Part v

. of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the ιδεαι of Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato abandoned ethics for physics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas, pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing but virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name _good_ to nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes, some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value, and called them _preferred_ to the second a negative value and called them _rejected_, to the third no value whatever--mere verbal alterations on the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms _right action_ and _sin_ belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate

## action (_officium_) and an inappropriate, which concerned things

_preferred_ and things _rejected_ (37). He made _all_ virtue reside in the reason, and considered not the _practice_ but the mere _possession_ of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40). Sensations (_visa_) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a sensation he called it _Knowledge_, if otherwise, _Ignorance_ (41). _Perception_, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them of the reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect wisdom (42).

§33. _Haec erat illis forma_: so Madv. _Em._ 118 for MSS. _prima_, comparing _formulam_ in 17, also _D.F._ IV. 19, V. 9, _T.D._ III. 38, to which add _Ac._ I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the MSS. reading and supply _pars_, as usual. His power of _supplying_ is unlimited. There is a curious similarity between the difficulties involved in the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here. _Immutationes_: so Dav. for _disputationes_, approved by Madv. _Em._ 119 who remarks that the phrase _disputationes philosophiae_ would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost certain by _mutavit_ in 40, _commutatio_ in 42, and _De Leg._ I. 38. Halm's odd em. _dissupationes_, so much admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's _Philologus_, needs support, which it certainly does not receive from the one passage Halm quotes, _De Or._ III. 207. _Et recte_: for the _et_ cf. _et merito_, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. _Auctoritas_: "system". _Inquit_: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the omission of _igitur_ after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin here. To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno opere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer. feebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is copying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and evidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's resumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought to begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded. _Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact that he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the strong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi nisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of the relation in which Plato's ιδεαι stand to his notion of the deity. _Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His real name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf. _loquendi nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf. _Orat._ 161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V. 12 sq., _T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed very widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him transmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of him. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in 22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of ευδαιμονιαν. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_ but does not elsewhere employ them.

§34. _Strato_: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for Diog. V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven ethical works, while Stob. II. 6, 4 quotes his definition of the αγαθον. _Diligenter ... tuebantur_: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic, cf. Diog. Laert. IV. 18, _Ac._ II. 131, _D.F._ II. 34, and R. and P. _Congregati_: "_all_ in the Academic fold," cf. _Lael._ 69, _in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege_. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. _Polemonem ... Zeno et Arcesilas_: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many teachers (Diog. VII. 2, 3), while he is not mentioned by Diog. at all among the teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is that we have a mere theory, which accounts for the split of Stoicism from Academicism by the rivalry of two fellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 5, συμφοιτωντες παρα Πολεμωνι εφιλο τιμηθησαν. Dates are against the theory, see Zeller 500.

§35. _Anteiret aetate_: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350, though the dates are uncertain. _Dissereret_: was a deep reasoner. Bentl. missing the meaning conj. _definiret_. _Peracute moveretur_: Bentl. _partiretur_; this with _definiret_ above well illustrates his licence in emendations. Halm ought not to have doubted the soundness of the text, the words refer not to the emotional, but to the intellectual side of Zeno's nature. The very expression occurs _Ad Fam._ XV. 21, 4, see other close parallels in n. on II. 37. _Nervos ... inciderit_: same metaphor in _Philipp._ XII. 8, cf. also _T.D._ II. 27 _nervos virtutis elidere_, III. 83 _stirpis aegritudinis elidere_. (In both these passages Madv. _Em. Liv._ 135 reads _elegere_ for _elidere_, I cannot believe that he is right). Plato uses νευρα εκτεμνειν metaphorically. Notice _inciderit_ but _poneret_. There is no need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the sequence is not uncommon in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ III. 33. _Omnia, quae_: MSS. _quaeque_, which edd. used to take for _quaecunque_. Cf. Goerenz's statement "_negari omnino nequit hac vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri_" with Madvig's utter refutation in the sixth Excursus to his _D.F._ _Solum et unum bonum_: for the Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R. and P. and Zeller for himself. I can only treat such points as are involved in the special difficulties of the _Academica_.

§36. _Cetera_: Stoic αδιαφορα, the presence or absence of which cannot affect happiness. The Stoics loudly protested against their being called either _bona_ or _mala_, and this question was one of the great battle grounds of the later Greek philosophy. _Secundum naturam ... contraria_: Gr. κατα φυσιν, παρα φυσιν. _His ipsis ... numerabat_: I see no reason for placing this sentence after the words _quae minoris_ below (with Christ) or for suspecting its genuineness (with Halm). The word _media_ is the Gk. μεσα, which word however is not usually applied to _things_, but to _actions_. _Sumenda_: Gk. ληπτα. _Aestimatione_: αξια, positive value. _Contraque contraria_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ III. 50 feels the need of a word to express απαξια (negative value). (Madv. in his note on that passage coins the word _inaestimatio._) _Ponebat esse_: cf. 19, _M.D.F._ V. 73.

§37. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section the student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller and Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic. appears at first sight to have made the αποπροηγμενα a subdivision of the ληπτα (_sumenda_), the two being utterly different. I admit, with Madv. (_D.F._ III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads _media_ in the place of _sumenda_, must be rejected. Nor can anything be said for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save Cicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could so utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of Stoicism, as to think even for a moment that the αποπροηγμενα formed a branch of the ληπτα. This view of Madvig's is strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in 36 had explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the αδιαφορα, nor is there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the theory any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the intention to speak of the _sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his thought so as to embrace the whole class of αδιαφορα, which he accordingly dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae secundum locum obtinent_, προηγμενα _id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita appellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely pressed, the αποπροηγμενα are made of a subdivision of the προηγμενα, though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention. So if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are made to include both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16 _appeterent_ includes _fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata vita_ is abruptly introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be construed together, and _ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said _coerceri_, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are opposite to these virtues.

I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_ Cic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to talk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and _minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the αξια and απαξια of the Greek, _not_ different degrees of αξια (positive value). That _minor aestimatio_ should mean απαξια need not surprise us when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing this απαξια or negative value in Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on 36; (2) on the strong negative meaning which _minor_ bears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic. means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing απαξια. Stobaeus, in a passage closely resembling ours makes ελαττων αξια equivalent to πολλη απαξια (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly defining αποπροηγμενα as τα ‛ικανην απαξιαν εχοντα (_Adv. Math._ XI. 62--64) again speaks of them as τα μη ‛ικανην εχοντα αξιαν (_Pyrrhon. Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning. Now I contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, τα μη ‛ικανην αξιαν εχοντα. I therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the αδιαφορα, some have αξια while others have απαξια. He may fairly claim to have applied to his words the rule "_re intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus_" (_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. There are difficulties connected with the terms ‛ικανη αξια and ‛ικανη απαξια which are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the _D.F._ quoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_: Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly belonged to the Stoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob. speaks II. 6, 6 of τα μεταξυ αρετης και κακιας. (This does not contradict his words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, αρετης δε και κακιας ουδεν μεταξυ, which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R. and P. 393.) _Recte factum_ = κατορθωμα, _peccatum_ = ‛αμαρτημα, _officium_ = καθηκον (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller 238--248, 268--272). _Servata praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before _servata_, which all edd. since Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_ correspond in Cic., the _que_ is always an afterthought, added in oblivion of the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate _clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._ V. 64.

§38. _Sed quasdam virtutes_: see 20. This passage requires careful construing: after _quasdam virtutes_ not the whole phrase _in ratione esse dicerent_ must be repeated but _dicerent_ merely, since only the _virtutes natura perfectae_, the διανοητικαι αρεται of Arist., could be said to belong to the reason, while the _virtutes more perfectae_ are Aristotle's ηθικαι αρεται. Trans. "but spoke of certain excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be) by habit." _Ea genera virtutum_: both Plato and Arist. roughly divided the nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and Arist. το μεν ‛ως λογον εχον, το δε επιπειθες λογωι); Zeno however asserted the nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, to which he gave the name ‛ηγεμονικον (Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller 248, _D.F._ III. _passim_). When the ‛ηγεμονικον was in a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word ‛εξις, a use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the _Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a ‛εξις, according to the Stoics, but a διαθεσις (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog. VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a ‛εξις, VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 δυο γενη των ανθρωπων ειναι το μεν των σπουδαιων, το δε των φαυλων, και το μεν των σπουδαιων δια παντος του βιου χρησθαι ταις αρεταις, το δε των φαυλων ταις κακιαις. _Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of the _Acad._ appears, should read the plural _perturbationes_, a conj. of Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the abstract; _perturbationes_ below, particular emotions. There is exactly the same transition in _T.D._ III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while _perturbatio_ is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a trans. of Stoic παθεσι, which Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit carere sapientem_: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue (20), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All emotions are reasonless; ‛ηδονη or _laetitia_ for instance is αλογος επαρσις. (_T.D._ Books III. and IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the _T.D._ III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri libidine_.

§39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object; cf. Diog. VII. 111. τα παθη κρισεις ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller 233. For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15, 18. _Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. ακολασια, see Zeller 232. _Quintam naturam_: the πεμπτη ουσια or πεμπτον σωμα of Aristotle, who proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a curious and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. derived _mind_ from this fifth element, though the finest and highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65, _D.F._ IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important note, but he fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind from αιθηρ, which is the very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (σωμα αιθεριον in the _De Coelo_), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred influences at work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully influencing every other sect, and it placed νους εν αιθερι (see Plutarch, qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The notion that νους or ψυχη came from αιθηρ was also fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as αεικινητος in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his mind One from the _Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in _Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._ VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only thing with Aristotle which is αεικινητος in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion is alone perfect and eternal), is the αιθηρ or πεμπτον σωμα, that fiery external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works, to conclude that the αεικινητος ψυχη of Plato came from the αεικινητος αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by saying that the soul as an αρχη κινησεως must be ακινητος, but Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to the outer circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just where Arist. placed his πεμπτον σωμα Any one who will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with the _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the mind in its origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf. _Somn. Scip._ 15) These considerations will be enough to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible for the error, could have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too late. _Sensus_: we seem here to have a remnant of the distinction drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former being αναλογον τω των αστρων στοιχειω (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made no difference, except one of degree, between αιθηρ and πυρ, see Zeller 189, 190. _Ipsam naturam_: πυρ is κατ' εξοχην στοιχειον (Stob. I. 10, 16), and is the first thing generated from the αποιος ‛υλη; from it comes air, from air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136, 137) The fire is λογικον, from it comes the ‛ηγεμονικον of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought. These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics (Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view of sensation and thought see Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34 sq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a connection between the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed from old physical principles such as that of Democritus (ου γαρ εγχωρειν τα ‛ετερα και διαφεροντα πασχειν ‛υπ' αλληλων, qu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7, by R. and P. 43), the same is affirmed loosely of all the old φυσικοι, (Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines γαιαι μεν γαιαν οπωπαμεν, etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though in a different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of thought. _Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see Zeller, pp. 134, 135.

§40. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion that _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu animorum_, but having to explain φαντασια was obliged to break off and resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a very similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis Ciceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44 _e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav. _punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say. Φαντασιαν: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus licet_: the same turn of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc verbum quidem hoc quidem_ probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_ = συγκαταθεσιν. _In nobis positam_: the usual expression for freedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is involuntary (ακουσιον Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 397). _Tironum causa_ I note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the mind as _involuntary,_ while the καταληπτικη φαντασια _compels_ assent (see II. 38). This is, however, only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.

§41. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to the inner citadel of the καταληπτικη φαντασια. _Declarationem_: εναργειαν, a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on II. 17. _Earum rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct information of the _things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole truth lies in its own εναργεια, which requires no corroboration from without. _Comprehendibile_: this form has better MSS. authority than the vulg _comprehensibile_. Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity _Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes _inquam_. Why change? Atticus answers as in 14, 25, 33. Καταληπτον: strictly the _thing_ which emits the _visum_ is said to be καταληπτον, but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_, the sensation and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused. _Comprehensionem_: this word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not the individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use καταληψις for καταληπτικη φαντασια very often. _Quae manu prehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely renamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the term αισθησις to the φαντασια. _Scientiam_: the word επιστημη is used in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or systematised perceptions (καταληψεις or καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι) sometimes also called τεχνη (cf. Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 τεχνην δε ειναι συστημα εκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμνασμενων); (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. _Ut convelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno all καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι were ασφαλεις, αμεταπτωτοι ‛υπο λογου. Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every καταληπτικη φαντασια, instead of carrying with it its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret_: I know nothing like this in the Stoic texts; αμαθια is very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_: δοξα, see Zeller and cf. _Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.

§42. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of επιστημην και δοξαν και την εν μεθοπιαι τουτων καταληψιν. _Soli_: Halm, I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod omnia_: the meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate sensations and combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_. This will appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78 seems to take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of some Gk. word, κριτηριον perhaps, or γνωμων or κανων. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic εννοιαι; Zeller 81--84, R. and P. 367, 368. _Quodque natura_: the omission of _eam_ is strange; Faber supplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms εναπεσφραγισμενη, εναπομεμαγμενη, εντετυπωμενη occur constantly, but generally in relation to φαντασιαι, not to εννοιαι. _Non principia solum_: there seems to be a ref. to those αρχαι της αποδειξεως of Arist. which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all proof. (See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in Bain's _Mental and Moral Science_, now re-published in Grote's _Aristotle._) Zeno's εννοιαι were all this and more. _Reperiuntur_: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_ to _recta_, which however has repeatedly taken place during Varro's exposition, and for which see _M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase _reperire viam_, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm give _aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant. _Aliena_: cf. _alienatos_ _D.F._ III. 18. _A virtute sapientiaque removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur in iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The _firma adsensia_ is opposed to _imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the _sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More information on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes on the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In his constitit_: cf. II. 134.

§§43--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy. Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were carried on by Carneades (46).

§43. _Breviter_: MSS. _et breviter;_ see 37. _Tunc_: rare before a consonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in deference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading defensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_. Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought," etc. The edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_. This is a total mistake; cf. _ait ... putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15, _aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from Cic.

§44. _Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi_: for these words see n. on II. 14. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. 76. _Obscuritate_: a side-blow at _declaratio_ 41. _Confessionem ignorationis_: see 16. Socrates was far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. 74. _Et iam ante Socratem_: MSS. _veluti amantes Socratem;_ Democritus (460--357 B.C.) was really very little older than Socrates (468--399) who died nearly sixty years before him. _Omnis paene veteres_: the statement is audaciously inexact, and is criticised II. 14. None of these were sceptics; for Democritus see my note on II. 73, for Empedocles on II. 74, for Anaxagoras on II. 72. _Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri_: the verbs are all equivalent; cf. _D.F._ III. 15 _equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci ... idem pluribus verbis exponere_. _Angustos sensus_: Cic. is thinking of the famous lines of Empedocles στεινοποι μεν γαρ παλαμαι κ.τ.λ. R. and P. 107. _Brevia curricula vitae_: cf. Empedocles' παυρον δε ζωης αβιου μερος. Is there an allusion in _curricula_ to Lucretius' _lampada vitai tradunt_, etc.? _In profundo_: Dem. εν βυθω, cf. II. 32. The common trans. "well" is weak, "abyss" would suit better. _Institutis_: νομω of Democritus, see R. and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance. _Deinceps omnia_: παντα εφεξης there is no need to read _denique_ for _deinceps_ as Bentl., Halm. _Circumfusa tenebris_: an allusion to the σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., see II. 73. _Dixerunt_: Halm brackets this because of _dixerunt_ above, parts of the verb _dicere_ are however often thus repeated by Cic.

§45. _Ne illud quidem_: cf. 16. _Latere censebat_ Goer. omitted _censebat_ though in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as usual. For the sense II. 122. _Cohibereque_: Gk. επεχειν, which we shall have to explain in the _Lucullus_. _Temeritatem ... turpius_: for these expressions, see II. 66, note. _Praecurrere_: as was the case with the dogmatists. _Paria momenta_: this is undiluted scepticism, and excludes even the possibility of the _probabile_ which Carneades put forward. For the doctrine cf. II. 124, for the expression Euseb. _Praep. Evan._ XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of Arcesilas, ειναι γαρ παντα ακαταληπτα και τους εις εκατερα λογους ισοκρατεις αλληλοις, Sextus _Adv. Math._ IX. 207 ισοσθενεις λογοι; in the latter writer the word ισοσθενεια very frequently occurs in the same sense, e g _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 8 (add _N.D._ I. 10, _rationis momenta_)

§46. _Platonem_: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, Sextus _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 221 τον Πλατωνα οιν ‛οι μεν δογματικον εφασαν ειναι, ‛οι δε απο ητικον, ‛οι δε κατα μεν τι απορητικον, κατα δε τι δογματικον. Stobaeus II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the difficulty; Πλατων πολυφωνος ων, ουχ ‛ως τινες οιονται πολυδοξος. _Exposuisti_: Durand's necessary em., approved by Krische, Halm, etc. for MSS. _exposui_. _Zenone_: see Introd. p. 5.

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NOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.

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