Part 35

[Footnote 220: The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of his being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not, however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sa/m/h.]

[Footnote 221: The /S/ûdra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic matters in the legitimate way, i.e. through the study of the Veda under the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidyâ.]

[Footnote 222: The li@nga contained in the word '/S/ûdra' has no proving power as it occurs in an arthavâda-passage which has no authority if not connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the li@nga in the arthavâda-passage is even directly contradicted by those injunctions which militate against the /S/ûdras' qualification for Vedic matters.]

[Footnote 223: Ha/m/savâkyâd âtmanoznâdara/m/ /s/rutvâ jâna/s/rute/h/ /s/ug utpannety etad eva katha/m/ gamyate yenâsau /s/ûdra/s/abdena sâ/k/yate tatrâha sp/ris/yate /k/eti. Ânanda Giri.]

[Footnote 224: I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of /S/a@nkara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read /k/aitrarathinâmaika/h/). Ânanda Giri expressly explains tasmâd by /k/aitrarathad ity artha/h/.--The text of the Tâ/nd/ya Br. runs: tasmâ/k/ /k/aitrarathînâm eka/h/ kshatrapatir gâyate, and the commentary explains: tasmât kâra/n/âd adyâpi /k/itrava/ms/otpannânâ/m/ madhye eka eva râjâ kshatrapatir balâdhipatir bhavati.--Grammar does not authorise the form /k/ahraratha used in the Sûtra.]

[Footnote 225: The king A/s/vapati receives some Brâhma/n/as as his pupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the general rule.]

[Footnote 226: As the words stand in the original they might be translated as follows (and are so translated by the pûrvapakshin), 'Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the prâ/n/a, there goes forth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.']

[Footnote 227: The stress lies here on the 'as if.' which intimate that the Self does not really think or move.]

FOURTH PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference (i.e. the pradhâna); we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers to what is contained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself); and (that the text) shows.

In the preceding part of this work--as whose topic there has been set forth an enquiry into Brahman--we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1, 2); we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies to the pradhâna also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority for the latter (I, 1, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common purport of all Vedânta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman, and not the pradhâ/n/a, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the Sâ@nkhya again raises an objection which he considers not to have been finally disposed of.

It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no scriptural authority for the pradhâna; for some /s/âkhâs contain expressions which seem to convey the idea of the pradhâna. From this it follows that Kapila and other supreme /ri/shis maintain the doctrine of the pradhâna being the general cause only because it is based on the Veda.--As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages to which the Sâ@nkhyas refer have a different meaning (i.e. do not allude to the pradhâna), all our previous argumentation as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as unsettled. We therefore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving that those passages actually have a different meaning.

The Sâ@nkhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i.e. the pradhâna, is perceived in the text of some /s/âkhâs. We read, for instance, they say, in the Kâ/th/aka (I, 3, 11), 'Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order, the three entities with which we are acquainted from the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, viz. the great principle, the Undeveloped (the pradhâna), and the soul[228]. That by the Undeveloped is meant the pradhâna is to be concluded from the common use of Sm/ri/ti and from the etymological interpretation of which the word admits, the pradhâna being called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It cannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for the pradhâna. And this pradhâna vouched for by Scripture we declare to be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Sm/ri/ti, and ratiocination.

Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the Kâ/th/aka quoted by you intimates by no means the existence of that great principle and that Undeveloped which are known from the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti. We do not recognise there the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, i.e. an independent general cause consisting of three constituting elements; we merely recognise the word 'Undeveloped,' which does not denote any particular determined thing, but may--owing to its etymological meaning, 'that which is not developed, not manifest'--denote anything subtle and difficult to distinguish. The Sâ@nkhyas indeed give to the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to the pradhâna; but then that meaning is valid for their system only, and has no force in the determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does mere equality of position prove equality of being, unless the latter be recognised independently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a horse because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We, moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-matter, that the passage does not refer to the pradhâna the fiction of the Sâ@nkhyas, 'on account of there being referred to that which is contained in the simile of the body.' This means that the body which is mentioned in the simile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We infer this from the general subject-matter of the passage and from the circumstance of nothing else remaining.--The immediately preceding part of the chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so on, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, &c., 'Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Self) is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer.' The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c. are not well controlled enters into sa/m/sâra, while he who has them under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest place of Vish/n/u. The question then arises: What is the end of the journey, the highest place of Vish/n/u? Whereupon the text explains that the highest Self which is higher than the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the journey, the highest place of Vish/n/u. 'Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person. Beyond the Person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest Road.' In this passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus avoid the mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject. The senses, the intellect, and the mind are referred to in both passages under the same names. The objects (in the second passage) are the objects which are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the senses; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known from the scriptural passage representing the senses as grahas, i.e. graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i.e. superior to the grahas (B/ri/ Up. III, 2). The mind (manas) again is superior to the objects, because the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the mind. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects of enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect. Higher than the intellect is the great Self which was represented as the lord of the chariot in the passage, 'Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot.' That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest from the repeated use of the word 'Self;' that the Self is superior to intelligence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is naturally superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately called great as it is the master.--Or else the phrase 'the great Self' may here denote the intellect of the first-born Hira/n/yagarbha which is the basis of all intellects; in accordance with the following Sm/ri/ti-passage it is called mind, the great one; reflection, Brahman; the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest knowledge, consciousness; thought, remembrance[229], and likewise with the following scriptural passage, 'He (Hira/n/ya-garbha) who first creates Brahman and delivers the Vedas to him' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18). The intellect, which in the former passage had been referred to under its common name buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be represented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter explanation of the term 'the great Self,' we must assume that the personal Self which in the simile had been compared to the charioteer is, in the latter passage, included in the highest person (mentioned last); to which there is no objection, since in reality the personal Self and the highest Self are identical.--Thus there remains now the body only which had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore conclude that the text after having enumerated the senses and all the other things mentioned before, in order to point out the highest place, points out by means of the one remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only thing remaining out of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the body. The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the soul's passing through sa/m/sâra and release under the form of a simile in which the body, &c. of the soul--which is affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a body, senses, mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c.--are compared to a chariot, and so on.--In accordance with this the subsequent verse states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vish/n/u ('the Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect'), and after that the next verse declares Yoga to be the means of attaining that cognition. 'A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should keep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet Self.'--That means: The wise man should restrain the activity of the outer organs such as speech, &c., and abide within the mind only; he should further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external objects within intelligence, whose characteristic mark is decision, recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain intelligence within the great Self, i.e. the individual soul or else the fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm Self, i.e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole chapter treats.--If we in this manner review the general context, we perceive that there is no room for the pradhâna imagined by the Sânkhyas.

2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so designated).

It has been asserted, under the preceding Sûtra, that the term 'the Undeveloped' signifies, on account of the general subject-matter and because the body only remains, the body and not the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas.--But here the following doubt arises: How can the word 'undeveloped' appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i.e. that which is developed or manifested?

To this doubt the Sûtra replies that what the term avyakta denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped. The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed 'undeveloped,' but the subtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be called so, and that the term denoting the causal substance is applied to the effect also is a matter of common occurrence; compare, for instance, the phrase 'mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk' (/Ri/g-veda. S. IX, 46, 4). Another scriptural passage also--'now all this was then undeveloped' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7)--shows that this, i.e. this developed world with its distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely seminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of name and form.

3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is) according to reason.

Here a new objection is raised.--If, the opponent says, in order to prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit that this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede the doctrine that the pradhâna is the cause of the world. For we Sâ@nkhyas understand by the term pradhâna nothing but that antecedent condition of the world.

Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should indeed implicitly, admit the pradhâna doctrine. What we admit is, however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the potentiality of action. The existence of such a causal potentiality renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For that causal potentiality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly denoted by the term 'undeveloped;' it has the highest Lord for its substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character.[230] This undeveloped principle is sometimes denoted by the term âkâ/s/a, ether; so, for instance, in the passage, 'In that Imperishable then, O Gârgî, the ether is woven like warp and woof' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11). Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'Higher, than the high Imperishable.' Sometimes it is spoken of as Mâyâ, illusion; so, for instance (/S/ve. Up. IV, 10), 'Know then Prak/ri/ti is Mâyâ, and the great Lord he who is affected with Mâyâ.' For Mâyâ is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not.--The statement of the Kâ/th/aka that 'the Undeveloped is beyond the Great one' is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hira/n/yagarbha. If, on the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul, the statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual soul depending on the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience. For the continued existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond the Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience, is attributed to the body which is the product of Nescience, the cause and the effect being considered as identical. Although the senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term 'the Undeveloped' here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having already been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body alone being left.--Other interpreters of the two last Sûtras give a somewhat different explanation[231].--There are, they say, two kinds of body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which is perceived; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on. (Ved. Sû. III, 1, 1.) Both these bodies together were in the simile compared to the chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i.e. just as the objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the latter depends on the objects.--But how--we ask interpreters--is it possible that the word 'Undeveloped' should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the passage under discussion)?--If you should rejoin that you are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body which is vyakta, i.e. developed or manifest; we invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determination of the sense depends on the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loathsomeness. For the passage does not by any means refer to such a distinction--as we conclude from the circumstance of there being no verb enjoining it--but has for its only subject the highest place of Vish/n/u, which had been mentioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is beyond the Person.--We might, however, accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging our general argumentation; for whichever explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the Kâ/th/aka passage does not refer to the pradhâna.

4. And (the pradhâna cannot be meant) because there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.

The Sâ@nkhyas, moreover, represent the pradhâna as something to be cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements of the pradhâna and of the soul there results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise the difference of the soul from them. And somewhere they teach that the pradhâna is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special powers.--Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge; we there meet with the mere word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage to man.--For this reason also we maintain that the word avyakta cannot denote the pradhâna.--Our interpretation, on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of knowledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Vish/n/u, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.

5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradhâna as an object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant, on account of the general subject-matter.

Here the Sâ@nkhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the averment made in the last Sûtra is not proved, since the text later on speaks of the pradhâna--which had been referred to as the Undeveloped--as an object of knowledge. 'He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. II, 3, 15). For here the text speaks of the pradhâna, which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of perception. Hence we conclude that the pradhâna is denoted by the term avyakta.

To this we reply that the passage last quoted does represent as the object of perception not the pradhâna but the intelligent, i.e. the highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the following reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage, 'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest Road;' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the passage, 'The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,' because it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the passage, 'A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and, finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sâ@nkhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhâna, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelligent Self.--The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedânta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhâna is in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.

6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhâna).