Part 21
"'Whereas, it is just and reasonable, and essential to our interest and _the security of our_ colonies (the States then included), that the several nations or tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such parts of our dominions and territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by, us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their hunting grounds; we do therefore, with the advice of our Privy Council, declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that no governor or commander-in-chief, in any of our colonies, Quebec, &c. do presume, upon any pretence whatever, to grant warrants of survey, or pass any patents for lands beyond the bounds of their respective governments, as described in their commissions.' Now mark: 'As also that no governor or commander-in-chief of our colonies or plantations in America _do presume_ for the present, and until our further pleasure be known, to grant warrants of survey, or pass patents, _for any lands beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean_ from the west or north-west, or upon any lands whatever, which not having been ceded to, or purchased by, us, as aforesaid, _are reserved to the said Indians or any of them_.' Now, will any man of common reflection say, that under such circumstances, known to all our governors and commanders-in-chief, of course also to all engaged in the internal legislation of the plantations, there could be any obscurity to admit of dispute in the reference made to this precise mark of distinction--'beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers falling into the Atlantic?' the same mark being again referred to in the Imperial Act 14th George III., 1774, in nearly the same words, only adding 'the highlands,' &c., dividing, &c., again expressly described in the account of General Arnold's march over the very country; and lastly, briefly referred to in the treaty of 1783, the very brevity and looseness of the expression being the strongest possible proof of the notoriety of such division and landmark. I confess, Sir, I cannot divine any mode of escape from the dilemma in which the sticklers for this unreasonable claim are placed--either to recede from what is palpably an unjust pretence, or to stamp Washington, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Jay as the most consummate knaves, adopting a loose phraseology to escape at a future time from the effects of their own treaty. To the latter alternative no Englishman acquainted with the history of Washington's glorious, and--except in one point, too stern an adherence to what he conceived to be justice-unblemished career, will ever be disposed to accede.
"The next point on which I engaged to remark was the probable reason which induced Lord Shelburne to cede a country which the Indians had possessed, and thereby drive so many tribes from their homes, and the tombs of their ancestors, to them a heavier blow than any other That the Indians did possess it, is proved not only by the statement in the Imperial Parliament, but also by the fact of sundry raids occasionally made by them from this tract upon the settlers of Nova Scotia, known to be at that time altogether confined to the region about Pasamaquoddy Bay, which now forms the southern part of New Brunswick.
"Now the clause which I have quoted above I conceive to afford that probable reason. The governors, &c. are restricted not to grant warrants of survey on any pretence 'beyond the heads and sources of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic.' Though I believe it admits a question whether any patents were passed extending the British settlements beyond the 45th degree of north latitude, for the old geographers carry the line along that degree to the Bay of Pasamaquoddy, and bound Massachusetts on the west by New Hampshire--though the description of General Arnold's march is a traverse of a wild wilderness, wherein 'human face divine' seems never to have been seen, yet this clause most decidedly leaves a discretion in the Governor of Massachusetts, when population required it, to extend his surveys and his patents as far north as the heads of those rivers which fall into the Atlantic. The district now called Maine, then Penobscot, is exactly a tract so situated, and, whatever might have been the original intentions of the Crown as regarded the Indians within this tract, the discretion so given formed a just and proper reason, when peace was to be established, why the territory so described should be ceded to the United States, and that very cession of a country so circumstanced affords the strongest possible confirmation that 'the heads and sources of the rivers falling into the Atlantic' literally were the limits referred to in 1783, and that no just claim can be made out in the face of this evidence to a territory in which, by the confession of General Arnold's march, the rivers fall 'the contrary way.' I shall not trouble you further. A war founded on unjust aggression can never expect God's blessing upon it. A calm produced by concession to unjust aggression can never end in lasting peace.
"'If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter, for he that is higher than the highest regardeth." Eccles. v. 8.
I remain, Sir, your obedient servant.
W.J.D. Waddilove.
"_Beacon Grange, April 28._"
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After Great Britain had acknowledged the independence of the several States, if the true spirit of this treaty were not to be strictly adhered to, it must have been obvious at the time, that it would be impossible for her to defend her remaining North American possessions; much less be able at any future period to make them sufficiently powerful to cope with the United States. But surely with the Treaty, and the various documents alluded to by Mr. Waddilove, in their hands, a commission, composed of able military men, sent out to that part of the world, could so well define the boundary between the two countries, as to leave no further doubts upon the minds of our Government, as to the line of conduct to be with justice pursued towards the United States and also towards our North American possessions; and they would then be enabled also to act with that firmness and decision with which these republicans should be met in all our dealings with them. The idea of umpires ought not for a moment be tolerated--the treaty and the features of the country render them quite unnecessary. Without having any ambitious views, Great Britain evidently wants this disputed territory, if it were only for the security of her North American Provinces; and it might reasonably be expected that this point could be amicably arranged, if there is a sincere wish for peace, and any thing like good will towards us to be found in the United States. If therefore we are provoked to war, by simply working on both flanks of any body of troops hazarded by the States into the country alluded to, their fate may be pretty easily guessed or calculated upon; for we could have no difficulty in acting at once from Quebec, Halifax, &c.; and if hereafter emigration from the United Kingdom were duly and liberally encouraged, as it should be, into a country rightfully belonging to the British Empire, abounding in small lakes and fine rivers, we might soon begin to talk not only of our valuable but also of our powerful American colonies; especially if convicts, in place of being all sent to New Holland, were employed to make good roads to connect the countries lying between the Atlantic and the St. Lawrence. These convicts should never upon any account be allowed to become settlers.
Having so far entered upon the subject, I think I ought to proceed in what I hope may be useful; and whilst I speak from observations made upon the spot, I must take the liberty of reminding the reader that during the period occupied by "improvements" in the States; the Canadas, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, &c., though somewhat retarded by late events, have not been standing still.
The country behind the line running from Lake St. Francis, to Lake Memphremagog, ought as soon as possible to be secured from sudden incursions, by a few respectable forts, or strong redoubts; capable of affording good cover for a certain number of cavalry and infantry; situations for which, upon or close to the present frontier, can be found, so that that entrance into Lower Canada may be covered. The line mentioned being taken as a base, and Isle aux Noix, Ash Island, and the part of the frontier extending along from the La Colle river towards Lake St. Francis being judiciously protected, the Lower Province would thus be secured from the inroads of brigands from the adjoining States; and if they, or if even an army should venture forward in that direction, it would not be quite easy for them to return; especially if the redoubts I speak of, are by the labour of soldiers made strong enough to require a week's regular siege for their capture, and which might be scientifically thrown up at no great expense. They should, however, be connected with each other by military roads; the making of which, as well as constructing the redoubts, would be excellent practice for the regular troops I am so anxious to have called out; who could never be better employed, (for habits of labour are essential to them,) than in works of this kind; and I hope I have already shown, that veterans are quite unfit for the duties of our North American frontiers.
The thick, in some places, almost impassable woods and swamps, extending often for a considerable distance along the frontier line of the Lower Province, render it difficult to make arrangements to oppose inroads from the States; for it is impossible to calculate upon the direction in which an enemy's force may make its appearance, and in order to watch all the roads or approaches, especially in winter, our troops must necessarily be too much scattered over the country; for owing to want of cover, they cannot be kept in sufficient bodies, but so far to the rear as to expose the advanced posts to be overpowered and cut off.
The following documents, which appear to be official, will show clearly, that I have not without good reason made the foregoing observations respecting the state of our affairs with the United States, and which call for energetic measures on our part.
"MILITARY AND NAVAL PREPARATIONS ON OUR NORTHERN FRONTIERS.
"The Chair submitted the following message from the President of the United States:--
"TO THE SENATE.
"I communicate to the Senate, in compliance with their resolution of the 12th instant, a report from the Secretary of War, containing information on the subject of that resolution.
"M. Van Buren.
"_Washington, March 28._"
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"_War Department, March 27._
"Sir,--The resolution of the Senate of the 12th inst. 'That the President of the United States be requested to communicate to the Senate, if in his judgment compatible with the public interest, any information which may be in the possession of the Government, or which can be conveniently obtained, of the military and naval preparations of the British authorities on the northern frontiers of the United States, from Lake Superior to the Atlantic Ocean, designating the permanent from the temporary and field works, and particularly noting those which are within the claimed limits of the United States,' having been referred by you to this department, it was immediately referred to Major-General Scott, and other officers who have been stationed on the frontier referred to, for such information on the subject as they possessed, and could readily procure; and an examination is now in progress for such as may be contained in the files of the department. General Scott is the only officer yet heard from, and a copy of his report is herewith submitted, together with a copy of that to which he refers, made upon the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant. As soon as the other officers who have been called upon are heard from, and the examination of the files of the department is completed, any further information which may be thus acquired will be immediately laid before you.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J.R. Poinsett.
"_To the President of the United States._"
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"_Head Quarters, Eastern Division, Elizabethtown, New Jersey, March 23, 1840._
"Sir,--I have received from your office, copies of two resolutions, passed respectively, the 12th and 9th instant, one by the Senate, and the other by the House of Representatives; and I am asked for 'any information on the subject of both, or either of the resolutions, that may be in [my] possession.'
"In respect to the naval force recently maintained upon the American lakes by Great Britain, I have just had the honour to report to the Secretary of War, by whom the resolution of the House of Representatives (of the 9th instant) was directly referred to me.
"I now confine myself to the Senate's resolution, respecting 'military (I omit naval) preparations of the British authorities on the northern frontiers of the United States, from Lake Superior to the Atlantic Ocean, distinguishing the permanent from the temporary and field works, and particularly noting those which are within the claimed limits of the United States.'
"I will here remark, that however well my duties have made me acquainted with the greater part of the line in question, I have paid but slight attention to the forts and barracks erected by the British authorities near the borders of Maine, above Fredericton, in New Brunswick, or in Upper Canada, above Cornwall, being of the fixed opinion which need not here be developed, that all such structures would be of little or no military value to either of the parties in the event of a new war between the United States and Great Britain.
"I was last summer at the foot of Lake Superior, and neither saw nor heard of any British fort or barrack on the St. Mary's River, the outlet of that lake.
"Between Lakes Huron and Erie the British have three sets of barracks--one at Windsor, opposite to Detroit; one at Sandwich, a little lower down; and the third at Malden, 18 miles from the first; all built of sawed logs, strengthened by block-houses, loopholes, &c. Malden has been a military post, with slight defences. These have been recently strengthened. The works at Sandwich and Windsor have also, I think, been erected within the last six or eight months.
"Near the mouth of the Niagara the British have two small forts--George and Messisanga. Both existed during the last war. The latter may be termed a permanent work. Slight barracks have been erected within the last two years on the same side, near the Falls, and at Chippawa, with breast works at the latter place; but nothing, I believe, above the works first named, on the Niagara, which can be termed a fort.
"Since the commencement of the recent troubles in the Canadas, and (consequent thereupon) within our limits, Fort William Henry, at Kingston, and Fort Wellington (opposite Ogdensburg old works,) have both been strengthened within themselves, besides the addition of dependencies. These forts may be called permanent.
"On the St. Lawrence, below Prescott, and confronting our territory, I know of no other military post; 12 miles above, at Brockville, there may be temporary barracks and breastworks. I know that of late Brockville has been a military station.
"In the system of defences on the approaches to Montreal, the Isle Aux Noix, a few miles below our line, and in the outlet of Lake Champlain, stands at the head. This island contains within itself a system of permanent works of great strength. On them the British Government has, from time to time, since the peace of 1815, expended much skill and labour.
"Odletown, near our line, on the western side of Lake Champlain, has been a station for a body of Canadian militia for two years, to guard the neighbourhood from refugee incendiarism from our side. I think that barracks have been erected there for the accommodation of those troops, and also at a station, with the like object, near Alburgh, in Vermont.
"It is believed that there are no important British forts or extensive British barracks, on our borders, from Vermont to Maine.
"In respect to such structures on the disputed territory, Governor Fairfield's published letters contain fuller information than has reached me through any other channel. I have heard of no new military preparations by the British authorities on the St Croix or Pasamaquoddy Bay.
"Among such preparations, perhaps I ought not to omit the fact that Great Britain, besides numerous corps of well-organized and well instructed militia, has at this time within her North American provinces more than 20,000 of her best regular troops. The whole of those forces might be brought to the verge of our territory in a few days. Two-thirds of that regular force has arrived out since the spring of 1838.
"I remain, Sir, with great respect,
"Your most obedient servant,
"Winfield Scott.
"_Brigadier General R. Jones, Adjutant-General United States Army._"
BRITISH ARMED VESSELS ON THE LAKES.
"The papers on this subject submitted to Congress by the President, in compliance with a resolution of the House, show that at the close of navigation last fall, two steamers (owned or hired by the British authorities), one schooner, and a number of barges, were employed on Lake Ontario, and the river St. Lawrence, as a security against an apprehended renewal of the troubles of the preceding year; and from the annexed communication of Mr. Forsyth, there is reason to expect that even this small force, or at least a part of it, will be soon withdrawn."
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"_Department of State, Washington, March 13._
"The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, requesting the President to communicate to that body, 'if compatible with the public service, whether the Government of Great Britain have expressed to the Government of the United States a desire to annul the arrangements entered into between the two Governments in the month of April, 1817, respecting the naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes; and that, if said arrangements be not annulled, whether there has been any violation of the same by the authorities of Great Britain,' has the honour to report to the President a copy of the only communication on file in this department on the subject to which the resolution refers. Prior to the date of that communication, the Secretary of State, in an interview invited for that purpose, called Mr. Fox's attention to the disregard by Her Majesty's colonial authorities of the conventional arrangement between the two countries, as to the extent of naval armaments upon the lakes.
"In the autumn of the past year the Secretary of State made known verbally to Mr. Fox, that the cause assigned in his note no longer existing, the President expected that the British armament upon the lakes would be placed upon the footing prescribed by the convention. Mr. Fox engaged to communicate without delay to his Government the substance of the conversation between them: and expressed his own conviction, that if the winter then ensuing passed without renewed attempts to disturb the tranquillity of the Canadas, there could be no sufficient motive for either Government maintaining a force beyond that authorized by the convention of 1817.
"All of which is respectfully submitted.
"JOHN FORSYTH.
"_To the President of the United States._"
The instructions which were deemed expedient to be given to Colonel Sir William Williams of the 13th Regiment, commanding Isle aux Noix and its dependencies in 1814, after we lost the superiority on Lake Champlain, will clearly show that what I have proposed should be seriously considered; and also support my opinion of the necessity of establishing the fortresses I have mentioned, in which troops could at all times be comfortably quartered; indeed, with such neighbours as the Americans, our possessions can never be safe from insult without them.
"_St John's, November 9, 1814._
"SIR,
"I am commanded by Major-General Brisbane to transmit, for your guidance, the following instructions, which are to be acted upon as far as circumstances will permit, in case of an attack upon any of the advanced posts; not that the Major-General has reason to conclude the enemy have such an object in view; but the confusion always arising out of unexpected occurrences in time of war, must as far as possible be avoided or guarded against; and you ought also to be aware of his intentions in case of such events happening.
"1st. The enemy appearing in force in the direction of Caldwell's Manor, coming from Missisquoi Bay.
"It is not probable that the enemy would appear in that direction with any other intention, but for a demonstration, unless he came with the determination of attacking Isle aux Noix, in which case it is to be expected he will bring with him, if before the frost sets in, the means of water conveyance on the south river, or if afterwards, means of transport for heavy guns on the ice. His intentions, therefore, in these respects can be easily ascertained. If the former should be his object, a force must be detached into the Manor, or the concessions, (say five companies under a field-officer) to keep him in check, and to prevent the country from being over-run and plundered; this may in a great measure be effected by the choice of favourable situations or positions, but no general affair must be permitted without the consent of the Major-General.
"Whilst the enemy might be thus manœuvring, a real attack would likely take place on the line of the La Colle and Ash Island. Such an attack is not improbable, although the enemy could have no other object in view but to beat up our cantonments, and cause the troops, in some measure, to take the field exposed to the inclemency of the season, and might be effected with only a small part of his force. The whole of the posts upon that line must be ordered to hold out till reinforcements can arrive from this place; for until then it would not be safe to detach but small parties from the garrison of Isle aux Noix. A force from L'Acadie could only be brought up in support of the bridge. La Colle Mill and its dependencies must look to Isle aux Noix alone for assistance.
"2ndly, If the enemy should come with the intention of attacking Isle aux Noix with heavy guns, a certain time is requisite for him to make his arrangements; and measures could be taken on our part to frustrate his views.
"For some time longer, it is in the enemy's power to make an attack by means of his fleet, upon Ash Island and La Colle, in conjunction with a force acting in Caldwell's Manor; the necessity therefore, of keeping the guns in battery there, as long as possible, even till the frost sets in, must be obvious.