who led it, by superiority of tactics, though he evidently wished the world to think so; and we must attribute the results of the battle to the gallantry and superior intelligence of the French officers and soldiers over troops in whom such a spirit no longer existed; for had it not, in a great measure been banished, for the time, from amongst them, by the severity of Prussian discipline, which is most certainly calculated to eradicate courage out of any army in the world but that composed of English, Scotch, and Irishmen, upon whom its effects were but too long tried; and though it did not exhaust their innate national bravery, and love of war, yet it rendered them at all times ready and anxious to free themselves from the restraint under which they were so tightly kept; and when once they could contrive to get out of the sight of their officers, and to _think_ for themselves,--to do which they perhaps had very few opportunities in the course of their lives--they bade farewell to subordination, and took good care, in every kind of excess, to make up for what they had suffered, under the kind of discipline we had in a great measure copied from the Prussians; and to this I venture to ascribe many of our soldiers' irregularities, and even their crimes.

Let us see the effects of such absurd discipline upon a Russian army. In the month of June, 1807, the Russians occupied Heilsburg, where they had collected vast quantities of provisions, and all that was necessary for an army. Their position was excellent, and during a period of four months every thing possible had been done to render it, by field works, more formidable. The Russians even attempted to be the first to commence hostilities, but they were attacked by the French, and completely beaten with the loss of 30,000 killed and wounded, and 4,000 prisoners; while the French lost (and the results go to prove their statements to be correct) only 700 killed, and about 2,000 wounded; and I do not hesitate to attribute the loss of the battle of Eylau to the same cause as I do that of Jena; that is to say, the injurious, depressing effects of Prussian discipline; and which system seems to be even to this day followed up in the Russian armies.

In further proof of this, I must beg the reader's attention to what I am going to mention, and which actually occurred in a regiment that shall be nameless.

The day was fixed upon which it was to be reviewed. Its commanding officer was suddenly taken ill, and he was confined to his bed. So far had preparations been carried for this great event, that even the large cards, as was the practice in those days, containing the manœuvres to be performed, had been made out for the inspecting General. This illness of the Lieutenant-Colonel was an event quite unforeseen, and the senior Major, a good-natured old gentleman, whose military career had been in the West Indies, and who was more agreeably occupied at the time than in studying Dundas, was completely thunderstruck when he found that at the shortest notice he had to make up his mind to assume the command on this truly alarming occasion; for the General was well known to be a first-rate tiger. It was, therefore, a very hopeless case with the gallant Major, as he really could not at any time manœuvre a battalion, and much less under such trying circumstances; and what made matters worse, his Lieutenant-Colonel would rarely allow him to try whether he could do so or not, for he was one of those commanders who carried on every thing himself, aided by his adjutant, and a well trained set of drummers, whom he kept in constant practice.

His Adjutant was a well-meaning man, and in kindly feelings, and good will towards the Major, and in his great zeal for the reputation of his corps, he went with the beautifully written out card of the manœuvres (the produce of many an anxious hour of the Lieutenant-Colonel's valuable time) to the Major, to explain it fully to him, and also comfort him with the hope, that as the regiment had most diligently practised every march, counter-march, and wheel of it, things must go off well, if he would only not be alarmed. Accordingly, that very evening, well prompted by the Adjutant, he actually got the regiment through it handsomely enough. At night the Adjutant went to see and condole with his most yellow, billious-looking commander. "How will ever the poor Major get through with the review to-morrow?" "O, there is no fear whatever of him, for he put the regiment through _it_ tolerably this evening." "Through what, Sir--have you presumed to show him my manœuvres?" "Yes, Sir, but I thought there could be no harm in doing so, as----" "You thought, Sir--no harm, Sir. Go immediately, Sir, and bring back my manœuvres, and let Major ---- make out a review for himself--he shall certainly not have mine."

The cards were consequently delivered up to their unselfish owner. But the Adjutant, who flattered himself, that he was also something of a manœuvrer, though, at the risk of irritating the Lieutenant-Colonel, thought it would be well, before he should terrify the Major out of his senses with this awful intelligence, to sit down and concoct a very pretty review--one, at all events, which would show that the battalion knew how to act against an enemy in its front and rear, and probably upon both its flanks at the same moment. In short, he went that very night with a splendid plan, which he proudly and confidently displayed before the astounded Major; who, at last, after a good deal of trouble, made so far to comprehend it, that he was able next morning, at five o'clock, to put the regiment through it very tolerably. But this was rather sharp work upon all concerned; for the grand review was to take place at 11, A.M.--the Major was quite hoarse--and a new card had to be finely written out for the General.

The review came off admirably--the Major (his voice cleared by the yolks of eggs) was not often wrong; at least this was not observed, and it did not signify, as both officers and men had fully determined to do well, not only on the Major's account, but on their own.

At the long wished-for conclusion, the General came solemnly forward, and in front of the regiment, really covered the blushing, but exhausted, Major with praises and honourable acknowledgments, and approbation of his own and the corps' most admirable performances.

On the return of the Adjutant from the field, he, as in duty bound, waited upon his Commanding officer. "I suppose, poor ---- made a very pretty business of it to-day?" "A most admirable review; and I have, upon no occasion, ever seen the regiment do better; so much, so, that the General expressed in the strongest terms his admiration of our day's performance!"

This was quite enough, but the symptoms of the Lieutenant-Colonel's attack of bilious fever, were not alleviated by the account of the Major's unlooked-for success. Such were the men to whom the command of our regiments was too often confided, and who generally contrived to render soldiers indifferent to events, and reckless in their conduct.

I had the luck to be stationed in the West of Ireland under a General, who considered that nothing tended so effectually to make first-rate soldiers, as to accustom them to prolonged exposure, under arms, to deluges of rain, and to all kinds of weather; and certainly in that part of Ireland, there was no want of his favourite specific--rain. I must, however, at the same time acknowledge, that of this he himself took ample doses. Two other regiments, and the one to which I belonged, and a body of cavalry and artillery, formed his brigade; and the more gloomy and threatening the weather, the more certain were we of a repetition of the General's admired refrigerant system, for his practice in this line was extensive and unwearied; we had frequently, on such occasions, to take up favourite positions, and to make long and fatiguing excursions, over high sand-hills, which were some miles distant from our cantonments. But, notwithstanding this excellent treatment, our soldiers did not become a whit the more water-proof; and many of them most provokingly went into hospitals with violent pains in their backs, bones, &c. and which, to the General's surprise, often terminated in fever.

How differently were Sir Thomas Brisbane's kindly feelings evinced for those placed under his care (indeed Sir Thomas Picton always wished his commanding officers to act in the same manner). No officer commanding a corps was allowed, under any pretence, to keep his men unnecessarily under arms, especially after a march. As soon as the soldiers reached their cantonments, or ground of encampment, they were ordered to be instantly dismissed, and allowed to go into their quarters or tents to take off their accoutrements, knapsacks, &c. so that they might as soon as possible recover from the fatigues of the march; for keeping men standing, after being heated, till they became chilled, was always found to be injurious to their health.

After the troops came down the river Plata from Buenos Ayres, we were kept in what our Generals chose to denominate, barracks afloat--that is to say--in transports off Monte Video. One of these great officers came unexpectedly on board our head-quarter ship, which was certainly kept in fine order. The moment he set his foot on deck he called for the officer of the day, who happened to be also the senior officer on board, and ordered him to show him all over the ship. I believe he must have been surprised at the man-of-war style adopted, and at the extreme cleanliness and regularity of every thing (for even in spite of the remonstrances of the masters of the transports, as to their decks being ruined, the soldiers were kept constantly rubbing away with the holy stones), at all events, he found no fault, but unfortunately in passing the ship's coppers, he thought fit to demand what was in them, and being told rice for the soldiers' dinners, he, with great dignity and gravity, inquired of the alarmed officer the quantity of rice in them? The unlucky wight, not knowing well what to say, and being fully aware, that to betray ignorance upon such important points, was an unpardonable crime, answered at once, about 1000 pounds--terrible mistake, at least the threatened consequences were terrible--for this worthy coadjutor of General Whitelock, in an instant, set upon the unlucky miscalculator of boiled and unboiled rice, and declared that he had never met with such a downright ignorant blockhead in all his life; for the hold of the ship (and she was 700 tons burden) could not contain that quantity when boiled; "and now, Sir," continued this great commander, "I shall take care to make you suffer for such ignorance and inattention to your duty, and shall report your conduct upon this occasion to the Horse Guards, in order to have your promotion stopped." Whether he kept his word or not I cannot tell; but I am rather inclined to believe, that he had other matters to occupy his attention, on his return to England, which came more home to himself.

I could bring many more examples of this kind forward, but I must no longer occupy the reader's attention with such frivolous matters.

But it is impossible to show in a more satisfactory manner, what was the state of a British army in the field than by giving, as I intend to do after a few observations, a letter from his Grace the Duke of Wellington to the Generals commanding divisions and brigades; yet, I trust it will not be deemed presumptuous if I venture to say that the real causes of irregularities and bad conduct on the part of soldiers, are not always perceived or ascribed even by men of the greatest talents and experience to the proper sources; but having, in the retreat from Madrid and Burgos, which is that alluded to by his Grace, had much to do with the part of the rear-guard under Sir Edward Pakenham, who then commanded the 3rd division of infantry, during the absence of Sir Thomas Picton, and having also seen a good deal on many other occasions, I hope I may be considered authorized to remark, that owing to the admirable management and unwearied exertions of Sir Edward Pakenham, the conduct of the division on that retreat was, I may say, tolerably good, except upon the night after we left Madrid; when many a pig was slain in the woods, and the lives of the staff and other officers of the division and brigades seriously endangered in their endeavours, under a sharp fire of musketry, kept up at these animals, to put a stop to such disorderly conduct on the part of the soldiers, as actually left the division, from the hunt having become almost general, at the mercy of the French, had they known what we were about; for they were close at hand, and must have wondered what could have occasioned the uproar and firing in our camp. But what occurred, day after day, during the retreat amongst the numerous disorderly stragglers from the several divisions, some of whom, in spite of all that could be done, occasionally fell into the hands of the enemy, most clearly evinced very bad conduct on the part of the troops, and also a want of management somewhere; but the irregularities, his Grace laments, were comparatively nothing to what occurred in the retreat to Corunna. In this instance, also, the weather, as usual in Spain, in the month of November, was very severe, so much so, that some men who had been barely able to reach the resting, or rather halting place for the night, which was, perhaps, an open ploughed field, become quite a swamp from the rain, were in the morning found dead, from the effects of cold, wet, and want of sufficient food, much of which, from those having charge of it, not knowing in what direction to move, had gone astray; and in one instance, we, as rear-guard, obtained a supply of biscuit, by taking a quantity of it off the hands of a conductor of a brigade of mules, who, in a few minutes more, had he not been prevented, would have led them in amongst the enemy.

After the troops from Madrid and Burgos met, the army, when there were roads running nearly parallel to each other, marched generally in two columns; but I must say matters were not always well managed, and we had no properly organized police, who could have promptly, when necessary, enforced discipline, for what were a few provosts with their infantry guards, generally accompanying the baggage? The columns sometimes unfortunately and probably unavoidably, came into contact with each other on the same road, occasioning a certain degree of confusion, which afforded opportunities for some of the soldiers to escape from under the eyes of their officers, however watchful they might be, and to become as usual irregular; and at other times the columns (probably also unavoidably), considering the state of the weather, the nature of the country, and the then bad roads, were at times too far asunder, and the communication not having been kept up as it should have been by either our cavalry or infantry, the army became liable to sudden and unlooked for events; and in one instance of this kind, I believe it was, that one of our generals was taken by a French patrole, that through mistake, occasioned by the rain, and a hazy state of the atmosphere, and a want of proper precaution on our part, had actually contrived to get in between our columns, certainly not very much to our military credit.

When his Grace's letter reached us after the retreat, the feeling of the officers commanding brigades and corps was, that, in this instance, if nothing were said about the pig hunt, the 3rd division, although a few of its soldiers had fallen into the hands of the enemy, did not deserve the censure pronounced against the army in general; and it was thought right that Sir Edward Pakenham should be waited upon, in order to induce him to point out this to Lord Wellington, for they were besides hurt at the implied superiority of the French in even making fires and in quick cooking. Sir Edward, however, soon settled the matter, by declaring in his usually laconic manner, that "he would do no such thing," and adding, "let whoever the cap fits wear it."

They all knew well in what this supposed superiority of the French lay, for the truth was, they never hesitated to turn a town or village inside out, if it suited their purposes, or to pull down a house, or half a dozen of them, if necessary, so as to get dry wood for their fires, whereas our people had to be marched regularly under officers for beef, bread, water, and wood, and they had seldom any thing else for it, but to cut down, bring in, and use the green branches of trees as fuel to cook with. This accounts for the observable difference between the two armies, for when our soldiers occasionally, and when not a tree was to be seen, got a house or two to burn, which were always paid for, they could then cook as quickly as their practised foes.

"Sir, _Frenada, Nov. 28th, 1812._

"I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c. which are already in progress by different lines of communication to the several divisions and brigades.

"But besides these objects I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the general and other officers to bring it back to that state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late campaign to a greater degree _than_ any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations, which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships, excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

"It must be obvious however to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred.

"Yet the necessity for retreating existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches; none in which they made such long and repeated halts, and none in which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy. We must look therefore for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army to some cause, besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

"I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

"I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers of the army, and I am quite certain, that if their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of this duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

"Unfortunately the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which of all others every rule for the regulation and control of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and his field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments, for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his food, and the forage of his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, and a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

"These are points then to which I most earnestly intreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese as well as British, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army, regarding the constant inspection and superintendance of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments, and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority, and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty, by being constantly under the view and superintendance of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the Provost, and the punishments by the sentence of courts-martial will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages, of which there are too many complaints, when they know that the officers and non-commissioned officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them.

"The commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army, regarding the constant _real_ inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article, and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view, both should be inspected daily.

"In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and lamented in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the French soldiers cooked, in comparison with those of our army.