Part 34

This question is difficult. The ancient charters, however nearly they may go to telling us that the donee will do justice within his territory, never go quite that length. There is, however, a book granted by Cenwulf of Mercia in 816 to the church of Worcester which adds to the clause of immunity these words--'and if a wicked man be three times captured in open crime, let him be delivered up at the king's tún (_vicum regalem_)[978].' This seems to tell us that only the worst offenders will be delivered up to the royal or national officers and to imply that the bishop may do justice upon all others. Then there are two books in favour of the church of Abingdon, the one granted by Cenwulf in 821, the other by Egbert in 835, which, though their language is very obscure, seem to tell us that if one of the 'men of God' (by which phrase are meant the 'vassals' of the church of Abingdon) be accused of any crime, the overseer of the church may swear away the charge by his own oath, and that, if he dare not swear, he may pay the _ángild_ to the plaintiff and, this done, will have justice over the offender[979]. Another ancient book suggests that the lord of an immunity, when he had to pay the _ángild_ for one of his men, could not be forced to cross the boundary of his land. On that boundary some mixed tribunal would meet consisting partly of his men and partly of outsiders[980]. Then, again, there are the books which either give the lord the _furis comprehensio_ or else exempt his land from the _furis comprehensio_. Now when a writ of Cnut or Edward the Confessor tells us that a lord is to have _infangennethef_ we do not doubt that he is to have the right which bore that name in later days, the right to hold a court for and to hang thieves who are caught in seisin of the stolen goods, and to the _furis comprehensio_ of the older books we can hardly give another meaning. And the apparent equivalence of the two phrases 'You shall hold this land with thief-catching' and 'You shall hold this land free of thief-catching' illustrates our argument that to exempt land from public or national justice is to create private or seignorial justice[981]. We may see this in later days; a lord who holds land 'free and quit of frankpledge' assumes the right to hold a view of frankpledge, and we can not say that he is wrong in so doing[982].

[The Taunton book.]

Lastly, in a book of fairly good repute we may read of the grand liberties with which in 904 King Edward endowed the Bishop of Winchester's large estate at Taunton--that estate which in subsequent centuries was to become the classical example of colossal manors. 'I have,' says the king, 'granted to Christ that the men of the bishop, noble as well as non-noble, living on the said land shall be worthy of the same right that is enjoyed by those who dwell on the demesnes of the crown, and that jurisdiction in all secular causes shall be exercised to the use of the bishops in the same manner as that in which jurisdiction is exercised in matters pertaining to the king[983].' This is the more important because it suggests, what like enough is true, that the king himself is one of the first of all 'immunists'; his own estates, the ancient demesne of the crown, already stand outside the national system of finance, justice and police[984].

[The immunist and the wite.]

But so careful must we be in drawing inferences from singular instances, so wary of forgeries, that in the end we can not dispense with arguments which rest rather upon probabilities than upon recorded facts. It is conceded that the 'immunist' (it is convenient to borrow a term that French writers have coined) is entitled to many of the fines and forfeitures that arise from offences committed within his territory. Is it, we must ask, probable that any ealdorman or sheriff will be at pains to exact and collect these fines and forfeitures for the immunist's benefit? Now it is true that in later days a few lords enjoyed a comparatively rare franchise known as _amerciamenta hominum_. When their men were amerced in the king's court the amercements were paid into the exchequer, and then the lord would petition to have them paid out to him[985]. But this was an uncommon and an exalted franchise. As a general rule, the person in whose name a court is held, be he king or lord, gets the profits of the court. No one in the middle ages does justice for nothing, and in the ninth century the days when national officers would be paid by salary were far distant. When the king declares that nothing is to 'go out' of the immunist's lands 'by way of wite,' then to our thinking he declares that, save in exceptional cases, he and his officers will neither meddle nor make with offences that are committed within that territory. Again, though we may reject this charter and that, there can be little doubt that before the end of the tenth century, the territory held by a church sometimes coincided with a jurisdictional district, with a hundred or group of hundreds. When this was so, and the church enjoyed a full immunity, it was almost of necessity the lord of the court as well as the lord of the land. Why should the sheriff hold that court, why should he appoint a bailiff for that hundred, if never thereout could he get one penny for his own or the king's use?

[Justice and jurisdiction.]

We must once more remember that even in the days of full grown feudalism the right to hold a court was after all rather a fiscal than a jurisdictional right. We call it jurisdictional, but still, at least normally, the lord was, neither in his own person, nor yet in the person of his steward, the judge of the court[986]. His right was not in strictness a right _ius dicendi_, for the suitors made the judgments. When analysed it was a right to preside over a court and to take its profits. Very easy therefore is the transition from a right to 'wites' to such 'jurisdiction' as the feudal lord enjoys. When once it is established that all the fines of a hundred court are to go to a bishop, that no sheriff or bailiff will get anything by going to hold that court, then the court already is 'in the bishop's hands.'

[The Frankish immunity.]

This, however, can not be treated as a merely English question. Parallel to the English _fréols-bóc_ runs the Frankish _carta immunitatis_, and, if the former has given rise to the question whether it conceded jurisdictional rights, the latter has given rise, not merely to the same question, but to much learned controversy. Now it is highly probable that the English 'immunity' is not independent of the Merovingian 'immunity'; still the terms of the former do not seem to have been copied from those of the latter, and it is a significant fact that two different formulas should be equally open to the blame of not deciding just that most important question which according to our ideas they ought to decide. The Frankish formula is addressed by the king to his subordinates and declares that no public officer (_nullus iudex publicus_) is to enter the land of the immunist for the purpose of hearing causes, levying _freda_ (which answer to our 'wites'), making distresses or exacting pledges; but, like our English formula, it says no word of any court to be held or any jurisdiction to be exercised by the immunist. It would be impertinent to give here any lengthy account of the various opinions about this matter that have been held by foreign scholars, still more impertinent to pronounce any judgment upon them, but even those writers who seem most inclined to minimize the scope of the immunity are forced to admit that, as a mere matter of fact, the immunist by virtue of his immunity is enabled to hold a court for his territory. That seignorial courts were growing up even in the Merovingian time, that such courts there were even in the sixth century, there seems little or no doubt, even though it be denied that they were the creatures of these clauses of immunity. On the whole, to whichever side of the channel we look, we seem compelled, alike by the words of the charters and by the controversies which they have occasioned, to believe that in the eyes of the kings and the immunists seignorial jurisdiction, that right to hold a court which seems to us so strange a right, was not a matter of the first importance, not worth conceding, not worth denying. Who is to have the profits of justice?--that is a momentous question. But if it be decided that they are to go to the bishop, then the king will have no further care for them:--the bishop may and must get them for himself. As to the 'justiciables,' it may well be that they are very indifferent about the matter, not impossible that the burden of suit will be alleviated if the lord establishes a court of his own, or if an old court passes into his hands[987].

[Seignorial and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.]

One other question should be raised, even if we can find for it no certain answer. Is not seignorial jurisdiction very closely connected at its root with ecclesiastical jurisdiction? Of course in more recent times the two are thoroughly distinct from each other. The bishop, besides being a spiritual judge, will be a feudal lord with many manorial courts and many chartered franchises; but any court that he holds as a lord will have nothing to do with the court that he holds as a bishop. The constitution and procedure of the one will differ at every point from the constitution and procedure of the other. The one belongs to the temporal order and is subject to the king's court, the other belongs to the spiritual order and is in no sense below the royal tribunal. Thus it is when feudal law and canon law have reached their full stature. But even from the twelfth century we may get a hint that the distinction has not always been so sharply marked. We may read how in Henry I.'s day the Bishop of Bath 'with his friends and barons' heard a cause in which Modbert claimed lands that were held by the monks of Bath. The proceedings took place under a royal writ and ought, we should say, to have been in all respects temporal proceedings; but in framing the judgment two bishops, three archdeacons and several 'clerks and chaplains' took the leading part, while the lay tenants of the bishop stood by as witnesses[988]. In this context we must remember that in the twelfth century the clergy were contending that land given to a church in frankalmoin is outside the sphere of secular justice[989], and, while this contention was being urged, it was easily possible that a bishop should hold an amphibious court:--Over the claim that Modbert is making the bishop has jurisdiction, either because the monks are holding the land of him as his tenants, or because that land has been given to God and the saints by an ancient book which denounced the anathema against all who should violate it. Going back yet further, we see, at all events in France, that the claim of the clergy to hold their lands and seignories exempt from all temporal jurisdiction has been intimately connected with the claim of the clergy that they themselves need not answer before a lay tribunal. A learned man has said that the exemption of the clergy from the temporal courts was 'the first step towards the feudalization of justice[990].' If our English documents do not make this plain, if the relations between church and state were more harmonious in England than elsewhere (and because more harmonious therefore more indefinite and to the modern student more perplexing), still we can see that the main idea of the English _fréols-bóc_ is the liberation of a tract of ground from all secular troubles, all temporal burdens, all earthly service. The land is dedicated to God and the saints, or, if it is not dedicated in the strictest sense, it is given for God's sake and the welfare of the donor's soul; it is within the ban of the church. And so the men who sit upon the land of the church of Abingdon, laymen though they be, are _homines Dei_, the men of God[991]. As such, should they not be subject to the jurisdiction of the church?

[Criminal justice of the Church.]

At this point we may profitably remember that the jurisdiction which in later days appears as the 'criminal jurisdiction' of ecclesiastical tribunals (the jurisdiction which, for example, those tribunals exercise when they chastise a man for incest, fornication or perjury) was but slowly disengaged from the general mass of penal jurisdiction that was wielded by moots in which the bishop occupied a prominent seat. Moreover, the bishop's justice did not escape that fiscal taint which pervaded the whole system of criminal law. As in some cases the king is entitled to a _wite_, so in others the _wite_ falls to the bishop. For instance, we see traces of a rude _concordat_, which, when incest or adultery is committed, subjects the woman to the bishop, the man to the king[992]; and then from Domesday Book we learn that in the borough of Lewes the upshot of this partition is that the king will get 8_s._ 4_d._ from the man while the adulteress pays a like sum to the archbishop of Canterbury[993]. And so ecclesiastical jurisdiction becomes a source of income, a matter to be fought for and bargained for. The monks of Battle will claim that within the _banlieu_ of their abbey all the 'forfeitures of Christianity' belong to them and not to the bishop of Chichester[994]. What is more, they will connect their claim to purely temporal justice with their possession of ordeal pits, and here we may see another link between the hundred-moots and the churches[995]. The churches have made money out of the ordeal. Long after the English prelates had been forbidden to hold spiritual pleas in the hundred courts, Alexander III. was compelled to speak sharply to the archbishop of Canterbury touching the conduct of archdeacons who exacted thirty pence from every man or woman who went to the fire or the water for purgation[996].

[Antiquity of seignorial courts.]

No doubt the theory to which we have been led implies that in the eighth or even in the seventh century, there were in England 'immunists' who had jurisdiction within their territories, and further it implies that a royal grant of land in the ninth and tenth centuries generally included, and this as a matter of 'common form,' a grant of jurisdiction. We cannot see either in the history of England or in the history of the Frankish Empire any reason why we should shrink from these conclusions. Further, it must be admitted that if the clause of immunity conveys, or permits the growth of, seignorial jurisdiction, this jurisdiction is of an exalted kind, for no causes are excepted out of it, unless it be by the words about the _ángild_, and even those words drop out from the charters in course of time. Those words about the _ángild_ imply, to our thinking, that the immunist will have jurisdiction over any dispute which arises between two men of the enfranchised territory, and also that if an action against one of these men be brought by a 'foreigner' in a court outside the precinct, the immunist can obtain 'cognizance' of the action by appearing in that court and paying the _ángild_. When the words about the _ángild_ disappear, this means that the immunist is obtaining a yet further measure of 'liberty':--whenever one of his men is sued he can 'crave his court' and need not, as a condition for obtaining it, offer to pay what is due to the plaintiff. The highest criminal jurisdiction was probably excepted from the grant. Being a grant of wites, it will not extend to the 'bootless' the 'unemendable' crimes. But Cnut's attempt to save for himself certain pleas of the crown looks to us like the effort of a strong king to recover what his predecessors have been losing[997]. And then Cnut himself and the Confessor,--the latter with reckless liberality--expressly grant to the churches just those very reserved pleas of the crown. The result is that the well endowed immunist of St. Edward's day has jurisdiction as high as that which any palatine earl of after ages enjoyed. No crime, except possibly some direct attack upon the king's person, property or retainers, was too high for him. It is the reconstruction of criminal justice in Henry II.'s time, the new learning of felonies, the introduction of the novel and royal procedure of indictment, that reduce the immunist's powers and leave him with nothing better than an unintelligible list of obsolete words[998]. In this matter of seignorial justice England had little to learn from Normandy. On the contrary, the Norman counts and barons were eager to secure the uncouth phrases which gave to the English immunist his justice, 'haute, moyenne et basse justice.'

[Sidenote: Justice, vassalage and tenure.]

Our next question must be whether in the days before the Conquest a franchise or immunity was the only root of private jurisdiction: in other words, whether any jurisdiction was implied in the mere relation between lord and man or between lord and tenant. This also is a question which will hardly be finally answered if regard be had only to the English documents. For France it is the question whether the _senior_, as such, has jurisdiction over his _vassus_, or again, whether he has jurisdiction over his _vassus_ if, as is usually the case in the Carlovingian age, the _vassus_ holds a _beneficium_ given to him by his _senior_. The English dooms which deal with what we may call the justiciary relationship between lord and man closely resemble in many respects the Frankish capitularies which touch the same subject; both sets of documents seem to evade the simple question that we put to them. But as regards the continent it may here be enough to say that, though there have been many debates, the current of learning seems to have set decidedly in favour of the doctrine that neither in Merovingian nor yet in Carlovingian times had the _senior_, unless he was an immunist, a jurisdiction over his men. Such a jurisdiction has not been developed when the midnight hides everything from our view. When the morning comes, feudal justice stands revealed, though nowhere perhaps is it governed by that simple principle that ultimately prevailed in England, namely, that any and every lord, no matter his personal rank or the rank of his tenement, has civil justice over his tenants.

[The lord's duty when his man is accused.]

The possibility of debate about this matter is afforded by texts of an earlier age, which at times seem to speak of the lord as 'doing justice' when a charge is brought against any of his men[999]. Our English run parallel with the Frankish texts. The state in its organization of justice and police does not treat the contract between man and lord, between _senior_ and _vassus_, as a matter of indifference, still less as a danger to society. We must not think of feudalism or vassalism as of something which from the very first is anti-national and anarchic. In its earliest stages it is fostered by the state, by the king, by national law. The state demands that the lordless man of whom no right can be had shall have a lord[1000]. It makes the lord responsible for the appearance of his men in court to answer accusations[1001]. It is not unlikely that the whole system of frankpledge grows out of this requirement. In some instances the state may go further; it may treat the lord, not merely as bound to produce his man, but as responsible for his man's evil deeds. But, at all events, any one who has a charge to make against a lord's man must in the first instance demand justice of the lord. If without making such a demand, making it repeatedly, he brings the charge before the king, he must pay the same fine that the lord would have paid had he been guilty of a default of justice[1002]. 'Of a default of justice' we say and are compelled to say. It is phrases such as this that have occasioned controversy. To an ear attuned to the language of feudalism they seem to imply a seignorial court in which the lord 'does justice' or 'holds full right' to the demandant. But to all appearance they have gradually changed their meaning. Originally a lord 'does right' to the demandant by producing in a public court the man against whom the claim is urged; or he does it by satisfying the claim, and in that case he seems entitled to exact from his man, not merely a sum which will compensate the outlay, but also the 'wite' or fine which in another case would have gone to the king or some national officer. He has thus 'done justice' and may have the usual profit that comes of doing justice. Probably we ought to distinguish between a laxer and a stricter measure of responsibility, between the lord's responsibility for his men in general and his responsibility for such of his men as form his _familia_, in the language of later days his _mainpast_; but our texts do not lay much stress upon this distinction, and, as a matter of remote history, the relation between lord and man may grow out of the relation between the head of a household and the members of it[1003].

[Duty of the lord.]

At any rate, in numberless cases the law begins to interpose a third person, namely, the wrong-doer's lord, between the wrong-doer and the wronged: it is to this lord that the claimant should in the first instance address himself. The lord who does his duty by the king and the nation is he who keeps a tight hold on his men, who chooses them carefully, who dismisses them if they are bad subjects, who 'does justice' and 'holds full right' if any of them be accused. Then, on the other hand, he has the right and duty of 'warranting' his men. If, as will often happen, the bond between a lord and his man is complicated with the bond between landlord and tenant, then, as in later days, if the tenant's title be impeached, he will vouch his lord to warranty and the lord will defend the action. But, besides this, within limits that are not well defined, the lord is the man's _defensor_ or _tutor_[1004]. It is expected of him by morality, if not by law, that he will take upon himself the responsibility for his man's acts if they be not open crimes. He must stand by his men and see them through all trouble[1005].

[The state requires the lord to 'do right.']